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INTRODUCTION 
Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum may be one of the world’s most 
feared and resilient warlords.  As a young man in Soviet–occupied 
Afghanistan, he rose to command thousands of Soviet–backed troops 
fighting the mujahedeen rebels.  Later, after the Soviets withdrew and as 
Afghanistan descended into chaos, he carved out and ruthlessly controlled a 
swath of territory in northern Afghanistan, forging and breaking numerous 
alliances along the way.  After a brief period of exile, he returned shortly 
after the September 11 attacks and again became a critical player in Afghan 
politics.  Frequent allegations of atrocities followed Dostum and his forces, 
including rumors that his forces executed political opponents and prisoners.1   
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In the spring of 2002, Dostum reportedly called together all ninety of his 
senior commanders and required them to listen as an aide read out loud a 
human rights report detailing abuses they had committed.  The warlord 
reminded his commanders that an international court was about to come into 
existence and that they could be prosecuted for any future transgressions.2  
It was precisely this dynamic that advocates of the International Criminal 
Court(“ICC” or “the court”) predicted would occur around the world.  They 
argued that a permanent court would deter violators in ways that 
geographically limited ad hoc criminal tribunals, such as those in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, could not.3  A standing court would present 
potential wrongdoers with the constant possibility of investigation and 
punishment.  In short, the court would prevent crime as well as punishing it.  
Since the court has become operational, influential voices have encouraged 
the court to embrace this preventive potential, and senior ICC officials have 
repeatedly proclaimed their intent to do so.4  Indeed, in June 2009, the ICC 
prosecutor appointed a special adviser to assist on prevention issues.5   
Observers are divided over whether the court can serve as an effective 
preventive mechanism.  Legal scholars have tried to predict the court’s 
preventive effect, drawing on the experience of other international tribunals, 
the ICC’s architecture, and its first years of experience.6  A political 
  
antitrust matters.  Served as a political analyst and journalist in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
as deputy director of a joint United Nations/NATO project repatriating refugees in Sarajevo. 
He would like to acknowledge advice and comments from Edgar Chen, Steve Kostas and 
Shana Wallace. 
 1. See Profile: General Rashid Dostum, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2001, 17:43 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1563344.stm. 
 2. See Ilene R. Prusher, Battling Warlords Try Civility: A Grim Human-Rights 
Report Spurred Afghan Warlords to Agree to Stop Targeting Civilians, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 9, 2002, at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Parliamentarians for Global Action, A Deterrent International Criminal 
Court—The Ultimate Objective, 
http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/deterrent%20paper%20rev%20Tokyo.pdf (quoting 
Arthur Robinson, former president of Trinidad & Tobago, arguing that, if a permanent 
tribunal had existed before violence erupted in Bosnia and Rwanda, those crises might have 
been avoided or mitigated) (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
 4. See Statement by Antoine Bernard, Int’l Fed. for Human Rights, Public Hearing 
of the Office of the Prosecutor (June 17-18, 2003). 
 5. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Juan E. Méndez as 
Special Adviser on Crime Prevention (June 19, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282009
%29/pr425.  Mendez previously served as an advisor to then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan regarding the prevention of genocide. 
 6. See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(canvassing and assessing the various studies on the ICC’s preventive impact); Julian Ku & 
Jide Nzilebe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian 
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787-90 (2006); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: 
Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); 
Major Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of 
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scientist has employed theoretical models of individual behavior to analyze 
the court’s likely deterrent effect.7  An economist has examined how 
international prosecution will affect the cost–benefit calculations of national 
leaders.8  Others have questioned whether crime prevention—and 
deterrence in particular—is an appropriate objective for the institution and 
have encouraged the court and the international community to prioritize 
other goals.9  
What has not been adequately examined is the extent to which the goal 
of prevention is actually influencing the work and decisions of the court.  
Prevention of future crimes is a natural goal for the court, but it is not the 
only one that might guide its activities.  Other goals could include achieving 
justice (regardless of the preventive effect), establishing a historical record, 
fostering reconciliation, and maintaining peace.  These goals will sometimes 
overlap and reinforce each other, but not in all cases, and the court’s own 
view of its priorities matters.     
Examining the policy goals at work in the court is particularly important 
given the wide latitude that the ICC prosecutor and the judges have in 
developing a strategy for the institution.10  The court’s statute and other key 
documents offer little guidance on policy goals or how they should be 
prioritized.  Unlike national courts, there is no expectation that the ICC will 
pursue all—or perhaps even most—of the crimes that fall under its 
jurisdiction.  As a former international prosecutor has argued, “[t]he main 
distinction between domestic enforcement of criminal law, and the 
international context, rests upon the broad discretionary power granted to 
the international Prosecutor in selecting the targets for prosecution.”11  The 
court does not have the resources to pursue all the cases over which it has 
jurisdiction.  “If only for reasons of cost and capacity,” one ICC judge 
  
Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156 (2001); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the 
Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 477 (1999). 
 7. See Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of 
the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG., 935 (2006). 
 8. See Daniel Sutter, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court, in 
23 CONFERENCES IN NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 9 (2006).  
 9. See Pablo Castillo, Rethinking Deterrence: The International Criminal Court in 
Sudan, 13 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS 167 (2007); Kenneth A. Rodman, Darfur and the 
Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 529 (2008). 
 10. For assessments of the prosecutor’s discretion and the exercise thereof, see 
William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 731 (2008) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Discretion]; 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583 (2007); Luc Côté, Reflections 
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 162 (2005); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 510 (2003). 
 11. Justice Louise Arbour, The Need for an Independent and Effective Prosecutor in 
the Permanent International Criminal Court, 17 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 207, 213 
(1999). 
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argued recently, “the Court will never be able to do more than conduct a 
few, exemplary trials.”12  
This element of discretion is enhanced by another aspect of the ICC’s 
architecture.  In national legal systems, the legislative and the executive 
branches will typically establish policy goals and metrics for the judicial 
system.  Policymakers can respond to prosecutorial decisions and court 
actions via additional legislation or regulation and thereby adjust the 
priorities of the judicial system.  There is, in effect, a dialogue between the 
branches of government that keeps courts and judges in touch with the 
policy goals and priorities of the legislative and executive branches.  
Politically appointed or elected prosecutors, in particular, will respond 
readily to the policy goals of the government and the public more broadly.   
It is not clear that this dynamic operates at the ICC.  The prosecutor serves 
one, nonrenewable nine–year term and therefore may not be particularly 
sensitive to political guidance or pressure.13  Given that the ICC has more 
than one hundred member states, the political and policy signals that it does 
receive are likely to be confused and contradictory. 
Moreover, the ICC in many respects lacks the institutional interlocutors 
that national prosecutors have.  The Assembly of States Party (ASP)—
comprised of all states that have ratified the Rome Statute—is effectively 
the legislative arm of the court.  It meets annually, elects judges and the 
prosecutor, and considers statements and resolutions.  Seven years after the 
Rome Statute entered into force, the ASP acquired the ability to amend the 
statute.14  Thus far, however, the ASP has not engaged in oversight or 
dialogue with the court in the way that a national legislature would.  The 
first ever ICC review conference, held in June 2010 in Uganda, offered a 
more developed format for dialogue between states and the court, but it 
focused largely on defining the crime of aggression rather than discussing 
the court’s methods and policy goals.15  
The UN Security Council (“Council”) might also be a potential 
communicator of policy goals to the court, but the Council’s role in court 
  
 12. Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice-President of the Int’l Criminal Court, Peace 
Through Justice? The International Criminal Court in the Hague 15 (Nov. 2, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B7BC9709-394D-4449-AA08-
4182A98C567B/281395/JudgeKaulSpeech.pdf.  
 13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 42, para. 4, July 12, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 900 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  The prosecutor’s independence was seen as a 
virtue by many of the drafters of the Rome Statute.  But political pressure may not always be 
negative, and it may contain important signals about the intention of states that should factor 
into the court’s decisions. 
 14. See Id art. 121.  A variety of amendments were considered at the Review 
Conference held in Kampala, Uganda in May/June 2010.  See ASP Working Group on 
Amendments, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=asp-wgoa (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).  
 15. See, e.g., David Scheffer, State Parties Approve New Crimes for International 
Criminal Court (ASIL Insight, Wash. D.C.), June 22, 2010. 
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operations is, by design, quite limited.16  The Council may refer cases, delay 
investigations, and expand the jurisdiction of the court to non–states parties, 
but it otherwise has no role in court decisions on which cases to pursue.  
The court’s latitude in defining its scope of activity and the absence of close 
oversight make an examination of the goals and policy considerations 
influencing the court critical.      
This Article will assess in several stages how the goal of crime 
prevention is affecting the court.  First, and briefly, it will outline the 
relevant structural elements and procedures of the court and define several 
key concepts related to prevention and deterrence.  Second, it will review 
the debates and discussions that preceded the adoption of the Rome Statute 
with an eye to what role the drafters believed the goal of prevention should 
play in the court’s operations.  Certain provisions in the Rome Statute, the 
court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
own guidelines that bear on prevention will be discussed.  
This Article’s most extensive section will survey the court’s more than 
eight years of operation to assess whether and how court personnel are 
pursuing the goal of crime prevention.  The court’s work is still in the early 
stages—no case has yet been completed—but it is possible to make an 
initial assessment.  This part of the analysis will move through the various 
stages of the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions—from preliminary 
investigation through sentencing.  This Article concludes with observations 
on whether and how the court should attempt to maximize its preventive 
impact.  It notes that discussion of prevention serves a strategic purpose for 
the court at a time when other more quantifiable achievements are limited.  
It urges the court to move beyond rhetoric to develop a comprehensive 
prevention strategy that can guide the court, particularly as the prosecutor 
decides where to focus its activities and as the court considers how to 
conduct its public outreach. 
I.  DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS 
A.  The ICC Structure and Role 
The ICC was designed as a court of last resort that would prosecute those 
responsible for certain serious crimes when national jurisdictions proved 
unwilling or unable to do so.  This “complementarity” regime means that 
the ICC seeks to work together with national judicial systems to investigate 
and prosecute the crimes listed in the Rome Statute and only launches 
  
 16. The Security Council’s role in the court’s operations was one of the most divisive 
issues during the negotiations that led to the Rome Statute. For an examination of this debate, 
see William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All 
About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701 (2004). 
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prosecutions of its own when national courts cannot or will not.17  (Indeed, 
the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno–Ocampo, has argued on several occasions 
that the court could be a success without holding trials, so long as it 
encourages national court systems to prosecute offenders.)18  
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
aggression, and certain war crimes committed on the territory of a state 
party or by an individual who is a citizen of an ICC member state.  The 
court’s Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence defined all these 
crimes, with the exception of aggression.19  That crime has been the subject 
of considerable debate and controversy.  The 2010 Review Conference 
reached agreement on a definition of the crime of aggression but also 
determined that the court would not acquire jurisdiction until a two–thirds 
vote by the Assembly of States Parties sometime after January 2017.20  The 
UN Security Council may expand the jurisdiction of the court through a 
resolution under its Chapter VII powers and has done so in the case of 
Sudan, which is not a state party.21 
The court has three principal components: the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP), the judicial divisions (including pre–trial, trial, and appeals 
chambers), and the Registry, which is responsible for the non–judicial 
administration of the court, including certain outreach and informational 
activities.  A president of the court is selected from among the judges and is 
responsible for the judicial administration of the court.  The ICC also has 
several smaller components, including offices of public counsel for victims 
and for the defense. 
The task of identifying and investigating crimes falls to the OTP.  States 
parties and the Security Council may refer cases, but in all situations the 
final decision to pursue cases falls to the prosecutor.  He or she may also 
  
 17. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 17, para. 1(a). 
 18. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Statement 
made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l 
Criminal Court 3 (June 16, 2003), http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D7572226-264A-4B6B-
85E3-2673648B4896/143585/030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor’s most recent strategy document reiterates the point, noting that “the number of 
cases that reach the Court is not a positive measure of effectiveness.” Int’l Criminal Court 
[ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, para. 79 (Feb. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012]. 
 19. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Aggression, Legitimacy, and the International 
Criminal Court, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2009); Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for 
the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2001-2001). 
 20. Scheffer, supra note 15. 
 21. S.C. Res 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  For commentary on the 
referral, see John E. Tanagho & John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds 
To Darfur: ICC Prosecution Renews Hope for International Justice, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. 
REV. 367, 386 (2009); Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council's Referral of the Crimes in 
Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: 
Implications for the International Criminal Court's Functions and Status,  24 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 650 (2006). 
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initiate cases that have not been referred; in this respect, the prosecutor has 
proprio motu powers.22  The prosecutor’s discretion is significantly limited, 
however, by the pre–trial chamber, composed of three judges.  This 
chamber must determine that there is a “reasonable basis” for opening 
formal investigations and must review requests to issue indictments, 
summons, and arrest warrants.23  Decisions of the pre–trial and trial 
chambers can be reviewed by an appeals chamber.  Upon determination of 
guilt, the trial chamber issues a sentencing decision, which may also be 
appealed.24 
The ICC has no independent enforcement powers.  It is entirely 
dependent on the ability and willingness of states to provide resources, 
cooperate with the court’s requests for information and, ultimately, enforce 
arrest warrants.  States parties to the Rome Statute are under an obligation 
to assist the court, and the Security Council may also create legal 
obligations to assist the court and enforce its decisions. 
B. Deterrence and Prevention 
The goals and purposes of criminal law have been widely debated, but 
there is general acceptance that processes of investigation and punishment 
have both backward–looking and forward–facing elements.25  The 
prevention of future crimes—the focus of this article—is only one of several 
purposes that a system of punishment may have.  Retribution, in effect, a 
structured and controlled system of vengeance, is a powerful alternative 
purpose.26  Rehabilitation may also be an alternative purpose that seeks to 
convert offenders into responsible citizens.  Although rehabilitation can 
have preventive effects, its advocates often see it primarily as a matter of 
individual rights and basic humanity.27  
When discussion does turn explicitly to crime prevention, the concept of 
deterrence often dominates, and it has done so in the context of the ICC.   
  
 22. Early drafts of a statute for the court denied the prosecutor this power. See 
William Schabas, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 120 (2001). 
 23. Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 57-58. 
 24. Id. at arts. 76, 84. 
 25. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: 
A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. R. 1 
(2003). 
 26. Retribution has moved in and out of favor as a purpose of punishment but has 
never disappeared.  See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313 
(2000); See generally Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution—An Examination 
of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781. 
 27. See, e.g., Ramsey Clark, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, 
CAUSES, PREVENTION, AND CONTROL 220 (1970) (arguing first that rehabilitation is a form of 
“individual salvation,” but also that it is “the one clear way that criminal justice processes 
can significantly reduce crime.”).  
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Indeed, one delegate at the Rome Conference in 1998 made the concepts of 
deterrence and prevention almost one and the same.  “A particular 
advantage [of the ICC] would be its preventive role,” he argued, “through 
its deterrent effect on potential criminals, thereby strengthening efforts to 
maintain peace and stability in the world.”28  As will be discussed below, 
deterrence does not remotely exhaust the subject of prevention, but it is a 
critical component.  
1. Deterrence 
The literature on deterrence and criminal law is vast, although most of it 
approaches the issue from the perspective of national legal systems.  Legal 
scholars, criminologists, philosophers, sociologists, and economists have all 
explored the concept.  In part because of the volume of contributions on the 
issue, terminology has varied considerably.29  For the purposes of this 
Article, the following concepts will be used.  General deterrence refers to 
the discouragement of criminal activity through fear of punishment among 
the general public—i.e., those who have not been legally punished.  The 
ICC hopes to deter the crimes it has jurisdiction to prosecute, namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes.  As an 
international institution, the ICC’s general deterrent effect should reach 
around the globe, and at the very least to the populations of countries that 
are members of the court.30   
Specific deterrence refers to the discouragement of subsequent criminal 
activity by those who have been punished.  The concept is of limited 
relevance to an enterprise like the ICC.  As James Alexander has argued, 
“[o]ne struggles to name any historical occurrence in which an individual 
has been convicted of a crime like genocide by an international tribunal, 
served time, was released, and then found himself or herself in a second 
situation in which he or she might again commit genocide.”31  Instead, this 
article uses the term targeted deterrence to refer to attempts by the court to 
deter specific individuals or groups within a society.32  The court could 
pursue targeted deterrence in several ways.  First, the court may seek to 
  
 28. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 4th plen. mtg. ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 
1998) (comment by Mr. Michalek, Austria).   
 29. See Jack P. Gibbs, Deterrence Theory and Research, in THE LAW AS A 
BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 87, 87-88 (Gary B. Melton, ed., 1986) [hereinafter Deterrence 
Theory]. 
 30. While 114 countries are now states parties, many of the world’s most populous 
countries have not joined the court. The United States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Egypt among others remain outside the system. Together, 
non-states parties account for approximately 70 percent of world population. 
 31. Alexander, supra note 6, at 22. 
 32. The concept has been used sparingly in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Tom R. 
Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness, 81 B.U.L. REV. 361, 396 (2001). 
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deter selected individuals from continued criminal activity by issuing arrest 
warrants or summons.  In so doing, the court might not expect that the 
individuals would be detained but may hope that a warrant or summons 
would nonetheless deter them from further criminal conduct.  This scenario 
is particularly relevant for the ICC, which has already created a small pool 
of indicted but still at–large individuals.33  Targeted deterrence may also 
take a somewhat broader form.  The court might seek to prevent a particular 
violent scenario from occurring through public statements and warnings 
directed at political or ethnic leaders.  For example, if the context of a 
previous round of violence and atrocities was a disputed election, the court 
might seek to prevent a recurrence of that violence during the next round of 
elections.   
At certain points, this article also discusses the concept of restrictive 
deterrence, which refers to the minimization—rather than the 
abandonment—of criminal activity.  Restrictive deterrence has occurred 
“when, to diminish the risk or severity of a legal punishment, a potential 
offender engages in some action that has the effect of reducing his or her 
commissions of a crime.”34  A warlord or militia commander who, in an 
effort to avoid the ICC’s attentions, instructs his forces to avoid large–scale 
massacres while continuing to commit certain war crimes covered by the 
Rome Statute (e.g., the recruitment of child soldiers) would demonstrate the 
effects of restrictive deterrence.    
2.  Prevention 
A law enforcement system can discourage criminal activity through 
means other than fear of punishment, and this broader concept of prevention 
must also be examined.  Punishment can incapacitate offenders and thus 
render these individuals unable to commit new crimes.35  If punishment 
satisfies the retributive desires of those affected by a crime, the system may 
prevent crimes motivated by the desire for revenge.  Individualization of 
guilt can facilitate group reconciliation and help prevent violent reprisals.36  
As Johannes Andenaes has argued, public awareness of potential 
punishment for certain activity can have an educative effect that generates 
  
 33. Prominent indicted individuals still at large include Sudanese president Omar Al-
Bashir, Lord’s Resistance Army commander Joseph Kony, and Congolese warlord Bosco 
Ntganda. 
 34. Deterrence Theory, supra note 29, at 89. 
 35. See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 58-60 (1975) 
[hereinafter CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE]. 
 36. See Catherine Lu, The ICC as an Institution of Moral Regeneration, in BRINGING 
POWER TO JUSTICE? THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 191, 199 
(2006).  But see David Wippman, Exaggerating the ICC, in BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE?, 
supra, at 99, 120 (arguing that “members of politically polarized ethnic communities are at 
least as likely to interpret prosecutions in ways that confirm existing biases as they are to see 
them as neutral confirmations of individual rather than collective guilt.”). 
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moral disapprobation of the activity in question and consequently reduces 
the occurrence of that activity.  It may be the disapprobation, rather than the 
threat of punishment, that reduces the occurrence of the proscribed 
activity.37  Other scholars contend that a system of punishment can validate 
and strengthen existing norms against proscribed behavior, habituate lawful 
conduct, and limit the normative influence of perpetrators, thus 
discouraging imitation.38  In this realm, the ICC’s lack of effective 
enforcement power—so often cited as a critical weakness—may not be 
debilitating.39  According to Catherine Lu, “the moral authority of the ICC 
is not necessarily undermined by its political weakness; the lack of 
endorsement by the world’s most powerful states may even boost its moral 
legitimacy.”40 
II. PREVENTION AND THE ROME STATUTE 
The language of deterrence was ubiquitous at the Rome Conference in 
the summer of 1998 as national delegates—supported and prodded by a 
variety of nongovernmental organizations—negotiated the terms of the new 
court.  A succession of diplomats expressed the view that the court’s 
existence would deter serious violations of humanitarian law.41  Canada’s 
  
 37. JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 35-36 (1974).  
 38. See Deterrence Theory, supra note 29, at 87-93. 
 39. For notable criticisms of the court on enforcement grounds see, for example, Jack 
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92 
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 40. Lu, supra note 36, at 203. 
 41. Representative examples include statements by the South Korean representative 
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of an International Criminal Court, 2nd plen. mtg. ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) 
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international criminal court empowered to prosecute and convict persons responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes would not only overcome the 
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Criminal Court, 3rd plen. mtg. ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); the 
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Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 4th plen. mtg. ¶ 
31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); and the delegate from Bahrain (“the 
purpose of establishing an international criminal court was to act as a deterrent against the 
commission of war crimes during armed conflict.”), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
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delegate, for example, insisted that “an independent and effective 
international criminal court would help to deter some of the most serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”42  An international criminal 
court, predicted one advocacy group, would be “a veritable sword of 
Damocles hanging over the head of all warlords and their henchmen.”43     
Deterrence was also discussed in a variety of more specific contexts 
during the negotiations.  Several delegates argued that it could not be 
achieved absent a careful and precise definition of the crimes under the 
court’s jurisdiction.44  Other delegates argued that appropriately severe 
punishment, including the death penalty, would be necessary to create an 
effective deterrent.45  Singapore’s delegate expressed concern that the 
absence of this punishment would reduce the court’s impact, “especially in 
parts of the world where the deprivation of liberty was not an adequate 
deterrent.”46 
The court’s anticipated deterrent function was a particular concern 
during debate on the role of the UN Security Council in the court’s 
operations.  The U.S. delegation advocated requiring a decision of the 
Security Council to initiate an investigation.  U.S. officials stated that 
international criminal justice could only be successful with the support of 
the powerful countries on the Council.  U.S. delegate David Scheffer argued 
that “because the [Security] Council alone among international institutions 
exercises police powers, the design of the court must take into account the 
proper role of the Council.”47  This suggestion that the Security Council 
should  have a central role was vociferously opposed by the “like–minded” 
states—a group that had emerged as the strongest advocate of an 
independent court—and by most of the NGOs involved in the process, who 
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argued that such a structure would dramatically reduce the court’s deterrent 
impact.  The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights warned that a large 
Security Council role would politicize the court’s operations and insisted 
that the court be “bound by legal considerations only if the Court is to play a 
meaningful role in the prevention and punishment of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”48  
Other preventive theories were discussed during the negotiations, 
although far less frequently.  Several delegates, for example, predicted that 
the court would improve chances for reconciliation by offering redress 
through law and thereby preventing cycles of violence.49  But, in general, 
deterrence displaced discussion of broader preventive theories, including 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, education, stigmatization, and moral pressure. 
When the statute was completed, some observers expressed certainty that 
the court’s mere existence would prevent crimes.  William Pace, head of the 
influential Coalition for an International Criminal Court, predicted 
significant results: 
The ICC will deter; the ICC will prevent; the ICC will cause the greatest 
strengthening ever of national legal systems prosecution of crimes against 
humanity.  The ICC will save millions of humans from suffering 
unspeakably horrible and inhumane death in the coming decades.  This is 
an incredible achievement.  This will be part of the legacy of this night.50 
The final text of the Rome Statute itself is considerably less expansive 
than its advocates on the court’s preventive function.  The Statute’s 
preamble provides that the signatories are “determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes.”51  The phrasing suggests that prevention will be 
a consequence of the court’s activities rather than a conscious goal; ending 
impunity will prevent future crimes, but the court’s actual role is 
prosecution.  
The only other explicit reference to deterrence or prevention as a policy 
goal in the statute comes in Article 58(c)(3), which grants the pre–trial 
  
 48. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Accountability of an Ex Officio 
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 51. Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl. 
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chamber the authority to issue an arrest warrant or summons to appear in 
order to, among other reasons, “prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction 
of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.”52  This article 
appears to aim at an incapacitation effect rather than a deterrent one.  The 
presumed intent is to physically remove the individual from the conflict 
zone rather than to deter him through the threat of punishment.  However, it 
is possible that a targeted deterrent effect was intended as well.  It was 
known to the drafters that the court would have no enforcement arm, and 
they likely considered the possibility that a warrant issued under Article 
58(c)(3) would go unenforced.  In that situation, they may have nonetheless 
hoped that the existence of an arrest warrant would lead the individual in 
question to modify his behavior, perhaps in anticipation of an eventual trial 
or out of a desire to demonstrate to observers “clean hands.”    
The ICC’s drafting history indicates a strong desire on the part of many 
drafters to create an institution that would deter and prevent future crimes.  
But the Rome Statute and the subsequently adopted Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence offer little guidance on whether and how the court should seek to 
maximize that effect.  The court’s prosecutor, judges, and administrators are 
now in the process of exploring the court’s preventive potential. 
III. THE COURT IN OPERATION 
The court is now in its eighth year of operation and has active cases at 
several different stages.  As of late 2010, the court was conducting five 
formal investigations, had indicted thirteen individuals, and initiated three 
trials.  At least another nine situations were being monitored by the court.  
The court’s pre–trial chambers and appeals chamber have ruled on several 
different aspects of the court’s operations, primarily on questions related to 
opening investigations, the standards for issuing arrest warrants, and 
victims’ rights and participation.53  It is possible to make an initial 
assessment of whether and how the goal of prevention is influencing the 
court’s deliberations and operations, although certain relevant information-- 
most importantly, the deliberations of the court’s senior leadership--is not 
available.  More than most courts, however, the ICC has attempted to 
explain its reasoning and strategy through press statements, published 
papers, and speeches.  As representatives of a new and fragile institution, 
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ICC officials feel an obligation to explain their actions and educate a variety 
of audiences about the court’s operations. 
In these public statements, prevention is a recurring theme.  Indeed, the 
ICC prosecutor and other senior court officials have claimed on several 
occasions that the court has already had a notable preventive effect.   The 
cases it has pursued on child soldiers in Africa, it is claimed, have had an 
impact in Colombia and Sri Lanka.54  Crimes by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in northern Uganda “have dramatically decreased” as a result of the 
ICC indictment and the group’s recruitment efforts “dried up almost 
instantly” after the indictments.55  The prosecutor himself has contended 
that the Russian armed forces “[tried] to take the Rome Statute into 
consideration when it planned its military campaign in Georgia.”56  More 
broadly, he has argued that “armies all over the world, even those of non–
States Parties, are adjusting their standards and rules of engagement to the 
Rome Statute.  This is the way to prevent crimes.”57  
The prosecutor has pointed to even more specific instances in which the 
court served as an effective deterrent.  Before one audience, he argued that 
the Rome Statute was influencing the battlefield decisions of individual 
combatants: “In 2003 an Australian military pilot conducting operations in 
Iraq realized that if he executed the order received, he could be prosecuted 
in accordance with the Rome Statute.  He returned to his base without 
dropping the bombs.”58 
Observers outside the court have also identified situations in which they 
believe the court’s activities, or at least awareness of the court, has 
prevented crimes.   
After a coup attempt in the Central African Republic, the 
nongovernmental International Federation of Human Rights made a 
widely publicized call for ICC involvement.  The Federation claims that 
the public discussion of an ICC role reduced tension notably in the country 
and may have prevented further atrocities.59  
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It has been reported that the content of government statements in Cote 
d’Ivoire changed after a senior UN official stated that ethnic violence 
might fall under the jurisdiction of the court.  Statements that had been 
aggressive turned more conciliatory.60 
Human Rights Watch researchers have recounted being told certain 
militia commanders in eastern Congo are desperate to avoid being sent to 
[T]he Hague.61  
These claims are anecdotal and there is little empirical research yet on 
whether the ICC has played a preventive role.  Indeed, research on the 
preventive impact of international justice mechanisms in general is limited 
and inconclusive.62  That senior ICC officials have frequently commented 
on the court’s preventive function does not necessarily imply that the court 
is structuring its activity to produce that effect, but it does at least suggest 
that court officials value prevention and see it as a critical indicator of the 
court’s effectiveness.  As the court’s president stated recently: “If only one 
warlord has decided to release his child soldiers, then the ICC can already 
be deemed a success.”63  
The frequent references to the court’s preventive effect may therefore 
serve a pragmatic function.  In the absence of convictions, and faced with 
significant numbers of indictees at large, court officials need some method 
of demonstrating the court’s effectiveness to the public, member states, and 
important non–signatory states.  The prosecutor’s special adviser on 
prevention, Juan Mendez, has suggested that prevention serves as a 
convenient response to criticisms of the ICC.64 
A.  Preliminary Examination 
In advance of a formal investigation, the OTP reviews situations to 
determine whether crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the court have 
been or are being committed.  Information and complaints from individuals 
and organizations outside the court—of which there have been several 
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thousand—are reviewed by the prosecutor and his staff.65  A state party or 
Security Council referral will also lead to a preliminary examination.66 
The prosecutor’s discretion is broad during this phase of the court’s 
work.  Neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
offer the prosecutor any significant guidance on how to conduct preliminary 
examinations, although they do make clear that the prosecutor may seek 
additional information and may take oral or written testimony during this 
phase.67  The prosecutor may monitor a situation without any input from a 
pre–trial chamber and without any temporal limitation.  Perhaps because of 
this leeway, the OTP has sought to use this phase assertively for the 
purposes of prevention.   
Publicity surrounding a preliminary examination has proved to be a key 
tool.  Certain court documents suggest that the process of pre–investigation 
will normally be conducted without publicity and without public statements, 
noting that “[g]enerally, work in a situation does not become public 
knowledge until the Office opens an investigation.”68  The court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence require the prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness 
of information received” but they do not specify whether this is to be done 
publicly.69  The OTP’s own regulations provide only that “the Prosecutor 
may decide to make public the Office’s activities in relation to the 
preliminary examination of information . . . .”70   
During the court’s several years of operation, however, preliminary 
investigations have regularly become public.  In some cases, preliminary 
investigations appear to have had a notable impact on domestic politics as 
well as on international mediation efforts.  In Kenya, for example, the ICC’s 
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prolonged monitoring occasioned significant national debate and influenced 
the work of lead international mediator Kofi Annan.71  The prosecutor’s 
office has embraced the attention that its preliminary investigations receive.   
Even in the absence of a formal requirement, the OTP now routinely reports 
on situations it is monitoring.  As the deputy prosecutor stated, “the Office 
has developed the practice of being as transparent as possible so the 
international community and our partners will know whether there are 
situations which may require investigations to be carried out.”72  In public 
documents, the OTP has stressed the benefits that awareness of ICC 
scrutiny can have:   
[T]he announcement of ICC activities can have a preventive impact.  The 
mere monitoring of a situation can deter future crimes.  It increases the 
risk of punishment even before trials begin.  This effect is not limited to 
the situation under investigation but extends to all State Parties and 
reverberates worldwide.73 
In places like Colombia, the prosecutor has argued, scrutiny itself is 
salutary.  “Because we are there watching, they have to do everything 
perfectly . . . ,” Moreno-Ocampo said.  “Colombia shows how important it 
is to have this back–up system.”74  In 2008, the prosecutor announced that 
his office was examining the conduct of Taliban and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan.  At times, he appeared inclined to use that examination as a 
mechanism for encouraging forward–looking preventive mechanisms.  In 
discussing the inquiry, for example, the prosecutor emphasized policies 
such as appropriate education for the new Afghan armed forces.  “That is 
the most important [thing] because these massive atrocities are planned.  So 
if those who are planning know they will be prosecuted, they will do 
something different.”75  
During certain of its preliminary investigations, the OTP has focused on 
quite specific preventive goals.  The 2008 post–election violence in Kenya 
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was the subject of a preliminary examination for several months before the 
prosecutor sought permission to open a formal investigation in November 
2009.76  During that period, the prosecutor visited Kenya and made 
numerous public statements about the situation.  He pledged that “[w]e will 
do justice, we will work together to avoid a repetition of the crimes . . . . It 
has been two years since the post election violence in Kenya.  In two years 
another election is planned.  The world is watching Kenya and this Court.”77  
He later stressed that the court would try to proceed on a timetable that 
could maximize the chances for prevention.  “Everyone is worried about the 
next election in Kenya in 2012,” he told the press.  “That’s why I 
understand the importance of speed, and I am working to be sure that during 
2010—if the judges authorize investigations—we will be able to complete 
investigations and to define who are the suspects, who are the accused, that 
have to have justice in Kenya. And that will clean the situation [so] that 
you can have peaceful election [seasons] in 2011 and 2012.”78 
In situations where conflict has broken out abruptly, the OTP has 
signaled to combatants that it is scrutinizing events, a clear attempt to use its 
influence to alter the conduct of hostilities.  When fighting erupted between 
Georgian and Russian forces in August 2008, the court released a statement 
indicating that it was analyzing alleged crimes committed during combat 
operations.  The prosecutor also reportedly met with Russian and Georgian 
officials about possible violations committed.79  In other cases, the 
prosecutor has commented on specific incidents in ongoing conflicts.  Just 
two days after a massacre at a refugee camp in Uganda, the prosecutor 
released a statement indicating his intent to investigate, which could be seen 
as an effort to assure the affected Ugandan communities that revenge 
attacks were unnecessary and to thereby help prevent a spiral of violence.80 
When violence broke out in Cote d’Ivoire after a disputed election, the 
  
 76. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Press 
Conference by the ICC Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Nov. 26, 2009),  
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Situation, OTP WEEKLY BRIEFING, No. 15 (Office of the Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal 
Court, The Hague), Nov. 24-30, at 1. 
 78. Voice of America News, ICC Prosecutor Promises Speed in Kenya Proceedings 
(Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-11-07-
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 79. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Confirms Situation in 
Georgia Under Analysis (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282008
%29/icc%20prosecutor%20confirms%20situation%20in%20georgia%20under%20analysis. 
 80. See Press Release, ICC, Statement by the Prosecutor Related to Crimes 
Committed in Barlonya Camp in Uganda (Feb. 23, 2004), http://www.icc-
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prosecutor publicly warned one individual that his incitements to violence 
might be prosecuted.81 
Further, the OTP has incorporated into its latest strategy document the 
goal of prevention through public monitoring.  It states that the office will 
“make preventive statements noting that crimes possibly falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are being committed . . . [and] make public the 
commencement of a preliminary examination at the earliest possible stage 
through press releases and public statements.”82  The prosecutor has also 
expressed his intent to catalogue and assess the preventive impact of these 
activities, although he has not offered a methodology for doing so.  
Public awareness of ICC monitoring could have important benefits in 
this respect.  In particular, the prosecutor can employ monitoring as a form 
of targeted deterrence in situations where it appears that a recurrence of 
crimes is likely, as is the case in Kenya.  ICC scrutiny may lead combatants 
and political leaders to modify their future behavior in an attempt to 
discourage the prosecutor from seeking a formal investigation or to 
minimize the chances that they will be indicted.  At the same time, it may 
create pressure for national judicial proceedings and the possible 
incarceration of those responsible for crimes.  The prosecutor has, at various 
times, advanced the idea of “positive complementarity”—the notion that the 
court should actively encourage and assist states to conduct their own 
prosecutions and assist them in doing so.83  ICC involvement may serve as 
an effective means of “catalyz[ing] political will toward prosecution in 
situations under analysis.”84   
In theory, the OTP’s choice to highlight and publicize the court’s 
preliminary investigations could create complications for the methodical 
building of a case against perpetrators.  A high degree of publicity about 
prosecutorial activities might lead perpetrators to cover up evidence, destroy 
documentation, and intimidate potential witnesses, steps which could 
complicate construction of a case for trial.  Publicity may also complicate 
the ultimate enforcement of any warrants, as individuals who expect to be 
investigated may go into hiding or make preparations to do so.  It is for this 
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reason that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) often kept indictments secret until they could be enforced.85  
However, these complications might be unavoidable.  It is not clear that the 
OTP could keep a preliminary examination quiet even if it wanted to.  For 
example, news that the prosecutor was examining crimes committed in 
Colombia became public in March 2005 when Colombian lawmakers 
released a letter from Moreno–Ocampo requesting information on alleged 
crimes.86  Given this reality, the OTP has sought to extract as much 
preventive value from preliminary examinations as possible. 
B. Formal Investigations and Indictments 
The Rome Statute provides for increasing judicial oversight of the 
prosecutor when he seeks to begin a formal investigation or to issue 
summons or arrest warrants.  The pre–trial chamber assigned to the case 
must approve of major decisions by the prosecutor.  Even at this stage, 
however, the Rome Statute asks the prosecutor to use his discretion in 
certain limited but important ways.  In contrast to the preliminary 
investigation phase, the prosecutor has at several points resisted the idea of 
using formal investigations for preventive purposes or of requiring an 
assessment of the preventive effects of its formal steps.  
1. Abstention as Prevention  
The simplest way in which the court might factor prevention into its 
calculus at this stage is by deciding that formal investigation and indictment 
risk inciting additional crimes and therefore choosing not to pursue them.  
The possibility that ICC involvement would itself be the cause of violations 
has been raised as a theoretical possibility by observers and critics.  The 
argument has taken several forms.  A court investigation or indictment of a 
prominent politician or commander might spark a violent backlash by 
supporters.  An existing indictment might make an accused leader more 
committed to staying in power, including through the use of violent 
repression and atrocities.    
It did not take long for the issue to present itself as more than an abstract 
possibility.  One of the court’s earliest formal investigations was the 
situation in Uganda, which was referred to the court by the Ugandan 
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government.87  The referral specifically referenced the activities of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, led by Joseph Kony.  The court’s involvement in 
Uganda soon sparked a vigorous debate about the likely impact of the 
investigation on prospects for negotiation and reconciliation.  At one point, 
a delegation of senior Ugandan civil society representatives appealed to the 
prosecutor to drop the case.  In essence, their argument was that the ICC’s 
most important contribution to preventing future atrocities would be 
discontinuing its investigation.88  The prosecutor met with the elders and 
promised to take work cooperatively.89  He pointedly declined to offer 
immunity or end the investigation although he did express a willingness to 
consider delaying the investigation if he was convinced that it was not 
serving the interests of justice.90   
Should the prosecutor decide to adopt that line of reasoning, the Rome 
Statute provides him with a mechanism to decline a formal investigation as 
a matter of discretion even when the admissibility requirements are met.  
Article 53(1)(c) provides that the prosecutor may decline to open an 
investigation when “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice.”91  In September 2007, the OTP 
produced a policy paper on this provision in an effort to clarify how it might 
be used.92  It stated that use of the “interests of justice” provision would be 
  
 87. The referral, and the prosecutor’s announcement of it, was controversial from its 
first moments. Moreno-Ocampo appeared together with Ugandan president Yoweri 
Museveni at a press conference to announce the referral, a move that many human rights 
groups saw as linking the court too closely to the Ugandan government, which is accused of 
committing many of its own crimes. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, ICC: 
Investigate All Sides in Uganda—Chance for Impartial ICC Investigation into Serious 
Crimes a Welcome Step (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/02/04/icc-
investigate-all-sides-uganda (warning that “the ICC prosecutor cannot ignore the crimes that 
Ugandan government troops allegedly have committed”).  For an analysis of the referral’s 
impact, see Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the 
First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 403 (2005). 
 88. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
201-04 (2008). 
 89. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Joint Statement by ICC Chief Prosecutor 
and the visiting Delegation of Lango, Acholi, Iteso and Madi Community Leaders from 
Northern Uganda (Apr. 16, 2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/joint%20statement%20by
%20icc%20chief%20prosecutor%20and%20the%20visiting%20delegation%20of%20lango
%20acholi%20iteso%20and%20madi%20c. 
 90. See SCHIFF, supra note 87, at 204. 
 91. See, e.g., Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International 
Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209, 246-
52 (2008) (surveying interpretations of the provision in the context of the Uganda 
investigation); Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 596-97; Henry Lovat, Delineating the Interests 
of Justice, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (2007). 
 92. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (Sept. 
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf. 
184 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
exceptional.93  The OTP noted that Article 53 essentially requires a 
balancing test, and it acknowledged that alternative justice processes (i.e., 
truth commissions) and the existence of peace and reconciliation efforts 
might be relevant to this balancing.  But the OTP pointed out that the 
Security Council has the power to delay proceedings and insisted that 
questions of peace and security are not its responsibility.94  This 
interpretation makes it unlikely that the court will explicitly decline 
jurisdiction based on the possibility that its involvement could prolong 
conflict and thus encourage, rather than prevent, future atrocities, although 
this possibility may of course factor into the prosecutor’s decision about 
whether to seek a formal investigation in the first place. 
As an empirical matter, the OTP has appeared to cast doubt on the idea 
that pursuing justice can threaten peace processes or worsen violence.  In a 
paper released during the Kampala Review Conference, the prosecutor’s 
special adviser on prevention argued forcefully that none of the ICC’s cases 
to date suggest that justice efforts have hampered peace processes.  He 
presented evidence that indictments in Sudan, in particular, galvanized 
rather than complicated diplomatic efforts.  “Efforts to bring President Al 
Bashir to justice did not hamper peace,” he asserted, “they may well have 
had a decisive role in fostering it.”95  The paper essentially argued that the 
oft–discussed tension between justice and peace does not exist.  If this 
reflects the thinking within the OTP, it is very unlikely that the prosecutor 
will pursue prevention by staying his hand.      
2.  A Deterrence Test?  The “Gravity Requirement” 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which addresses issues of admissibility, 
sets out several situations in which cases will be inadmissible.  At both the 
stage of initiating formal investigations and at the stage of issuing warrants 
or filing charges, the pre–trial chamber must ensure that situations and cases 
meet these requirements.96  This process of review has occasioned explicit 
discussion about the court’s preventive function.   
Subsections 1(a) and 1(b) together exclude those cases that are being or 
have been genuinely investigated by competent national authorities: these 
provisions effectuate the court’s well–known complementarity requirement 
and were debated at length during the Rome Conference.97  Subsection 1(c) 
declares inadmissible cases in which the person concerned has already been 
tried.  Subsection 1(d) provides a distinct test: It provides that a case will be 
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 95. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31- June 11, 
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inadmissible if it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.” 98  This provision appears potentially redundant, given that Articles 
5, 7 and 8 of the Statute emphasize that the court should consider crimes 
that are large–scale or systematic, and define certain crimes accordingly.99  
The Rome Statute’s drafting history does not provide clear guidance on 
the precise purpose of this separate Article 17 gravity requirement, and the 
concept of gravity is not defined in the Statute or in the court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  Indeed, as William Schabas has argued, “the issue 
of gravity was virtually ignored in the negotiations of the Rome Statute, and 
did not manifest itself as an important question until well after the Court had 
begun to operate.”100  The provision first appeared during proceedings of the 
International Law Commission, which produced an early draft treaty, and 
was apparently intended as a mechanism for allowing the court to manage 
its caseload and prevent it from being overburdened with minor cases.  The 
provision remained in subsequent drafts even as the definition of the crimes 
under the court’s jurisdiction was altered to include only the most serious.101  
In reviewing the prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants for Congolese 
militia leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and his deputy, Bosco Ntaganda, the 
pre–trial chamber (“PTC”) examined in some depth the meaning of this 
“gravity” threshold for admissibility.102  The chamber noted that the 
provision is separate from the gravity considerations included in the 
selection of the crimes under Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute and should 
consequently be analyzed as a distinct requirement.  Moreover, the judges 
held that the court has no choice but to assess whether a case meets the 
gravity requirement.  “The Statute leaves the Chamber no discretion as to 
the declaration of the inadmissibility of a case once it is satisfied that the 
case ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’”103  
The PTC also determined that the hurdle provided by the provision must be 
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cleared twice: once when an investigation is initiated and again when a case 
is brought.104  
On the substance of the gravity requirement, the chamber found that (1) 
the conduct in question must be either systematic or large–scale; and (2) 
that “due consideration must be given to the social alarm such conduct may 
have caused in the international community.”105  Drawing on the reference 
to prevention in the Rome Statute’s preamble, the chamber concluded that 
17(1)(d) required that prosecutions only be initiated against those senior 
leaders who have committed systematic or large–scale crimes.  At the root 
of this reasoning was the view that deterrence was a principal objective of 
the court, and that the gravity requirement is “a key tool provided by the 
drafters to maximize the Court’s deterrent effect.”106  The chamber reasoned 
that “only by concentrating on this type of individual can the deterrence 
effects of the activities of the Court be maximized because other senior 
leaders in similar circumstances will know that solely by doing what they 
can to prevent the systematic or large–scale commission of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court can they be sure that they will not be 
prosecuted by the Court.”107 
The chamber found further support for its reasoning in the principles and 
rules of international law.  Specifically, it cited UN Security Council 
resolutions calling on the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), as part of their completion strategy, to concentrate on 
“the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes . . . 
.”108  For the judges, the fact that the ICC is a permanent rather than an ad 
hoc institution heightened the importance of “ensuring the effectiveness of 
the Court in carrying out its deterrence function and maximizing the 
deterrence effect of its activities.”109  On the facts presented to it, the 
chamber found that the case against Lubanga met this test but that the case 
against Ntaganda did not.  According to the judges, not enough evidence 
was presented that Ntaganda, as the third in command of the militia, “was a 
core actor in the decision–making.”110  The case against him was 
accordingly declared inadmissible.111 
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The substance of the chamber’s ruling aside, the decision was an 
important signal that the judges were inclined to play an active role in 
supervising the OTP’s work and that they would not hesitate to express 
themselves on prosecutorial strategy and policy goals.  Indeed, the chamber 
appeared eager to begin filling in the interstices of the Rome Statute and to 
provide principles that would guide the court in its choice of cases and 
prosecutions.   
Several months after the PTC issued its decision, the court’s appeals 
chamber rejected this reading of the gravity requirement.112  In reviewing 
the refusal to grant the arrest warrant, the appeals chamber found that the 
pre–trial chamber had erroneously created an additional requirement at the 
admissibility stage that conduct in question must be “systematic or large–
scale.”113  The appeals chamber reasoned that such a requirement would 
render meaningless other provisions of the Rome Statute.114  The judges also 
found no support for the “social alarm” test set forth by the pre–trial 
chamber, and it directly questioned the pre–trial chamber’s reasoning on 
deterrence.  In particular, it argued that excluding cases against all lower–
level perpetrators might actually weaken the deterrent effect of the court.   
“It seems more logical to assume that the deterrent effect of the Court is 
highest if no category of perpetrators is per se excluded from potentially 
being brought before the Court.”115  The appeals chamber also expanded on 
the issue of the Court’s broader preventive function: 
The imposition of rigid standards primarily based on top seniority may 
result in neither retribution nor prevention being achieved.  Also, the 
capacity of individuals to prevent crimes in the field should not be 
implicitly or inadvertently assimilated to the preventive role of the Court 
more generally.  Whether prevention is interpreted as a long–term 
objective, i.e. the overall result of the Court’s activities generally, or as a 
factor in a specific situation, the preventive role of the Court may depend 
on many factors, much broader than the capacity of the individual to 
prevent crimes.116 
On the broad issue of the court’s preventive function, the appeals 
chamber here showed itself to be essentially agnostic on whether prevention 
should be conceived of as a byproduct of the court’s activity or whether it 
should factor into the court’s decision-making.  While the appeals chamber 
rejected the pre–trial chamber’s reasoning, it did not exclude the possibility 
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that the concept of gravity might still involve consideration of the deterrent 
impact of an investigation or case.  It appears unlikely that 17(1)(d) will 
ultimately be interpreted to require such an assessment; the provision’s text 
and the Rome Statute more broadly cannot support such an interpretation.  
The ICC prosecutor has acknowledged at several points that his office is in 
the process of defining and putting into practice the concept of gravity,117 
and it appears that the chambers are engaged in the same process.  
3. The Conduct of Investigations 
Once the pre–trial chamber has authorized a formal investigation, the 
OTP has responsibility for “extend[ing] the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
responsibility under this Statute . . . .”118  The interests of victims and 
witnesses and the nature of the crime should play a significant role in the 
development of an investigative strategy.119  Throughout the Rome Statute, 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the OTP’s own guidelines make 
the protection and wellbeing of victims a high priority during 
investigations.120  
The court’s apparent commitment to both the protection of victims and 
maximizing its preventive effect creates the possibility of tension.  What 
best serves the victims of crimes already committed may not necessarily be 
best for those facing ongoing or imminent violence.  This tension 
manifested itself during the early stages of the court’s investigation into 
crimes committed in the Darfur region of Sudan.  Specifically, the question 
arose as to whether the court’s investigations and the presence of ICC 
personnel can mitigate or restrain ongoing violence and atrocities by 
making visible the threat of prosecution.  The UN Security Council had 
referred the case of Darfur to the ICC in March 2005, and the Prosecutor 
formally opened its first investigation in June of that year.121  In July, the 
pre–trial chamber, acting through Article 103 of the Rome Statute, invited 
observations from certain eminent international jurists on aspects of the 
court’s investigation there, notably the protection of victims.122   
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In response to the pre–trial chamber’s request, Louise Arbour, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, submitted observations.123  
She criticized the ICC prosecutor for not conducting investigations in 
Darfur and for instead relying primarily on refugees and displaced persons 
for witness testimony.  Arbour contended that in crafting its investigative 
strategy the ICC had placed too much emphasis on the possible risks to 
witnesses and victims and too little on the benefits that an active 
investigation in Darfur might yield.  She encouraged the prosecutor to 
consider “the potential deterrent effect of ICC investigations on the 
perpetrators of the very crimes that put the civilian population at risk and 
thus of its impact on the general reduction of violence.”124  The presence of 
ICC investigators “can create an atmosphere in which the costs of abuse are 
more apparent to the perpetrators of violence against civilians.”125 The 
ICC’s position in the international system, she argued, makes it particularly 
suited to targeted deterrence: 
The High Commissioner is of the view that the promise of the ICC is that, 
contrary to ad hoc tribunals created ex post facto, it has the potential of 
being effective during armed conflicts and to contribute to the effective 
prevention of current crimes and general reduction of violence.  The ICC’s 
potential power of deterrence can thus be more situation–specific and 
makes it a tool without equivalent for the international community. . . .126 
A few weeks later, the OTP responded to the Arbour observations.127  
The Prosecutor acknowledged the reference to prevention in the Rome 
Statute’s preamble but insisted that the office cannot be expected to help 
provide physical security in a conflict zone: 
The OTP has expressed on many occasions the firm belief in the deterrent 
power of ICC investigations and prosecutions and the objective of 
maximizing the deterrent effects of its activities.  Still, the OTP’s mandate 
cannot reasonably be expanded to encompass a duty to protect the security 
of civilians in areas in which it has chosen not to investigate.  As the 
Preamble acknowledges, deterrence is a consequence of prosecution and 
accountability, not an independent objective.128  
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The responsibility for security and prevention in Darfur, argued the 
prosecutor, lies with the government of Sudan and with the UN Security 
Council.  As an empirical matter, the prosecutor’s office also cast doubt on 
whether an increased international presence has any deterrent effect.  It 
noted that in the context of the Darfur conflict, “increased international 
presence . . . has not had the effect of reducing the level of violence in the 
region.”129  
The OTP’s broad statement on the place of deterrence in the court’s 
work should likely be limited to the context of investigations.  Even in that 
limited sense, however, it is not clear that the prosecutor is persuaded by his 
argument that deterrence should not be an independent objective.  The 
prosecutor has regularly briefed the Security Council on the progress of the 
Sudan case, and those briefings have included several suggestions that the 
office would craft its strategy so as to halt ongoing atrocities.  He has also 
stated that prevention will affect how the office directs its resources:  
The impact of ICC investigations and prosecutions on the prevention of 
future crimes is also an important consideration, and particular attention 
will therefore be given to investigating the crimes currently affecting the 
lives and safety of the two million displaced civilians, in an effort to 
contribute to their protection from further attack and to the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.130 
The prosecutor does not make clear whether he expects OTP’s activities 
to prevent ongoing crimes through deterrence or through the arrest and 
incapacitation of those responsible.  In either case, this policy might suggest 
that the prosecutor is willing to complicate investigations in order to 
maximize the preventive impact.  Ongoing crimes could be significantly 
harder to investigate than those committed months or years in the past, 
particularly given the investigative approach the OTP has taken in Darfur.  
Eyewitnesses and victims of the most recent crimes might not be in refugee 
camps and might be therefore out of reach for investigators.  Moreover, it 
can be expected that senior commanders and government officials are now 
more adept at disguising responsibility for crimes than they were in the 
early stages of the conflict.    
Taken together, the prosecutor’s exchange with Arbour and his briefings 
to the Security Council suggest a calibrated approach to prevention at the 
investigate stage: the prosecutor will consider prevention in crafting an 
investigation and prosecution strategy but will not allow prevention or 
deterrence to influence decisions on where investigators are deployed.  In 
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essence, the prosecutor has argued that it may be appropriate for the court to 
become an instrument of prevention, but not its personnel.     
4. Choice of Charges 
Once the prosecutor has identified individuals against whom it will bring 
charges, there remains the question of precisely what charges to bring.  The 
PTC must approve of charges filed, but the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure offer no guidance on how the prosecutor should 
choose the precise charges to bring or whether he should prioritize certain 
crimes over others.  The OTP’s regulations provide that the investigative 
team “shall aim to select incidents reflective of the most serious crimes and 
the main types of victimization—including sexual and gender violence and 
violence against children—and which are the most representative of the 
scale and impact of the crimes.”131 
In its early cases, the OTP targeted several individuals against whom it 
was possible to bring a variety of different charges.  Militia leaders in the 
Congo, for example, have been accused of committing or authorizing 
murder, rapes, pillage, and forced displacement, among a number of other 
crimes covered by the Rome Statute.  It is likely that this will be the 
situation in many of the court’s future cases.  The selection of charges 
therefore becomes an important element of the prosecutor’s discretion and 
could be used to maximize the court’s preventive impact.   
The court’s indictments related to the conflict in eastern Congo suggest 
just such a dynamic.  The three charges brought against Thomas Lubanga 
all involved the use of child soldiers.132  By emphasizing this theme, the 
prosecutor may have decided to help stigmatize a practice that is accepted 
as normal in some environments.  However common, murder and rape have 
a basic stigma attached to them, while recruiting child soldiers may not.  In 
media interviews as the case opened, Moreno-Ocampo stressed the broad 
effect he hoped the prosecution would have.  “The charges in the Lubanga 
case will reverberate around the world . . . in Sri Lanka, in Colombia, in 
many countries.  This trial will make clear that this is a law to be respected.  
If you conscript, enlist or use child soldiers you will have a problem, you 
will be prosecuted.”133  The prosecutor’s opening argument to the court 
continued the theme: “The Lubanga case, beyond the guilt or innocence of 
Mr Lubanga, is also a clear message to perpetrators of crimes against 
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children such as enlisting them as soldiers, are very grave and will be 
prosecuted.”134  
The prosecutor runs a risk in seeking to isolate and raise the profile of 
certain criminal behavior.  In the case of the Congo indictments, the court’s 
narrow focus elicited strong reactions from some quarters.  Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice confronted the prosecutor about the absence of 
sexually–based offenses:  
It is evident that if the Prosecutor, in the exercise of his or her discretion, 
chose never to prosecute certain types of crimes, the ICC would not have 
the effect of deterring those types of crimes.  Indeed, the ICC might in 
such circumstances send the signal that such crimes can be committed with 
impunity.  Thus, the selection of the particular charges against those who 
are accused is even more important than the overall number of accused.135   
If the court consciously decides to pursue an educative approach, it 
might, in some cases, seek to prioritize those crimes within its jurisdiction 
that are lesser known and where the educational impact can be maximized.  
As has been demonstrated, however, that approach runs the risk of 
alienating certain victims groups and those advocating on their behalf.  
5. The Preventive Effect of Indictment 
To date, the court has issued thirteen indictments, the majority of which 
remain unenforced, including those against Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir and Lord’s Resistance Army Commander Joseph Kony.  From a 
crime prevention standpoint, unenforced indictments can be analyzed in 
several different ways.  In the case of ongoing crimes, the ICC may hope 
that issuance of an indictment will lead the indicted individual to modify his 
or her behavior even if there is little prospect of the individual being 
apprehended.  In effect, the court might be seeking to achieve targeted 
deterrence that leads the indictee to abandon criminal behavior or at least 
restrictive deterrence that leads the indictee to reduce, if not completely 
abandon, criminal activity.  The court may also conclude that issuing 
indictments can have a general educative effect either on the society in 
question or in the international community as a whole.  As discussed above, 
this may particularly be the case when the indictments focus on crimes that 
are little known or not widely regarded as serious.    
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But unenforced indictments can serve to highlight the court’s lack of 
enforcement power and, potentially, to diminish its ultimate preventive and 
deterrent effect.  Senior government and non–state leaders in a position to 
prevent major crimes may conclude that the ICC’s indictments are unlikely 
to threaten them and therefore choose not to modify their behavior.  
Maintaining the court’s ability to affect the calculations of senior leaders—
an important element of preventive effect—may suggest a policy of issuing 
indictments only when it appears likely that enforcement will occur.  It is 
apparent that the court has not chosen this approach, at least not on a 
consistent basis.  There was little prospect, for example, that President 
Bashir would be apprehended when the court indicted him.  Going forward, 
the court will have to weigh these considerations and decide whether it 
should only seek indictments when the prospects for enforcement are high.   
There is another dimension to the court’s effort to use indictments to 
maximize its preventive effect.  As suggested by the Lubanga case, the 
court at times may find itself in the position to take into custody individuals 
who might not, under normal circumstances, be deemed significant enough 
to merit the ICC’s attentions but whose apprehension could help prevent 
future atrocities.  In this situation, the court must attempt to weigh that 
preventive effect and determine whether pursing an indictment is an 
appropriate use of the court’s resources.  Most accounts suggest that 
Lubanga, a militia leader who had been detained by the Congolese 
authorities, was set to be released.  When word of his imminent release 
reached The Hague, the OTP negotiated with the Congolese authorities to 
transfer Lubanga to the ICC, and the office moved quickly to seek an 
indictment.136  The suspect’s likely release was discussed at some length 
before the pre–trial chamber as it considered whether to authorize an arrest 
warrant.137  Several commentators have argued that the ICC’s focus on 
preventing Lubanga’s release trumped its normal standards for assessing the 
seriousness of a situation.  “One might wonder . . . whether the selection of 
the Lubanga case was based on gravity or by his ‘possible imminent 
release.’”138  From a prevention standpoint, however, the chance to remove 
a dangerous individual from the conflict zone—and perhaps avoid or limit 
imminent atrocities—may be hard for the court to ignore.139 
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C. Sentencing 
The guidelines for sentencing at the ICC are elaborated in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, but they do not include any reference to the 
deterrence function or indeed to any of the traditional purposes of 
punishment.  “The ICC Statute is in effect silent on the purposes and 
principles that govern the rules on sentencing.”140  Rule 145(a) calls for the 
Court to “balance all the relevant factors, including any mitigating and 
aggravating factors and consider the circumstances both of the convicted 
person and of the crime . . . .”141  The Rules outline certain relevant 
considerations including the damage caused; degree of intent; and the age, 
education, and social and economic condition of the convicted person.  A 
number of aggravating and mitigating conditions are also listed, but none of 
them relate specifically to prevention or deterrence.  The only sentencing 
provision that can be considered to focus on prevention appears in Rule 223, 
which addresses the possible reduction of sentences.  It instructs the court to 
consider whether early release “would give rise to significant social 
instability.”142  The provision appears to anticipate a situation in which the 
release of a controversial individual would lead to protests, political 
instability, or even violence and atrocities.  It may also encompass the 
possibility that the individual released may commit or instigate additional 
crimes.  As such, it can be considered to have a preventive purpose. 
The experience of the ICTY and ICTR on sentencing suggests that even 
in the absence of statutory guidance, the court will likely begin to articulate 
a sentencing philosophy, although not necessarily a comprehensive one.143  
Both of those tribunals adopted the practice of issuing sentencing decisions, 
and on several occasions they specifically addressed the question of 
sentencing’s preventive impact, always in deterrence terms.  In the Tadic 
case, the judges determining the sentence went so far as to declare that 
“deterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of 
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appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”144  
The ICTR also suggested that deterrence should have pride of place in 
sentencing decisions:  
It is clear that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by 
the Tribunal must be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said 
accused, who must see their crimes punished, and over and above that, on 
the other hand, at deterrence, namely to dissuade for good, others who may 
be tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing that that 
the international community shall not tolerate the serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights.145 
The first indication of the OTP’s approach to sentencing came in the 
Lubanga case.  In his opening statement, the prosecutor signaled that he 
would seek harsh punishment for the accused:   
I want to put the Defence on notice that the prosecution anticipates to call 
for a severe punishment, close to the maximum.  The Prosecution believes 
that the massive crimes litigated in this International Criminal Court, with 
hundreds or thousands of victims, with entire communities affected, 
warrant very high penalties.  In this case, the defendant stole the childhood 
of the victims by forcing them to kill and rape.146 
One should be wary of extrapolating from this statement a defined 
philosophy of sentencing, but the prosecutor’s statement does suggest an 
emphasis on retribution and “just deserts” rather than prevention, a notable 
departure from the emphasis that the OTP placed on stigmatizing and 
deterring the recruitment of children in other public statements before and 
during the trial.  The ICC judges, for their part, have not yet had the 
opportunity to elaborate their own approach to sentencing.   
D. Public Outreach  
The ICTY and the ICTR were often criticized, particularly in their first 
years of operation, for being distant from and little understood by the people 
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most affected by their activities.147  Responding to these concerns, the ICC 
has developed an active outreach program to publicize and explain the work 
of the ICC, particularly in countries where active investigations are 
underway.  
The court’s strategic plan for outreach acknowledges that the institution 
is designed to help foster “long–lasting respect for and enforcement of 
international criminal justice, the prevention of such crimes, and the fight 
against impunity.”148  The prosecutor’s office has stressed the importance of 
explaining court activity so that “ICC investigations and prosecutions, and 
in particular the conduct charged . . . are known to all parties to conflicts in 
order to deter perpetrators.”149  However, prevention is not listed as one of 
the explicit goals of the outreach program itself, and perpetrators or 
potential perpetrators are not discussed as target audiences.150  The strategic 
plan does refer somewhat obliquely to prevention when it discusses 
directing information about the court specifically to those involved in 
conflicts.  “Stigmatised by their families and/or the ethnic groups to which 
they belong for their active participation in hostilities, they represent a 
volatile segment of the society and could be the source of significant 
instability.”151  Describing combatants in these terms alone appears to 
intentionally avoid casting them as potential perpetrators of atrocities and to 
minimize the implication that the outreach program has an explicit deterrent 
purpose. 
In practice, the court’s outreach program has focused on those countries 
where formal investigations are underway.  The court has established 
offices and stationed some personnel in the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Uganda.  On its own, this 
choice of limiting major outreach activities to these societies suggests 
limited ambition as regards prevention.  These societies have already 
experienced extreme violence and, as targets of formal investigations that 
often receive significant media attention, may be least in need of education 
about the court’s existence.  From a broad prevention standpoint, a focus on 
vulnerable societies that have not yet experienced major violence might be 
more effective.     
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The content of the court’s outreach activities reflects a strong emphasis 
on normative and educative approaches and a very limited use of 
deterrence.  Principal outreach strategies have included meetings with civil 
society representatives, question–and–answer sessions about the work of the 
court, special briefings for local media, information sessions at schools and 
universities, coordination with relevant non–governmental organizations, 
screenings of court proceedings, and selected radio messages.  In Uganda, 
for example, the ICC reports that almost 21,000 people participated in more 
than 200 interactive sessions and that ICC radio messages may have reached 
eight million people.152 
Targeted groups have included victims groups, former child soldiers, and 
women.  Court officials have designed information sessions for them that 
have included tailored messages on the rights of victims, the crime of child 
recruitment, and sexual crimes, respectively.153  In some instances, the court 
has sought to seek out populations that might be skeptical of or even hostile 
to the court’s work.  In Congo, for example, the court arranged information 
sessions in areas of the country where support for indictee Jean–Pierre 
Bemba is high.154 
It is notable, however, that the ICC has rarely attempted to communicate 
targeted messages to senior government officials, military representatives, 
or militia commanders about their responsibilities or the threat of 
punishment (the prosecutor’s December 2010 statement on Cote d’Ivoire 
being a notable exception).  It is possible that this type of communication 
occurs more regularly behind the scenes,  but in general, the outreach effort 
has focused on education rather than targeted deterrence.  Given the court’s 
ambition to alter the calculations of senior leaders, this omission is striking.  
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that, in the abstract, the ICC prosecutor and 
judges see crime prevention as an important objective of the court’s work.   
The court’s Special Adviser on Crime Prevention concedes that “our task is 
very complicated and difficult,” but argues that the court has no choice but 
to engage with the complexities of measuring and assessing the institution’s 
preventive impact: 
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[W]e have a legal but also a moral and political obligation to engage in 
prevention and to study the way justice can serve the purposes of 
prevention in specific an detailed ways.  We will probably never have the 
specific evidence because we prosecute and punish this particular case 
[that] we prevented similar cases to happen in this jurisdiction or in others.  
But our ability to make arguments that justice is what contributes to a 
preventive mechanism is important.155  
His comments suggest that the court’s prevention discourse may be as 
much about justification as strategy.  More than eight years after it opened 
its doors, the court still has no convictions.  A significant number of the 
individuals it has indicted remain at large.  Tension has emerged between 
the court and many African member states over the emphasis on African 
conflicts.  The court’s first trial has been characterized by repeated sparring 
between the prosecutor and the judges and may not be completed.156  In this 
context, discussion of the court’s preventive effect and potential can easily 
become a gloss to cover the absence of more concrete and quantifiable 
achievements.   
At the very least, it is apparent that the broad goal of prevention is not 
yet accompanied by a coherent strategy on how to do so.  One close 
observer of the court concluded that “the potential of preventive impact is 
widely unexplored.  It requires a systematic approach and use.”157  The 
evidence to this point suggests that the ICC prosecutor is particularly 
interested in the preventive impact of preliminary investigations and has 
sought to maximize that effect through frequent and targeted public 
statements.  The court is also pursuing an active outreach campaign that 
emphasizes information and education as a preventive tool.   
Beyond that, the place of prevention appears uncertain.  The prosecutor 
and his office have sometimes claimed that prevention and deterrence 
cannot be conscious goals of the institution and at other times have 
suggested that they are key objectives.  The OTP’s discussion of its 
preventive role at the investigation phase captures this uncertainty well.  
The appeals chamber, for its part, declined the opportunity to state clearly 
whether prevention should be conceived of as a byproduct or conscious goal 
of the court’s work.    
It is not surprising that the ICC’s approach to crime prevention is 
fragmented and, at times, inconsistent.  The absence of clear guidance from 
  
 155. Juan E. Mendez, Special Adviser to the Prosecutor on Prevention, Introduction to 
the Work of the Special Advisers: Special Adviser on Prevention (Mar. 2, 2010) (emphasis 
added), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F57A26F6-30DE-4C47-831E-
C3ECAC044BF6/281614/Juan_Mendez02032010.pdf. 
 156. Wairagala Wakabi, Judges Issue Warning to Prosecutors as Lubanga’s ICC 
Trial is Halted, THE LUBANGA TRIAL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (July 10, 
2010), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/07/10/judges-issue-warning-to-prosecutors-as-
lubanga%E2%80%99s-icc-trial-is-halted/. 
 157. Statement by Antoine Bernard, supra note 4. 
2011] The International Criminal Court and Crime Prevention 199 
the Rome Statute and the court’s other published rules and guidelines create 
fertile ground for uncertainty.  For an institution like the ICC, that lack of 
clarity may ultimately be an advantage; many international organizations 
use ambiguity in their underlying charters in an attempt to shape their 
mandate—converting ambiguity into a form of autonomy.158 While the ICC 
will undoubtedly engage in this process, its senior officials are sensitive to 
accusations that they are abusing their discretion.  Prominent court critics 
have pointed out the danger of the court’s broad discretion and lack of 
oversight.159  In response, the prosecutor and other court officials have 
declared that they will not seek to engage in ambitious interpretations of the 
court’s role.  “I have to respect scrupulously my legal limits,” Moreno–
Ocampo said recently.  “Our policy is never to stretch the interpretation of 
the norms adopted in Rome.”160 As a new institution, the ICC faces an 
imperative to establish its place in international politics and to demonstrate 
its effectiveness.  In so doing it must respond pragmatically and flexibly to 
events.  At least until the court is better established, consistency will often 
have to yield to expediency.   
There are other significant hurdles to a well developed prevention 
strategy.  The difficulties of measuring and analyzing the preventive effects 
of criminal justice are well documented.161 Those difficulties are 
compounded for the ICC because the small number of prosecutions offers 
limited data for empirical study and because it is difficult to assess the 
calculations of those targeted by the court.  Moreover, conducting 
formalized and public assessments of the likely preventive effect of court 
action would involve political, social, and even psychological calculations 
that judicial bodies are hesitant and usually ill–equipped to make.     
Still, within these constraints, there is room for the court to improve and 
systematize its approach to prevention.  Either within the OTP or the 
registry, the court should develop a small prevention unit with two principal 
tasks: assessing the likely impact of possible investigations and recording 
and analyzing the effects of ongoing investigations and cases.  In particular, 
the court should develop a set of prevention guidelines for use as it 
considers information it has received and referrals from states parties and 
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the Security Council.  These guidelines might include the following 
considerations: 
Whether there is ongoing conflict that a preliminary or formal 
investigation might help mitigate. 
If conflict is not ongoing, an assessment of how likely it is that 
violence will recur and how the court’s involvement might affect that 
possibility. 
Whether political and military leaders thought to be involved in 
committing atrocities will be susceptible to the pressure of an ICC 
investigation. 
The degree of attention that an ICC investigation will likely garner in 
the country and region. 
Whether the situation would expose types of international crimes that 
are underpublicized and thereby contribute substantially to the building of 
awareness. 
While the guidelines should be published as part of a broader policy 
paper on prevention, the court’s assessment should be conducted internally 
and without rendering formal decisions or evaluations.  The efforts of the 
pre–trial chamber regarding the gravity requirement notwithstanding, it 
would not be fruitful or plausible to read into the Rome Statute a formal 
prevention requirement.  Without structured internal guidance, however, 
there is a danger that the focus on prevention may begin to fade as other 
achievements accumulate.  That would be unfortunate.  For all its rhetoric, 
the court has only begun to explore systematically its preventive potential.     
 
  
ADVANCING THE INTERESTS OF                      
SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILDREN:   
A LOOK AT THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN 
UNDER SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILDREN’S ACT 
Thomas J. Walsh* 
 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 202 
I.  THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE CHILDREN OF                        
SOUTH AFRICA ....................................................................................... 203 
A. Pre–Colonial Period..................................................................... 203 
B. Colonial Period ............................................................................ 205 
C. Post-Independence and Segregation ............................................ 207 
D. Apartheid Era............................................................................... 208 
E.  Post–Apartheid Era ...................................................................... 211 
F. The Socio–Economic Impact of South African History ............... 213 
II. CHILDREN AND THE ROMAN-DUTCH HERITAGE IN  
     SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ............................................................................ 213 
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN OF SOUTH 
AFRICA ................................................................................................... 220 
A. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child ............... 222 
B. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ............... 225 
C. World Children’s Summit of 1990 .............................................. 228 
D. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child ...... 229 
E.  Children’s Charter of South Africa ............................................. 230 
F.  The Impact of International Agreements ..................................... 231 
IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHILDREN’S ACT .............................................. 232 
A. The Best Interests of the Child in the Balance ............................ 236 
B. The Impact on Customary Law Related to Children ................... 240 
C. Specific Substantive Provisions................................................... 241 
V.  REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILDREN’S ACT:  AN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE .......................................................................................... 244 
A. The Currents of American Society .............................................. 245 
B. Nationwide Legislation and Law Reform ................................... 247 
C. Constitutional Protection ............................................................. 248 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
 
 
 
“There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in 
which it treats its children.” 
Nelson Mandela 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
There is no one in a better position to speak to South Africa’s soul than 
Nelson Mandela.  The road he walked—from the small village of Mvezo in 
Eastern Cape Province1 to the prison on Robben Island2 to the presidency of 
the Republic of South Africa—compels us to give him that distinction.  
Although appropriate treatment of children is an obvious moral mandate, 
Nelson Mandela clearly saw the importance of children’s rights to a 
successful society.  Mandela, a tireless advocate for unity in his country, 
recognized that if the children of his country were not treated equally nor 
provided protection under the law, the society he hoped for could not be 
built in South Africa.  Mandela served as president of South Africa from 
1994 to 1999.  Since the very beginning of his presidency, there developed 
in that country a growing movement committed to children’s rights.3  The 
movement recognized that children are among the most vulnerable members 
of South African society.4  During the early years of the Mandela 
presidency, the government of South Africa began a review of the laws 
governing the treatment of children in various contexts—including divorce, 
paternity and child protection.5  South Africa’s Children’s Act of 2005 is the 
culmination of this review.6   
This comprehensive piece of legislation, designed to protect children, 
emerged from the meeting of three separate currents in South African 
society.  The first current was the socio–economic conditions brought about 
by the policies of segregation and apartheid.  Those official government 
  
 * Thomas J. Walsh is a partner in the law firm of Walsh & Walsh, S.C., in DePere, 
Wisconsin, receiving his B.A. from Marquette Univeristy and his J.D. from Hamline 
University School of Law.  He specializes in the area of family law. This article is dedicated 
to the men and women of the Gregg Herman Delegation to South Africa sponsored by 
People to People (October 2009).  Your input and contribution to the delegation has provided 
insight for this Article. 
 1. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 3 (1995). 
 2. Id. at 382.     
 3. Briefing from S. Afr. Dep’t of Justice & Constitutional Dev. to U.S. People to 
People Delegation 7 (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Briefing to People to 
People Delegation]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 15. 
 6. See Id. 
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policies brought hardship and misery to the lives of many South African 
children.  The second was the Roman–Dutch legal system—brought to the 
country during the colonial period and developed throughout the legal 
history of the country.  As it developed post–independence, the legal system 
began to express the ideal that children’s interests were to be protected.  
While not always realized in practice, the courts were at least expressing 
those ideals in their legal opinions.  The third current was the impact on 
South Africa of international conventions and declarations from 
transnational organizations.  Throughout the Twentieth Century and into the 
Twenty–First, various international agreements came into existence whose 
main focus was to advance the cause of children.  South Africa frequently 
signed on to those child-centered accords.  As a result, South Africa created 
for itself a number of obligations that needed to be fulfilled domestically. 
This Article will focus on the Children’s Act of South Africa in an effort 
to learn how well it serves the ideals of Mandela and the children of that 
nation.  This analysis will occur in five parts.  First, the socio–economic 
history of the children of South Africa will be discussed.  Not simply the 
plight of children under apartheid, but a discussion of where they were 
before apartheid and where they have been since its fall.  Second, an 
examination of the legal system’s development in South Africa will occur. 
Specifically, the history of children under the law of South Africa will be 
discussed.  Third, an analysis will take place concerning some of the 
international efforts to help children and where South Africa fits in those 
efforts.  Fourth, this analysis will briefly review the Children’s Act and how 
its provisions are designed to protect children; finally, a reflection on the 
Act will be offered from an American perspective.   
I.  THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE CHILDREN OF SOUTH AFRICA 
A. Pre–Colonial Period 
An inherent problem with textbooks used in schools is that they often 
begin a discussion of a former colony’s history at a time when the first 
Europeans arrived.  The country of South Africa is no different.7  As with 
many former colonies, however, such a beginning for South Africa is 
simply incorrect.  In fact, modern man’s history in South Africa’s is quite 
ancient.  Hominids originated in South Africa approximately three million 
years ago.8  Around one million years ago homo erectus replaced those first 
hominids.9  Notably, “[t]he earliest fossils . . . [found] anywhere in the 
  
 7. See MANDELA, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that the standard South African text 
books claim the history of South Africa “began with the landing of Jan Van Riebeek at the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1652.”). 
 8. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 6 (3d ed. 2001). 
 9. READER’S DIGEST, Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story 19 
(Dougie Oakes ed., 3d ed. 1995). 
204 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
world[, which] some physical anthropologists attribute to modern Homo 
sapiens[,] come from [the] Klasies River mouth in . . . eastern Cape 
Province on the Natal-Swaziland border.”10  They are dated to 50,000 years 
old.11  “By the beginning of the Christian era, human communities [of 
hunter gatherers] had lived in South[ ] Africa . . . for . . . thousands of 
years.”12  “The basic social [structure of these hunter gathers] was the 
nuclear family, but several families usually [grouped themselves into larger] 
bands . . . .”13  People from the various bands would often intermarry.14  
These early human communities in southern Africa were the ancestors of 
the Bushman culture, groups of indigenous hunter gatherers who were still 
present in South Africa when the first Europeans arrived.15  Although exact 
dates are uncertain, pastoralism eventually arrived in South Africa.16  That 
arrival could have been as early as 2,500 years ago and probably came from 
immigrants from the north.17  These pastoralist Bushmen became known as 
Khoikhoi (men of men) as opposed to the hunter–gatherer Bushmen which 
became known as San.18  Eventually, these two groups intermarried and 
their descendants became known as “Khoisan.”19  
Early in the Christian era, Bantu speaking people began arriving in South 
Africa from the north.20  “Between the fourth century . . . and the . . . 
eighteenth century [of the Christian era], Bantu speaking [hunter gathers] . . 
. ” were building successful communities in eastern South Africa.21  While 
there is certainly evidence that some Bantu speakers intermarried with the 
Khoisan, it is specifically the “Bantu–speaking . . . [peoples]” who are “the 
ancestors of the majority of . . . [modern South Africans].”22  Many of the 
currently existing South African tribes trace their origins to these people—
including the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, and many more.23  These are just some of 
the aboriginal tribal groupings that the Europeans encountered when they 
arrived on the South African cape and moved inland. 
  
 10. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.   
 13. Id. at 7.  
 14. See id.  
 15. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6. 
 16. Id. at 11–12. 
 17. Id. at 12. 
 18. READER’S DIGEST, supra note 9, at 20–21. 
 19. HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 21 (2003).  
 20. Id. at 26.  
 21. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 15–16. 
 22. Id. at 10.  
 23. HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 19, at 26 (“Bantu–speakers who came 
to South[ ] Africa included two main groups: the Nguni, who today include the Swazi, 
Xhosa, and Zulu, and the Tswana–Sotho, the ancestors of today’s people of Botswana and 
Lesotho.”). 
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Although they had not yet experienced the influx of European 
colonialism, the indigenous people of South Africa had experienced the 
arrival of new settlers from the northern part of Africa.  Indeed, conditions 
for children in such tribal societies is not ideal, yet the arrival of European 
colonialism was going to have a much more profound impact on the people 
in southern Africa and, therefore, on the children of southern Africa. 
B. Colonial Period 
It was not until the late fifteenth century that this European encounter 
occurred.  The first European to round the Cape of Good Hope was the 
Portuguese mariner, Bartholomew Dias in 1487.24  He anchored briefly in 
Mossel Bay, which is approximately 170 miles further east than the cape.25  
He went “another 170 miles along the [southern] coast [of Africa] to Algoa 
bay before [turning around and] returning to [Portugal].”26  It was left to 
another Portuguese sailor, Vasco De Gama, to round the Cape and travel up 
the eastern coast of Africa to Mombasa in modern Kenya.27  Although the 
Portuguese were the first Europeans to pass by the southern tip of Africa, it 
would be the Dutch who came to stay.  In 1652, the Dutch East India 
Company set up a service station in South Africa to provide supplies and 
rest to Dutch merchants trading in the east.28  The first commander in charge 
of the company on the Cape was Jan van Riebeeck.29  He had been 
instructed to build a fort and supply the Dutch fleets with food and drink as 
they passed back and forth around the Cape.30  The Dutch had no intention 
of creating a permanent settlement there, but simply needed a stopover point 
for the fleet on its way to the eastern empire of the Netherlands.31  However, 
after a few years the colony began to acquire an evident level of autonomy.    
In 1657 the company released nine of its employees from their 
employment contracts and gave them land just south of Table Bay.32  The 
purpose of this move was to have them grow crops and sell them back to the 
company at fixed prices.33  “In the years that followed, the company 
[released] more [employees] on similar [terms].”34  It also brought 
immigrants into the area and allowed them to create their own settlements.35  
  
 24. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 31.  
 25. Id.   
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1. 
 28. Id. at 32–33.  
 29. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 33. 
 30. Id. at 32. 
 31. Id. at 33. 
 32. Id. at 33–35. 
 33. Id. at 35. 
 34. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 35. 
 35. Id.  
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By 1793 the company records reflected that 4,032 men, 2,730 women and 
7,068 children were living in that colony.36  
It should come as no surprise that Europeans taking over land in southern 
Africa caused displacement of the people who already lived there—and that 
such displacement caused tension between the Europeans and indigenous 
communities.  The Europeans gave the local pastoralists the option of 
withdrawing from the land they lived on—which had abundant fresh water 
and rich soil—or serving the Dutch.37  Clearly these were not attractive 
options for people who had lived on the land for generations.  The Dutch 
also started importing black slaves from other parts of Africa in order to 
help develop the infrastructure of the colony.38  “By the time van Riebeeck 
[handed command] over . . . to his successor in 1662, the colony had 
become a . . . racially stratified society.”39  
During the time that the Dutch East India Company controlled the Cape, 
the “white [settlers] and their diseases [wiped out] most of the . . . [Khoisan 
people] . . . in . . . western . . . South[ ] Africa.”40  “White people did not 
[start moving into] the eastern part of [S]outh[ ] Africa . . . until the late 
eighteenth century.”41  The British gained control of the Cape Colony in 
1795 and, after briefly surrendering it back to the Dutch, they came to stay 
in 1806.42  As with the Dutch, the British viewed the Cape as merely a 
stopover point on the way to Asia.43  What they did not realize was that they 
had inherited a very complex and racially structured society.  Racial conflict 
continued not only between whites and blacks, but also between whites of 
Dutch origins who called themselves Afrikaners, and whites of British or 
other European origin.44  The British rule lasted for slightly more than one 
hundred years.  The South African War, known as the Boer War to the 
British, began in 1899.45  While the war came to a successful military 
conclusion for the British in 1902,46 the turmoil that it left in its wake 
continued until 1910 when Great Britain granted sovereignty to the Union 
of South Africa.47  It was a “British dominion with [a prime minister of its 
own and] a population [consisting] of [four] million Africans, 500,000 
[coloreds], 150,000 Indians and [1.2 million] [w]hites.”48 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 33. 
 40. Id. at 70. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 52.  
 43. Id. at 52-53. 
 44. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 53–56. 
 45. Id. at 141.  
 46. Id. at 143. 
 47. Id. at 152–53. 
 48. Id. at 153.  
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The years prior to independence had been difficult on South African 
children of all races.  The children of indigenous peoples were displaced 
and destroyed by war and diseases just like their parents.  While perhaps to 
a lesser degree, a similar fate awaited children of white settlers during this 
colonial period.  During the Boer Wars alone, nearly 28,000 Afrikaners—
most of them children—died of various diseases including dysentery and 
measles.49  While the situation for white children was destined to improve in 
the immediate aftermath of independence, the situation for black children 
would not see improvement for quite some time. 
C. Post-Independence and Segregation 
The era between independence in 1910 and the beginning of Apartheid in 
1948 was characterized by increasing segregation between the races.50  
“[T]he white population consolidated its control over the [government and] 
strengthen[ed] its grip on the black population . . . .”51  Black people were 
being turned into manual laborers working in the fields, the mines, and in 
the factories.52  Black farmers were moved off of their land or turned into 
renters and sharecroppers.53  During this period in time, black South 
Africans adopted many strategies for dealing with their situation.  In an 
effort to simply survive day–to–day, many black men would leave their 
homes for long stretches of time simply to obtain employment.54  This left 
the women at home to maintain the integrity of the community and raise the 
children.55  During this period, “[o]ver one–fifth of the children [of black 
South Africans] died within their first year of life.”56  Fewer than thirty 
percent of those children were receiving any formal education.57 
The basis for future trouble in the black community was also laid during 
this period.  As a result of men leaving their homes for long periods of time, 
black children were victimized by broken families.  Fathers were absent and 
mothers were overextended.  These problems would be compounded as the 
government tightened its grip in the apartheid era.  The black community—
the largest in the country—was seeing its most basic social structures 
undermined by government policies. 
  
 49. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 143. 
 50. Id. at 154–86.  
 51. Id. at 154. 
 52. Id. at 155. 
 53. See id. 
 54. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 155–56. 
 55. Id. at 171–72 (noting that labor migration disrupted African families causing 
women to “assume responsibilities [as] household heads [which had] previously [been] 
reserved to men”). 
 56. Id. at 164. 
 57. Id. 
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D. Apartheid Era 
In 1948 the National Party came to power in South Africa’s 
parliamentary elections.  That electoral victory signaled the dawn of a more 
strident segregation policy.  The National Party was a right–wing party that 
had opposed South Africa’s involvement in World War II on the side of the 
Allies.58  Rather, they had urged South Africa’s wartime government to join 
the war on the side of Germany.59  Their rise to power in 1948 was the death 
knell for any future peaceful transition to majority rule.  The legislation 
passed by the National Party parliament “extended the . . . laws of the 
segregationist era and tightened…the administration of those laws.”60  
Through a series of prime ministers from 1948 until the early 1990’s, the 
National Party government continued a policy of legalized oppression and 
marginalization of black and colored South Africans.61  This policy came to 
be known as apartheid and touched the lives of all South Africans—
regardless of race.    
While such policies impacted all members of society, it invariably had 
the most negative impact on black and colored individuals and their 
children.  Children were hit especially hard by apartheid.  One commentator 
noted: 
If there is a group in South Africa which has consistently had their rights 
denied it is our children and in particular black children.  From conception 
the black child’s life is characterized by hunger and malnutrition, 
insecurity and trauma, instability, family breakdown and dislocation of 
communities, a lack of primary health care and educational opportunities; 
and the absence of adequate housing, electricity, running water and 
sanitation.62 
To understand the precarious position of black children during apartheid, 
it is helpful to look at four basic problem areas: mortality rates, poverty, 
quality of education and violence.  
Mortality rates among black children were more than five times higher 
than among whites.63  By the time apartheid ended, twenty–three out of 
every one thousand white children died in their first year of life.64  For black 
children the story was quite different.  In the first year of life, 140 out of 
every one thousand black children died.65  The most common causes of 
  
 58. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 110. 
 59. Id.   
 60. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 189. 
 61. Id. at 187–220.  
 62. ERIC ATMORE, APARTHEID AND SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILDREN 1–2 (1992), available 
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED365441.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 3.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
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child death in the black and colored communities were “gastro–enteritis, 
measles and tuberculosis, which were caused in large measure by the poor 
socio–economic conditions under which these children had to live.”66  
In the black and colored communities, apartheid also left a legacy of 
hunger and disease associated with malnutrition.67  One commentator noted: 
Approximately a third of black, coloured and Asian children below the age 
of 14 years are underweight and stunted for their age.  In some areas, e.g. 
in parts of the Ciskei and Chatsworth in Durban, the situation is worse, 
(rising to 60 – 70% or more).68 
This level of poverty, deeply rooted in the black and colored 
communities, would have understandably left scars on these segments of 
society. 
Apartheid also caused an educational crisis among the black and colored 
people of South Africa.  The educational system reflected the deeply racist 
policies of apartheid.  One commentator noted that by the time apartheid 
ended, for every one hundred black children entering the first grade only 
seventy–nine passed to the second grade.69  Only forty–nine percent passed 
to the seventh grade.70  For whites there was a stark contrast.  Fully ninety–
eight percent of all white children completed twelve years of education by 
the time apartheid ended.71  By the fall of apartheid there was also a 
substantial difference in the per capita spending on education for blacks and 
whites.  South Africa spent R3,739.00 on education for whites and R930.00 
on education for blacks.72  Not only are these figures disturbing, but they 
also have a long–term impact on the ability of blacks to increase their 
earning capacity and be successful in running a representative democracy. 
Violence against children was not uncommon.  “In 1987 . . . the 
International Commission of Jurists sent four Western European lawyers to 
South Africa.”73  In their report, they noted that “an undemocratic 
government has extended the executive power of the state so as to 
undermine the rule of law and destroy basic human rights . . . . We stress 
particularly the widespread use of torture and violence, even against 
children, which is habitually denied by the government and thus goes 
unpunished, though plainly illegal.”74  One can only speculate about the 
  
 66. Id. at 5. 
 67. Id.  
 68. ATMORE, supra note 62, at 5 (citing John Hansen, Food and Nutrition Policy 
With Relation to Poverty: The Child Malnutrition Problem in South Africa 7, Carnegie Conf. 
Paper, No. 205 SALDRU, University of Cape Town, 1984). 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 236. 
 74. Id. 
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long–term impact on a society of a government that chose to inflict such 
widespread violence upon its children.  According to one commentator, 
“children may be socialized into vandalism or find themselves having to 
adopt violent measures as a matter of survival and, in the process, losing 
any sense of right and wrong.  The impact on children’s minds and values of 
the physical violence that they witness and experience, not least at the hands 
of the police, is a matter of grave concern.”75 
One event that brings to light the tragic impact apartheid had on the black 
children of South Africa was the Soweto uprising and the events that led to 
it.  It brought together the legal and social oppression black children 
experienced at the time with the sheer violence that was perpetrated on them 
by the government.  In 1976, an uprising of school children began in the 
Soweto Township in response to the government’s policy that black 
secondary school children in urban areas should all be taught in the 
country’s two official languages: Afrikaans and English.76  In Soweto there 
were not enough teachers that spoke Afrikaans—so the English language 
was predominant.77   Yet, the education department decided to enforce the 
policy anyway and required that social studies and mathematics be taught in 
Afrikaans regardless of whether or not a sufficient number of teachers were 
available.78  At the same time the education department made that decision, 
the government abolished the final year of primary school for black 
students—reducing the number of years required for primary school 
completion from thirteen to twelve.79  The action resulted in a merger of 
senior primary school classes with junior secondary school classes.80  
Overcrowding issues arose,81 and on June 16, 1976 a student protest 
erupted.82  Fifteen thousand school children gathered in Soweto to protest 
these policies and the impact those policies would have on their education.83  
The students did not want “to learn and the teachers did not want to teach in 
the language of the oppressors.”84  The police confronted this group of 
school children and opened fire without warning.85 The children fought back 
with sticks and stones.86  Hundreds of children were injured, two white men 
were stoned to death and a black boy named Hector Pieterson lost his life 
  
 75. Id. at 201-02. 
 76. JOHN ALLEN, RABBLE–ROUSER FOR PEACE 156 (2006). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. JOHN ALLEN, RABBLE–ROUSER FOR PEACE 156 (2006). 
 82. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 483. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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from the bullet of a police officer.87  Hector Pieterson became one more 
symbol for the victimization of blacks by the white minority.88 
It was events like this that brought the attention of the world to South 
Africa and ultimately caused many members of the international community 
to push for economic sanctions against the government of South Africa.89  
On February 11, 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from incarceration—
the culmination of the efforts of many people.90  Shortly thereafter, 
discussions got underway that would eventually lead to an interim 
constitution and a full participatory democracy.91  In April 1994 a 
nationwide election was held and Mandela was elected as the first president 
of a fully democratic South Africa.92  Work was then begun on a new 
constitution, which was to follow closely the various provisions set out in 
the interim constitution.93 
While it seemed as if the democratic elections in South Africa had finally 
delivered the country from the evils of apartheid, it was the results of 
apartheid policies that South Africans in the immediate post–apartheid era 
would still have to deal with.  The newly elected government would have to 
deal with a population wherein a large segment was poorly fed.  A similarly 
large portion had poor health care.  The population was frightened by 
violence that was often times state sponsored, and also the majority of South 
Africans were illiterate. 
E. Post–Apartheid Era 
Against this backdrop of abuse and neglect of South Africa’s children by 
the apartheid government, the democratically elected government of South 
Africa made significant commitments to the welfare of children.  The 
commitment to change this socio–economic dislocation of children started 
with a constitution that contained a bill of rights expressly recognizing 
  
 87. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 483. 
 88. Proof of this symbolism can be seen in the Hector Pieterson memorial just a short 
distance away from the site where he was killed. Included are a stone monument, 
photographs and a plaque in Hector’s honor.  Next to this monument is the Hector Pieterson 
Museum, which is dedicated to the events of those days. 
 89. ALLEN, supra note 76, at 177–79. 
 90. Id. at 313-17 (noting that after Mandela’s release from imprisonment, Arch 
Bishop Desmond Tutu, quoting God’s promise of liberty to Moses, wrote the following to 
Anglicans in Cape Town: “The road ahead may be long and hazardous but at long last it 
seems that what so many have prayed and fasted for, sacrificed and died for, were 
imprisoned, banned and went into exile for [it]…seems more attainable than ever before.”). 
 91. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 594. On December 20, 1991, the first formal 
negotiations occurred between the government, the African National Congress and other 
South African parties.  Id.  The Convention for a Democratic South Africa, known as 
CODESA, had as one of its goals the writing of a new constitution. Id. at 594–95. 
 92. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 263–64. 
 93. Id. at 269.  
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political and social rights for children.94  In fact, South Africa’s Constitution 
was “the first in the world to make an express commitment to children’s 
socio–economic rights.”95  It included not only the classic civil and political 
rights contained in the United States Bill of Rights, but also substantive 
economic and social rights.  These rights included inter alia—basic 
nutrition, shelter and basic health care services.96 
Despite this substantial legal commitment made to children, the reality 
for South African children was something less.  In 2001—five years after 
the constitution was adopted—there were over nineteen million children in 
South Africa.97  At that time, “the most significant challenges facing 
children were poverty,98 child abuse and violence,99 HIV/AIDS,100 and a 
lack of access to services.”101  In the year 2000, many of South Africa’s 
children reported being denied access to basic education because they could 
not afford to pay school fees or purchase school uniforms.102  In the same 
year, over 1.2 million children of school age were not attending school.103  
The reasons related mostly to poverty in their homes.104  Violence in schools 
was also a problem—especially for girls.105 
While the new Constitution and its Bill of Rights were designed to 
protect children from such social ills, the problem was that the economic 
realities of the country made it difficult to enforce those rights under law.  
For example, one “clause . . . gave children the right to security, 
rudimentary nutrition, and basic health services.”106  Yet, the government 
was ill equipped financially to ensure those services were provided.107  
  
 94. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, 1996. 
 95. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND [UNICEF], REFORMING CHILD LAW IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: BUDGETING AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING 33 (2007) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/southafrica/SAF_resources_qachildsupport.pdf [hereinafter 
REFORMING CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA]. 
 96. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 28 (1), 1996. 
 97. CHILDREN’S INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN, RAPID ASSESSMENT: THE 
SITUATION OF CHILDREN IN SOUTH AFRICA 4 (2003) [hereinafter RAPID ASSESSMENT]. 
 98. Id. (Three out of every four children in South Africa live in Poverty, and thirty 
percent of the country’s total population experiencing food uncertainty.). 
 99. Id. In the year 2000 there were over 72,000 crimes committed against children;  
the most common type of crime was common and aggravated assault, and the second most 
common type of crime was sexual crimes—rape being the most prevalent.  Id. at 5. 
 100. Id. at 4. The infant mortality rate due to HIV/AIDS continues to increase among 
South Africans under five years of age.  See Id. at 5. 
 101. RAPID ASSESSMENT, supra note 97, at 4. 
 102. Id. at 5. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 257. 
 107. Briefing from Bianca Robertson – Community Law Centre, Univ. of the W. Cape 
to U.S. People to People Delegation (October 12, 2009) (noting that one of the key 
challenges in implementing the services required under the South African Children’s Act is 
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F.  The Socio–Economic Impact of South African History 
As one of the three currents leading to the passage of South Africa’s 
Children’s Act, the impact of socio–economic forces on the lives of South 
Africa’s children really is self–evident.  The majority of children in this 
society found themselves in such difficult straights that—in a society 
striving to rejoin the world community—the problem could hardly be 
ignored.  South Africa was a land that saw the earliest human beings emerge 
from the jungle.  Yet, from the arrival of Europeans to the departure of the 
National Party from the political scene in South Africa, society was 
increasingly polarized and resources unevenly divided.  It started with 
dislocations resulting from the settler’s need for quality land and—over a 
period of 340 years—resulted in the injustices of apartheid. 
II. CHILDREN AND THE ROMAN-DUTCH HERITAGE IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
The legal system in South Africa is a direct reflection of the changing 
colonial rule that South Africans experienced.  It is, in a very real sense, 
several different legal systems layered on top of each other to form a 
complete whole.  The first layer was already present when Europeans 
arrived in South Africa.  That is, the indigenous people already had their 
own form of conflict resolution and methods of fostering the success of 
children.  Those forms of conflict resolution continued even after Europeans 
arrived with their systems of law.  The continued struggle between these 
various systems has been a trademark of the South African legal system and 
has had a clear impact on the treatment of South African children.   
In African pre–colonial societies, the head of the clan was often the one 
who dispensed justice and resolved conflict between disputing members.108  
This form of individual justice would likely include disputes about care of 
children and possession of children if the parents were unable to care for 
them.  Yet the resolution of these types of disputes did not focus so much on 
the interests of the child as an individual, but on the family as a whole.109  
The overall care and welfare of children in these tribal communities 
belonged to the tribe as a whole.110  These traditions were generally oral 
traditions—as there was no particular need for a written standard protecting 
  
that the need for services far outweighs the capacity of the state to respond financially) (on 
file with author). 
 
 108. READER’S DIGEST, supra note 9, at 24–25 (stating that although the word ‘chief’ 
often implies an autocratic ruler, this was seldom the case in Khoikhoi society. The Chief 
was assisted by a council of clan heads in dealing with matters such as interclan disputes and 
relations with other groups.  Individual justice was normally dealt with at a gathering of all 
the males of a particular clan).  
 109. CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 227 (Trynie Boezaart ed., 2009) [hereinafter CHILD 
LAW]. 
 110. See T. W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 295 (2004). 
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the welfare of children, because it was tended to by all members of the 
family or tribe.111  This traditional system of resolving conflict and settling 
family matters continues even to this day.  In South Africa, these traditional 
systems are known as “customary law.”112  African customary law has been 
defined as “those rules of conduct which the persons living in a particular 
locality have come to recognize as governing them in their relationships 
between one another and between themselves and things.”113  “Customary 
law derives from social practices that the community concerned accepts as 
obligatory.”114  The European legal systems that were brought to South 
Africa were essentially layered on top of the customary law.  The current 
South African Constitution specifically protects customary law and requires 
the courts to enforce customary law as long as it is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution.115 
As the Dutch started to form colonies on the cape, they brought with 
them the Roman–Dutch legal system.116  The Dutch legal system traces its 
roots to the old Roman legal system.117  At the time the Dutch arrived on the 
cape, that legal system viewed the father as the primary protector of a 
child’s welfare.118  Thus, a father’s interests in and rights to a child were 
superior to the mother’s rights.119  The application of this principle was 
usually seen in the context of custody cases in divorce.120  The British also 
brought with them their common law system.121  Under the English system 
that came with the British in 1795, the Roman–Dutch law remained the 
basic common law in South Africa.122  Regarding issues of child welfare, 
the position of the English common law was similar to the Roman–Dutch 
system.  That is, the father’s rights were superior to the rights of the 
  
 111. See BENNETT, supra note 110 at 2 (noting that customary law was unwritten and 
uncodified). See also T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 61–62 (1995) (noting that in some regions of Africa, 
attempts were made by conolial governments to codify customary law). 
 112. Allison D. Kent, Note, Custody, Maintenance, and Succession: The 
Internalization of Women’s and Children’s Rights Under Customary Law in Africa, 28 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 507, 513 (2007). 
 113. Id. (citing A.A. KOLAJO, CUSTOMARY LAW IN NIGERIA THROUGH THE CASES 1 
(2000)). 
 114. BENNETT, supra note 110, at 1. 
 115. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 12, 1996. 
 116. Johanna Margaretha Kruger, Judicial Interference With Parental Authority: A 
Comparative Analysis of Child Protection Measures (Nov. 2003) (unpublished L.L.D. 
thesis), available at http://uir.unisa.ac.za/dspace/handle/10500/2545. 
 117. Id. at 47.  
 118. Id. at 56–57.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Hans Visser, Some Ideas on the “Best Interests of a Child” Principle in the 
Context of Public Schooling, J. CONTEMP. ROMAN DUTCH L. 459 (2007). 
 121. Kruger, supra note 116, at 56.  
 122. Id. 
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mother.123  Children were viewed as the property of the father, and the best 
interests of the child were irrelevant to any discussion custody cases.124  In 
deferring to a father’s superior position in raising children, one court noted 
that a “father knows far better as a rule what is good for his children than a 
Court of Justice.”125  According to one commentator,126 the 1892 case of 
Van Rooyen v Wemer127 accurately summarized the Roman–Dutch rule 
prevailing in South Africa: 
Firstly, as to the father, he is the natural guardian of his legitimate children 
until they attain majority.  During his lifetime he alone may appoint tutors 
to take his place after his death, during his children’s minority .   .   . He 
alone is entitled to their custody, has control over their education, and can 
consent to their marriage.  On the other hand he is bound to maintain them 
until they can maintain themselves.  He no longer enjoys a life interest in 
any part of their property, but where they have means of their own, derived 
either from their own earnings, or other–wise, he can recoup himself for 
his expenses of maintenance out of such means.  He has the right to 
administer their property, but he may lose this right by allowing them to 
live apart from him, and openly to exercise some trade or calling.  Until 
they have thus been virtually emancipated, or until they become majors, 
either by marriage, or by attaining the age of twenty–one years, he has the 
management of their property, except such property as has been left to 
them by others and placed under a different administration.128 
 
Near the end of British colonial rule, however, the prevailing view of 
children as the property of a father started to change.  Several South African 
appellate court cases demonstrate this shift.  In the 1907 case of Cronje v 
Cronje,129 the custody of three children was at issue.130  The children were 
ages fourteen, ten, and eight years.131  The court found that the mother was 
living in an adulterous relationship, but also that the father was not mentally 
healthy and likely unable to care for the children.132  The court opined that 
“[t]he father, as the natural guardian of the children, is by law entitled to 
their custody; but that, of course, is subject to any order the Court may 
make.”133  It went on to note that “[i]n all cases the main consideration for 
  
 123. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Parental Custody:  The Recent Trends, 90 S. 
AFR. L.J. 131 (1973) [hereinafter Parental Custody]. 
 124. Nancy Voigt Wedemeyer, Child Custody: A Central Issue, in DIVORCED 
FATHERS:  RECONSTRUCTING A QUALITY LIFE 105, 106 (1984). 
 125. In re Agar–Ellis, [1883] Ch.D. 317 at 338 (Eng.). 
 126. Kruger, supra note 116, at 56–57.  
 127. (1892) 9 SC 425.  
 128. Id. at 428. 
 129. See Cronje v. Cronje 1907 TS 871 (S. Afr.). 
 130. Id. at 871. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 873–74.  
 133. Id. at 872.  
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the court in making an order with regard to the custody of the children is, 
what is best in the interests of the children themselves.”134  The court noted 
that the best interest of the child is the main consideration in South African 
law as well as in English law.135  Another case arising near the end of 
British rule, Tabb v Tabb,136 involved a post–divorce custody matter.137  The 
court started out by recognizing the principle that “[b]y our law a father is 
the natural guardian of his children, and therefore prima facie entitled to 
their custody.”138  Yet, in contrast to this long held principle, the court went 
on to indicate that: 
No doubt it is as a general rule best that children of tender years should be 
left under the care of their mother; because her love induces her to give 
that personal attention and supervision to their physical and moral welfare 
which a mother can most effectively supply.  And therefore courts often 
give the custody of children to mothers who have been found guilty of 
matrimonial offences, provided that their character is not such as to make 
it prejudicial to the moral welfare of the children that they should remain 
with them.139 
In the end, the court in Tabb did not affirm the trial court’s awarding of 
child custody to the mother because her employment prevented her from 
being fully attentive to the child’s needs.140  Yet it is a clear indication that 
the legal preference for the father was changing—to one in which children 
of “tender years” were more likely to end up living with the mother.  
Finally, Kramarski v Kramarski, 141 was a 1906 case involving the custody 
of three children ages seven, six, and three.142  The wife left her husband, 
taking the three children with her.143  She went to live with her three 
brothers.144  The husband filed suit against the brothers and his wife alleging 
that he had been wrongfully prevented from having access to his wife and 
his children.145  In discussing custody of the children, the appellate court 
first noted that “[p]rima facie a husband is always entitled to the care and 
custody of his children, even though the marriage was celebrated out of this 
country.”146  However, the court went on to state as follows: 
  
 134. Id.   
 135. Cronje, 1907 TS at 873–74. 
 136. 1909 TS 1033 (S. Afr.). 
 137. Id. at 1034.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.   
 140. Id. at 1036.  
 141. 1906 TS 937 (S. Afr.). 
 142. Id. at 937. 
 143. Id. at 938–39.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 939. 
 146. Id. at 941.  
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In the present case the children are of tender years—there is no question of 
that.  Prima facie, therefore, as the Court has more than once laid down, it 
is better for children of tender years to be under the care of the mother, 
especially where the mother has a home, as she has in this case with her 
brothers, and the father has no fixed abode.147 
All three of these cases signaled a shift in the South African legal system 
away from a father–oriented approach.  However, it would not be until after 
independence that a transformation to a “best interests” standard would be 
complete.    
Despite the changes signaled by Cronje, Tabb, and Kramarski, the 
Roman-Dutch principle that fathers had superior rights when it came to 
children remained intact after independence.  In the 1939 case of Calitz v 
Calitz,148 the appellate court of South Africa expressed the current position 
in South Africa as follows: 
Although the patria potestas149 of the Roman law was not recognized in 
the Roman–Dutch law and the parental power belongs to the mother as 
well as the father, there is no doubt that under our law, at any rate as it 
exists today in the Union, the rights of the father are superior to those of 
the mother.150  
It was not until Fletcher v Fletcher151 that a definite departure can be seen 
from the Roman–Dutch law.152  The Fletcher case was a divorce matter pled 
upon the basis of adultery by the wife.153  There were two children, ages 
seven and five.154  The trial court had awarded custody of the children to the 
father.155  In affirming the trial court’s award of custody to the father, the 
  
 147. Kramarski, 1906 TS at 941–42. 
 148. 1939 AD 56.  
 149. Patria potestas is a term from the Roman law meaning “parental authority.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (5th ed. 1979) (stating that this term “denotes the aggregate 
of those peculiar powers and rights which, by the civil law of Rome, belonged to the head of 
a family in respect to his wife, children (natural or adopted), and any remote descendants 
who sprang from him through males only.”). 
 150. See Calitz, 1939 AD at 61. (Despite this overarching principal favoring fathers, 
the Calitz court also recognized that the principles favoring the father over the mother could 
be overcome by proof that the physical or moral well–being of the child would be 
endangered if custody were to be given to the father.). 
 151. 1948 (1) SA 130 (A) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Fletcher]. 
 152. See Sornarajah, supra note 123, at 136 (noting that the case of Fletcher v. 
Fletcher “marks a definite departure from the Roman–Dutch law”). 
 153. Fletcher, supra note 151, at 141. 
 154. Id.   
 155. Id. at 142–43.  
218 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
appellate court finally recognized the rule that in custody matters, “the 
children’s interests must undoubtedly be the main consideration.”156 
In this family court realm, the apartheid government of South Africa 
continued the transformation of the standard governing custody of children.  
In 1953, the Matrimonial Affairs Act was enacted.157  That law stated, inter 
alia, 
Any provincial or local division of the Supreme Court or any judge thereof 
may – 
(a) on the application of either parent of a minor in proceedings for divorce 
or judicial separation in which an order for divorce or judicial separation is 
granted; or 
(b) on the application of either parent of a minor whose parents are 
divorced or are living apart, if it is proved that it would be in the interests 
of the minor to do so, grant to either parent the sole guardianship  .   .   .  or 
sole custody of the minor  .   .   .   .158   
This act clearly resolved any further dispute about the appropriate 
standard to be applied in custody cases in the context of a divorce.  Thus, 
the South African parliament put an end to the Roman–Dutch standard of 
paternal preference and required courts to look at the child’s interests.   
As the apartheid era came to an end, a new Constitution was written to 
guide the affairs of the democratically elected government.159  The 
Constitution contained a bill of rights modeled after various other 
constitutions from around the world.  In a very strong statement on behalf of 
children, the people of South Africa included in their Constitution a bill of 
rights that contained specific provisions for the protection of children and 
advancement of their rights.160  Those specific Constitutional provisions on 
behalf of children have been “hailed internationally as a good example of a 
Constitution providing for the protection and advancement of children’s 
rights.”161  
As a general principle, the Constitution guaranteed that “[a] child’s best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.”162  But the Constitution did not stop there.  A complete list of 
substantive rights afforded to South African children was also 
  
 156. Id. at 134.  See also Sornarajah, supra note 123, at 136 (noting that “until 1948, 
the year of the decision in Fletcher v. Fletcher, it could not with certainty be said whether 
there was one rule governing all custody problems”). 
 157. See Parental Custody, supra note 123, at 137.  
 158. Id. (quoting §5(1) of the Matrimonial Affairs Act 1953). 
 159. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 160. See infra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.  
 161. CHILD LAW, supra note 109, at 265. 
 162. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 28(2), 1996. 
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enumerated.163  Other rights were also provided to children by implication.  
That is, all South Africans were guaranteed the right to “a basic 
education.”164  They were also guaranteed the right to have access to health 
care services165 and sufficient food and water.166  By implication, children 
are protected under those provisions by virtue of their citizenship in South 
Africa.167 
  
 163. Id.  Under the South African Constitution of 1996, every child has the right: 
(a) To a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) To family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment; 
(c) To basic nutrition, shelter, basis health care services and social 
services; 
(d) To be protected from maltreatment, neglect abuse or degradation; 
(e) To be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f) Not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide 
services that – 
(i) Are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or 
(ii) Place at risk the child’s well–being, education, physical or 
mental health or spiritual, moral or social development; 
(g) Not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which 
case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, 
the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of 
time, and has the right to be – 
(i)   kept separately detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii)  treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of 
the child’s age; 
(h) To have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and 
a state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result; and 
(i) Not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in 
times of armed conflict. 
Id. §§ 28(1)(a) –(i). 
 164. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 29, 1996. 
 165. Id. § 27(1)(a). 
 166. Id. § 27(1)(b). 
 167. The basis for including such substantive rights in the South African Constitution 
can be seen from some of the legislative history of the document: 
 
The struggle for democracy in South Africa was not limited to claims 
for political rights.  It included claims for social and economic rights 
such as land, housing and education.  As such, social and economic 
rights were always recognized as human rights.  To deny the 
acceptance of these rights as full human rights in the final 
constitution means that the text will not reflect the aspirations and 
values of the majority of the population. 
 
Submission of the Ad–Hoc Committee for the Campaign for Social and Economic Rights to 
the Theme Committee on Fundamental Rights 1 (April 1995) (S. Afr.).  
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Thus, the legal system in South Africa is a composite of customary law, 
Roman–Dutch law, and finally British common law.  As one commentator 
put it: 
[w]hether we cherish the idea or not, during its prolonged sojourn in South 
Africa the old “two layer cake” has collected a third layer, English law.  
As Lord Tomlin put it in the otherwise somewhat suspect case of Pearl 
Assurance Company v. Union Government [[1934] AC 570 (PC) at 579], 
“it would be idle to assert that development of the Roman-Dutch law in the 
territories now constituting the Union has not been affected appreciably by 
the English law.”168 
This layered system of law—developed over centuries of colonialism—
ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the best interest of the child should 
be the touchstone in dealing with child related issues.  It should be noted 
that the legal system was dominated by white judges,169 thus the focus of the 
jurisprudence undoubtedly had been built in the midst of some inevitable 
biases.170 Yet, the mechanics of addressing a child’s best interests had 
arrived.   
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The international community has made several attempts to advance the 
interests of children and protect them from various forms of abuse and 
neglect.  These efforts occur not only in the form of conventions, protocols, 
and charters on behalf of children, but also in the form of agreements that 
simply advance the protections for human rights in general.  While a 
discussion of all such agreements is beyond the scope of this article, there 
are a few specific efforts that are noteworthy in the development of 
children’s law in South Africa. 
From the time of independence from Great Britain in 1910 to the 
democratic elections in 1991, the relationship between South Africa and the 
international community has certainly ebbed and flowed.  Jan Smuts, an 
author and South African statesman during the first half of the twentieth 
century, was instrumental in the creation of both the League of Nations and 
  
 168. H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 584–85 (1968). 
 169. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 265. 
 170. MANDELA, supra note 1, at 149. Nelson Mandela relates the story of appearing in 
court on behalf of the accused in a criminal case and being asked by the magistrate, “where is 
your certificate?” The “certificate” being no more than the equivalent of a law school 
diploma that no attorney ever carries to court. Because he did not have the certificate the 
magistrate “refused to hear the case, even going so far as to ask a court officer to evict me.” 
Mandela noted that this was clearly a violation of court practice and he attributed it to his 
color. Id .at 150. 
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the United Nations.171  He wrote the Preamble to the United Nations Charter 
and is the only signatory of both the  League of Nations and United Nations 
Charters.172  South Africa was one of the original fifty–one founding 
members of the United Nations—which came into existence on October 24, 
1945.173  Since its inception, membership in the organization has grown to 
192 States.174  Despite its positive participation in formation of the 
international organization, in 1946 the government of South Africa—led by 
then–President Jan Smuts—was condemned by a large majority in the 
United Nations General Assembly for its racist policies.175  While he had 
long been an advocate of South Africa’s racial segregation, as his 
presidential tenure came to an end this international pressure caused Smuts 
to start advocating for more liberal racial laws.176  Yet all of those efforts 
were too little too late—as the National Party came to power in 1948 and 
started to construct apartheid.177 
By 1974 pressure from member states in the United Nations reached a 
point at which apartheid could no longer be ignored.178  The United Nations 
General Assembly decided on November 12, 1974 to suspend South Africa 
from participating in its work—due to international opposition to the policy 
of apartheid.179  During the late 1970s and early 1980s United Nations 
Security Council sanctions were instituted against South Africa, and it was 
barred from officially participating in almost all United Nations related 
bodies.180  Financial support was also given by the United Nations to 
national liberation movements.181  Notably, both the Pan African Congress 
and Africa National Congress obtained observer Missions at the United 
Nations with United Nations financial support.182  It was not until the 
  
 171. See JAN SMUTS – BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN STATESMAN 5 (2008) [hereinafter JAN 
SMUTS].  
 172. Id. at 5.  
 173. S. AFR. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS., Permanent Mission of South Africa to the 
United Nations, S.AFR. MISSIONS IN N.Y., http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Permanent Mission]. 
 174. Id.  
 175. JAN SMUTS, supra  note 171, at 27.  
 176. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 181.  Near the end of his tenure as president, Smuts 
noted that “‘segregation has fallen on evil days.’”  Id.  “[T]he [Smuts] government [also] 
appointed numerous committees and commissions, staffed by reform-minded white people, 
to investigate the racial problems of the country and to [make] plan[s] for the future.”  Id.  
One such report exposed the problems of migrant labor, noting that it was “‘morally, 
socially, and economically wrong’ and looked forward to ‘its ultimate disappearance.’”  Id. 
 177. Permanent Mission, supra note 173. 
 178. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 214.  From 1952 onward, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations passed annual resolutions condemning apartheid.  Id.  By 1967, the 
General Assembly had created both a Special Committee on Apartheid and a Unit on 
Apartheid.  Id. 
 179. Permanent Mission, supra note 173. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
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democratic elections in South Africa in April 1994 that the way was paved 
for complete normalization of South Africa’s relations with the United 
Nations and the reintegration of that country with that world organization.183  
Since then, South Africa has participated actively in all aspects of the work 
of the United Nations.184  
A.  United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
One of the first organized international efforts to protect children in the 
Twentieth Century occurred in the League of Nations in 1924.185  A 
document known as the Declaration of the Rights of the Child—more 
commonly referred to as the Declaration of Geneva—was adopted by the 
Save the Children Union in Geneva, Switzerland on February 23, 1923.186  
Drafted by Eglantyne Jebb, it was brought before the General Assembly of 
the League of Nations in 1924.187  That body approved it in November 1924 
and named it the World Child Welfare Charter.188 
The World Child Welfare Charter consisted of five very basic principles 
to protect the children of the world community: 
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal 
development, both materially and spiritually. 
2. The child that is hungry must be fed, the child that is sick must be 
nursed, the child that is backward must be helped, the delinquent child 
must be reclaimed, and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and 
succored. 
3. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress. 
4. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and must be 
protected against every form of exploitation. 
  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Thoko Kaime, The Foundations of Rights In the African Charter On the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child: A Historical and Philosophical Account, 3 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 
120, 121 (2009). 
 186. International Alliance, SAVE THE CHILD. CANADA, 
http://www.savethechildren.ca./index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=199&Ite
mid=271&lang=en (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 187. Id.  
 188. UNICEF-Company History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/United-Nations-International-Childrens-
Emergency-Fund-UNICEF-Company-History.html. 
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5. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must 
be devoted to the service of its fellow men.189 
While these principles are very basic needs in the life of a child, they are 
important needs that can be traced through future international agreements 
and into the South African Constitution of 1996.  That is, basic food, health 
care, and shelter are mandated by both documents.  Promoting a child’s 
material and spiritual well–being—as well as protecting the child from 
exploitation—are also part of both treatises.   
After World War II, several non-governmental organizations lobbied the 
United Nations to endorse the World Child Welfare Charter.190  Thus, on 
November 20, 1959 the United Nations General Assembly asserted “that the 
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well 
as after birth.”191  Pursuant to this assertion, that organization adopted a 
standard of ten principles for the protection of children which were based 
upon the World Child Welfare Charter.192  Those ten principles were as 
follows: 
1.   The child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this Declaration.  Every 
child, without any exception whatsoever, shall be entitled to these 
rights, without distinction or discrimination on account of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status, whether of himself or of 
his family. 
2.  The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given 
opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him 
to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a 
healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.  
In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the 
child shall be the paramount consideration. 
3.  The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality. 
4.   The child shall enjoy the benefits of social security.  He shall be 
entitled to grow and develop in health; to this end, special care and 
protection shall be provided both to him and to his mother, including 
  
 189. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, League of Nations O.J. 
Spec. Supp. 21, at 43 (Sept. 26, 1924), available at http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm.  
 190. The State of the World’s Children 1996: Fifty Years For Children, UNICEF 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/50years.htm (citing the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child, G.A. Res. 14/1386, U.N. Doc. A/RES/14/1386 (Nov. 20, 1959)).  
 191. Declaration of the Rights of the Child pmbl., G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. 
GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354, at 19 (Nov. 20, 1959).  
 192. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 191. 
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adequate pre–natal and post–natal care.  The child shall have the right 
to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services. 
5.  The child who is physically, mentally or socially handicapped shall be 
given the special treatment, education and care required by his 
particular condition. 
6.  The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, 
needs love and understanding.  He shall, wherever possible, grow up 
in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any 
case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; 
a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be 
separated from his mother.  Society and the public authorities shall 
have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family 
and to those without adequate means of support.  Payment of State 
and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large 
families is desirable. 
7.  The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and 
compulsory, at least in the elementary stages.  He shall be given an 
education which will promote his general culture, and enable him, on 
a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual 
judgment, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to 
become a useful member of society. 
The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those  
responsible for his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in 
the first place with his parents. 
The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which 
should be directed to the same purposes as education; society and the 
public authorities shall endeavour to promote the enjoyment of this 
right. 
8.  The child shall in all circumstances be among the first to receive 
protection and relief. 
9.  The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and 
exploitation.  He shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form. 
The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate 
minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in 
any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or 
education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral 
development. 
10.  The child shall be protected from practices which may foster racial, 
religious and any other form of discrimination.  He shall be brought 
up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, 
peace and universal brotherhood, and in full consciousness that his 
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energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow 
men.193 
This document became known as the United Nations Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child (DRC).194  It is the forerunner of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The World Child Welfare Charter 
and the DRC form the basis for the advancements in children’s rights 
worldwide.  As was the case with the World Child Welfare Charter, when 
reviewing the South African constitution of 1996, some of the substantive 
rights in the DRC can be clearly identified.195  In fact, some of the rights 
afforded children under the DRC can be identified in the South African 
Children’s Act.196 
B. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
On November 20, 1989 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).197  It came into force on 
September 2, 1990 after it was ratified by the requisite number of nations.198  
The CRC sets out the specific obligations of signatory nations in protecting 
the civil, political, economic and social rights of children.  Under the CRC, 
a child is generally defined as “every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier.”199  It recognizes that every child has some very basic rights 
  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  (stating that a child “shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a 
nationality.”).  The South African Constitution indicates that each child has the right to “a 
name and a nationality from birth.”  S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 28(1)(a), 1996.  The South 
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services and social services.”  Id. § 28(1)(c).  Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra 
note 191 (stating that a child “shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation 
and medical services.”). 
 196. See Children’s Act § 38 of 2005 [hereinafter Children’s Act] (stating that one 
objects of the Children’s Act is to promote “the sound physical, psychological, intellectual, 
emotional and social development of children.”).  Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 
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spiritually and socially.”). 
 197. Convention on the Rights of the Child pmbl., opened for signature Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (recognizing the importance of 
principles set down by the Geneva Declaration and the 1959 version of the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child: “Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has 
been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 
1959. . . .”). 
 198. UNTC – Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 199. Id. at art. 1. 
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such as the right to life200 and the right to be raised by his or her parents 
within a given social or cultural grouping.201  It also recognizes that every 
child has the right to a relationship with both parents and that parents have 
the right to exercise their parental responsibilities.202  The CRC recognizes 
that children have the right to be free from abuse and neglect203 and to have 
their opinions heard and acted upon when appropriate.204  Legal 
representation must also be provided to children in any judicial dispute 
regarding a restriction on the child’s liberty.205  The convention also forbids 
capital punishment for children.206  The CRC protects these rights by 
mandating that signatory states: 
[R]espect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, 
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic 
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.207 
Of clear relevance to South Africa is the fact that neither race nor color 
could be used as a basis to deny children the very basic rights afforded to 
every human being.  The CRC also mandated that “[i]n all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”208 
The world community seemed to be communicating that no longer would 
children be viewed as mere chattel to be treated like any other piece of 
property.  Consideration of the best interests of the child required that a 
child be looked at as a human being who had his or her own interests. 
As of January 2010, 194 countries have ratified it—including all member 
states of the United Nations except Somalia and the United States.209  
Further, Somalia’s cabinet ministers have indicated their intent to ratify the 
convention in the near future.210  The United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of the Child is the organization within the United Nations that 
monitors compliance with the CRC.211  Within two years of initially 
  
 200. Id. at art. 6(1).  
 201. Id. at art. 7(1).   
 202. Id. at art. 9.  
 203. Id. at art. 19(1).  
 204. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 197, art. 12. 
 205. Id. at art. 37(d).  
 206. Id. at art. 37(a).  
 207. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 208. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 209. See id. 
 210. Somalia to Join Childs Rights Pact: UN, THE SOMALILAND TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2009, available at http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/408/21.shtml. 
 211. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 197, at art. 43(1). 
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ratifying the CRC and thereafter one time every five years, the signatory 
nations are to submit to the Committee a report on “the measures they have 
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the 
progress made on the enjoyment of those rights.”212  Every two years, the 
Committee is to provide to the General Assembly of the United Nations a 
report on its activities.213 
Two additional protocols were adopted on May 25, 2000.214  The first 
restricted the ability of signatory states to involve children in military 
conflicts.215  The second prohibited the sale of children, child prostitution, 
and child pornography.216  Both protocols have been ratified by more than 
120 states.217  With the finalization of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in 1989 came enthusiasm for reform on the international level as well 
on the national level of various countries.218  Children had become 
independent subjects entitled to rights—not just objects of parental rights 
and protection.219 
South Africa ratified the CRC on June 16, 1995, before the date that its 
new Constitution was ratified.220  Under the new Constitution, treaties are to 
be viewed as legally binding once ratified.221  Thus, by signing on to this 
accord, the South African government was undertaking a significant 
responsibility to its children.  Yet, by following up the ratification of the 
CRC with the implementation of a Constitution that reiterated the 
significance of children’s rights, South Africa demonstrated that it was 
among the world’s leaders in advancing the case of children.222  As can be 
seen with prior international declarations, many provisions of the CRC 
appear in the South African Constitution and the South African Children’s 
  
 212. Id. at art. 44(1). 
 213. Id. at art. 44(5). 
 214. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 
(May 25, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict]; see Optional 
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 215. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 214.  
 216. Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, supra note 214.  
 217. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 197. 
 218. REFORMING CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 95, at 3. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 197. 
 221. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14, § 231(2), 1996. 
 222. One important aspect of effectively constitutionalizing children’s rights is that 
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SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 95, at 4.  The constitutions of Albania, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Moldova, Namibia, Romania, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, Uganda and 
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provides for just such a right.  Id. 
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Act.  In assessing South Africa’s success in advancing the substantive rights 
of its children through legislation, one commentator noted that “South 
Africa continues to lead much of the rest of the world in legislative progress 
and protective laws that safeguard the well–being of children.”223 
C.    World Children’s Summit of 1990 
On September 29-30, 1990 a World Summit for Children was held at the 
United Nations in New York.224  It was the largest gathering of world 
leaders in history.225  It included seventy-one heads of state and government 
and eighty-eight other senior officials—mostly at the ministerial level.226  
The stated purpose of the Summit was to “undertake a joint commitment 
and to make an urgent universal appeal to give every child a better 
future.”227  South Africa, however, was not represented at that summit.228  It 
continued to be excluded from the operations of the United Nations because 
the worldwide struggle against apartheid was continuing.229 
Over the two day summit, the World Declaration on the Survival, 
Protection and Development of Children was adopted.230  The document 
recognized that several challenges faced the children of the world.  It 
expressed that “[e]ach day, millions of children suffer from the scourges of 
poverty and economic crisis—from hunger and homelessness, from 
epidemics and illiteracy, from degradation of the environment.”231  It also 
noted that “[e]ach day, 40,000 children die from malnutrition and disease, 
including acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), from the lack of 
clean water and inadequate sanitation and from the effects of the drug 
problem.”232  And in a clear reference to the problems of South Africa, the 
Declaration noted: 
Each day, countless children around the world are exposed to the dangers 
that hamper their growth and development.  They suffer immensely as 
casualties of war and violence; as victims of racial discrimination, 
apartheid, aggression, foreign occupation and annexation; as refugees and 
  
 223. Children’s Bill ‘a Major Step’, NEWS24.COM   
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 224. REFORMING CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 95, at 10. 
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 230. World Declaration of 1990, supra note 227. 
 231. Id. § 5. 
 232. Id. § 6. 
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displaced children, forced to abandon their homes and their roots; as 
disabled; or as victims of neglect, cruelty and exploitation.233 
These were the challenges facing the world’s children—which the 
world’s political leaders needed to meet.  South Africa’s apartheid system 
was specifically targeted as one of those challenges. 
In its effort to embrace past efforts to help children, the Summit 
specifically recognized the positive impact the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child had on children.234  It noted that the CRC “provides a new 
opportunity to make respect for children’s rights and welfare truly 
universal.”235  It recognized that improvements in the international 
climate—such as the movement that created the CRC—could significantly 
improve the plight of children.236  The opportunity to help children was 
further seized upon by the Summit when it adopted a Plan of Action for 
Implementing the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and 
Development of Children.  The Plan of Action called for the various 
signatory nations to inter alia report on their progress in implementing the 
Plan of Action. 
Despite the fact that South Africa did not participate in the Summit, its 
new democratically elected government picked up the standard of the Plan 
of Action.  Efforts were made by South Africa to bring itself into 
compliance with the goals set out at the Summit.  To that end, in 2001 South 
Africa prepared an End–Decade Report on Children to report on its progress 
in complying with the goals of the Plan of Action.  Clearly, the post–
apartheid government was trying to rehabilitate its reputation and improve 
the plight of its children.   
D.   The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
In 1990 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.237  Called the “African 
Children’s Charter,” it required ratification of at least fifteen of the 
organization’s members before it could enter into force.238  Not until 
November 29, 1999 did the requisite number of member states approve its 
terms.239  South Africa ratified the document on January 7, 2000.240  The 
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three anchoring principles of the African Children’s Charter are “the best 
interests of the child, the principle of non–discrimination, and the primacy 
of the Charter over harmful cultural practices and customs.”241  
The African Children’s Charter notes that in all actions concerning 
children, the best interests of the child “shall be the primary 
consideration.”242  Under the Charter, children are entitled to equal 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Charter regardless of who they 
are or who their parents are.243  Some of the grounds on which 
discrimination is outlawed include fortune, birth, or other status of the child, 
parent, or guardian.244  Demonstrating the desire by participating nations to 
outlaw certain customary practices deemed harmful to children, the Charter 
outlaws customs that are prejudicial to the health or life of the child and 
discriminatory to the child based on sex or other status.245  Yet the most 
relevant provision to South Africa at the time it was drafted was the 
reference to the assistance to be provided to children living under apartheid: 
States parties shall undertake to provide whenever possible, material 
assistance to such children and to direct their efforts towards elimination 
of all forms of discrimination and Apartheid on the African continent.246   
As with the World Declaration that came out of the World Children’s 
Summit, the OAU’s African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
was specifically targeting apartheid as harmful to the development of 
children. 
E.   Children’s Charter of South Africa 
An International Summit on the Rights of Children in South Africa was 
held on May 27 – June 1, 1992 in Cape Town, South Africa.247  It was held 
as a part of the International Summit on the Rights of Children in South 
Africa held later in June of that same year.248  The Summit brought together 
over 200 children from around South Africa.249  They represented various 
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races, classes, genders, and disabilities.250  The discussion focused on the 
various problems they were facing as children in South Africa.251  They 
spoke about the fact that apartheid was still affecting them and that children 
were not being treated with respect and dignity in South Africa.252  This 
Summit occurred after the release of Nelson Mandela—but before a 
democratically elected government took office.  With that transitional 
period as a background, the Summit noted the following: 
It is [a]cknowledg[ed] that, at the present time, children have not been 
placed on the agenda of any political party, or the existing government or 
within the CODESA negotiations and are not given the attention that they 
deserve.253 
From this Summit came a framework for children’s rights in South 
Africa.  Known as the Children’s Charter of South Africa, the framework 
asserted that “all children are created equal and are entitled to basic human 
rights and freedoms and that all children deserve respect and special care 
and protection as they develop and grow.”254  Yet, the Children’s Charter 
also noted that “within South Africa, children have not been treated with 
respect and dignity, but as a direct result of apartheid have been subjected to 
discrimination, violence, and racism that has destroyed families and 
communities and has disrupted education and social relationships.”255 
Despite this bleak assessment by her own children—and based partly 
upon its commitment to the international accords noted prior—South Africa 
set out to transform international principals into concrete domestic laws.  As 
referenced above, South Africa’s Constitution provides an extensive list of 
fundamental rights that are guaranteed to all of its citizens—including 
children.256  However, it was not until 2006, with enactment of the 
Children’s Act of 2005, that South Africa fully realized the goals set out in 
the CRC. 
F.  The Impact of International Agreements 
The impact of international agreements on the development of the South 
African Constitution of 1996 and the South African Children’s Act cannot 
be overemphasized.  The rights afforded children in both documents mirror 
the rights enumerated by the international agreements that preceded them.  
More obviously, the South African Children’s Act has as one of its specific 
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objectives to “give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the well–
being of children in terms of international instruments binding on the 
Republic.”257  As one of the currents that led to adoption of the Children’s 
Act, the force of international agreements was specifically enumerated by 
the South African Legislature in the Act.258 
IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHILDREN’S ACT 
In the United States, the importance and relevance of a given piece of 
legislation to our society can often be picked up from the legislative history 
of that legislation.  The goals of proponents and concerns of opponents are 
often revealed in the debates that occur and the reports that are prepared by 
drafting committees.  South Africa is no different.  In that respect, the South 
Africa Law Reform Commission (SALRC) is an important starting point.  
The SALRC was established by the South African Law Reform 
Commission Act 19 of 1973.259  The purpose of the SALRC is:  
“[t]o do research with reference to all branches of the law of the Republic 
and to study and investigate all such branches in order to make 
recommendations for the development, improvement, modernisation or 
reform thereof . . . . [i]n short, the Commission is an advisory body whose 
aim is the renewal and improvement of the law of South Africa on a 
continuous basis.”260 
 
In 1997, the South African Law Reform Commission was asked to 
investigate and review South Africa’s Child Care Act of 1983.261  The 
functioning and principles underlying that Act had been the subject of 
debate among practitioners, social workers, and child and youth care 
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workers since it came into operation in 1987.262  The SALRC was asked to 
review that Act and make recommendations to the Minister for Social 
Development for reform of this law.263  From the beginning of the process, 
however, the Commission viewed its mandate as broader than simply 
reviewing the Child Care Act of 1983.264  Socio–economic forces in South 
Africa had resulted in a desire by the people for greater protection of 
substantive rights.  These socio–economic forces had been building since 
the first Europeans arrived on the Cape.  International protocols and 
conventions, which were adopted by South Africa, encouraged and indeed 
mandated such protections on behalf of children.  The legal system in South 
Africa as a whole had arrived at a place in its historical development 
wherein the best interest of the child was the guiding principle.  These three 
currents started to converge now that apartheid had ended.  The SALRC 
undertook its review in that environment.  The Commission viewed its 
mandate as one that included a review of all statutory, customary, common, 
and religious laws affecting children.265   
The process of review included the publication of an issue paper in May 
1998.266  That paper was followed by a series of research papers on specific 
areas such as the parent–child relationship, children living with HIV/AIDS, 
children living on the street, children in residential care, and child 
protection.267  In December 2001 a lengthy discussion paper was issued by 
the SALRC outlining the Commission’s preliminary findings and 
recommendations.268  After further deliberations and revisions, in 2002, the 
SALRC issued a final report on its review of the Child Care Act of 1983.269   
One of the most basic issues to address was who would be covered by the 
new Children’s Act, i.e., what was the definition of a child? In a country as 
diverse and culturally rich as South Africa, the question was not necessarily 
easy.  As it analyzed this issue, the SALRC reviewed the test of childhood 
under various international protocols and under the laws of various other 
countries.270  They also reviewed the various standards that existed within 
South Africa itself.271  In the end, the recommendation made by SALRC and 
the one adopted in the Children’s Act was consistent with the international 
trend, i.e., a child is defined as a person under the age of eighteen.272   
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It was to benefit this group of South Africans that in June 2006 President 
Thabo Mbeki signed into law Act Number 38 of 2005—the South African 
Children’s Act.273  It was the culmination of many years of work by South 
Africans committed to the concept that protecting children was essential to 
the success of their republic.  South African children were to be treated as 
individuals with rights of their own rather than simply relying on parents for 
protection.  As one South African judge noted:  
Every child has his or her own dignity.  If a child is to be constitutionally 
imagined as an individual with distinctive personality, and not merely as a 
miniature adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a 
mere extension of his parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim with 
them.274 
To that end, the Act was a very comprehensive piece of legislation.  It 
contained twenty–two chapters and addressed, in one act, custodial rights in 
family court situations,275 child protection,276 termination of parental 
rights,277 adoption,278  kidnapping,279 trafficking of children,280 and 
surrogacy.281                 
The purposes of the Act were very clearly delineated.  According to its 
terms, the Act was designed with the following goals in mind: 
(a) to promote the preservation and strengthening of families;  
(b) to give effect to the following constitutional rights of children, namely- 
(i) family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment; 
(ii) social services; 
(iii) protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; and 
(iv) that the best interests of a child are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child; 
(c) to give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the well-being 
of children in terms of international instruments binding on the Republic; 
(d) to make provision for structures, services and means for promoting and 
monitoring the sound physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional and 
social development of children; 
(e) to strengthen and develop community structures which can assist in 
providing care and protection for children; 
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(f) to protect children from discrimination, exploitation and any other 
physical, emotional or moral harm or hazards; 
(g) to provide care and protection to children who are in need of care and 
protection; 
(h) to recognize the special needs that children with disabilities may have; 
and 
(i) generally, to promote the protection, development and well-being of 
children.282 
These goals were designed by the SALRC because the Child Care Act of 
1983 did not contain such goals and a need for them existed.283  That is, 
such a list was needed to guide decision–makers in implementing the 
provisions of the new Act.284  Such guidance would also be needed by 
decision–makers when determining how they should allocate scarce social 
resources and services to the children who are most at risk and how they can 
ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable children are met.285  The 
SALRC also opined that such a clearly formulated list of goals was needed 
because of the recent rise in the number of reported cases of child abuse and 
neglect as well as the crisis faced by South Africa with the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.286  
After setting forth these goals for the Act, the SALRC recommended—
and the legislature adopted—a separate chapter devoted exclusively to 
outlining the general principles to be used as a guide when interpreting the 
Act.  The prefatory comments to the general principles chapter are very 
enlightening.  They note: 
(1) The general principals set out in this section guide – 
(a) The implementation of all legislation applicable to children, 
including this Act; and 
(b) All proceedings, actions and decisions by any organ of state in 
any matter concerning a child or children in general.287 
These prefatory comments make the Act an incredibly sweeping piece of 
legislation—given that the Children’s Act is intended to guide all aspects of 
legislation related to children and is intended to guide all actions by any 
organ of the state when dealing with children’s issues.   
  
 282. Id. at ch. 1, § 2.  
 283. SA Law Commission Executive Summary Review of the Child Care Act, iv 
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 285. Id.  
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The central focus of the chapter on general principles is that “[i]n all 
matters concerning the care, protection and well–being of a child the 
standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount importance, must be 
applied.”288  While the Act does not specifically set forth a definition of the 
best interest of the child, it does set forth a list of factors that must be 
weighed in the balance in a given set of circumstances.  This is the set of 
factors that must be considered when analyzing a child’s best interests in 
any court proceeding, governmental action or legislative process involving a 
child.  
A. The Best Interests of the Child in the Balance 
In its Discussion Paper of 2002, the SALRC addressed the existence of a 
dispute about whether the “best interest of the child” standard should be left 
to courts to define or whether legislative input was appropriate.289  The 
SALRC came down squarely on the side of legislative input.  It noted: 
The commission is convinced of the need to include guidance to the courts 
and other users of the new children’s statute as to what exactly it means 
when it is said that a particular decision or action must be in the best 
interests of a particular child.  In this regard, we recommend that such 
guidelines be included in the body of the substantive act, ideally following 
on the confirmation that in all matters concerning children, the best 
interests of the child shall be paramount.290 
The way in which the SALRC arrived at its recommended standard for 
best interest of the child is notable.  Understandably, it started by looking at 
South African judicial precedent.  Specifically, it discussed two court cases.  
The first was the 1994 case of McCall v McCall 291 and the second was the 
1991 case of Märtens v Märtens.292  In McCall, the appellate court, in its 
discussion of the appropriate method to assess the best interest of the child, 
held as follows:  
In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the Court must 
decide which of the parents is better able to promote and ensure his 
physical, moral, emotional and spiritual welfare.  This can be assessed by 
reference to certain factors or criteria which are set out hereunder, not in 
order of importance, and also bearing in mind that there is a measure of 
unavoidable overlapping and that some of the listed criteria may differ 
only as to nuance.  The criteria are the following: 
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(a)  The love, affection and other emotional ties which exist between 
parent and child and the parent’s compatibility with the child; 
(b) The capabilities, character and temperament of the parent and the 
impact thereof on the child’s needs and desires; 
(c) The ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the 
parent’s insight into, understanding of and sensitivity to the child’s 
feelings. 
(d) The capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the 
guidance which he requires; 
(e) The ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the 
child, the so-called ‘creature comforts’, such as food, clothing, housing 
and the other material needs – generally speaking, the provision of 
economic security; 
(f) The ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and 
security of the child, both religious and secular; 
(g) The ability of the parent to provide for the child’s emotional, 
psychological, cultural and environmental development; 
(h) The mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent; 
(i) The stability or otherwise of the child’s existing environment, having 
regard to the desirability of maintaining the status quo; 
(j) The desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together; 
(k) The child’s preference if the Court is satisfied that in the particular 
circumstances the child’s preference should be taken into consideration; 
(l) The desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex 
matching, particularly here, whether a boy…should be placed in the 
custody of his father; and 
(m) Any other factor which is relevant to the particular case with which 
the Court is concerned.293 
The SALRC report then turned to the parental custody case of Märtens v 
Märtens.  In that case the appellate court relied on earlier case law when 
setting out this shorter list of guidelines: 
1. The sense of security of the children, involving an examination of the 
extent to which a parent makes the children feel wanted and loved; 
2. The suitability of the custodian parent involving and examination of 
the character of the custodial parent, with particular reference to the 
ability of the parent to guide the moral, cultural and religious 
development of the children; 
3. Material consideration relating to the well-being of the children; and 
4. The wishes of the children.294    
This analysis of prior judicial precedent in South Africa seems quite 
normal for a legislative consulting body such as the SALRC.  The analysis 
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that followed, however, demonstrates the extent to which South Africa is 
open to ideas from the outside.  That is, the SALRC turned to a discussion 
of three foreign sources for analyzing the best interests of a child.   
The first foreign source that was discussed was the Canadian Special 
Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access.295  The report issued by that 
Committee was entitled For the Sake of the Children.296  This Committee 
listed fourteen separate factors that ought to be considered in analyzing a 
child’s best interests in custody cases.297  Many of those factors are similar 
to the ones ultimately adopted by South Africa’s legislature.  
Next, the SALRC turned to a discussion of Australia’s child custody 
statute.298  That statute had twelve factors that needed consideration by a 
court when addressing a child’s best interests.299  It is significant to note 
that, while the discussion paper issued by the SALRC was over 1,300 pages 
long, the discussion of this Australian legislation was little more than one 
page in length.  Yet, the SALRC noted that “such a list can be adapted to 
South African circumstances with little difficulty.”300  It then recommended 
that South Africa adopt a list of factors that is virtually identical to the 
Australian statute.     
The Act that was eventually signed into law reflected a list of fifteen 
factors—slightly longer than the Australian version.  Those factors are part 
of the chapter on general principles—and are as follows: 
7.   (1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child 
standard to be applied, the following factors must be taken into 
consideration where relevant, namely- 
 
(a) the nature of the personal relationship between– 
(i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care–giver or person relevant in those 
circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards- 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of 
the child; 
(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other 
care-giver or person, to provide for the needs of the child, including 
emotional and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s 
circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation 
from- 
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(i) both or either of the parents; or  
(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or 
person, with whom the child has been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with 
the parents, or any specific parent, and whether that difficulty or 
expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal 
relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on 
a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child– 
(i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended 
family; and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended 
family, culture or tradition;  
(g) the child’s– 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child;  
(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her 
intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family 
environment and, where this is not possible, in an environment 
resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological 
harm that may be caused by– 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation 
or degradation or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or 
other harmful behavior; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill–
treatment, violence or harmful behavior towards another person; 
(m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the 
child; and 
(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimize further legal or 
administrative proceedings in relation to the child. 
 
(2) In this section “parent” includes any person who has parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child.301  
 
8.   (1) The rights which a child has in terms of this Act supplement the rights   
which a child has in terms of the Bill of Rights. 
 
(2) All organs of state in any sphere of government and all officials, 
employees and child has in terms of the Bill of Rights.302 
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It is ironic that—in light of South Africa’s unique history and the stated 
desire to Africanize its legislation—such a wholesale adoption of a foreign 
family code would have occurred.  Especially that such a foreign code 
would be from a non–African country.  Yet this might be seen as simply an 
indication that South Africa is open to ideas from foreign sources without 
any parochial concerns or prejudice. 
The factor that is notably missing from the above list is “the wishes of the 
child.”  However, as an indication of the importance of the child’s wishes, 
the South African Children’s Act sets forth that factor in a separate section 
immediately following the above list of factors.  It notes that “[e]very child 
that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to 
participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in 
an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due 
consideration.”303  Thus, the voices of children are to be heard in any matter 
involving them. 
B.  The Impact on Customary Law Related to Children 
Customary law remains a very real part of South African jurisprudence, 
albeit a difficult one to manage because of its basis in oral tradition.  
Nevertheless, nothing in the South African Children’s Act changes that 
legal reality.  As related above, customary law is defined as “those rules of 
conduct which the persons living in a particular locality have come to 
recognize as governing them in their relationships between one another and 
between themselves and things.”304  While the Constitution makes it very 
clear that such customary laws are enforceable, some of that customary law 
could have very negative consequences for children.  To that end, the South 
African Children’s Act specifically prohibits some of the most egregious 
customary law practices and provides that “every child has the right not to 
be subjected to social, cultural and religious practices which are detrimental 
to his or her well-being.”305  In Africa as a whole, some of those practices 
include such things as female genital mutilation, killing of baby twins, 
arranged marriages, male primogeniture, and child marriages.306 
Thus, the Children’s Act of South Africa remains faithful to its 
multilayered legal system but attempts to limit some of the most harmful 
aspects of tribal law.  As one commentator put it, “[c]ustomary law is an 
active and integral part of the South African community and its application 
is bound to bring about some challenges to the courts.  There is no doubt 
that within the constitutional dispensation, in any dispute where parties rely 
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on customary law pertaining to or affecting children, such law will have to 
be measured against the best interest of the child.”307  
C. Specific Substantive Provisions 
As mentioned above, the South African Children’s Act addresses a broad 
range of child related issues including the rights and responsibilities 
possessed by parents and those filling the role of parents.  The Children’s 
Act indicates that under the law of South Africa, a person may have the 
following rights and responsibilities regarding a child:  the right to care for a 
child; the right to maintain contact with the child; the right to act as 
guardian of the child; and the right/responsibility to contribute to the 
maintenance of the child.308  These basic rights are the ones addressed in 
various sections of the Act and can be possessed and exercised by parents, 
relatives or—under certain circumstances—third parties.309  In addition to 
outlining the rights of parents, the Act also has various substantive 
provisions that impact the rights of children and define the mechanisms for 
enforcing those rights. 
The Act addresses the operation of children’s courts310 and methods for 
addressing children in need of care and protection.311  The provisions related 
to children in need of care and protection not only set out the circumstances 
under which a child will be found in need of care and protection but also the 
procedures to be followed when such a finding is made.  In addition, the Act 
creates two nation–wide registers for purposes of monitoring cases 
involving children in need of care and protection:   
(1) The Director–General must keep and maintain a register to be called 
the National Child Protection Register. 
(2) The National Child Protection Register consists of a Part A and a Part 
B. National Child Protection Register.312 
Part A of the Register is used to keep a record of abuse or neglect 
inflicted on specific children—as well as a record of the circumstances 
surrounding such abuse or neglect.313  This information is to be used to 
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protect these children from further abuse or neglect.314  Part B of the 
Register is established for the purpose of having a record of people who are 
unsuitable to work with children in order to protect children in general from 
abuse by this population of individuals.315 
The South African legislature also addressed a chronic health problem for 
children in that country when it included in the Children’s Act several 
provisions related to HIV/AIDS.316  That public health menace has impacted 
large numbers of South African children.317  If a particular child has not 
actually been killed or infected with HIV/AIDS, then the child has likely 
been affected by the illness in other ways.318  Testing children for 
HIV/AIDS is addressed in Chapter 7 of the Children’s Act: 
(1) Subject to section 132, no child may be tested for HIV except when– 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child and consent has been given in 
terms of subsection (2); or 
(b) the test is necessary in order to establish whether- 
(i) a health worker may have contracted HIV due to contact in the 
course of a medical procedure involving contact with any substance 
from the child’s body that may transmit HIV; or 
(ii) any other person may have contracted HIV due to contact with 
any substance from the child’s body that may transmit HIV, 
provided the test  has been authorized by a court. 
(2) Consent for a HIV–test on a child may be given by– 
(a) the child, if the child is– 
(i) 12 years of age or older; or 
(ii) under the age of 12 years and is of sufficient maturity to 
understand the benefits, risks and social implications of such a test; 
(b) the parent or care-giver, if the child is under the age of 12 years and 
is not of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social 
implications of such a test; 
(c) the provincial head of social development, if the child is under the 
age of 12 years and is not of sufficient maturity to understand the 
benefits, risks and social implications of such a test; 
(d) a designated child protection organization arranging the placement 
of the child, if the child is under the age of 12 years and is not of 
sufficient maturity 
(e) the superintendent or person in charge of a hospital, if– 
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(i) the child is under the age of 12 years and is not of sufficient 
maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of 
such a test; and 
(ii) the child has no parent or care–giver and there is no designated 
child protection organization arranging the placement of the child; 
or 
(f)  the children’s court, if 
(i) consent in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) is unreasonably 
withheld; or 
(ii) the child or the parent or care–giver of the child is incapable of 
giving consent.319 
 
The very notion that a child–centered law like the South African 
Children’s Act needs to specifically address the rights and obligations of 
children and government institutions in testing for HIV/AIDS demonstrates 
the severity of the problem and the extent to which the people and 
government of that nation recognize the issue they are facing.  This growing 
menace to the lives of Africa’s children was also addressed at the World 
Children’s Summit320 and identified in the Children’s Charter of South 
Africa.321 
Domestic and inter–country adoptions are also regulated by the 
Children’s Act.  The focus of the inter–country adoption provisions was to 
give effect to the Hague Convention on Inter–Country Adoptions.322  The 
Act notes that the Hague Convention has been enacted by the South African 
legislature and its provisions are “law in the Republic.”323  In a step that 
seems to implicate its own sovereignty, the South African legislature 
included the provision that “[t]he ordinary law of the Republic applies to an 
adoption to which the Convention applies but, where there is a conflict 
between the ordinary law of the Republic and the Convention, the 
Convention prevails.”324 
The Children’s Act also addresses the issues of Child Abduction and 
Child Trafficking.  Both issues are addressed by adopting international 
accords to which South Africa is a signatory nation.  The Hague Convention 
on International Child Abduction has been adopted and is recognized as 
“the law in the Republic.”325  The United Nations Protocol to Prevent 
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Trafficking in Persons has also been adopted.326  It too is recognized as “the 
law in the Republic.”327 
The final topic addressed by the Act is surrogate motherhood.328 Prior to 
the Children’s Act, South Africa did not have any statutory guidance in 
surrogate situations.329  Thus, the only way that a couple commissioning a 
surrogate mother could become the parents was through an adoption after 
the birth of the child.330  In addition, any agreements that were made 
between a surrogate and a commissioning couple would be unenforceable as 
against public policy.331  The Children’s Act changed that situation and put 
in place specific laws governing surrogacy including, inter alia, the 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements as long as they are in writing.332 
Clearly, in crafting the South African Children’s Act, policymakers in 
that country wanted to protect the best interests of the child.  They did so in 
essentially three ways:  First, they established a list of criteria that courts 
must weigh in the balance when determining what is in the best interests of 
children.  Second, they respected the customary law of the indigenous 
people while at the same time precluding the enforcement of that customary 
law if it is harmful to children.  Third, they set out some substantive 
provisions to specifically address certain aspects of child related law.  Given 
the manner in which the SALRC workshopped the legislation and discussed 
the various currents of South African society, the Act clearly reflects the 
experience of that country and its children.     
V.  REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILDREN’S ACT:  AN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Although there has certainly been some criticism of the South African 
Children’s Act, it has been a success if for no other reason than the fact that 
it put children’s issues at the forefront of discussion and debate.  It is an 
example of a country trying to improve the situation of children within its 
borders—when those children have been routinely subjected to all forms of 
racism, abuse and neglect.  While it is very much a “South African” piece of 
legislation, there are some very informative reflections that can be made on 
the Act. 
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A. The Currents of American Society 
The extent and depth of the three currents that led to the South African 
Children’s Act are specific to that country.  The United States has not 
undergone some of the socio–economic troubles that faced South Africa. 
Yet there was a period in United States history when members of our 
society with colored skin were treated with the same level of dehumanizing 
conduct that people of color met in South Africa.  The United States 
Constitution initially viewed a black person as being equal to three–fifths of 
a white person.333  Native Americans, those who resided in this land before 
white settlers, were not counted as individuals under the United States 
Constitution.334  These groups—and their children—faced issues similar to 
the ones faced by South African blacks during apartheid.  For the children 
of black slaves in the American South, mortality rates were very high: 
In the United States in 1850, 51 percent of all black deaths were children 
younger than nine.  Until age fourteen, the mortality rate of slave children 
was twice that of the white population.  A slave infant was 2.2 times more 
likely to die than a white baby, and white children between five and 
fourteen survived 1.9 times more often than did slave children of the same 
ages.335 
Life was very short for the average child of a black slave.  If the child’s 
life was not short, it was generally marked by poverty and malnutrition.  
One commentator, noting the specific level of malnutrition on the part of 
slave children in Appalachia, indicated that “slave children were 
malnourished in patterns that parallel conditions in contemporary poor 
nations.”336  What is more startling is the fact that in Appalachia this 
malnutrition was part of the profit generating strategy of white masters.337  
For the same group of Appalachian slaves, education was almost non-
existent.  By 1870, five years after the ratification of the XIII Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, three quarters of black Appalachians were 
illiterate.338  Violence was also a daily event for black children in the 
American South—especially in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.339  
Although this socio–economic oppression did not change overnight, the 
passage of Amendment XIII to the United States Constitution in 1865 
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started to change some of these patterns.340  However, unlike the elective 
process which swept away apartheid, the American transition out of the era 
of slavery was accompanied by the bloodiest conflict in our nation’s history.  
Even then, Jim Crow laws re–enforced a situation of de facto racial 
separation in our country until the 1960’s.  Perhaps the singular difference 
between these two currents in South Africa and the United States is the 
percentage of the population that was affected.  In South Africa the racist 
policies of apartheid hit 84% of the population by the end of apartheid.341  
The remaining percentage was white.  In the United States the percentage of 
African Americans is significantly smaller.  That smaller percentage of 
racially oppressed people would not have the same political influence when 
set free as did the same group of people when set free in South Africa.  The 
children in both situations would have been impacted, but the ground swell 
of support for sweeping change along the lines of an American Children’s 
Act would have been substantially less in the United States at the end of the 
slavery era. 
The societal current seen in the South African court system’s progression 
to a “best interest of the child” standard was also seen in American 
jurisprudence.342  As with South Africa, the United States was impacted by 
English common law.  Unlike South Africa, the United States was largely 
unaffected by Roman Dutch law.  Nevertheless, the English law of paternal 
preference was brought to the United States during the colonial period.  Just 
as in South Africa, the American courts struggled with this preference and 
eventually transitioned away from it.  The transition generally occurred in 
the form of replacing the paternal preference with a maternal preference, or 
“tender years” doctrine.  That doctrine would then be ultimately replaced 
with a “best interests” standard.  Thus, both nations followed that same path 
in their jurisprudence. 
One striking difference between the South African progress toward 
development of the Children’s Act and the experience of the United States 
is the reception received by international agreements in the two nations.  As 
a society, the United States of America was built with input from other 
countries and other cultures.  We have been able to take the best from other 
countries and other cultures and combine it into something better and 
something all our own.  Yet, in the realm of accepting input from beyond 
our borders on children’s issues, we have been less than receptive.  The 
  
 340. Amendment XIII to the United States Constitution prohibited slavery and 
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the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
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 342. For a more complete discussion of the American transition from British Common 
Law to the “best interest of the child” standard, see Thomas J. Walsh, In the Interest of a 
Child: A Comparative Look at the Treatment of Children Under Wisconsin and Minnesota 
Custody Statutes, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 929, 930–33 (2002). 
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United States still has not adopted the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.  It shares that distinction with Somalia.  President Barak Obama has 
indicated that the failure of our country to adopt the CRC is embarrassing.343  
Other examples could be given, but just in the context of this discussion we 
can see the rejection by the United States of the Charter for the League of 
Nations.  Yet it was the League of Nations that participated in the initial 
advancement of children’s issues by passing the World Child Welfare 
Charter.  President Woodrow Wilson, very much a proponent of that 
organization, was unable to convince the United States Congress that 
participation was in our national interests. 
The reasons for this disinterest by United States policy makers are varied.  
Yet, it is often the case that the true value of something depends entirely on 
what it is compared with.  In that sense, looking at the legislative actions of 
other countries and of international organizations would help the United 
States continue the process of infusing new ideas into our nation.  The 
SALRC recognized that very fact when it opined that “[i]nternational 
instruments on children’s issues, by their very nature, represent a common 
pool of wisdom, and a culmination of efforts to ensure recognition of 
children’s rights.”344  South Africa was very willing to look at the 
community of nations to see if someone might be doing it better.  A review, 
for example, of the South African Children’s Act by United States 
policymakers may assist in legislative efforts to protect and advance the 
interests of children in this country.  As one American commentator noted, 
“[m]uch of the product of our courts and lawyers could be improved by 
taking more of an international and comparative view.”345 
B. Nationwide Legislation and Law Reform 
The Children’s Act is different from what would be found in the United 
States because, as a general rule, family related issues are seen in this 
country as being within the purview of state legislatures and state courts.  
Clearly, that creates inefficiencies for practitioners and those that use the 
system. Fifty different sets of laws dealing with family court, child 
protection, termination of parental rights and adoption makes a complex 
legal situation within the United States.  Certainly the history of the United 
States is different than that of South Africa.  American history brings to its 
citizens a different political reality—including the desire of individual states 
to maintain the rights and independence they historically had before our 
Federalist system came into being.  Yet, it is interesting to note that the 
  
 343. Patrick Geary, United States: Is Obama’s Win Also a Victory for Children’s 
Rights?, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS INFO. NETWORK (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://www.crin/org/violence/search/closeup.asp?infoID=18874. 
 344. SALRC Issue Paper, supra note 263, at 33. 
 345. Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards When 
Construing Multilateral Conventions, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 442 (1993). 
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Commission which drafted the Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act opined that “[a]s with child support, state borders have become one of 
the biggest obstacles to enforcement of custody and visitation orders.”346  
Despite that political and social history, there have been a number of 
efforts in various realms to create uniform laws that would be applicable 
throughout the American Union.  These efforts have occurred in various 
areas of the law, but in the family court realm they include the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and its successor the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and the Uniform Adoption Act, 
just to name a few.  As opposed to South Africa, however, most of these 
efforts to create uniformity across the country have been through 
independent organizations rather than by a government entity.347  That 
results in the need for such an organization to lobby each state legislature 
for passage of the uniform legislation.  It also results in each state 
legislature having the ability to change the uniform law before it is passed.  
Thus, each state may have their own version of the “uniform” law.  South 
Africa’s Law Reform Commission does not have a counterpart doing 
similar work in the United States.  Several states have law reform 
committees whose purpose is to review laws within those states.348  Yet 
nothing similar exists on a nationwide basis.  The process used by SALRC 
to assess existing law and propose changes is based heavily on the 
workshop model.349  This brings input from across the country and across 
different groups of interested parties.  Such a commission in the United 
States would be beneficial to assist in bringing some uniformity not only in 
family law matters, but also in the myriad of other areas of the law in the 
United States.        
C. Constitutional Protection 
One of the most notable differences between the treatment of children in 
South Africa versus the treatment of children in the United States is the 
  
 346. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT Prefatory Note 
(1997).  
 347. See New South Wales L. Reform Comm’n, Law Reform Links, 
LAWLINK.NEW.GOV.AU,  
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/pages/LRC_links (last visited Oct. 24, 
2010) (noting that the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are examples of law reform commissions on a  
nationwide basis). 
 348. Id.  (noting that the following law reform commissions operate on a state to state 
basis:  California Law Revision Commission, Connecticut Law Revision Commission, 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Michigan Law Revision Commission, New Jersey Law 
Revision Commission, New York State Law Revision Commission, Oregon Law 
Commission). 
 349. SALRC Discussion Paper, supra note 270, at 2–4.  
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constitution of each nation.  As mentioned above, the South African 
Children’s Act builds upon very fundamental protections expressly afforded 
to children in South Africa’s Constitution.  One could read the South 
African Constitution as a virtual mandate for the creation of a Children’s 
Act.  When looked at from that vantage point the creation of such a 
comprehensive piece of legislation regarding children seems almost to be 
expected.    
The Constitution of the United States is significantly different.  Our 
Constitution was created in a different era—with different motivations and 
different historical imperatives.  It has a Bill of Rights that is applicable to 
children, but does not specifically outline child related rights or child related 
obligations of the State.  This is not surprising, as in 1787 America was 
more concerned about how it was going to govern itself than it was with 
specifically caring for its children.  With the exception of non-white 
children as mentioned above, the children of colonial America were 
generally cared for commensurate with the standards of the time and place 
in which they were born.  It simply was not an overriding concern.  Further, 
child related issues have generally been addressed on a satisfactory basis by 
statutory law within each state.     
CONCLUSION 
Nelson Mandela believed that the soul of a society could be seen in the 
way it treats its children.  The South African Children’s Act allows the 
outside world to take a look at the soul of South Africa.  The socio–
economic currents that have been flowing in the part of the world that 
makes up South Africa brought the population to the point where it 
demanded broad protections for its children.  The legal system adequately 
arrived at a point when it was already looking to protect the best interests of 
children.  These factors combined with the desire of that country to fulfill 
international obligations it had undertaken as a member state of the United 
Nations and the African Union.350  The process undertaken by South Africa 
and the legislative results it achieved on behalf of children are models for 
other countries around the world.    
The financial resources to implement that framework are far from 
complete.  UNICEF cautioned that “major implementation challenges 
remain in translating the act into concrete actions to improve the care and 
protection of South Africa’s children.”351  Yet, the legal framework to 
advance the cause of children is in place.  In its review of the Act, the 
Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference noted as follows: 
  
 350. Briefing to People to People Delegation, supra note 3, at 15. 
 351. UNICEF Welcomes Children’s Act, NEWS24, Aug. 4, 2008, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Unicef-Welcomes-Childrens-Act-20080408 
(quoting Macharia Kamau, representative of UNICEF in South Africa). 
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The Act puts children’s issues squarely on the agenda:  it emphasises that 
services to children must be prioritised by government at all levels, and 
that all spheres of government should review their services and budgets, 
and co-operate with each other, to ensure that children get the services 
they need.  All of this is most welcome and, although there are certain 
provisions with which the Church must take issue, the Act has the 
potential to have a strongly positive impact on the lives of children, 
especially the most vulnerable.352 
In many respects the South African Children’s Act represents some of the 
very same values and principals embodied in the family codes of the several 
United States of America.  It asserts a commitment to the best interests of 
the child in legal proceedings and to the protection of children who are 
victims of abuse or neglect.  In other respects, however, the Children’s Act 
is a foreign piece of legislation that would not fit in with American 
jurisprudence.  Yet in all respects it reveals the character of the South 
African people and reflects well on the soul of that nation. 
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Banking is the industry that failed.  Banks are meant to allocate capital to 
businesses and consumers efficiently; instead they ladled credit to anyone 
who wanted it.  Banks are supposed to make money skillfully managing 
the risk of transforming short–term debt into long–term loans; instead, 
they were undone by it.  They are supposed to expedite the flow of credit 
through economies; instead they ended up blocking it.1 
“Give not unto the foolish your wealth which Allah has made a means of 
support for you.”  – Qur’an, 4:5 
INTRODUCTION 
The years 2008 and 2009 have brought the world considerable problems, 
many stemming from bank failures.  The conventional Western system of 
finance is in a quagmire.2  There is a banking system however, that has not 
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suffered much in the present crisis; the Islamic Banking System.3  Islamic 
banks seem to have emerged mostly unscathed in the current phase of the 
crisis, and industrialized Western countries are looking at them to see why, 
and to see if they provide some better ways of doing business.4    Regulators 
in many countries are asking whether the Islamic paradigm has any 
answers.5  Even before the crisis occurred, the United States Department of 
the Treasury unveiled a plan to teach Islamic finance to U.S. bank 
regulatory agencies.6 Islamic banking seems to have been on the minds of 
many Western financiers for a while. 
The University of Reading, in England, recently started a Masters degree 
in Investment Banking and Islamic Finance, as have other universities 
throughout the United Kingdom. John Board, director of Reading’s 
International Capital Markets Association Centre says that  “[w]e started to 
get prospective students asking us if we knew about it [Islamic finance], 
while current students going to job interviews, even for non–Islamic posts, 
said it came up as a conversation piece.”7  
Islamic banking has been proliferating around the world since the 
1970’s.  There are in excess of 300 Islamic financial institutions in the 
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world today in 51 countries throughout the Muslim world, Europe and 
North America.8 
A. Purpose of the Paper 
The measure of the effectiveness of any system of governance is the 
degree to which the governed organization achieves its purpose.  One must 
look at the purpose of the various systems, and ask the question, does the 
system achieve its purpose? Indeed, does the current global economic 
order perforce call for a change in the purpose?9   
This paper intends to describe the governance system of Islamic banks in 
order to see the differences that exist between the Islamic banking paradigm 
and that of its conventional Western counterpart.  This is a timely topic 
since within that governance paradigm there may be elements that can be 
useful in shoring up the risks that conventional banks have faced and which 
have precipitated the current banking crisis.  Certainly the current 
governance paradigm of Western banks is coming under increased scrutiny.  
According to some researchers, “bank regulation will top the global policy 
agenda.”10  It certainly is on the minds of policy makers, commentators and 
the public alike.11  The Federal Reserve is working on new regulations.12 
The British are doing the same.13 
Since the late 1990’s, and especially in the early 2000’s, there has been a 
world-wide dramatic increase in the interest in, and concern for, corporate 
governance.14  Conventional Western bankers also have been concerned 
about widely acceptable and effective principles of corporate governance, 
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so as to make for an effective and transparent international banking system 
in which shareholders, depositors and borrowers alike have confidence.15  
National and international banking authorities agree that banks must be 
supervised—not simply to avoid chicanery, fraud, theft and bank failures—
but also to provide for a system in which businesses and consumers have 
confidence.16  The officials of the Basel Committee believe that effective 
supervision cannot take place unless effective systems of corporate 
governance are in place.17 
The Basel Committee heartily endorses the principles and definition of 
corporate governance as espoused and published by the Organisation for 
Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD), which state: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.  Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring.  The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an 
economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy.  As a result, the 
cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more 
efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.18 
 
So for the purposes of this study, the starting point is the proposition that 
any organization—whether it be simply a club, a company or a state—has a 
controlling mechanism composed of rules, procedures and customs by 
means of which decisions are taken and the organization is run.  Whatever 
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its system and body of rules and decision-making procedures by which the 
organization is run is the organization’s system of governance.19 
In any corporation, the need for a system of governance arises from the 
inherent agency problem.  In a sole proprietorship, the most prevalent type 
of business entity,20 the owner manages the enterprise, and knows where the 
money goes and where it comes from.  However, in the corporation, owners 
are separated from managers, and it is the latter who actually control the 
operations and finances of the corporation.  These managers are the agents 
of the shareholders, and the shareholders, who wish that their investments 
be fruitful, will want to ensure that the managers do not engage in self– 
dealing; rather, the shareholders will desire that the managers act in the best 
interest of the corporation, and thus of the shareholders’ investment.  The 
main objective of a system of corporate governance is to overcome this 
agency problem—to provide a monitoring system to oversee the activities 
of the agents.21  So, according to some, even though the Western system of 
economic activity considers itself a system of capitalism and therefore an 
ownership system, its system of organization and management of 
corporations is, in effect, a system of agency rather than ownership.22 The 
questions many are asking today in that Western system—especially in the 
financial system—is whether the agents are doing their job properly and 
whether they are being properly monitored. 
Banks are essential in any economy, as they provide financing for 
commercial enterprises, financial services to the population in general and a 
system for making all manner of payments.23  For conventional Western 
banks, the Basel Committee has been very active in providing rules by 
which the banks within its system are governed.24  Government regulatory 
agencies and the banks which they supervise have generally adopted these 
principles, of course taking into account their national and local constraints.  
That is why the conventional banking systems work in much the same way 
on a world–wide basis.   
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In the conventional Anglo–American system of corporate governance, 
the main objective of the company is to make a profit and increase 
shareholder wealth.  In other words, it is the interest of the shareholders 
which the managers and directors of the corporation should be looking out 
for.  In this paradigm, the “exclusive focus of corporate governance should 
be to maximize shareholder value.”25  The Franco–German model of 
corporate governance, or what has been also termed the European bank-
based system of governance, looks at a broader base of what has been 
termed “stakeholders” to include employees, lenders, customers and 
vendors, among others.26  So in this latter paradigm, management is 
concerned with protecting the interests of a much broader base of 
stakeholders than in the Anglo–American model.  This at times gives rise to 
conflicts, since there will be times when the interests of such a diffuse group 
will clash.  The manager is faced with a whom–do–you–protect–first 
dilemma in such an event. 
Generally—at least in the Anglo–Saxon model—owners of a 
corporation, the shareholders, wish to increase their wealth.  They are 
familiar with the old maxim “the more the risk, the more the reward,” and 
so often owners will wish that the managers take certain risks in order to 
reap more rewards.  A non–shareholder manager often has no incentive to 
take risk, since he or she knows that if the enterprise fails, he or she will 
have no job.  This is where the alignment of shareholder interest with 
manager’s interest comes in by providing incentives that align the 
manager’s rewards with the shareholders’ interests.  Stock awards and stock 
options, and sometimes bonuses, do just that. 
Lenders, on the other hand, have no such interest; lenders do not wish 
the corporate borrower to take risk.  The lender wants to be assured that its 
loan will be repaid.  Loan covenants are a means by which lenders have a 
very strong influence on the governance of their corporate borrowers.  In 
this sense, banks are themselves important elements of the governance of 
corporations in the places in which they operate. 
I. THE GOVERNANCE OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
Banks are an essential cog in the wheel of commerce in any society.  
Banks differ markedly from general corporations insofar as governance 
needs are concerned:  
Banks Matter.  When banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, they 
lower the cost of capital to firms and accelerate capital accumulation.  
  
 25. Jonathon R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 95 (2003). 
 26. See generally JONATHON CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES (1994); see also Perry & Rehman, supra note 
9. 
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When banks allocate credit to entrepreneurs with the best ideas (rather 
than to those with the most accumulated wealth or strongest political 
connections) productivity growth is boosted and more people can pursue 
their economic dreams.  And, when banks manage risk prudently, the 
likelihood of systemic crises is reduced.27   
Others have said that “when banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, 
this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and 
stimulates productivity growth.  So, weak governance of banks reverberates 
throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic 
development.”28 The corporate and financial structures of banks differ from 
the typical corporation.  Banks are opaque; it is hard to determine where 
exactly the money is and how much risk is covering the funds out on loan.  
Opacity makes monitoring for governance purposes difficult.  The relative 
risk of loans outstanding on a bank’s balance sheet is difficult to determine 
simply by looking at the balance sheet. 
A second problem is regulation.29  This may seem counterintuitive, since 
many would say that the regulation of banks is a good thing as it protects 
banks, their shareholders, and their depositors.  But regulation may have the 
opposite effect.  As mentioned above, in the typical corporate scenario, an 
outside lender has an ameliorating effect on shareholders’ propensity to take 
risks—with the lender’s money.  With a bank, the depositor is, in effect, a 
lender to the bank.  But such lenders take no interest in the governance of 
the bank or in the level of risk that it runs in its operations.  Generally the 
depositor/lender does not require more or less interest be paid to him or her 
on the deposit dependent on the level of risk the bank runs.  So the “debt 
holders” do not share in the upside potential, no matter the level of risk.  In 
fact, because depositors feel comfortable that the government will protect 
their “loan” to the bank, they take no interest whatsoever in the bank’s 
practices.  Some studies have shown that government regulations generally 
have an adverse impact on the governance of banks.30  It has been suggested 
that such regulation often encourages low capital–asset ratios.31  It has even 
been argued that banking regulation brought about the destruction of AIG.32 
As a practical matter, the stakeholders in the typical bank, even in those 
countries where the Anglo–American model of corporate governance 
prevails, are multiplied.  The bank not only has the owners, that is, the 
  
 27. Laeven & Levine, supra note 10. 
 28. Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of 
Concepts and Issues (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3404, 2004). 
 29. See generally Andrea Polo, Corporate Governance of Banks: The Current State 
of the Debate (MPRA Paper No. 2325, Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muennchen.de/2325/.  
 30. See Levine, supra note 29.   
 31. Polo, supra note 30, at 5. 
 32. John Carney, How Bank Regulation Destroyed AIG, THE BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bank-regulation-helped-destroy-aig-2009-3. 
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shareholders, but there are depositors and society in general, which depend 
on the viability of its banks for its economy to run smoothly.  So banks 
should be looking out for a variety of interests.  It is questionable whether 
they actually do.  Lest anyone continue to say that the interest and profit of 
shareholders—the only relevant stakeholders—and their say in management 
and governance in the Anglo–Saxon model is the way the truth and the 
light, one need only look at who has bailed them out and where the money 
came from for that bailout:  the governments and the taxpayers.  So for 
financial institutions at least, many stakeholders abound, even in the Anglo–
Saxon model. 
Concerned over renewed problems in the international commercial world 
and the ethical and other failures in the governance systems of companies 
around the world, and mindful of the fact that certain banking structures 
around the world lack transparency and that many banks exist in 
jurisdictions that purposefully impede information flows, the Basel 
Committee issued a revision to its 1999 guidance in 2006.33  That revision 
set forth eight principles by which sound banks were to be governed.34  This 
system presupposed that the governance systems would ensure that the 
banks in question would adhere to the guidelines respecting such things as 
  
 33. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 3 (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf. 
 34. Those principles are: 
Principle 1: Board members should be qualified for their positions, 
have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and 
be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank. 
Principle 2: The board of directors should approve and oversee the 
bank’s strategic objectives and corporate values that are 
communicated throughout the banking organisation. 
Principle 3: The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines 
of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. 
Principle 4: The board should ensure that there is appropriate 
oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. 
Principle 5: The board and senior management should effectively 
utilise the work conducted by the internal audit function, external 
auditors, and internal control functions. 
Principle 6: The board should ensure that compensation policies and 
practices are consistent with the bank’s corporate culture, long-term 
objectives and strategy, and control environment. 
Principle 7: The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. 
Principle 8: The board and senior management should understand the 
bank’s operational structure, including where the bank operates in 
jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (i.e. 
“know-your-structure”).   
Id. 
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the management of interest rate risk, the management of credit risk, 
transparency and internal controls systems. 
Even so, there has not been an intense scrutiny and push for enhanced 
corporate governance in banks, at least not in the U.S., where some of the 
world’s largest banks are headquartered.35 
In the U.S. there are some problems going forward even after the 
financial debacle and the infusion of billions of dollars in the banking 
system by the U.S. government.  Compensation and risk taking, according 
to some governance experts, have not been curbed, despite the rhetoric of 
the U.S. Congress and the infusion of billions of dollars.  For example, 
directors have been left in place—those same directors who allowed the 
problems to arise in the first place—and compensation levels that encourage 
risk–taking are not really controlled in a meaningful way.36  The British, in 
their bailout program, have at least replaced a number of directors.37   
The corporate governance of the typical US bank is shown in the 
following diagram: 
 
Diagram 1.1  
Corporate Governance of US 
Banks
 
 
  
 35. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26. 
 36. See Alistair Barr, Corporate Governance Takes Back Seat in Bank Bailouts, 
RISKMETRICS GROUP (Oct. 17, 2008), 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/articles/20081017_djn.html. 
 37. Id. 
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II. THE GOVERNANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
Islamic banks are governed differently than Anglo–American banks.  In 
order to understand how and why they are different, it is first necessary to 
understand a modicum of Islamic law, since the law, as Muslims define it, is 
the normative basis and indeed the reason for the existence of Islamic 
banking.   
The source of the law and the definition of law are different between the 
typical Western legal tradition and that of Islam.  Even though some highly 
regarded U.S. practitioners have suggested that to ask “what is law” is a 
meaningless question,38 in most industrialized countries—and certainly in 
the United States—law is considered to be “a body of rules of action or 
conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.  
That which must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanction or 
legal consequence . . . .”39  The Mexican jurist defines law as a norm or rule 
that sets the limits of human conduct, in order to settle social conflict, and to 
which all people must forcibly subject themselves.40  Another Western, civil 
law example is the Mexican Constitution, which states that all the 
resolutions of the Congress will be considered law.41  In the United States, 
the source of all law is the Constitution of the United States, and its source 
is the people.42  The Constitution gives authority to the Congress to make 
the laws, and the Congress is also elected by “the People of the several 
States.”43  In a typical civil law country, such as Mexico, law is considered 
as “emanating from legitimate authority.”44 
Islamic law is different, and Muslims believe differently.  Since in the 
West the lawgiver is man and the institutions of man, the law can be 
changed by man.  But for Muslims “[t]he absolute knowledge which is 
required to lay down a path for human life is not possessed by any group of 
people.”45  For Shari’ah, which is the Muslim concept of law, God is the 
  
 38. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L.REV. 761, 765 (1987). 
 39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  The foregoing is a 
definition from a Common Law jurisdiction, and in practice, that definition fairly represents 
the operation of “law” in most industrialized countries.  However  the Civil Law tradition, 
which often deals with such subjects from both a broader and more theoretical approach, 
defines law as;  “A rule of conduct . . . (which is) . . . the combination of rules that govern 
social relations.”  Eugine Petit, 21 DERECHO ROMANO 15 (2005).  See also Charles Louis de 
Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Del Espiritu de las Leyes, Editorial Porrúa, 
México, Capítulo Primero (1992).  Of course in this tradition, there is a distinction between 
droit and loi, or derecho and ley, which distinction is not easy to translate into English, but 
the Common Law concept and word law is broad enough to cover them.   
 40. TRINIDAD GARCIA, APUNTES DE INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO (1978). 
 41. I RAFAEL DE PINA, DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO 92 (11th ed. 1981). 
 42. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art I, §2. 
 44. De Pina, supra note 42, at 44. 
 45. ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI’AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 2 (5th ed. 1984).  
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lawgiver, and no one—no power on earth—has the authority to change the 
law.46  The source of Islamic law is the Qur’an, considered by Muslims to 
be the holy word of God, and the Sunna, the sayings and way of life of the 
Prophet Mohammed.47 
Shari’ah, or the law for Muslims, is an all-encompassing set of concepts 
and rules that govern nearly every aspect of daily life, including the laws of 
contract and commerce; in light of this, according to most legal and 
religious scholars, Islamic law is divinely inspired and revealed, and 
therefore not given to changes by man—as are the laws in the other two 
traditions.48  The other two legal traditions, which govern most of the 
world’s citizens and its commerce, are what are known as the Common Law 
tradition and the Civil Law tradition.49  The laws in both a Civil Law society 
and a Common Law society are made by human beings, and therefore are 
changeable by them.  This is not so in divinely revealed Shari’ah, the 
revelation of which has been interpreted to some extent, but not changed.50  
This can be problematic in finance law since we need to bridge the gap of 
one thousand years of jurisprudential development to meet today’s modern 
financial needs.  At about 1000 A.D., the Ulema declared that enough 
interpretation had taken place, and most schools of Islamic law did not 
develop their jurisprudence any further51 despite radical changes in other 
societies thereafter.  In contrast, Western systems of law change with 
society’s changing circumstances. 
Even though the first bank to use Islamic concepts can be traced to Egypt 
in 1963, the truly modern idea of an Islamic bank and Islamic banking 
industry was raised at the Islamic Summit in Lahore, Pakistan in 1975.52   
  
 46. DAVID M. NEIPERT, LAW OF GLOBAL COMMERCE 27 (2002). 
 47. RAHMAN, supra note 46, at chs. 2-4.   
 48. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, IDEALS AND REALITIES OF ISLAM 86 (KAZI Publications 
2000) (1966).  Rafei, supra note 8.   
 49. Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law and Civil 
Law Divide in Arbitration, 18 ARBITRATION INT’L 1, 1.  For a list of countries governed by 
the common law tradition, see Common Law, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:46 AM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law (“The common law constitutes the basis of the 
legal systems of: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Ireland, federal law in the United 
States and the law of individual U.S. States (except Louisiana), federal law throughout 
Canada and the law of the individual provinces and territories (except Quebec), Australia 
(both federal and individual states), Kenya, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and many other generally English-speaking 
countries or Commonwealth countries (except Scotland, which is bijuridicial, and Malta). 
Essentially, every country that was colonised at some time by England, Great Britain, or the 
United Kingdom uses common law” with few exceptions.  “The main alternative to the 
common law system is the civil law system, which is used in Continental Europe, and most 
of the rest of the world.”).   
 50. Frederick V. Perry, Shari’ah Islamic Law and Arab Business Ethics, 22 CONN. 
J.INT’L L. 357, 368 (2007). 
 51. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW ch. 10 (1982).  
 52. Id. 
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Banking in the Arab world has traditionally been identified with the 
colonial powers, and freedom from colonial rule sparked an interest in a 
return to the culture and customs of the people—that is, to Islam.  
Oppression would, it was believed, be eliminated through the fairness and 
justice that Islam espoused.  Locally owned banks did not start in the Arab 
world until the 1920’s.53  The Western banking system was seen as an 
instrument of Western corruption and exploitation; so for the people to have 
confidence in the banking system that was to be home grown, it had to be 
based on Islamic principles and not Western principles.54  Banking activities 
were to be associated with the tenets espoused by the Prophet Mohammed 
and the Qur’an.  Commercial ventures, borrowing, and lending therefore 
could all be associated with acts of piety.  But for this to happen, people had 
to be assured that what the banks were doing actually was sanctioned by 
Shari’ah.   
The banks, which started proliferating in the Middle East in the 1970’s, 
covered this requirement by using Shari’ah boards to “bless” their activities 
and their financial instruments.  The idea was that since Islamic banks were 
new, they must submit all new types of transaction to a “Shari’ah 
committee” in order to ensure that they conformed with Islamic principles.55 
It was essential that the expectations of the Muslim community be met56 in 
order to give the banks legitimacy.  An Islamic organization must serve 
God, and “act within the framework of an Islamic formula, so that any 
person approaching an Islamic bank should be given the impression that he 
is entering a sacred place to perform a religious ritual, that is the use and 
employment of capital for what is acceptable and satisfactory to God.”57  
There has been a broad interest in the use and function of the Shari’ah 
boards, since it is believed that compliance with Shari’ah is the raison 
d’être of the Islamic financial services industry.58  Indeed “the core mission 
of an Islamic financial institution is to meet its stakeholders’ desire to 
conduct their financial business according to Shari’ah principles.”59 
  
 53. Eur. Inst. on Res. on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, Islamic Banks,  
MEDEA.BE (Mar. 2000), http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=28 
[hereinafter Islamic Banks]. 
 54. See Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Shariah, Economics and the Progress of 
Islamic Finance: The Role of Shariah Experts  (Concept paper presented to the Seventh 
Harvard Forum on Islamic Finance, Apr. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Role_of_Shariah_Experts.htm [hereinafter Siddiqi, Finance]. 
 55. Islamic Banks, supra note 54. 
 56. Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 57. A. L. Janahi, ISLAMIC BANKING: CONCEPT, PRACTICE AND FUTURE 42 (2d ed. 
1995). 
 58. ISLAMIC FIN. SERVS. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON SHARI’AH 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 1 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter EXPOSURE DRAFT].   
 59. Wafik Grais & Matteo Pellegrini, Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options 6 (World Bank Research Working Paper 
4052, 2006). 
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Just like a modern day Catholic may turn to her priest to answer certain 
questions about her religion, Muslims turn to experts also when interpreting 
their religion and in order to answer certain wooly questions; they turn to 
the scholars—the Ulema.60 The word Ulema is the plural form of the Arabic 
Alim, and means a learned man or scholar.61  Such men are learned in 
Shari’ah and all aspects of Muslim traditions, are knowledgeable in divine 
law, and serve as its guardians and interpreters.  They are the closest thing 
to a priest that the religion has, but they are not priests, and they do not rule 
over Islamic society (aside from the exception of Iran after the revolution of 
1979).62 
In order to fill this need for legitimizing Islamic banking, the bankers 
invented the concept of the Shari’ah board, made up of Ulema who could 
interpret and evaluate the operations and transactions of the bank.63  All new 
ways of doing business and new types of transactions— including 
contracts—are submitted to the Shari’ah board for scrutiny and approval.64  
A.  Islamic Banking Law 
Islam looks at wealth as something to be used efficiently to sustain life;65 
and justice and fairness for all concerned are the theoretical and religious 
basis for the institution of Islamic finance.66 The idea is to ensure the 
equitable distribution of wealth, so that wealth does not simply circulate 
among only the wealthy.67  Shari’ah prohibits the charging of interest.68  
Many in the West are not unfamiliar with the prohibition of interest, but in 
Islamic banking there are four other important elements.  Essentially there 
are five basic principles of Islamic Banking:  
  
 60. RAHMAN, supra note 46 at 5-6.    
 61. 2 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM 438-39 (1974) (explaining 
that the word Ulema is the plural form of the Arabic Alim, and means a learned man or 
scholar, and such men are learned in Shari'ah and all aspects of the Muslim traditions). 
 62. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE HEART OF ISLAM: ENDURING VALUES FOR HUMANITY 
148 (2002). 
 63. See Siddiqi, Finance, supra note 55.  
 64. See id. 
 65. Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, The Foundation of Islamic Finance, Lecture 
Delivered at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA (Oct. 25, 2001), 
available at http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Lecture1.htm [hereinafter Siddiqi, Finance 
Lecture].  
 66. Mohammed Nejatullah Siddiqi, Recent History of Islamic Banking and Finance, 
Lecture Delivered at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA (Nov. 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Lecture2.htm. 
 67. Hasan Zubair, Islamic Finance Education at Graduate Level: Current Position 
and Challenge, 5 (MPRA Paper No. 8712, May 2008), available at mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/8712/. 
 68. Id. at 12. 
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1) In a loan any predetermined payment over and above the actual   
amount of principal is prohibited, that is, no interest. 
2) Arising from the interest prohibition, the lender must share in the 
profits or losses arising out of the enterprise for which the money was lent.  
3) Making money from money is not acceptable, as money has no 
intrinsic value.  
4) Gharar (uncertainty, risk or speculation) and the related Maysir 
(gambling, bets and wager) are also prohibited69 
5) Investments can only support practices or products that are not 
forbidden (alcohol, pornography, investment in real estate for a casino, etc. 
are forbidden). 70 
B.  Prohibition of Interest 
The reason set forth in the Qur’an and Shari’ah for the prohibition of 
interest is that the depositor (or the lender) should not profit unduly from the 
hard work and risk bearing of others.  Although Islam prohibits interest, it 
encourages profit and return from investment where the investor takes a 
calculated risk; commerce and trade are encouraged,71  so banks can give an 
investor a share of their annual profits (and losses) in proportion to the 
investor’s (depositor’s) deposit based on the share of an individual’s deposit 
in relation to total assets of the bank being lent out.  
This rate of return to the investor is different from interest in two 
important ways: the amount to be paid is not known at the outset of the 
transaction (there are no guarantees as to amount of return), and the investor 
(read lender or depositor) has to accept more risk.  On the other hand, as an 
example, the depositor in the conventional western bank takes less of a risk 
because the bank’s capital (that is, the capital investment of the stockholders 
of the bank) is first at risk before the capital of the depositors.  
Because of the foregoing, equity participation and profit and loss sharing 
are the basis of Islamic banking.  Such banks do not charge interest; rather 
they participate in the profits arising from the use of lent funds.  The 
depositors also share in the profits arising from the use by the bank of their 
funds in lending activities based on a predetermined ratio.  However, in the 
event of losses (for certain types of deposits, as will be explained), the 
depositor also loses a proportional share of his or her funds on deposit.  The 
bank also is arguably more at risk than is a conventional Western bank, 
  
 69. But see infra note 123. 
 70. See Sulieman, supra note 8; Mohammad Netjatullah Siddiqi, The Wisdom of 
Prohibition of Interest, Lecture at LaRiba Annual Meeting at Los Angeles (Mar. 30, 2002); 
Siddiqi, Finance Lecture, supra note 66.    
 71. Qur'an 4:32. 
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since the bank cannot require a guarantee or security in the form of 
collateral to cover a potential loss in the event of default on repayment.  
Theoretically, the liability of the borrowing entrepreneur is limited to their 
ability to repay based on success of the enterprise, absent negligence or 
mismanagement, in which case the borrower can be liable for repaying the 
lender’s financial loss.72   
The source and use of funds are a bit different with Islamic banks. 
Reserves are fractioned; that is, deposits are not simply mingled and place 
wherever the banks wish.  Not all depositor accounts are used by the bank 
for the same purpose.  Some are used for financial investments and 
commercial loans, and some are not; it depends on the type of deposit 
account.  Further, some deposit accounts give the depositor the claim to the 
full amount of the deposit, along with a premium payment or an amount 
based on the bank’s earnings.  The deposit of funds into an investment 
deposit account allows the bank to use the funds in a long term loan.  The 
depositor may lose some or all of his funds if the bank incurs losses; 
however, the returns to the depositor—if there are returns—are normally 
higher.73  Rather than a depositor earning a fixed rate of interest as in 
conventional western banks, the depositor only earns money if she subjects 
herself to the same risk that the bank undergoes, and thus receives only a 
share in the profits.74 
In sum, Shari’ah and Islam in general seek economic fairness and justice; 
in fact, Muslims are commanded to seek justice and fairness.75  A loan from 
a conventional Western bank requires repayment no matter the outcome of 
the business venture of the borrower, but Islam considers this unfair—ergo 
the prohibition of interest—and a sharing in the profit and loss is considered 
to be fairer, more legitimate, and thus this principle is the basis for Islamic 
banking.76 
C.  The Governance of Islamic Banks 
Islamic banks are typically organized as corporations under the laws of 
their jurisdictions of incorporation.  Those laws differ from place to place in 
their vision of the relationships among the stakeholders and the role that the 
corporation is to play in society,77 but they all have a governance system, 
  
 72. See Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Examples are Qur'an 57:25, 16:90 and 7:29; this is the theme found throughout 
the Qur'an. 
 76. Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 77. See Scheherazade Rehman & Frederick V. Perry, Globalization and its Effects on 
the Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems?, 17 J. GLOBAL BUS. 5 (2006).  See also 
Larry A. DiMatteo & Lucien J. Dhooge, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW:  A TRANSACTIONAL 
APPROACH ch. 3 (2d ed. 2006). 
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varied though it may be, which conforms to the commercial laws and 
customs of the jurisdiction in question.  So it is that the typical 
corporation—for example, in the case of a bank under the Anglo–Saxon 
model—has both an internal and an external governance system.  The 
external system is made up of the stock exchange rules, the corporation or 
company laws of the jurisdiction, and any central bank regulatory authority 
and lenders, who require certain restrictive covenants in their loan 
documents.  On the other hand, the Islamic bank has a more complex 
governance system. 
It must be remembered that in the Franco–German model of the 
corporation, there are a variety of stakeholders in addition to the 
shareholders whose interests are looked after in the running of the 
corporation, and in countries like Germany, there is a two-tiered board of 
directors.78  In this sense, the Islamic bank is similar to the German 
corporation in its governance model.  In essence it has two boards: the one 
required by secular law, and the one required by religious law.  So the 
Islamic bank has to comply with the laws of man and the laws of God at the 
same time.  This is not always easy, since it also has to compete within the 
marketplace.   
The Islamic bank has at least one further outside governance body: the 
Islamic Accounting Standards Board, also known as the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).79  The 
  
 78. CHARKHAM, supra note 27, at 14.   
 79. The AAOIFI website provides: 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) is an Islamic international autonomous not-
for-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and Shari'a standards for Islamic financial 
institutions and the industry. Professional qualification programs 
(notably CIPA, the Shari’a Adviser and Auditor "CSAA", and the 
corporate compliance program) are presented now by AAOIFI in its 
efforts to enhance the industry’s human resources base and 
governance structures. 
AAOIFI was established in accordance with the Agreement of 
Association, which was signed by Islamic financial institutions on 1 
Safar, 1410H, corresponding to 26 February 1990, in Algiers. Then, 
it was registered on 11 Ramadan 1411, corresponding to 27 March 
1991, in the State of Bahrain. 
As an independent, international organization, AAOIFI is supported 
by institutional members (155 members from 40 countries, so far) 
including central banks, Islamic financial institutions, and other 
worldwide participants from the international Islamic banking and 
finance industry.  
AAOIFI has gained assuring support for the implementation of its 
standards, which are now adopted in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Dubai 
International Financial Centre, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and 
Syria. The relevant authorities in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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AAOFI develops, recommends, and promulgates accounting standards for 
Islamic banks, and while its standards do not generally have the effect of 
being rules of law or having sanctions for their transgression, they have 
been adopted by many Muslim and Western countries, and for a bank to 
state that it adheres to them is good for its reputation and provides yet 
another measure of comfort for the bank’s customers. 
In addition to the outside regulators, however, the internal regulators are 
multiplied for the Islamic bank.  First, there are the two boards: the one 
required by law and the one “required” by God.  Then there are, of course, 
the shareholders.  In addition, the depositors are stakeholders; they share in 
the profits and losses of the bank’s operation.  The borrowers are also 
stakeholders, since the bank is in essence a partner with the borrower in the 
borrower’s business ventures.   
The Shari’ah board and its use can give rise to a number of thorny issues 
for the bank.  The members of the Shari’ah board are supposed to be 
objective outsiders who make their decisions in consultation with the other 
Shari’ah board members, but in a way that is to be unbiased by any financial 
or other interests respecting the bank or the transaction. 
An Islamic bank has its Shari’ah board, which is supposed to be external 
and independent (though its members are paid by the bank), revising 
policies and documents, but answerable only to themselves and God.  
Additionally, the bank will often, and usually does, have an internal 
Shari’ah compliance person or committee,80 whose job it is to ensure that 
the bank complies with that which the Shari’ah board has mandated through 
its fatwas.81 
The Islamic Financial Services Board82 is working toward better gover-
nance in Islamic banking.  In a speech before the meeting of the Arab Bank-
  
Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have issued 
guidelines that are based on AAOIFI’s standards and 
pronouncements.  
AAOIFI Overview, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aaoifi.com/overview.html (last visited Nov. 
6, 2010).  
 80. One is recommended by the Islamic Financial Services Board in the GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM.  EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 59, at 2. 
 81. A fatwa is the considered legal opinion of a mufti; an expert on Shari’ah. JOSEPH 
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 73 (1982). 
 82. The Islamic Financial Services Board based in Kuala Lumpur, was officially 
inaugurated on 3 November 2002 and started operations on 10 March 2003, and states on its 
website:  
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is an international 
standard-setting organisation that promotes and enhances the 
soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry by 
issuing global prudential standards and guiding principles for the 
industry, broadly defined to include banking, capital markets and 
insurance sectors. The IFSB also conducts research and coordinates 
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ing Association of North America, the executive vice president in charge of 
the Bank Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
a member of the Bank’s Management Committee commented that: 
To this end, institutions like the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions and the Islamic Financial Services Board 
[IFSB] are serving a critical function . . . the IFSB recently released 
exposure drafts of capital adequacy and risk management standards for 
Islamic financial institutions.  These standards will help regulators both in 
countries that already have well–developed Islamic financial systems and 
in Western countries, to understand and supervise Islamic finance . . . [the 
IFSB] is also working to strengthen the corporate governance framework 
for the Islamic financial services industry, and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York . . . [involvement to date has been its via in the 2007 IFSB–
sponsored summit on Islamic finance] . . . of course, corporate governance 
issues and compliance have become particularly important . . . [to the Fed 
over the past few years] . . . and some of the approaches [the Fed] has 
taken to address this issue already have much in common with the 
practices of Islamic finance.83 
The IFSB has issued a set of principles on corporate governance for 
Islamic banks,84 as has the AAOIFI.85 In fact, the AAOFFI has commenced 
a training program to educate the market and practitioners about its 
standards.86   Other organizations have been formed to standardize the 
  
initiatives on industry related issues, as well as organises 
roundtables, seminars and conferences for regulators and industry 
stakeholders.  
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.ifsb.org (last visited Nov. 6, 
2010). 
 83. William L. Rutledge, Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banking in the 
United State, Remarks at the 2004 Arab Banking Association of North American (ABANA) 
Conference on Islamic Finance: Players, Product & Innovation in                                   
New York City (Apr. 15, 2005), available at 
https://abanaboard.bluestep.net/download/123321_U127360__71877/Rutledge%20Presentati
on.pdf.  Mr. Rutledge was a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from 
1999 through 2004.  William L. Rutledge, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/orgchart/rutledge.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 84. ISLAMIC FIN. SERVICES, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR 
INSTITUTIONS OFFERING ONLY ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES (EXCLUDING ISLAMIC INSURANCE 
(TAKAFUL) INSTITUTIONS AND ISLAMIC MUTUAL FUNDS) (2006), 
http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb3.pdf. 
 85. The AAOIFI, whose main objective is to promulgate standards for accounting 
and audit for Islamic banks, also issued its “Accounting, Auditing and Governance 
Standards” (for Islamic Financial Institutions) in 2008.  See AAOIFI Overview, supra note 
80. 
 86. The AAOIFI has training programs on Certified Shari’ah Advisor and Auditor, 
and Certified Islamic Professional Accountant.  AAOIFI, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aaoifi.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2010).  
2011] The Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks 269 
 
system, such as the International Islamic Rating Agency, the International 
Islamic Financial Market and the Liquidity Management Center.  None have 
the force of law.  While the IFSB principles do call for a variety of 
measures to strengthen the governance of Islamic banks, they do not really 
push in a meaningful way for global standardization; rather, they take the 
view that “there is no single model of corporate governance that can work 
well in every country.”  These principles go on to say that “[a]ny rigid, rule 
based approach adopted in haste with the aim of strengthening the corporate 
governance of [Islamic banks] may hinder their potential and healthy 
growth.”87  These principles accept the principles promoted by the OECD,88 
and the Basel Committee’s “Enhancing Corporate Governance of Banking 
Institutions.”  This may be unfortunate, since those companies complying 
with the OECD principles are a varied group of all sorts of companies, and 
global standardization is not essential for their ability to interact and 
compete.  Financial transactions are different, and do require more 
standardization.  According to the Basel Committee:  
Implementation of the Basel II Framework continues to move forward 
around the globe.  A significant number of countries and banks already 
implemented the standardized and foundation approaches as of the 
beginning of this year.  In many other jurisdictions, the necessary 
infrastructure (legislation, regulation, supervisory guidance, etc) to 
implement the Framework is either in place or in process, which will allow 
a growing number of countries to proceed with implementation of Basel 
II’s advanced approaches in 2008 and 2009.89  
But the original Basel Capital Accord introduced by the Basel 
Committee in 1998 has been introduced in “virtually all countries with 
internationally active banks.”90 Banks are not as dissimilar as industrial 
corporations are dissimilar, and the conventional Western style banks of the 
world are attempting to comply with the Basel standards—as opposed to the 
more loose OECD standards.  Thus, a conventional loan in Mexico City, 
New York, Paris or London is fairly uniform.  On the other hand, the 
financial instruments and offerings used by Islamic banks around the world 
are quite dissimilar, as will be discussed below. 
Given all this, if asked, most Muslim financiers appear to say that the 
Islamic controls provide for a more regulated, less risky, user friendly, 
  
 87. See Rutledge, supra note 84. 
 88. OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 14. 
 89. Progress on Basel II Implementation, New Works Streams and Outreach, BASEL 
COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), May 2007, available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_nl11.htm. 
 90. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE 
AND ITS MEMBERSHIP (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
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community friendly, ethical way of doing business91 and they believe that 
any effects of the current crisis on Islamic banks will be limited.92  Many 
Muslims believe that their system has the answer.  The Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, in speaking about the current world–wide crisis, stated in a 
conference on Islamic banking that:  
We have inherited a system where people can trade what they do not own 
and the resulting inflationary pressure in the global market has caused 
immense damage to the economic well–being of the world’s poor . . . .  
Such is the impact of unbridled greed in the financial system where there 
is no accountability on money lending . . . .  The world is beginning to 
appreciate the need for alternative financial arrangements.93 
In March of 2009, “Muslim presidents, prime ministers and prince[s] . . . 
. called on the world to adopt Islamic financial practices to overcome the 
global crisis and urged Islamic banks to undertake ‘missionary work’  in the 
west to promote Shariah banking.”94 
D.  Standardization 
While Muslims may feel confident that the bank they go to adheres to 
Islamic principles, it appears that those principles are not uniformly defined, 
and that banks and their Shari’ah boards differ in their interpretations of 
Islamic principles.  This makes for difficulties in cross–border banking 
activities and a truly globalized system of Islamic banking and finance.  
Many are calling for standardization.  John B. Taylor, a former Under 
Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury Department, in 
discussing Islamic banking,  has said that “[t]here needs to be some level of 
consistency in regulatory treatment across the board . . .”95  However, with 
  
 91. Rafei, supra note 8; Islamic Finance Sector Resilient, supra note 3; Adnan Yusuf: 
Arab, Gulf Banks Not Hurt by Global Mortgage Crunch, DUBAI FINANCIAL BROKERAGE, 
LLC (Aug. 26, 2008), 
http://ae.zawya.com/researchreports/p_2008_08_06_08_07_34/20080826_p_2008_08_06_0
8_07_34_093131.pdf. 
 92. Mohammed Al-Hamzani, Islamic Banks Unaffected by Global Financial Crisis, 
ASHRAQ ALAWSAT, Sept. 30, 2008, 
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=6&id=14245. 
 93. Rafei, supra note 8. 
 94. John Aglionby, Islamic Banks Urged to Show the Way, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f74e17a-0757-11de-9294-000077b07658,s01=1.html. 
 95. John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y, Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Keynote Address at the 
Forum on Islamic Finance: Understanding and Supporting Islamic Finance: Product 
Differentiation and Int’l Standards (May 8, 2004), available at www.stanford.edu/ (search 
for “Understanding and Supporting Islamic Finance.”). 
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the growth of and proliferation of Islamic banks, efforts at standardization 
have become even more difficult.96  
There are some problems respecting standardization.  The IFSB and 
Basel II are attempting to nudge banks in the direction of standardized 
practices, but a major stumbling block to the development of an 
internationally accepted Islamic banking industry is the lack of broadly 
accepted standards.  The Shari’ah board of an Islamic bank in Malaysia may 
approve a financial product, and that same product may not be acceptable or 
approved in a country within the Gulf Cooperation Council.97 Some 
countries set up Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah boards at the national 
level.  Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran have set up Shari’ah boards for 
approving banking standards at the level of the central bank.  In most other 
countries, the finance industry appoints its own Shari’ah board,98 which in 
many cases is at the institutional level; that is, within each bank or finance 
house.  This gives rise to a variety of different interpretations.  Khaled 
Yousaf, head of business development in the Islamic finance sector of the 
Dubai International Finance Center, states that “Egypt and Malaysia have 
very liberal interpretations of Shari’ah law, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
are quite strict.  Dubai is somewhere in the middle.”99   
Moreover, there is the lack of trained Islamic legal scholars with 
knowledge of the world of finance to become members of banks’ Shari’ah 
boards.  This can prove to be a disadvantage for the industry.100 
Additionally, there do not appear to be enough trained business people and 
economists who understand the Islamic financial industry to man the 
banks.101 
For a Western trained banker, the term “standardization” is fairly 
common and easy to understand.  This is not so easy for proponents of 
Shari’ah law.  Religious views are not easily changed or compromised.  In 
addition to the varying level of conservatism versus liberalism regarding 
Islam in the various Islamic countries, the matter is further complicated by 
the fact that there are four main schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and 
one Shi’a school.102  Accordingly, “the lack of clarity in Shari’ah practices 
  
 96. James Abbas Zaaidi, Shari’a Harmonization, Regulation, and Supervision 1 
(Nov. 2008) (paper presented to AAOFI-World Bank Islamic Banking and Finance 
Conference). 
 97. The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed for mutual self defense and consists 
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
 98. Gordon Platt, Profits With Principle, GLOBAL FIN., July/Aug. 2006, 
http://www.gfmag.com/archives/51-51-july-2006/1355-cover-story-profits-with-
principles.html#axzz137eVx6Z2. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Zubair, supra note 68. 
 102. The Sunni schools (Hanbali, Shafi, Malik and Hanbal) do not differ on major 
issues, but do on certain essential smaller issues.  The Shi’a school is known as the Jafaria 
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leads to lower mobility of these practices within the same country and 
across borders, which handicaps the growth of the industry.”103 
Some Islamic scholars are now espousing a supreme Shari’ah board that 
will oversee all Shari’ah boards and which will bear responsibility for 
supervising the activities and the fatwas of all other boards.104  In fact, 
Indonesia, the most populous Muslim nation, has set up such a “super” 
Shari’ah board.  The Indonesian Council of Ulema has set up a National 
Shari’ah Board, which issues fatwas that are binding on the other Shari’ah 
boards.  And under this system, the board members of the individual banks 
must be highly qualified in order to be able fully to understand the fatwas 
and to be able to draft and approve contracts that comply with such 
fatwas.105  
On an international basis, it appears that both the regulators of banks and 
the Shari’ah scholars agree that the Shari’ah standards and the methods of 
their interpretation and application must be standardized, especially if the 
Islamic Banking system really wants to grow in an international way and 
wants to appeal to a broad array of international commercial capital 
consumers.  But it is also clear that this will require close cooperation and 
collaboration among the interested parties.106  This does not appear to be an 
easy task.  Despite a lot of vocal chords being exercised and ink being 
spilled on the matter, no one has to date clearly and fully defined the term 
“Shari’ah Governance System.”107   
To that end—and in order to strengthen and standardize the Islamic 
financial services industry—the Islamic Financial Services Board, in a 
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, promulgated an exposure draft on Guiding 
Principles on Shari’ah Governance System and requested comments on that 
draft to be sent in by May 15, 2009.108  This document goes a long way in an 
attempt to standardize the industry; however, even when it is finally agreed 
upon, it is unlikely to be anything more than a set of guiding principles, 
with no real sanctions for non–compliance.  In fact, other international 
institutions have issued their own guidelines regarding Shari’ah 
governance.109  One area of interest for the IFSB is that of the 
professionalism of the members of the Shari’ah boards.   
As noted above, and according to the IFSB, the word “scholar” in the 
context of Islam refers to a translation of the Arabic alim, the plural of 
ulema, which are people who are learned and expert in the study of the 
  
school.  RAHMAN, supra note 46, at ch. 5.  See also LALEH BAKHTIAR, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPENDIUM OF THE MAJOR SCHOOLS (1996). 
 103. Zaaidi, supra note 5, at 3. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. EXPOSURE DRAFT., supra note 59. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at n.4. 
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Qur’an and Islam.  However, when the IFSB use the term “Shari’ah 
Scholar,” they refer to a more specialized person, someone who is an expert 
in commercial law in the Islamic context—as opposed to someone who is 
simply well versed in Islamic studies.  On Shari’ah boards, the IFSB wants 
people who, more specifically, are specialized in providing expert opinions 
and resolutions related to Islamic financial services.  They want 
professionals as opposed to merely academics.  Accordingly, the IFSB 
prefers the term “Shari’ah Board” as opposed to “Shari’ah Scholars” in 
referring to the phenomenon of using Islamic legal experts in the 
administration of Islamic banks and banking instruments.110  Of utmost 
importance to the IFSB is the independence of the Shari’ah Board.111   
Ideally, according to the IFSB, the Shari’ah Board should have at least 
three members; it would be good if they were of different nationalities or at 
least trained in different schools of Islamic law, and they “should possess 
some exposure in the areas of commerce or finance . . . .”112 
The IFSB suggests that there be either a department or a person within 
the bank, a sort of Shari’ah compliance officer or department (ISCU), who 
will disseminate the fatwas and monitor day–to–day compliance with them 
by bank operations and financial instruments.  This person should also be 
independent from other departments, just as the audit function in most any 
standard publicly traded corporations or banks in the United States is 
independent.  The third organism of Shari’ah compliance at the bank or 
corporation level would be the internal Shari’ah compliance review and 
audit function (ISRU), the task of which is to verify compliance with 
Shari’ah as defined in the fatwas and to recommend the strengthening or 
modification of systems to ensure such compliance if weaknesses are 
detected.  This function is similar to that of an internal audit department in 
most any standard publicly traded corporations or banks in the United 
States, but its task is more specific and targeted than that of a standard 
corporate audit department.  An annual Shari’ah compliance review—much 
like the typical annual financial audit of a Western bank—is a further 
recommendation of the IFSB.113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 110. Id. at 3-4. 
 111. Id. at n.5. 
 112. Id. at 7. 
 113. EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 59, at 7. 
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Accordingly, the corporate governance framework recommended by the 
IFSB for an Islamic bank would be along the lines set forth in the following 
Diagram:  
 
Diagram 1.2114 
 
FUNCTIONS TYPICAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 
ADDITIONS IN 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
Governance  
 
• Board of directors  
 
 
• Sharī`ah board  
 
 
Control  
 
• Internal auditor  
• External auditor  
 
 
• ISRU115  
• External Sharī`ah 
   review  
 
Compliance  
 
• Regulatory and financial 
compliance officers, unit or 
department  
 
 
• ISCU116  
 
 
As already mentioned, the major Western banks follow the Basel 
Accords in accordance with and interpreted by their own national regulatory 
structures.  Because the major Western banks are the ones who, as a 
practical matter, control most of the finances for the world’s commerce, 
they are the ones that count in conventional banking.  For this reason, 
among others, Basel II is respected and fairly well followed around the 
world.  As we have seen, this is why banking activities are similar in the 
major world capitals. 
The IFSB, on the other hand, and other such institutions recognize “the  
detailed scope of the Shari’ah Governance System may vary from one 
jurisdiction to another, depending on the types of structures adopted.”117  
The IFSB promulgates merely “guiding principles.”  Nothing is mandated, 
monitored, or controlled. 
The AAOIFI, headquartered in Bahrain, also understands the problems 
of standardization in an industry that is located in many countries with 
differing political, commercial and religious standards, and expects that the 
  
 114. Id. 
 115. Internal Shari’ah review/audit unit. 
 116. Internal Shari’ah unit/department.  If the ISCU is part of the IIFS’s compliance 
team, the internal Sharī`ah review/audit unit/department (ISRU) may be established to 
function in a similar manner to the IIFS’s internal audit team. The major difference is that 
while the internal auditor will usually report to the Audit Committee, the ISRU will report to 
the Sharī`ah board.  EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 59 at 3. 
 117. Id. at 4. 
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institutions will implement its standards to the extent that they wish to do so 
or are able to do so.118   
Despite all the hype and the successes of Islamic banks and the recent 
favorable press, all is not milk and honey.  The Financial Times has 
reported that Islamic banking could play a useful role in our troubled 
financial world, but that it would not be a “silver bullet” for the crisis.119  It 
  
 118. Accounting and Auditing Standards Board, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi/TheOrganization/AAOIFIStructure/AccountingandAuditingSta
ndardsBoard/tabid/68/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).  The powers 
of the Standards Board include, among others, the following: 
(1) To prepare, adopt and interpret accounting and auditing 
statements, standards and guidelines for Islamic financial 
institutions. 
(2) To prepare and adopt code of ethics and educational standards 
related to the activities of Islamic financial institutions. 
(3) To review with the aim of making additions, deletions or 
amendments to any accounting and auditing statements, standards 
and guidelines. 
(4) To prepare and adopt the due process for the preparation of 
standards, as well as regulations and by-laws of the Standards Board. 
The powers of the Shari’a Board include, among others, the 
following:  
(1) Achieving harmonization and convergence in the concepts and 
application among the Shari’a supervisory boards of Islamic 
financial institutions to avoid contradiction or inconsistency between 
the fatwas and applications by these institutions, thereby providing a 
pro-active role for the Shari’a supervisory boards of Islamic financial 
institutions and central banks.  
(2) Helping in the development of Shari’a approved instruments, 
thereby enabling Islamic financial institutions to cope with the 
developments taking place in instruments and formulas in fields of 
finance, investment and other banking services.  
(3) Examining any inquiries referred to the Shari’a Board from 
Islamic financial institutions or from their Shari’a supervisory 
boards, either to give the Shari’a opinion in matters requiring 
collective Ijtihad (reasoning), or to settle divergent points of view, or 
to act as an arbitrator.  
(4) Reviewing the standards which AAOIFI issues in accounting, 
auditing and code of ethics and related statements throughout the 
various stages of the due process, to ensure that these issues are in 
compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari’a. 
AAOIFI Shari’a Board, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi/TheOrganization/AAOIFIStructure/AAOIFISHAR
IABOARD/tabid/71/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 119. John Aglionby, Islamic Banks Urged to Show the Way, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f74e17a-0757-11de-9294-000077b07658.html. 
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appears that greater transparency and standardization are required 
throughout the industry as a whole, since “[t]he . . . combination of 
requirements of Shari’ah compliance and business performance raises 
specific challenges and agency problems, and underlines the need for 
distinctive [corporate governance] structures.”120  The CEO of the recently 
formed and licensed BBK Capanova, the investment bank owned by the 
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, has said the industry needs to improve its 
transparency, and others have echoed this call.121   
Even though Islamic banking and financial institutions contend that they 
base themselves on piety, concern for social justice and the laws of God, 
some, such as Nobel Laureate Economist Hirschman, have contended that 
generally businesses, individuals, and organizations suffer legal and ethical 
lapses.122  Islamic bankers have proven to be no exception, and “[t]he 
history of Islamic finance shows that cases of [corporate governance] 
failures, neglect of minority shareholders’ interests, imprudent lending and 
excessive risk taking by management.”123  
There appear to be at least three possible reasons why the Islamic banks 
have not suffered much in the current stage of the world economic crisis, 
and they all stem from their governance based on Shari’ah principles.  First, 
because the banks share in the profits or losses of their borrowers’ ventures 
(and in the case of mortgages, generally the mortgage is on the books of the 
bank until paid off), which is a result of the principle of no interest, the 
Islamic bank is very careful about where they put their money; credit 
worthiness is therefore a paramount concern.  Second, since money is not be 
made from money and uncertainty or gambling is prohibited, the bundling 
and securitization of financial instruments—the bundling and further selling 
of loans, or making and selling of derivatives,124 for example—is prohibited. 
  
 120. Grais & Pellegrini, supra note 60, at 7. 
 121. Frederik Richter, Capinnova Urges More Islamic Finance Transparency, 
ARABIANBUSINESS.COM (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/capinnova-urges-
more-islamic-finance-transparency-40755.html.  See also A.L.M. Abdul Gafoor, Riba-Free 
Commercial Banking, ISLAMICBANKING.NL (May 2001), 
http://www.islamicbanking.nl/article3.html; His Excellency Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Speech to the Symposium on Islamic Banking 
Prudential Standards (Jan. 15, 2007); Khurshid Ahmed, Islamic Banks Need to Introduce 
Transparency, ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INDUSTRY NEWS CENTRE (July 4, 2010), 
http://www.cibafi.org/newscenter/english/Details.aspx?Id=7684&Cat=0; ISLAMIC FIN. 
SERVS. BD., DISCLOSURES TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY AND MARKET DISCIPLINE FOR 
INSTITUTIONS OFFERING ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb4.pdf. 
 122. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970), cited in Grais & Pellegrini, supra note 60, at 6. 
 123. Grais & Pellegrini, supra note 60, at 6. 
 124. Bright and creative bankers are attempting to come up with new financial 
instruments in order to compete with conventional banks and finance houses and thus capture 
more of the market.  The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) has submitted to its 
Shari’ah board a scheme for making and selling derivatives.  Cecilia Valente, Sharia 
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The bank generally keeps the paper and this not only makes the bank 
concerned about proper credit checks, but it inhibits the bank’s ability to 
multiply capital; that is, continue to lend based on a fixed amount of 
reserves.  And finally, because Islamic banking does not allow the same 
level of the fractionalizing of  reserves as conventional banks, (that is, not 
all deposits can be used for certain types of—or long term—lending)  
theoretically the bank puts a lower amount of its total reserves at risk.  Even 
so, Islamic bankers believe that the recent world financial crisis has “leveled 
the playing field,” making it easier for Islamic banks to compete; but they 
also believe that the industry has to work to come up with new and 
innovative financial instruments in order to appeal to a broader market.125 
CONCLUSION 
No international institution governs, monitors or controls the internal 
corporate governance standards in the far–flung Islamic banks, and because 
an important aspect of the internal standards is Shari’ah compliance, this 
gives rise to differing standards for financial instruments and financial 
operations from place to place.  So of course, in order for Islamic banks to 
have universal appeal and full cross–border application, most believe that 
they will have to have standardized practices.  This will require 
standardized governance structures.  How long this will take is an open 
question.  Conventional banks took centuries to evolve into what they are 
today, while Islamic banks are still in their infancy.126 
 
 
  
Derivative Standard out by Year-End - IIFM, ARABIAN BUS., Sep. 11, 2009 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/sharia-derivative-standard-out-by-year-end-iifm-
12913.html.  They are still waiting for it to be approved by the Shari’ah board.  Even if some 
do approve such derivatives, it is questionable whether even a majority of the mainstream 
Islamic Shari’ah boards will approve such instruments, since they have traditionally been a 
violation of Islamic tenets.  IIFM is a non-profit international infrastructure development 
institution supported by the central banks and government agencies of Bahrain, Brunei, 
Dubai, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan and the Islamic Development Bank, Saudi 
Arabia, in addition to number of financial institutions from various jurisdictions.  Founding 
and Permanent Members, INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKET, 
http://www.iifm.net/default.asp?action=category&id=60 (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
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ISLAMIC FIN. INDUS. NEWS CENTER, Sept. 9, 2009,  
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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Edward M. Morgan notes that “extradition, as opposed to 
domestic prosecution, has become the law enforcement vehicle of choice for 
governments willing to engage with the United States in the anti–drug 
campaign.”1  This Article will review U.S. international drug trafficking 
  
  * Dr. Aronofsky, Ph.D., J.D., has been the General Counsel and Adjunct Professor of 
International Law at The University of Montana since 1994.  He practiced international law 
in a large Washington, D.C. firm for twelve years before moving to Montana.  He has been 
teaching international extradition law in his courses for many years and his professional 
experience includes serving as special extradition counsel for two non-U.S. governments.  
The views expressed herein are solely his personal ones and should not be attributed to The 
University of Montana.  
  † Jie Qin, LL.M, LL.B, who directs the Confucius Institute at The University of 
Montana, is currently on leave from her law faculty position at Southwest University of 
Political Science and Law (SWUPL) in Chongqing, China.  
 1. Edward M. Morgan, Traffic Circles:  The Legal Logic of Drug Extraditions, 31 
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 373, 375 (2009). 
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extradition cases with the dual objectives of identifying (a) contemporary 
legal issues, trends and developments; and (b) analyzing how these trends, 
issues and developments might reasonably apply to future U.S.–China 
cooperation in international drug enforcement efforts.  Special attention will 
be paid to the recent Valencia–Trujillo court decision2 as an example of why 
extradition treaties may not be needed for effective drug trafficking 
enforcement and prosecution in certain instances.   
Part I of this Article discusses general international extradition legal rules 
and principles applied in U.S. courts, based on both treaties and comity.  
Part II describes how U.S. courts have applied these extradition rules and 
principles to select international narcotics cases during the past several 
years.  Part III looks at the Valencia–Trujillo case and why it may prove 
useful in bolstering international enforcement.  Part IV analyzes how the 
U.S. approach to extradition in drug cases, particularly extradition not based 
on treaties, might reasonably be used in future U.S.–China collaborative 
efforts to combat international drug trafficking through proactive use of the 
U.S.–China Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (approved between the 
two countries in June 2000), even as the two countries consider the much 
more complicated issue of whether to negotiate a bilateral extradition treaty. 
I.  GENERAL U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION CASE LEGAL RULES AND 
PRINCIPLES 
The United States utilizes two legal approaches to extradition.  The 
primary one involves extradition pursuant to a specific extradition treaty, 
usually bilateral, which involves either the U.S. or the other treaty party 
requesting the return of a fugitive to the requesting state.  The second 
approach, which is far less used, is extradition by comity, whereby the court 
of one country, in the interest of averting real or perceived jurisdictional 
conflicts with another country’s legal system, will defer to that country’s 
judicial order or request for a fugitive’s return to face prosecution.3 
Three legal principles apply to both extradition approaches.  First, the 
alleged crime must constitute an extraditable offense, i.e., the extraditing 
country must agree that the alleged offense is one suitable for extradition.  
This is easy enough when a treaty contains a list of such offenses, but is not 
so readily apparent with comity–based extradition.4  Second, the offense 
must constitute a crime in both countries, a requirement often referred to as 
  
 2. United States v. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11027 (11th Cir. 2010).  Valencia–Trujillo subsequently filed an 
unsuccessful appeal challenging the jury foreman's bias.  Valencia–Trujillo, 380 Fed. Appx. 
936 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 682 (2010). 
 3. Stephen C. Warneck, Note, A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to 
Attack the Financial Strength of International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 
177, 205 (1998). 
 4. Id. at 205-06. 
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“dual criminality” or “double criminality.”  Although the definitions and 
elements of the offense in each country need not be identical, some 
similarities will normally be present under both extradition approaches and 
both approaches require some form of serious punishment even though this 
need not be identical.5  The third principle, “specialty,” prohibits the 
requesting state from prosecuting the fugitive for any crime other than the 
one for which extradition is sought, although the U.S. generally allows 
requesting states to add additional criminal charges related to the 
extraditable offense if permitted under the laws of the requesting state.6  The 
U.S. also allows the receiving state to consider pre–extradition illegal 
conduct in both sentencing phases.7 
Federal statutes govern U.S. extradition procedures.8  The statutes 
establish a two–step procedure that divides responsibility for extradition 
between a federal judicial officer and the U.S. Secretary of State.  The 
judicial officer, upon complaint, issues an arrest warrant for an individual 
sought for extradition, provided that there is an extradition treaty between 
the United States and the requesting foreign country and that the crime 
charged is covered by the treaty.  If a warrant issues, the judicial officer 
then conducts a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the charge under the treaty.  If the judicial officer finds sufficient 
evidence, the judicial officer certifies to the Secretary of State that a warrant 
for the surrender of the person(s) subject to the extradition request 
extradition may be issued.  The judicial officer must also provide the 
Secretary of State with a copy of the testimony and evidence from the 
extradition hearing.  The Secretary of State has sole discretion to decide 
whether extradition should occur.  Extradition by non–treaty means 
generally functions through similar processes.9 
Even when the above three principles are present, a country may 
nonetheless refuse to extradite a fugitive based on a legal exception.  One 
such exception involves a political offense, based upon the extraditing 
state’s own national interpretation of what constitutes such an offense when 
a treaty does not specify otherwise.10  U.S. courts have developed a two–
part test for determining when an offense is sufficiently “political” in nature 
to fall under this exception based on whether there was some form of 
violent disturbance or uprising in the requesting country; and if so, whether 
the alleged offense is incidental to or in furtherance of the uprising.11  As 
one legal commentator notes, “[e]ven a purely political offense, however, 
  
 5. Id.; Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d at 1178-79. 
 6. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 7. U.S. v. Lomeli, 596 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (2006). 
 9. U.S. v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (9th Cir. 1997) (providing a good 
illustration of how the process works) [hereinafter Kin-Hong]. 
 10. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 11. Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596-97 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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when linked to a common crime such as murder, loses its political character, 
and may thus be the proper ground of an extradition request.”12  Moreover, 
political offenses normally do not include international crimes such as 
genocide, piracy, war crimes, and at least arguably, international narcotics 
trafficking.13  Another important exception to extradition under U.S. and 
international law rests on a prohibition (reflected in the U.S. FARR Act,14 
which in turn implemented the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment15).  Judicial review 
of this exception in U.S. courts is nonetheless all but nonexistent based on a 
2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision deferring to the U.S. Executive Branch 
determination of when these conditions are met, with legal challenges 
seldom successful under the sole mechanism of habeas corpus.16 
As noted above, most extraditions occur pursuant to treaty and the cases 
tend to be fairly straightforward in U.S. courts, with all but a handful of 
extradition requests made to the U.S. government resulting in the grant of 
extradition.  Extradition pursuant to comity, however, is a more complicated 
and far less common approach.  The United States makes comity–based 
extradition especially difficult by limiting its application to third country 
nationals and barring it altogether with regard to U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens.17  This restriction does not restrict the U.S. from 
using non–treaty comity principles to exercise jurisdiction over alleged 
criminals once they enter the U.S. prosecutorial system, as seen below in the 
Valencia–Trujillo case. 
II.  SELECT U.S. EXTRADITION CASES INVOLVING NARCOTICS 
Both U.S. and non–U.S. courts have experienced increased activity in 
international narcotics extradition proceedings.  The U.S. has been 
especially assertive in requesting extradition of drug traffickers who seek 
refuge abroad, including traffickers who are citizens of the countries where 
extradition is sought, and at times perhaps surprisingly, these countries 
seem inclined to cooperate by sending these drug traffickers to the U.S. for 
prosecution.18 Professor Morgan notes: “The case law reveals that when the 
  
 12. Warneck, supra note 3, at 207. 
 13. Id.  Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering extradition of an 
alleged international drug trafficker to Thailand), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1171 (2006). 
 14. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (clarifying 8 U.S.C. § 1231).  
 15. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
 16. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1135 (2008).   
 17. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2006). 
 18. See Joshua H. Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: 
The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FORDHAM INT’L 
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United States calls for drug extraditions, the fugitives tend to come; or more 
accurately, tend to be sent.”19  Below are brief descriptions of how the U.S. 
courts handle these cases when they arrive. 
A.  U.S. Appellate Court Extradition Treaty Decisions 
U.S. v. Thomas20 considered the 1972 U.S. extradition treaty with the 
United Kingdom, as applied to a large scale U.S. marijuana trafficker who, 
upon learning he would be arrested in the U.S., fled first to Jamaica and 
then to the England, from where he was extradited.  The specific treaty issue 
was whether the charges against Thomas for operating a “continuing 
criminal enterprise” conflicted with dual criminality principles because 
neither the Treaty nor U.K. law expressly included the “continuing criminal 
enterprise” offense.  Because the U.K. criminalizes marijuana trafficking, 
the Court had no difficulty rejecting Thomas’ challenge by concluding that 
what an offense is called in each country is not especially pertinent as long 
as the conduct subject to prosecution constituted a serious crime in each 
country.  This case may well be typical of how U.S. courts handle dual 
criminality challenges in drug cases, as the “continuing criminal enterprise” 
offense under U.S. law imposes very strong penalties. 
U.S. v. Cuevas21 addressed the issue of when U.S. courts can ignore 
extraditing country’s efforts to limit a sentence as an extradition condition, 
although the effort here seems legally specious.  The Dominican Republic 
took custody of defendant and extradited him to the U.S. pursuant to both 
the 1909 bilateral extradition treaty and the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances22 on 
various narcotics trafficking charges.  Following extradition, however, the 
Dominican Republic unilaterally issued a decree declaring that the 
applicable sentence for the charged offenses should not exceed thirty years.  
The Court had little difficulty rejecting this after–the–fact effort by the 
sending country to condition sentencing and defendant’s specialty challenge 
based on the purported condition, because the U.S. had never agreed to the 
condition (nor been asked to) when extradition was sought and obtained.  
Required to interpret the U.N. Convention (to which both the U.S. and the 
Dominican Republic are parties), as well as the bilateral treaty, the Court 
found that the Convention did not require a receiving country to limit a 
sentence to the maximum allowed by the sending country’s laws if the 
  
L.J. 2373 (1999).  See Rishi Hingoraney, Note, International Extradition of Mexican 
Narcotics Traffickers: Prospects and Pitfalls for the New Millennium, 30 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP.  L. 331 (2002). 
 19. Morgan, supra note 1, at 420.   
 20. 322 Fed. App’x 177 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2813 (2009). 
 21. 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 680 (2007). 
 22. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-4, 28 I.L.M. 493. 
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sending country never required this condition in the extradition proceeding.  
Interestingly, the trial court sentence of 390 months did not notably exceed 
the 360–month sentence proposed by the Dominican Republic and because 
of a non–extradition U.S. law sentencing issue requiring remand of the case 
to the trial court, it was likely that the defendant would receive a lighter 
U.S. sentence anyway. 
Ramanauskas v. U.S.23 addresses the issue of when and how double 
jeopardy and extradition intertwine.  The case involves the 2003 U.S.–
Lithuania extradition treaty applied to a Lithuanian citizen convicted of 
counterfeiting offenses in the U.S. pursuant to a plea agreement that 
acknowledged, but did not include, drug trafficking charges.  Ramanauskas 
was also charged in Lithuania with a drug trafficking offense for which 
Lithuania sought extradition from the U.S.  He argued unsuccessfully that 
the U.S. plea agreement barred the Lithuanian drug charges extradition 
based on the treaty provision precluding extradition for charges resolved by 
plea agreement in the requested country, because another treaty provision 
expressly permitted extradition for any charges not filed against the person.  
The U.S. Court found that the decision not to prosecute defendant for drug 
offenses meant that he could be charged in Lithuania for the alleged drug 
offenses there. 
Prasoprat v. Benov24 may well be the most controversial U.S. extradition 
case to date involving narcotics.  Prasoprat, a U.S. citizen, was criminally 
charged in both Thailand and the U.S. with heroin trafficking between the 
two countries.  Thailand sought extradition pursuant to the 1983 bilateral 
extradition treaty and the defendant opposed this on the ground that he 
would face the death penalty in Thailand for what is a non–capital offense 
in the U.S.  Although the treaty permitted either party to deny extradition on 
this basis except for murder crimes, the treaty did not require it.  The Court 
denied defendant the opportunity to contest extradition on this ground based 
on deference to the U.S. Executive Branch decision to permit extradition, 
and ordered the case dismissed.  Undaunted, however, Prasoprat then filed a 
second habeas corpus challenge to extradition based on alleged torture if he 
were returned to Thailand and although the Court recognized there may be a 
viable legal claim on this basis, the Court nonetheless concluded Prasoprat 
had provided little credible evidence this would occur and recommended 
dismissal, with his case apparently still pending on appeal.25  Although the 
2005 appellate decision has been sharply criticized, the rule of judicial non–
inquiry into Executive Branch determinations of requesting state conditions 
still prevails and seems unlikely to change.26 
  
 23. 526 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 24. Prasoprat,  421 F.3d 1009. 
 25. Prasoprat v. Benov, 622 F. Supp. 2d 980 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 26. Andrew J. Parmenter, Comment, Death by Non-Inquiry: The Ninth Circuit 
Permits the Extradition of a U.S. Citizen Facing the Death Penalty for a Non-Violent Drug 
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B.  U.S. District Court Treaty Decisions 
In the Matter of the Extradition of Jacques Pelletier27 illustrates how 
identity of the person being sought for extradition is proved based on a 
combination of photographs, customs and immigration declarations, 
interviews with other law enforcement agencies, etc. even when there is no 
corroborating witness.  Brought under the 1908 U.S.–Portugal extradition 
treaty, the case involved a Canadian citizen sought by Portugal for alleged 
large–scale drug smuggling.  Pelletier owned a large boat seized by the 
Portuguese navy while carrying a large illegal narcotics shipment, and he 
was arrested in the U.S. when Portugal sought his extradition.  After 
determining he was the same person as that sought by Portugal, the Court 
then found extradition proper based upon evidence presented from the 
Portuguese trial of the captain and crew that Pelletier intended to ship the 
illegal drugs to Portugal for sale, a crime in both the U.S. and Portugal.    
In re Gon28 involves the application of the 1978 U.S.–Mexico extradition 
treaty to a Chinese–born Mexican citizen in some interesting U.S. judicial 
process contexts.  Gon was first arrested in the U.S. on methamphetamine 
distribution charges and while in U.S. custody awaiting trial, Mexico sought 
his extradition for major drug and related crimes (far more serious in nature 
than the U.S. charges).  Gon tried unsuccessfully to argue that (1) the 
extradition case should be deferred until after his U.S. case was disposed of; 
(2) he should be released on bail; (3) he should not be extradited for 
humanitarian and political offense reasons; and (4) he should be allowed to 
conduct evidentiary discovery of both Mexico’s and the U.S. evidentiary 
bases for the Mexican charges.  The Court rejected deferral based on the 
long–established principle that extradition proceedings should precede 
domestic prosecution because of U.S. treaty obligations, although deferral 
of the extradition removal itself could occur afterward.  The Court refused 
bail because bail is seldom if ever granted in extradition cases and also 
because Gon posed a serious flight risk.  The Court likewise rejected the 
humanitarian and political offense arguments as legally improvident.  The 
Court then refused discovery of Mexico’s evidence as a violation of 
Mexican sovereignty, but did allow limited discovery of the U.S. for the 
  
Offense [Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2005)], WASHBURN L.J. 657, 664-65 
(2006); Matthew Murchison, Note, Extradition's Paradox:  Duty, Discretion, and Rights on 
the World of Non-Inquiry, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 295 (2007); see Meredith Angelson, Note, 
Beyond the Myth of “Good Faith”: Torture Evidence in International Extradition Hearings, 
41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603 (2009). 
 27. In the Matter of the Extradition of Jacques Pelletier, No. 09-22416-MC-
SIMONTON, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44979 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 28. 613 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2009); see also In re Extradition of Zhenly Ye Gon, 
No. 08-596, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96023 (D. D.C. 2009); In re Zhenly Ye Gon, No. 08-
596, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1563 (D. D.C. Jan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Zhenly Ye Gon]. 
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purpose of seeing whether any U.S. evidence could negate probable cause 
for the Mexican arrest warrant.    
U.S. v. Blackiston29 involves a 1982 U.S.–Costa Rica extradition treaty 
specialty challenge to the sentencing of a U.S. citizen extradited to the U.S. 
for prosecution of various marijuana trafficking charges.  After his return to 
the U.S., the government added Ecstasy trafficking to the list of crimes 
Blackiston eventually pleaded guilty to.  The issue before the Court was 
whether Blackiston’s sentence could be enhanced for the Ecstasy charges 
not expressly included in the Costa Rican extradition order because of treaty 
language stating a person could be “punished” only for the offense(s) 
subject to the extradition decision absent exceptions inapplicable to the 
case.  Although noting various bases for sentence enhancement in 
extradition contexts based on crimes either committed in connection with 
the extraditable offenses of after extradition occurred, the Court expressed 
concern about the difference between Ecstasy and marijuana and decided to 
have the U.S. government notify the Costa Rican Government of the 
proposed sentence enhancement to ascertain whether the latter would 
object. 
U.S. v. Wathne30 saw the Court wrestle with the complicated issue of 
appropriate remedies for violation of the dual criminality rule.  Wathne was 
an Icelandic citizen residing in Russia when he was detained by Russian 
authorities pursuant to a U.S. law enforcement assistance request for 
questioning about alleged LSD money laundering activities.  Wathne 
claimed the Russians tortured him and fled to India, where he was arrested 
upon landing at the airport pursuant to an Interpol notice and subjected to a 
U.S. extradition request under the 1999 U.S.–India extradition treaty.  While 
extradition proceedings in India were pending, Wathne voluntarily agreed to 
come to the U.S. on the condition that he could raise any defenses allowed 
under the treaty (he had already succeeded in persuading at least one India 
court that the treaty did not permit extradition for the alleged offense he was 
charged with in the U.S.).  The parties conceded that extradition from 
Russia would not have occurred because of both the absence of a treaty and 
the general unwillingness of Russia to extradite or otherwise send fugitives 
to the U.S. for prosecution.  Wathne successfully persuaded the Court of a 
dual criminality violation by proving that the money laundering offense he 
was charged with was not a crime in India when allegedly committed.  The 
Court then considered various remedy options before deciding that it lacked 
both the power to dismiss the charges (the remedy sought by Wathne) and 
jurisdiction over the case.  The Court noted that if Wathne failed to leave 
the U.S. he would be considered to waive his right to be free of prosecution, 
and then pointed out that Wathne probably had nowhere to go because he 
would likely be extradited from almost any other country he fled to.  This is 
  
 29. 593 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 30. No. CR 05-0594 VRW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79348 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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an interesting case because in essence Wathne won his legal battle but it is 
far from clear he could ever win the legal war. 
U.S. v. Mondragon–Garcia31 illustrates the difference between extradition 
and conditional release into the custody of a requesting state.  Two Mexican 
citizens attempting to leave Panama were stopped at the airport and detained 
for investigation of alleged money laundering.  A few weeks later, a U.S. 
federal court in Florida issued indictments against the two for what were 
probably similar money laundering offenses.  The U.S. Embassy in Panama 
then requested the conditional release into U.S. custody of the two pursuant 
to the U.S.–Panama law enforcement cooperative agreement and 
Panamanian law, deliberately choosing not to request extradition.  The 
Embassy diplomatic note described the two as dangerous members of the 
Sinaloa, Mexico drug cartel involved in large scale cocaine trafficking, 
although there was apparently no evidence presented to support this in the 
note.  They were then bought to the U.S. for prosecution.  The defendants 
unsuccessfully tried to convince the Court that their detention and 
conditional release were predicated on U.S. Government misrepresentations 
to the Panamanian authorities and a lack of evidence to support their release 
into U.S. custody.  The Court rejected these arguments by ruling that 
procedural flaws could not negate the charges.  This particular court opinion 
is not especially well–reasoned because even though extradition was 
apparently never sought, the Court nonetheless analyzed the case pursuant 
to extradition treaty law and in the end correctly concluded that procedural 
flaws in an extradition process will not normally negate a court’s power to 
criminally try the extradited persons. 
Germany v. U.S.32 illustrates how U.S. courts decide extradition disputes 
arising from trials and convictions of fugitives in absentia.  The case 
appears to involve two separate extradition treaties, namely the one between 
the U.S. and Jamaica, where Germany was in preventive custody, and the 
1996 U.S.–France treaty.  Only the U.S.–France treaty is pertinent here, as it 
was the basis for the Court’s decision finding adequate evidence to support 
the extradition request.  Germany was convicted in absentia in two separate 
French courts of various cocaine trafficking offenses.  Applying well–
established case law, the Court determined that the trials in absentia posed 
no barrier to extradition because the legal test is the same as that for 
establishing adequacy of probable cause that the crimes occurred.  In this 
case France provided more than ample evidence to meet the standard. 
In the Matter of the Extradition of Giovanni Gambino33 reflects the 
complexities of interpreting extradition treaty offense language when the 
English and non–English versions differ from one another.  The case 
involved sophisticated heroin trafficking conspiracies in both the U.S. and 
  
 31. No. 8:07-cr-119-T-26MAP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86118 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 32. No. 06 CV 01201 (DLI), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65676 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 33. 421 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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Italy, with convictions obtained on some of the conspiracy charges in the 
U.S. and extradition sought by Italy under the 1983 U.S.–Italy treaty for 
certain conspiratorial acts similar in nature to those resulting in the U.S. 
convictions.  The Court considered the opinions of multiple U.S. and Italian 
legal experts to determine that the treaty provision precluding extradition 
for the same or substantially similar offenses conclusively resolved in the 
requested state did not apply; but then finding that one set of conspiracy 
charges subject to Italy’s extradition requests was not adequately presented 
or substantiated as required by the treaty, while another could be certified 
for extradition. 
U.S. v. Hunte34 addresses certain procedural aspects of extradition 
requests from foreign states arising from the U.S.–Barbados extradition 
treaty in a marijuana smuggling case.  Barbados sought Hunte’s extradition 
based on information obtained from two other persons arrested in Barbados 
in connection with the same criminal activity.  Hunte unsuccessfully argued 
inadequate probable cause for the extradition because the Court found the 
testimony by the other arrestees sufficient to support it even though there 
was a partial recantation by one of them.  The Court further found as not 
credible Hunte’s argument she was promised immunity from extradition by 
U.S. drug officials because she failed to obtain or produce written evidence 
to support it.   
C.  Some Key Non–Treaty Decisions 
U.S. v. Alvarez–Machain35 is a significant U.S. Supreme Court case 
which establishes the legal rule in the U.S. that once a fugitive or criminal 
suspect comes within the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts the person 
stays within such jurisdiction regardless of how the person arrives there.   
Here Alvarez–Machain, a Mexican physician suspected and charged with 
aiding in the torture and murder of U.S. DEA agents in Mexico by a 
Mexican drug cartel head, was kidnapped in Mexico by U.S. federal agents 
and brought into the U.S. for criminal prosecution.  Mexico formally 
protested the seizure, claiming it violated the U.S.–Mexico extradition 
treaty.  The Court ruled that the treaty was not the exclusive means of 
bringing Mexican fugitives into the U.S., and despite a general outcry of 
opposition from the international community objecting to the abduction as 
an egregious international law violation,36 the Court also ruled that he could 
  
 34. No. 04-M-0721(SMG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 607 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 35. Fiocconi v. U.S. Attorney General, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); see also Sosa v. 
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 36. See Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-sponsored Abduction: 
A Comment on United States v. Alvarez–Machain, 86 AM.  J. INT’L. L. 746 (1992); see Halle 
Fine Terrion, Comment, United States v. Alvarez–Machain: Supreme Court Sanctions 
Governmentally Orchestrated Abductions as Means to Obtain Personal Jurisdiction, 43 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 625 (1993); see Royal J. Stark, Comment, The Ker–Frisbie–Alvarez 
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be criminally prosecuted.  Interestingly, he was acquitted of the criminal 
charges and in separate litigation, unsuccessfully sued the U.S. Government 
in a civil tort action.  The decision is very important because it supports 
proceeding with prosecution without regard to how drug offenders find 
themselves in U.S. jurisdiction regardless of whether there is an extradition 
treaty in place. 
Fiocconi v. U.S. Attorney General37 is perhaps the seminal U.S. non–
treaty extradition case involving narcotics.  The U.S. sought extradition of 
two French citizens on narcotics trafficking conspiracy charges even though 
the applicable 1868 U.S.–Italy treaty did not include narcotics offenses.  
Using comity as the basis for granting the U.S. extradition request, Italy 
turned over the two to U.S. authorities on the conspiracy charges issued in a 
Massachusetts federal court.  After their return, the two were subjected to 
additional charges involving trafficking in a New York federal court.  Citing 
specialty, the defendants argued that they should not be subjected to the 
New York charges because Italy never agreed to grant extradition on these.  
With some difficulty the Court determined that the spirit of the comity–
based extradition was complied with by concluding that the offenses were 
closely enough connected to obviate any argument that the U.S. was acting 
in bad faith towards Italy.  The Court acknowledged the viability of 
defendants’ arguments but nonetheless sided with the prosecution.  It may 
well have mattered that the U.S. had returned to the Italian courts to seek a 
broadening of the narcotics charges, and that at the time of the U.S. decision 
Italy had not objected to the U.S. charges. 
U.S. v. Gardiner38 upheld the use of non–treaty means to obtain U.S. 
custody over a Bahamian national who entered the Dominican Republic 
illegally and was subsequently charged in a U.S. court with cocaine 
trafficking conspiracy.  Although the U.S. alerted Interpol of the charges 
with the apparent intent of seeking extradition, the Interpol alert was in fact 
used to trigger a Dominican Republic law authorizing the expulsion of any 
non–citizen subject to an arrest warrant.  The Dominican Government 
turned over Gardiner to U.S. custody and he then tried to argue that the 
U.S.–Dominican Republic extradition had been violated.  The Court 
rejected this argument by concluding that Gardiner was in effect never 
extradited to the U.S. but instead was properly handed over to U.S. custody 
pursuant to Dominican law.  Although not an extradition case per se, this 
decision illustrates how international narcotics crimes can be combated 
through creative means of obtaining custody over fugitives.  
  
Doctrine: International Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored Kidnapping of 
Foreign Nationals Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 113 (1993); see Aimee Lee, Comment, 
United States v.  Alvarez–Machain: The Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126 (1993). 
 37. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). 
 38. 279 Fed. App’x 848 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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U.S. v. Valencia–Trujillo39 appears to be a significant new case in the area 
of non–treaty extradition for narcotics offenses.  Convicted on various 
drug–related crimes, Valencia–Trujillo argued that both specialty and the 
U.S.–Colombia extradition treaty were violated because matters not in the 
indictments against him were used to convict him and also because he was 
charged with offenses not facially within the parameters of the treaty.  The 
Court rejected these arguments by concluding that he was extradited 
pursuant to non–treaty means because the U.S.–Colombia treaty was not in 
effect at the time of his extradition, and then concluding that he lacked 
standing to raise the specialty issue at all as this could only be done in 
treaty–based extraditions.  The potentially far–reaching implications of the 
Court ruling are elaborated below. 
III.  VALENCIA–TRUJILLO IMPLICATIONS IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT 
The Valencia–Trujillo case has significant implications for international 
narcotics enforcement and prosecution activities involving the United States 
because it offers some effective alternatives to the use of extradition treaties 
as a means of receiving and sending fugitives, suspects, and criminal 
defendants.  The Court ruled that persons extradited by non–treaty means 
have no legal standing to challenge alleged specialty violations, i.e., to 
claim that they are being prosecuted for offenses other than those for which 
they were surrendered.  In 2002, Valencia–Trujillo was indicted by a U.S. 
federal court for alleged drug conspiracy and criminal enterprise activities 
as a member of the Cali, Colombia drug cartel.40  Colombia arrested him at 
U.S. request with a diplomatic note also requesting that Colombia extradite 
him to the U.S. to face these specific charges.  The Colombian Justice and 
Interior Ministries approved the extradition subject to the condition that he 
could be tried “only for those charges for which he was requested, and for 
those acts which took place after December 17, 1997.”41  This 1997 date had 
legal importance in that Colombia had amended its Constitution to permit 
extradition of Colombian citizens with or without a treaty for offenses 
committed after this date. 
Before his trial Valencia–Trujillo raised the specialty argument that 
certain conspiracy counts based on acts allegedly occurring before 
December 1997 be stricken from the case.42  The trial court refused and he 
was convicted on all counts.  The appellate court rejected his specialty 
  
 39. 573 F.3d 1171. 
 40. Id. at 1173-74. 
 41. Id. at 1176. 
 42. Recent Case, Customary International Law -- Extradition -- Eleventh Circuit 
Holds That 'Rule of Specialty' Applies Only When Provided by Treaty.  -- United States v. 
Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 572, 573 (2009) 
[hereinafter Recent Case]. 
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argument by ruling that he had no right to raise this argument because he 
was extradited by non–treaty means.43  In other words, defendants may only 
challenge specialty violations if they were extradited pursuant to treaty.  
This tends to undermine the above Fiocconi case allowing specialty 
challenges in comity–based extraditions and some subsequent federal court 
decisions also allowing specialty challenges in non–treaty cases.44  The 
Court also rejected Valencia–Trujillo’s argument that specialty protected 
him under customary international law by noting that specialty probably 
does not constitute customary international law, and even if it does, no 
private right of action to enforce it exists because extradition is a diplomatic 
act between governments.45 
The Valencia–Trujillo case allows U.S. drug enforcement officials and 
prosecutors to use non–treaty extraditions more aggressively by eliminating 
surrendered fugitive specialty challenges.  The practical effect means that a 
person within U.S. criminal court jurisdiction has no legal means to 
challenge prosecutions and convictions based on charges and offenses not 
part of the non–treaty surrender process.  Although the surrendering country 
can certainly file diplomatic objections, this would not necessarily affect 
decisions that disregard specialty.  For these reasons the case has been 
sharply criticized by one commentator as “a message . . . that the United 
States cannot be trusted to live up to the promises that it makes in order to 
secure extradition.”46  Moreover, the case appears to bar persons subject to 
comity–based extradition from the U.S. to other countries to raise specialty 
challenges.  In other words, the case provides a great incentive to use means 
other than treaties as the basis for extradition.  Because a number of 
countries, including the U.S. and China, lack extradition treaties with each 
other and will necessarily require extensive diplomatic efforts over lengthy 
periods of time to get them, the Valencia–Trujillo decision provides an 
easier means to facilitate extraditions far less vulnerable to legal attack. 
IV.  U.S.–CHINA DRUG ENFORCEMENT COLLABORATION THROUGH NON–
TREATY EXTRADITION: PROSPECTS AND ISSUES 
The U.S. and China have something of an inconsistent history regarding 
drug enforcement collaboration.  It is not altogether clear that any 
significant collaboration occurred until the late 1980s, when the infamous 
Goldfish heroin smuggling case reflected both the promise of such 
  
 43. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 F.3d at 1181. 
 44. Recent Case, supra note 42, at 575-76. 
 45. Id. at 577-79. 
 46. Amie Cafarelli, Extradition Law – Criminal Defendants Extradited Outside of 
Treaties Lack Standing to Assert Rule of Specialty – United States v. Valencia–Trujillo, 573 
F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009), 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 377, 388 (2010).  Whether this 
criticism is valid is questionable, in that extradition was never used as the U.S. jurisdictional 
basis for trying the fugitive. 
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collaboration—at least initially—and a major setback which could have 
curtailed such collaboration altogether.47 
A.  The Goldfish Heroin Case: A Troubled Beginning 
The Goldfish case began in 1988, when Chinese customs brokers at the 
Shanghai Airport discovered heroin hidden inside a shipment of goldfish 
destined for San Francisco.  Chinese police officials arrested Wang Xong 
Xiao, a Chinese citizen, for arranging the shipment.  During interrogations, 
Wang allegedly confessed to assisting Hong Kong resident Leung Tak Lun 
ship the drugs to the United States.  Chinese officials arrested Leung, and 
notified the United States Drug Enforcement Agency of the pending 
shipment.  DEA agents seized the shipment when it arrived in San Francisco 
and arrested Chico and Andrew Wong.  The Chinese government extradited 
Leung to the U.S., where federal prosecutors indicted Leung and the two 
Wongs for conspiracy to import and possess heroin with intent to 
distribute.48 
In what apparently was the first time China cooperated with another 
country to prosecute a defendant charged with a criminal offense, China 
sent Wang and five Chinese investigating officials to the U.S. to assist the 
U.S. Government at the criminal trial.  The Chinese officials testified during 
the first month of the trial.  Wang was then called as a witness, and he 
testified for several days.  Wang then shocked all concerned by filing a 
petition for political asylum and testifying to the trial court that his Chinese 
captors had coerced and tortured him to confess falsely.  He claimed his 
Chinese captors ordered him to testify falsely at trial, with the threat that 
failure to comply with their demands would lead to a death sentence when 
he returned to China.49  The trial court immediately declared a mistrial but 
refused to dismiss the case against defendants, who were convicted in the 
subsequent retrial.   
Meanwhile, Wang’s asylum petition became subject to sharp legal 
conflict as U.S. Government officials sought his removal from the U.S. in 
apparent retaliation for his changed testimony.  The U.S. courts which heard 
Wang’s challenge to the attempted removal found that U.S. prosecutors had 
engaged in serious misconduct in connection with the decision to bring 
Wang to the U.S. to testify and further found that Wang should be allowed 
to remain in the U.S. as his due process rights would be violated if he were 
involuntarily returned to China to face likely torture and death.50  Both the 
trial and appellate courts excoriated U.S. Government officials for not 
  
 47. U.S. v. Leung Tak Lun, 944 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 48. Id. at 643. 
 49. Id. at 643-44. 
 50. Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’g 837 F.Supp. 1506 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993). 
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independently corroborating the legitimacy of Wang’s trial testimony 
against the defendants, and then trying to remove him from the U.S. after 
placing him in his position in the first place.51  One commentator has written 
that “[t]he Wang case demonstrated the importance of a neutral court’s 
capacity to exercise its supervisory powers to protect a witness and to 
ensure that witness testimony in U.S. proceedings is free of the taint of 
coercion.”52  Although this case might well have ended further China–U.S. 
drug enforcement cooperation, this in fact did not occur and instead the two 
countries developed new legal means to develop it. 
B.  The Lui Kin–Hong Case: Extradition Via Hong Kong 
Although not a narcotics case, U.S. v. Lui Kin–Hong53 deserves mention 
here because it addressed whether extradition from the U.S. to Hong Kong 
was permissible in the aftermath of the Goldfish decisions as Hong Kong 
was about to revert to China’s jurisdiction on July 1, 1997.  
 In 1995, when Hong Kong was still subject to British sovereignty, a 
Hong Kong criminal court charged Lui with large scale bribery involving 
tobacco imports and pursuant to the applicable U.S.–U.K. extradition treaty 
which extended to Hong Kong, U.S. officials apprehended Lui at a U.S. 
airport when he tried to enter the country on a business trip.54  After 
extradition proceedings began, a U.S. trial court released Lui on bail 
contrary to the general rule that bail is not normally allowed in extradition 
cases but a federal appeals court reversed this decision and ordered Lui held 
pending the extradition case outcome.55  
The crux of the case was whether Lui could be lawfully extradited to a 
Hong Kong criminal court system subject to China’s control.  Lui argued 
unsuccessfully that his rights could not be protected in Hong Kong; that 
there was no extradition treaty between the U.S. and China; and that even if 
there were an applicable treaty, he was entitled to a political offense 
exception for the crimes he was charged with.  The Court noted that the 
U.S. and Hong Kong (specifically the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region) had signed an extradition treaty in 1996 which contemplated 
extradition after the reversion of Hong Kong to China and further noted that 
both the U.K. and the Hong Kong treaties were in effect.  The Court also 
rejected Lui’s effort to show he could not be fairly tried by relying on the 
non–inquiry rule discussed above, because the Secretary of State has sole 
  
 51. Id. at 819-20. 
 52. David Whedbee, Comment, The Faint Shadow of the Sixth Amendment: 
Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering Capacity Abroad Under the U.S.-P.R.C. 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 561, 
563 (2003). 
 53. Kin–Hong, 110 F.3d 103. 
 54. Id. at 107. 
 55. Id. at 108; see also U.S. v. Kin–Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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discretion to determine whether Lui could and should be extradited.56  
Finally, the Court found both dual criminality and specialty present in the 
case while rejecting Lui’s evidentiary sufficiency challenges and he was 
ordered extradited.57 
Although there is no mention of the Goldfish case in any of the various 
U.S. court opinions involving Lui, this is in and of itself significant because 
the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit decided both.  This Court 
could well have cited Goldfish to block Lui’s extradition based on concerns 
about Lui’s rights, but instead opted to rely on explicit treaty language plus 
the non–inquiry rule to support Lui’s extradition.  In other words, while 
knowing Hong Kong would be subject to China’s jurisdiction the U.S. 
Court did not seem concerned about it and assumed the legitimacy of Hong 
Kong jurisdictions.  Three years later a different federal appeals court 
followed the Lui Kin–Hong decision, using the same arguments, in 
affirming the extradition of another criminal fraud fugitive to Hong Kong in 
Cheung v. U.S.58  These cases have positive implications for virtually all 
narcotics cases involving Hong Kong and they help lay a foundation for 
non–treaty extraditions with China. 
C.  The 2000 U.S.–China Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 
On June 19, 2000, the U.S. and China signed an important bilateral 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters59 in Beijing.  
This Agreement, similar to others entered into by the U.S., China, and many 
other nations, authorizes law enforcement and prosecutorial officials to 
collaborate in a number of specific areas related to criminal investigations, 
prosecutions, and related proceedings.  These areas include serving 
documents; taking witness testimony; providing documentary evidence 
assistance; expert evaluations; making witnesses available for testimony; 
locating or identifying persons; executing requests for inquiry, searches, 
  
 56. Id. at 110-11. 
 57. For a good analysis of the case, see Jonathan A. DeMella, Note, In Re 
Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong: Examining the Effects of Hong Kong's Reversion to the 
People's Republic of China on United States–United Kingdom Treaty Obligations, 47 AM. U. 
L. REV. 187 (1997).  For a review of post-reversion Hong Kong extradition generally, see 
Erik Alexander Rapoport, Comment, Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region: Will Hong Kong Remain a Separate and Independent Jurisdiction After 1997?, 4 
ASIAN L.J. 135 (1997). 
 58. 213 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).  See also In re Extradition of Grace Chan Seong, 346 
F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. N.M.  2004) (allowing the extradition of a  U.S. citizen to Hong Kong 
pursuant to the U.S.-Hong Kong Treaty to  face commercial  bribery charges. Extradition 
would not have been allowed to China because of the absence of a treaty and the bar against 
comity-based extradition of U.S. citizens). 
 59. Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-China, June 19, 2000, STATE 
DEP’T. DOC NO. 01-44. 
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freezes and evidence seizures; helping with asset forfeitures; and perhaps 
most importantly, “transferring persons in custody for giving evidence or 
assisting in investigations; and . . . any other form of assistance which is not 
contrary to the laws in the territory of the Requested Party.”60  The 
Agreement resulted from serious U.S. concerns, shared by China, of heroin 
and methamphetamine activities affecting both countries.61  To avoid the 
coercive problems seen in the Goldfish debacle, the Agreement requires 
consent of anyone whose help is sought in the requesting country’s territory 
to consent to go there, even if the person is in the custody of the requested 
country; the Agreement also adopts extradition principles by allowing a 
party to refuse assistance if the request pertains to conduct which is not a 
crime in both countries unless the parties agree otherwise or which 
constitutes a political offense, among other exceptions.62 
These kinds of Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements (MLATs) are used, 
often effectively, to combat international narcotics and other crimes, 
although they face criticism for tending to be too much an “Americanized” 
approach to enforcement with a tendency to sacrifice the rights of 
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of countries other than the U.S.63  
Commentators seem especially concerned about the issue of rights in China, 
but at least on the face of the U.S.–China Agreement itself, there are 
safeguards built into the Agreement to avoid this problem; and organized 
crimes related to narcotics and other illicit activity involving the two 
countries are admittedly serious problems for both.64  Perhaps more 
significantly, the Agreement gives the two countries a specific framework 
for potentially effective collaboration in narcotics enforcement and 
prosecution.  Although to date, there are no reported U.S. court decisions 
utilizing the Agreement, it is quite probably only a matter of time before 
these cases emerge.  This collaboration includes transfer of persons in 
extradition–like proceedings, subject to the consent requirement. 
D.  Post–2000 MLAT Agreement Collaborative Activity 
The U.S. and China have sought to cooperate with each other in narcotics 
cases since the 2000 MLAT Agreement, which took effect March 8, 2001.  
In May 2003, the two countries joined India and Canada in taking down a 
  
 60. Id. at art. 1(2)(a)-(j). 
 61. Whedbee, supra note 52, at 561-62. 
 62. Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note 59, at arts. 3.1, 9, 11, 12. 
 63. Whedbee, supra note 52, at 569-74. 
 64. Id. at 592-93.  Article  11.2  expressly provides:  “The Requested Party may 
request the Requesting Party to make a  commitment that a person who has been asked to be 
present in the territory  of the Requesting Party . . . not be prosecuted,  detained . . . or  
subject to any  other restriction  of  personal liberty,  for any acts or omissions or  convictions 
which preceded such person’s  entry  into the territory of  the Requesting Party . . .” 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note 59, at art. 11(2).  
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major heroin trafficking network centered in Fujian.  The case involved an 
elaborate sting operation conducted jointly by U.S. and Chinese officials in 
China.65  Annual U.S. State Department International Narcotics Strategy 
Reports (INSCR) cite other examples of collaboration, and in 2005 the U.S. 
DEA signed a cooperative memorandum with Chinese authorities to 
strengthen joint investigative efforts.  This in turn may have helped the 
countries break a major Colombian drug smuggling ring centered in 
Zhongshan City, southern China, and Hong Kong.66  Then a few years later, 
the two countries engaged in Operation Vulture Hunting to break a heroin 
smuggling ring that involved China, the U.S., and Canada.67  These 
collaborative efforts have been somewhat hampered by the absence of a 
formal Letter of Agreement between the two countries on how drug 
enforcement efforts should be formally and systematically coordinated so 
the countries continue their case–by–case approach. 
E.   The U.S., China and Extradition – Current Issues and 
Developments 
Because of human rights concerns, countries have been reluctant to enter 
into extradition treaties with China even though, as noted above, 
extraditions from the U.S. to Hong Kong have proceeded with U.S. judicial 
and Executive Branch blessings since 1997.  In 2005, however, Spain 
became the first country to enter into an extradition treaty with China with 
France, Portugal and Australia soon to follow.68  China now has some 
twenty bilateral extradition treaties, most with less developed countries, 
with the impetus for most of them being China’s aggressive efforts to seek 
the return of corrupt government officials who fled the country with ill–
gotten gains.69 
Extradition activities between China and the U.S. have been conducted 
on a case–by–case basis because of the absence of a treaty.  The U.S. has 
proved willing (in the non–Hong Kong context) to use comity and domestic 
immigration laws to help China gain custody of its own nationals who do 
not enjoy freedom from extradition under U.S. law.70  This approach has its 
advantages—the main one being flexibility—and disadvantages, including 
inconsistency in approaches and lack of predictability.  To the extent 
Chinese nationals find themselves extradited to the U.S. through non–treaty 
means, there appear to be few practical limits on their prosecution as 
  
 65. Bruce Zagaris, U.S.–P.R.C. Heroin Sting Signals Renewed Drug Cooperation 
Between the 2 Countries, 19 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., August 2003, at 297, 297. 
 66. See 2007 U.S. DEP. OF STATE INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REP. 281. 
 67. 2008 U.S. DEP. OF STATE INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REP. 292-93.   
 68. Matthew Bloom, Note, A Comparative Analysis of the United States’s Response 
to Extradition Requests from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 179-80 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 189-90. 
 70. Id. at 200-02. 
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discussed above.  For drug enforcement purposes, extradition of Chinese to 
the U.S. for prosecution clearly requires no treaty, and this provides a viable 
mechanism for effective enforcement. 
Whether the U.S. and China will have an extradition treaty has been the 
subject of recent speculation.71  Now that western European countries and 
Australia have signed such treaties with China, the U.S. faces an interesting 
dilemma.  It can continue to conduct case–by–case extradition review on a 
non–treaty basis; or alternatively, follow these other countries with a treaty.  
It is nonetheless unclear whether a treaty is needed, because as the 
Valencia–Trujillo case suggests, Chinese who find themselves subject to an 
extradition proceeding seeking either U.S. retention of prosecutorial  
jurisdiction or U.S. return to China for prosecution have no apparent legal 
basis for seeking judicial intervention in their plights.  Therefore, non–treaty 
approaches can work.  Of course, the U.S. cannot apply such approaches to 
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regarding transfer to China, but 
as long as the issue remains one of international narcotics enforcement and 
prosecution, it seems unlikely that these particular criminal activities will 
not somehow find themselves, at least partly, within U.S. jurisdiction in 
some respect.   
CONCLUSION  
Extradition continues to be the primary U.S. enforcement approach to 
international narcotics offenses.  Although treaties have traditionally been 
the primary means of obtaining extradition of alleged drug traffickers both 
to and from the U.S., Valencia–Trujillo and various of the other cases 
discussed above demonstrate that treaties are neither needed, nor necessarily 
even always desired, for extradition to occur.  Comity–based extradition 
offers the advantage of eliminating judicial challenges to the basis for such 
extraditions, while necessarily limiting these extraditions from the U.S. to 
persons other than U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens.  Because the 
U.S. and China may well require a long time before agreeing to a bilateral 
extradition treaty, non–treaty extraditions offer an attractive alternative 
whenever the U.S.–Hong Kong treaty cannot be feasibly used.  Despite the 
Goldfish case fiasco, which could have permanently eliminated U.S.–China 
cooperation in drug cases, the countries have found ways to increase 
collaborative enforcement and prosecution efforts to attack their common 
objective of waging war on international narcotics trafficking involving 
their respective borders.  These authors believe that such collaboration will 
continue, and most likely expand, as the countries become more familiar 
and comfortable with how each goes about the business of eradicating the 
traffickers. 
  
 71. Anna MacCormack, Note, The United States, China, and Extradition:  Ready for 
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Humanity is the sovereignty which has been offended and a tribunal is 
convoked to determine why.† 
 
 
War is essentially an evil thing.†† 
 
A QUESTION OF DEFRAGMENTATION 
The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights has been made into an issue of scholastic debate.1 As it ultimately 
  
 † United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen case), 4 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 497 (1949). 
            ††  Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and 
Sentences, (Oct. 1, 1946), 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, at 186 (1947). 
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issue of the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS devoted to “Human Rights,” which 
contains some articles that will be referred to here.  See generally 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1 
(2008).  Some useful references for this general discussion, given the limited nature of the 
engagement with the topic here, are: Louise Doswald–Beck & Sylvain Vité, International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 33 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993); Kenneth 
Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary 
Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International 
Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000); Robert Quentin–Baxter, Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law – Conflict or Confluence? 9 AUST. YBIL, 94–112 (1985); Dietrich 
Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws, 31 AM. U. 
L. REV. 935 (1982); César Sepúlveda, Interrelationships in the Implementation and 
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 
117 (1983); Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Are There Some 
Individuals Bereft of all Legal Protection?, 98 ASIL PROC. 353 (2004); Christine Byron, A 
Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of International Humanitarian Law by Human 
Rights Bodies, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 839 (2007); Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of 
Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310 (2007) [hereinafter Droege, Interplay]; David Kretzmer 
et. al, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Exploring 
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concerns issues of legitimate violence, life and death, the legal questions 
posed by that debated relationship need to be rescued from the grips of legal 
idealism, and their political content recovered in the process. Triggering a 
conversation around this project is the main objective of this contribution. 
Highlighting the political fabric of the type of technocratic policy–making 
based on one understanding of that relationship is the particular angle that 
will be taken to initiate the discussion.  
Whatever the answer that will ultimately be preferred, the question of a 
relationship between human rights and humanitarian law rests always on a 
series of premises. First, we are in the presence of two presumably 
identifiable objects, understood as two normative systems or two areas of 
practice, with presupposed distinctive traits. Second, the distinctiveness is 
related to some internal coherence, which permits a determination of what is 
included in each one of them. Third, some form of relationship is possible, 
which in turn suggests a fundamental or overarching commonality that 
allows for comparison, contradistinction, and other ways of juxtaposing 
those two objects of study and practice. In contemporary international law, 
those premises make the present question to fall into the more general issue 
of “fragmentation” of international law.2 That notion refers to the 
accelerating proliferation and diversification of international rules, which 
has raised for some the specter of looming contradictions, conflicts, 
  
Parallel Application, 40 ISR. L. REV. 306 (2007); Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the 
Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 
194 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Nancie Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More 
Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 356 (2007); William A. Schabas, 
Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the 
Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40 ISR. L. REV. 592 (2007); 
Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism or Convergence?, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (2008); 
Richard Baxter, Human Rights in War, 31 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 4 (1977); Heike 
Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 265 (2006); Ruona 
Iguyovwe, The Inter–play Between International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law, 34 COMMW. L. BULL. 4, 749 (2008); Daniel O’Donnell, Trends in the 
Application of International Humanitarian Law by United Nations Human Rights 
Mechanisms, 80 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 481 (1998); Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the 
Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law, 
86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 789 (2004); HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND 
CONFLICT RESEARCH, FROM LEGAL THEORY TO POLICY TOOLS: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (2007).  An interesting book-length study on the topic, framed by 
the general idea that an important structural difference between IHL and IHRL as normative 
frameworks lies in the legal position of the individual as a holder of rights or obligations, is 
RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (2002). 
 2. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) 
[hereinafter Fragmentation of International Law]. 
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overlaps and other difficulties in their coexistence and concurrent 
operation.3 Among those problems, some are of a normative kind, as when 
two rules appear to say different things on the same issue.4 And some are of 
an institutional kind, as when two institutions appear to say different things 
about the same issue.5 When they meet, we have the mixed kind where 
specialized institutions appear to fragment issues by ignoring rules outside 
of their specialization.6 The term “fragmentation” suggests a passing or lost 
unity among the emerging fragments, and it is generally approached as a 
problem to be managed. Proposed solutions should have as an aim to help 
recover the lost unity, by confirming the existence of an actual system, 
either on normative grounds or institutional grounds, or both. From that 
perspective the coexistence of human rights law with humanitarian law has 
been a paradigmatic case in the fragmentation debate, both in terms of the 
issues it raises in concrete situations where the law is applied, and in terms 
of the general legal strategies designed to address those issues. 
  
 3. Among the abundant literature on the topic, one can start with some of the 
contributions to the Symposium on “Diversity or Cacophony? New Sources of Norms in 
International Law” published by the Michigan Journal of International Law in 2004.  See in 
particular Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing From Fragmentation of International 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849 (2004); Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: 
International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903 (2004); 
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the 
Growing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929 
(2003-2004); Mario Prost & Paul Kingsley Clark, Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of 
International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really 
Matter?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 341 (2006). For discussions of fragmentation as it affects 
specific fields of practice, see for example August Reinisch, The Proliferation of 
International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise 
of a More Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of Investment 
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: 
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 107–26 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008); 
Harro Van Asselt et al., Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International 
Law, 30 LAW & POL’Y, 423 (2008); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or 
Convergence?, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (2008). 
 4. Under that generic label one finds a series of issues, such as conflicts between 
successive norms, conflicts between so-called universal (or general) and regional (or special) 
norms, or conflicts between overlapping treaty regimes.  These are dealt with in the bulk of 
the ILC’s fragmentation report.  See Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 2, ¶ ¶ 
46–294. 
 5. The fragmentation report mentions for instance the fact that the European Court 
of Human Rights (and then other human rights bodies) understands itself as institutionally 
different from the International Court of Justice, which justifies differentiating its practice 
regarding the European Convention from the general practice of the ICJ rearding 
international treaties, including human rights treaties.  See id. ¶ 131. 
 6. As noted in the fragmentation report, the twin issues of normative and 
institutional fragmentation (otherwise labeled as substantive conflicts and jurisdictional 
conflicts) appear frequently in debates concerning international trade law.  See id. ¶ ¶ 165–
85. 
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On that basis, the pages below argue in favor of fragmentation. The 
relationship between human rights and humanitarian law is approached 
from the perspective of trends or ideas that actually suggest their 
defragmentation, that is, their variously defined or even explicit integration 
into a greater whole.7 Given that all talk about fragmentation is at the same 
time a set of propositions about the type of unity that exists or existed 
among the fragments, and the way in which the loss of unity is understood, 
the argument below favors one type of fragmentation, i.e. substantive or 
normative fragmentation, against the backdrop of a particular type of formal 
commonality, i.e. common belonging to the political system of international 
law. In other words, one side of the argument seeks to entrench the notion 
that human rights and humanitarian law are distinct fragments, in the sense 
of being separate parts of a greater whole. In terms of being distinct parts, 
each one has its own internal dynamics and structural orientation (or bias);8 
and in terms of belonging to a whole, they share the common ground that 
allows for the discussion of their coexistence. The other side of the 
argument seeks to justify the entrenchment of both legal distinctness and 
commonality as necessary from the perspective of international law as a 
political discourse on government. Conversely, thereby, the argument 
suggests that any handling of the relations of human rights and humanitarian 
law that glosses over their difference in sameness needs to become aware of 
itself as part of an alternative political discourse to that of international law. 
The present contribution therefore weighs in a tangential way on the variety 
of arguments that try to make sense of the relationship between these two 
bodies of law, by focusing on the legal frame within which that debate 
occurs, and what it leaves out of the conversation.    
I proceed as follows. The premise is that distinct legal regimes have 
loose but distinct normative bents, or structural biases. Although the 
structural bias does not overrule the possible inner contradictions of each 
regime, I proceed first (Part II) to boiling down both bodies of rules to what 
could arguably be seen as their respective animating principles: distinction 
  
 7. For a critical reading of the spirit in which such merger happens, see Ruti G. 
Teitel, For Humanity, 32 J. HUM. RTS. 225 (2004) (describing the progress of a narrative of 
“humanity” as the flipside of the traditional internationalist discourse of State sovereignty). 
Professor Teitel has pursued a larger project of describing the transformation of the 
international legal order through the progressive meeting of human rights and humanitarian 
law, as well as the expansion of international criminal law. For instance, see, e.g., Ruti G. 
Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 
at 359 (2001) [hereinafter Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law] (noting that "the most 
pronounced change in the international legal system is the dramatic expansion of 
humanitarian law's reach through its merger with international human rights law and its 
attendant implications for global rule of law."). See also Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity Law: A 
New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 667 (2008).  
 8. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2009) (describing the challenge of the fragmentation era as one of choice 
between structurally biased regimes). 
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for humanitarian law (Section A), and non–discrimination for human rights 
(Section B). I suggest that these separate and apparently contradictory 
principles are both rooted in the same political liberal tradition, which I 
evoke through the use of loose social contract imagery in the description of 
both distinction and non–discrimination. That leads me, in the spirit of the 
era of fragmentation, to revisit some judicial encounters with the 
relationship between human rights and humanitarian law (Part III). Starting 
with the canonical moment when the International Court of Justice 
suggested the interpretive principle of lex specialis as a panacea (Section 
A), I move to an examination of the respective case law related to 
humanitarian law in the three regional human rights systems—Europe 
(Section B), the Americas (Section C) and Africa (Section D). Paying close 
technical attention to that practice will serve to give some depth, through the 
variety of situations and particular position of human rights bodies, to the 
implicit connection between lex specialis and jurisdiction, that is, formal 
sovereignty. Once the political form of sovereignty is put back in place as 
the basis for the lex generalis / lex specialis trope—and therefore also the 
argumentative line between peace and war—concluding thoughts will 
follow concerning the political message of defragmentation. 
I. A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLES 
The basic starting point in the received conversation about the relations 
between human rights and humanitarian law is that one is obviously 
considering some form of relationship between two distinct bodies of rules. 
Whatever the preferred outlook and conclusions reached—and regardless of 
the depth and nature of the relationship that is thus presented—the 
discussion inevitably starts from a received boundary. Jurisprudentially, 
standard legal keywords in the discussion, such as “complementarity” or lex 
specialis, suggest that there is proximity but never conflation.9 In terms of 
the realities of the field, the relationship will in turn refer to institutional 
examples of proximity, such as the turn of quintessentially “human rights” 
organizations towards humanitarian law for their work, within which such 
organizations will speak of humanitarian law rather than human rights, 
whereas, precisely because they are human rights organizations, one will 
assume that it is still somehow human rights work.10 And conversely, the 
  
 9. E.g. Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 
90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 501, 521 (2008) [hereinafter Droege, Affinities] ("It is thus clear 
from the outset that a complete merging of the two bodies of law is impossible.  It is natural, 
therefore, that the approach in jurisprudence and practice is rather that human rights and 
humanitarian law are not mutually exclusive, but complementary and mutually 
reinforcing."). See also Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law, supra note 7. 
 10. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UP IN FLAMES: HUMANITARIAN LAW 
VIOLATIONS AND CIVILIAN VICTIMS IN THE CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA (2009). 
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relationship will be also exemplified by the primordial humanitarian law 
organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and its 
cautious engagement with human rights law,11 both in the type of field work 
that leads it to cross the armed conflict / peace divide,12 and through its 
presence as a permanent observer at the sessions of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (later replaced by the Human Rights 
Council)—an institutional presence that would suggest at least some 
subjective sense of mutual relevance.13 
The depth of the boundary between human rights law and humanitarian 
law is sometimes, especially for didactic purposes, posited in historical 
terms. According to received narratives, the contemporary shape of 
  
 11. See Sergey Sayapin, The International Committee of the Red Cross and 
International Human Rights Law, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 95 (2009).  As Toni Pfanner notes, in 
his editorial for the special issue of the International Review of the Red Cross devoted to 
human rights, “[t]oday, nobody questions that international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law apply during armed conflict and that the two bodies of law 
are complementary and influence each other.” See Toni Pfanner, Editorial, 90 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 485 (2008) (emphasis added).  Pfanner also explains the reluctance of the ICRC 
to engage too openly with human rights for fear of “politicization”.  Id. at 488. The 
involvement of the ICRC in a variety of situations based on its "right of initiative" 
recognized through the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement leads it into non-traditional 
contexts that lend themselves to the invocation of human rights standards. See Statutes of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by The 25th International 
Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva (Oct. 1986), amended by The 26th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent at Geneva (Dec. 1995) and by The 29th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent at Geneva (June 2006), art. 
5(3), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/statutes-movement-
220506.htm (stating that “[t]he International Committee may take any humanitarian initiative 
which comes within its role as a specifically neutral and independent institution and 
intermediary, and may consider any question requiring examination by such an institution.”). 
Given the position of the ICRC on the “War on Terror,” it is significant that the ICRC report 
on the treatment of “War-on-Terror” detainees in the detention centers of the United States’ 
Central Intelligence Agency (a confidential report that was, however, leaked to the press in 
April of 2009) contained references to the violation of both humanitarian law and specific 
rules of human rights law applicable to detention situations.  See Mark Danner, The Red 
Cross Torture Report: What It Means, 56 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/30/the-red-cross-torture-report-what-it-
means/. 
 12. “The ICRC strives to ensure that the rank and file of armed, security and police 
forces know and apply IHL and human rights law as they go about their daily work, and that 
other weapon bearers respect IHL and support, or refrain from actively opposing, 
humanitarian action.” E.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 48 
(May 2009) (emphasis added).  The ICRC is generally active also on the front of 
disseminating rules of conduct to all agencies that wield the State’s power of physical 
coercion.  See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GUIDE FOR POLICE CONDUCT AND 
BEHAVIOR (2004). 
 13. Observer Status for the International Committee of the Red Cross, in 
Consideration of the Special Role and Mandates Conferred Upon it by the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, U.N. Res. 45/6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/6 (Oct. 16, 1990). On 
that peculiar status, see Christian Koenig, Observer Status for the ICRC at the United 
Nations: A Legal Viewpoint, 73 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 37 (1991). 
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international human rights law14 is informed by the foundational mold of the 
1948 Universal Declaration15 and, behind it, the Charter of the United 
Nations16—although prehistoric roots extend deeper back in time to 
encompass League of Nations era experiences such as the minority 
regimes17 and scattered winks by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice,18 and some would extend those roots to a variety of moral, religious, 
or philosophical systems that have supposedly shaped the idea of “human 
rights.”19  
International humanitarian law, in turn,20 would emerge in its modern 
codified form from, on the one hand, the St. Petersburg Declaration of 
186821 and the Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907,22 and—on the 
other hand—the historical development of the system of the Geneva 
Conventions since 186423 down to 1949 and beyond.24 This schematized 
  
 14. For an attempt at presenting the evolution of human rights thought and practice 
since antiquity, see Dinah L. Shelton, An Introduction to the History of International Human 
Rights Law (Geo. Wash. Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 346, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010489.  For more de-centered takes, see Berdal Aral, The Idea of 
Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 454–82 (2004); Reza 
Afshari, On Historiography of Human Rights — Reflections on Paul Gordon Lauren’s the 
Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 1–67 (2007)  
 15. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 16. See generally U.N. Charter pmbl, ¶ 3 and art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 17. See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 
HIST. J. 379 (2004).  On the experimental legal architecture of the time, see Nathaniel 
Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy and the Limits of the 
Interwar Framework, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (1992). 
 18. An important moment in that retrospective narrative would be the Permanent 
Court of International Justice’s involvement in seemingly novel issues relating to 
international law’s entanglement with constitutional questions relating ultimately to the 
protection of individual freedoms.  See Conformity of Certain Legislative Decrees with the 
Constitution of the Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, at 41 (Sept. 
4). The retrospective reading would then be reinforced by the powerful defense of a 
seemingly “traditionalist” vision of interstate international law in Judge Anzilotti’s dissent.  
See id. at 60 (Anzilotti, J., dissenting). 
 19. See, e.g., BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1997); ROGER RUSTON, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IMAGE OF GOD (2004). 
 20. For the ICRC’s own version of the history of international humanitarian law, see 
What Are the Origins of International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Jan 1, 
2004)  http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5KZFR8.  See also Howard S. Levie, 
History of the Law of War on Land, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 339 (2000); LESLIE C. GREEN, 
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 18–51 (1993). 
 21. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 1868 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration], reprinted in 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER 
RULES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 159. 
 22. E.g. Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 
Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 INT'L AFF. 619, 625 (1999). 
 23. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. 
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bifurcation is what is used to didactically separate humanitarian law into 
two subgroups of rules.25 Out of the 1899–1907 time period comes the 
lineage of the laws of war referred to as “Hague Law,”26 that is, the rules 
governing means of warfare (weapons and weapon systems such as 
antipersonnel lasers,27 asphyxiating gas28 or cluster ammunition29) and 
  
 24. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are, in their traditional order: Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GCI]; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at the Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter GCII]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GCIII]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GCIV]. The two Additional 
Protocols are: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened 
for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter 
API]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for 
signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter 
APII].  The third Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions will not be referred to as 
frequently infra as the two others due to its more specific purpose and contents.  Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of 
an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), opened for signature Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 
U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Jan. 14, 2007) [hereinafter APIII]. 
 25. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 20, at 328; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 12 (2004); Richard 
John Erickson, Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law of Armed Conflict, 19 
VA. J. INT’L L. 577 (1979); Robert Cryer, Hague Law Comes Home: Prosecuting Weapons 
Offences at the International Criminal Court, 2003 ACTA JURIDICA 238.   
 26. It should be noted that the labels “Geneva Law” and “Hague Law” have a 
conventional meaning within international humanitarian law.  That is what I am referring to 
here.  The terms are sometimes used in a different way.  “Geneva Law” has sometimes been 
used, especially recently, to refer to international humanitarian law as such.  See, e.g., Aya 
Gruber, Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017 (2007).  Hague Law is 
sometimes used to refer exclusively to international law contained in the Hague Conventions 
of 1899 and 1907, which extends it beyond "Hague Law" stricto sensu and into "Geneva 
Law" issues (such as the treatment of POWs), but also extends it beyond the confines of 
humanitarian law as a whole and into the domain of peaceful dispute resolution.  See, e.g., 
Peter J. Van Krieken & David McKay, Introduction to THE HAGUE: LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE 
WORLD 3, 13 (Peter J. van Krieken & David McKay eds., 2005). 
 27. Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) as Amended, and Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), 35 I.L.M. 1206, 1218 (1996) (entered into force July 
30, 1998). 
 28. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 
(entered into force Feb. 8, 1928). 
 29. Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 
354 (entered into force Aug. 1, 2010). 
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methods of warfare (tactics such as the manipulation of hunger30 or fear31 
among the enemy’s civilian population, the use of treachery32 or perfidy33 
against enemy combatants, or the manipulation of the environment for 
hostile purposes,34 and possibly the extension of war tactics to the use of the 
cyberspace or “cyber weaponry”).35 Out of 1864 comes the other branch of 
humanitarian law, the so–called “Geneva Law,” which governs in essence 
the treatment of “protected persons,” that is, persons who are generally in 
the hands of the enemy Power (such as civilians in occupied territory or 
prisoners of war in the case of international conflicts).36 Beyond that more 
contemporary lineage, humanitarian law is also—as a notoriously archaic 
branch of international law—echoed in pre–modern normative systems, 
such as codes of chivalry,37 and various religious traditions,38 infiltrating 
from there also the literary canon.39   
The foregoing only serves to suggest that the distinctiveness of both 
human rights and humanitarian law is traditionally presented in terms of 
origins, regardless of whether those historical narratives are convincing or 
  
 30. API, supra note 24, arts. 54(1), 54(2), 54(3); APII, supra note 24, art. 14; Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), opened for signature July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 31. API, supra note 24, at art. 51(2); APII, supra note 24, art. 13(2). 
 32. Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 8(2)(e)(xi). 
 33. API, supra note 24, art. 37. 
 34. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. 
 35. See, e.g., Jeffery T.G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: 
The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1427 (2008); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber 
Attacks in International Law, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 192, 213–14 (2009).  Some suggest that 
existing law is precisely not adapted for the extension of war operations onto cyber terrain.  
See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information 
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007). 
 36. The distinction between the two branches is helpful for didactic purposes and for 
clarifying, as done below, the idea of "distinction."  As such it should be understood as a 
functional divide, not a historical reality. As the narrative of that historical evolution goes, 
the two branches are said to have been reunited in 1977 when the Additional Protocols 
included Hague Law into the Geneva corpus.  Yet as we know, the 1907 Hague Regulations 
dealt already with the treatment of prisoners of war, long before the first Geneva Convention 
on the topic, adopted in 1929.  See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 U.N.T.S. 343. The merger was noted by the 
International Court of Justice.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, 256 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Legality]. 
 37. See, e.g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991). See 
generally THEODOR MERON, BLOODY CONSTRAINT: WAR AND CHIVALRY IN SHAKESPEARE 
(1998). 
 38. A classic example would be THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 
(Majid Khadduri trans., 1966).  See also Michel Veuthey, International Humanitarian Law 
and Spirituality, 21 REFUGEE SURV. Q., Oct. 2002, at 45. 
 39. See, e.g., the now classic THEODOR MERON, HENRY’S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE’S 
LAWS (1993). 
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not. In all cases the backdrop to the issue of relating human rights and 
humanitarian law is one where the two bodies of law are recognized as 
separate, whether we look at it in terms of current practice or in terms of 
historical narratives. Only starting from that basic assumption can one then 
spot instances where they can be said to overlap in one way or another. 
Something that also is presented in terms of historical evolution, such as 
when humanitarian law has borrowed from the language of human rights,40 
or when human rights treaties have included rules which would seem to 
have a humanitarian law pedigree.41 As suggested above, the fact that they 
have a relationship—whatever the relationship—is thereby premised on 
their identifiable distinctness, and by the same token a commonality which 
triggers the question of their relationship in the first place.  
If we move to the nature of that relationship, a variety of positions exist 
on the topic,42 and those possible relations have even been the objects of 
dispassionate doctrinal classification.43 Instead of immediately entering the 
domain of that discussion, however, one can ask here why similar doctrinal 
production does not exist on the relationship between humanitarian law and 
  
 40. On the process of influence of human rights over humanitarian law, see generally 
Meron, supra note 1.  A specific case of linguistic influence is that of API, supra note 24, at 
art. 75, which says that individuals not benefiting from better protection from the rest of 
humanitarian law are entitled to the “fundamental guarantees” listed in the provision, 
“without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any 
other similar criteria.”  This is an important instance in the narrative of a convergence of 
purpose or motive of the two bodies of law.  See, e.g., Doswald–Beck & Vité, supra note 1. 
 41. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, opened for signature Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). 
 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules 
of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed 
conflicts which are relevant to the child.   
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a 
direct part in hostilities.   
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not 
attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.  In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but 
who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.   
4. In accordance with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed 
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure 
protection and care of children who are affected by an armed 
conflict. 
Id. 
 42. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 43. Robert Kolb, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at http://www.mpepil.com.. 
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international trade law, or between humanitarian law and the law of 
international investment. Out of a disciplinary sense of obviousness the 
answer could arguably be: humanitarian law and human rights law share 
something in a way that has no parallel in humanitarian law’s 
relationship—or even human rights law’s relationship—to any other sub–
body of international legal norms.44 That it does not make that much sense 
to juxtapose international investment law and international humanitarian 
law means essentially that there is no immediately obvious practical or 
theoretical point of contact that would suggest the comparison or 
interrogation. From any legally relevant perspective, it would seem that they 
are—to say it simply—more different than they are the same. That is not 
the case apparently for our normative couple. If we try to pin down that 
something which connects human rights and humanitarian law more 
precisely, the available literature and legal commentary will quickly reveal a 
loosely consensual functionalist attitude. What they have in common is 
variously felt to be the objective that they serve45 or—in a different 
version—the values that they embody.46 They meet because they perform a 
  
 44. This sense of obviousness lies behind the use, most notoriously by the United 
Nations General Assembly for a long time but also by others, of expressions such as “human 
rights in armed conflict.” An early document adopting this terminology is the Resolution 
XXIII, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, adopted by the International Conference on 
Human Rights in Teheran (May 12, 1968).  See Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 
International Conference of Human Rights Resolution XXIII (May 12, 1968), reprinted in 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS 261, 261-62 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988).  On the adoption of 
the expression by the General Assembly, see ERIC DAVID, PRINCIPE DE DROIT DES CONFLITS 
ARMES 83–84 (1st ed. 1994). 
 45. When speaking of human rights and humanitarian law, what is meant by a 
common goal is what some see as a shared mission of protecting the life and dignity of 
individuals, as evidenced for instance by a common prohibition of torture or common 
modalities of fair trial.  See, e.g., Iguyovwe, supra note 1. That leads also to the issue of 
advocating further cooperation between, or integration of, the two sets of norms, for the 
purpose of achieving that common goal, particularly in situations of armed conflict.  See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Mottershaw, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: 
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, 12 INT'L J. HUM. 
RTS. 449, 449-70 (2008). 
 46. That perspective is based on the notion that humanitarian law and human rights 
instruments both form part of the larger category of “humanitarian” provisions or treaties, 
which is mentioned in different parts of general international law, and are otherwise part of 
the group of “peremptory norms” (jus cogens).  In the law of treaties, suspension or 
termination in response to a material breach of the treaty is not possible with regard to 
“provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a 
humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against 
persons protected by such treaties.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(5), 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention].  In the law of State responsibility, countermeasures (considered a legitimate 
breach of the law in response to a prior violation) cannot affect three types of provisions: 
“the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations,” “obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights,” and 
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similar function,47 albeit possibly in different ways, in different places, at 
different times, and maybe even for partially different reasons.  
Beyond the details of the varied positions on the substantive meeting of 
the two bodies of law, the shared goal and purpose of the two sets of norms 
is usually stated in terms transcending immediate political references or 
controversy, like “common humanist ideal.”48 The possibility of framing a 
non–political objective common to human rights and humanitarian law is 
significant because of what the label “political” may mean in the meeting of 
those two types of norms. One can think here of the ICRC’s long–held 
sense that human rights could be excessively close to politics for 
professional neutrality’s comfort49—an attitude that had been shared, for 
functionally identical reasons, by the World Bank until recently.50 The 
political element that appears here in humanitarian law’s encounter with 
human rights refers, as it does in the World Bank’s escape from the 
  
“obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals.” As the last subparagraph of 
that provision makes clear, what they have in common is that they are norms of jus cogens.  
In its commentary on the provision, incidentally, the International Law Commission itself 
uses the Geneva Conventions to illustrate the second type of norms (fundamental rights), 
presumably with the idea that what is illustrated is the general idea of not affecting 
fundamental interests of the international community while responding to a breach.  See 
[2007] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 132, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.  The 
Commission speaks of jus cogens as “[t]he obligations [that] arise from those substantive 
rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it 
presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values.” See id. 
at 112.  Because human rights and humanitarian law supposedly express or protect the same 
values, the general idea is that they should be looked at as one single type of norm under 
general international law, particularly for the sake of special treatment in the application of 
secondary rules, such as the rules of State responsibility and the law of treaties.  See also 
Florentino Ruiz, The Succession of States in Universal Treaties on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 42 (2003). 
 47. The language of “complementarity” is one underpinned by such a perspective.  
See Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – Demonstrated by the Procedural 
Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
437 (2009); Droege, Interplay, supra note 1, at 310–55; Maj. J. Jeremy Marsh, Rule 99 of the 
Customary International Law Study and the Relationship Between the Law of Armed Conflict 
and International Human Rights Law, 2009 ARMY LAW. 21, 21–22. 
 48. Droege, Affinities, supra note 9, at 503, 521. 
 49. See, e.g., Pfanner, supra note 11. 
 50. Roberto Dañino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World 
Bank (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/sites/ifiwatchnet.org/files/ 
DaninoLegalOpinion0106.pdf. (reversing settled interpretation of Article IV, Section 10, of 
the Articles of Agreement of the Bank, successfully imposed by former Vice-President and 
General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata).  The General Counsel’s personal views can also be read 
in  Roberto Dañino, The Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights,  DEV. 
OUTREACH, HUM. RTS. & DEV. (Oct. 2006) 
http://www.devoutreach.com/oct06/SpecialReport/tabid/1518/Default.aspx. 
312 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
political,51 to the baggage of international contestation that can plausibly be 
feared to come with the invocation of “human rights” themselves.52 At a 
political minimum, “human rights” as such evoke almost by definition the 
possibility of questioning the sovereign’s own prerogatives and 
responsibilities over its people and territory.53 More specifically, however, 
“human rights” have been deemed too close to political controversy, as they 
are recurrently associated with the global North–West’s (neo)colonialisms,54 
  
 51. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, art. IV, ¶ 10, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 2 U.N.T.S 
134 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1965). 
 52. The association of human rights to politics takes a variety of forms.  A common 
one is to present human rights in its connection with political and/or economic liberalism.  
See, e.g., Paul J. Magnarella, International Human Rights: Roots of a Progression, 19 J. 
THIRD WORLD STUD., Fall 2002, at 13; Tony Evans, If Democracy, Then Human Rights?, 22 
THIRD WORLD Q. 623 (2001); Anthony J. Langlois, Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: 
A Critique, 51 POL. STUD. 509 (2003). 
 53. This is how Antony Anghie describes the self-understanding of the human rights 
project in international law: 
 
The emergence of international human rights law is characterized 
axiomatically, in virtually all the literature on the subject, as a 
revolutionary and unprecedented moment in the history of 
international law because it undermined the fundamental principle of 
territorial sovereignty, which had been in existence since the 
emergence of the modern European nation-state and the writings of 
Vattel. 
 
Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, 
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
545 (2002). In more external terms, given the period examined by Anghie, a psychological 
reading puts it more sharply: “We might understand the monumental significance of 
international human rights law in these terms: It enabled international law and institutions to 
enter the interior, to address the unconscious, and thereby to administer civilizing therapy to 
the body politic of the sovereign state.” Id. at 547. As far as the critique of human rights’ 
self–understanding is concerned, a useful and multi–faceted discussion of the grounding of 
human rights in a specific brand of political philosophy, among other things through a 
psychoanalytic reading, can be found in the now classic COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 147 (2000).  A 
follow–up discussion, more oriented towards issues of globalization and war, is provided in 
COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
COSMOPOLITANISM (2007).  A particular line of criticism against the human rights discourse 
from an anticolonial perspective can be found in, for example, Makau Mutua, Savages, 
Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 (2001), and 
Makau Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1996).  See, e.g., 
UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2002) 
(providing the broad TWAIL constellation with a more subtly ambivalent take.); OBIORA 
CHINEDU OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA (2006); and 
B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L CMTY. L. 
REV. 3–27 (2006). 
 54. Beyond the examples provided in Third-World-Approaches-to-International-Law 
literature, exemplified above by Antony Anghie, Obiora Okafor, and Makau Mutua, see 
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imperialisms,55 universalisms,56 and other outright political endeavors. In a 
specific perspective from within human rights work, considering human 
rights “political” can be seen as equivalent to soiling the project of human 
rights.57 The ties to the political would lead to equating a “human rights” 
claim with a mere partisan claim—or worse—a gesture of disloyalty.58 
From such a perspective on “human rights,” being non–political and 
therefore immune from political indictment gives them in that sense even 
greater affinity with humanitarian law, in particular through their 
association with the meta–sovereign status of jus cogens,59 erga omnes,60 or 
  
discussions of some historical dimensions of the political coexistence of human rights and 
colonialism in Kirsten Sellars, Human Rights and the Colonies: Deceit, Deception and 
Discovery, 93 THE ROUND TABLE, 709 (2004) and Alice L. Conklin, Colonialism and Human 
Rights, A Contradiction in Terms? The Case of France and West Africa, 1895–1914, 103 
AM. HIST. REV. 419 (1998).  See Note, Saving Amina Lawal: Human Rights Symbolism and 
the Dangers of Colonialism, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2365 (2004), for a discussion of 
neocolonialism in a recent case of North–South debate mediated by human rights. 
 55. Outside of legal analysis stricto sensu, an interesting association made between 
human rights and imperialism can be found in David Holloway, The War on Terror 
Espionage Thriller, and the Imperialism of Human Rights, 46 COMP. LITERATURE STUD. 20 
(2009).  The very first words of the essay explain its purpose as follows: “This essay 
describes the war on terror espionage thriller as a popular literary form which legitimates 
human rights abuses by the West, particularly state sanctioned torture, by depicting the West, 
rhetorically, as the virtuous bringer of rights.” Id. 
 56. Among an immense literature, some illustrative general references addressing the 
association of human rights with “universalism” can be mentioned: See generally Sonia 
Harris-Short, International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective?  Cultural 
Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 130 (2003); 
Michael Freeman, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 491 
(1994); Eva Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident 
Voices in Human Rights Discourse, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 136 (1997); Jack Donnelly, Cultural 
Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984); Michael Freeman, 
Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on ‘Asian Values’, 16 NETHERLANDS 
HUM. RTS Q., 25 (1998); Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the 
Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838–60 (2000); 
Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human 
Rights, 8 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1 (1994); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? 
The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); Christina M. 
Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human 
Rights in Different Socio–Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994). 
 57. Apolitical conceptions of human rights as such can extract their apolitical 
character by taking on an ethical or moralizing form.  For a particularly sharp critique of that 
discursive tradition in international relations, see DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO 
KABUL: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2002). 
 58. See Valasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 04, ¶ 114 (July 
29, 1988). See also FIDH, National Human Rights Organization (ONDH) and Rencontre 
Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v. Senegal, African Comm’n 
on Human & Peoples’ Rights Commc’n No. 155/96, 15th Activity Report, African Union, 
Executive Council, 10th sess., AU Doc. EX.CL/322 (X), § 3525–26 (2007). 
 59. As is already apparent in the International Law Commission’s cross–referencing 
of its own work between State responsibility and the law of treaties, the relationship between 
human rights and jus cogens is a topic of never–ending speculation, especially given the 
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non–derogable norms.61 As a result of the fact that humanitarian and human 
rights law therefore meet on presumably non–political ground, be it in the 
realm of technical practice62 or else values,63 discussions of the relations of 
human rights to humanitarian law will not take into consideration the 
background of political contestation that has followed human rights since 
their post–war rebirth.64  
The process of defragmentation of those bodies of law is shown here to 
be intimately linked to a downplaying of their individual origins and 
  
disagreement over whether Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which introduces formally the notion of jus cogens to international law, has effects beyond 
the law of treaties and more specifically the issue of invalidity of treaties.  See [2007] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 132, supra note 46.  The International Law Commission repeated in the 
context of the Law of State Responsibility what it had suggested about the contents of the 
body of jus cogens norms when it adopted Article 53 of the Vienna Convention.  See Rep. of 
the Int’l Law Comm’n to the General Assembly, Rep. on its 53rd Sess., Apr.23–June 1, July 
2–Aug.10, 2001,  GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, at 85, 112–113.  For 
general remarks on the issue, see Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus 
Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491 (2008).  An important contribution discussing the not so 
arbitrary speculations about the contents of jus cogens is of course Hilary Charlesworth & 
Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993).  
 60. In international law, erga omnes effects were first considered with regards to 
obligations.  See the dictum of the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).  The ICJ has 
however also accepted that rights, specifically the right of peoples to self–determination, can 
have an erga omnes character.  See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) (East Timor Case), 
Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).  This was confirmed in: Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Palestinian Wall), Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ ¶ 155–56 (July 9), where the Court incidentally joins together 
erga omnes rights and erga omnes obligations (whereas they have legally speaking inverse 
effects one from the other), where the latter arise from humanitarian law.  See id. ¶ 157.  For 
a critique of the Court’s use of the erga omnes label, see the individual opinion filed by 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, id. ¶ 216 (Higgins, J., dissenting).  
 61. See Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ ¶ 38–44 (1999).  Some compare human rights and 
humanitarian law based on the notion that “humanitarian law” can be meaningfully called 
“non-derogable” (which is at least debatable from a technical point of view if the term non-
derogable is connected, as it is intimately in the context of human rights, to the notion of the 
state of emergency or necessity.) See Droege, Affinities, supra note 9, at 521 ("[W]hile most 
international human rights are with few exceptions derogable, humanitarian law is non-
derogable (with the sole exception of Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention)."). 
 62. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli & Laura Olsen, The Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment 
of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599 (2008). 
 63. That is the implicit basis for the notion that the “Asian values” debate, mentioned 
above in references relating to human rights universalism, may be of any relevance at all to 
humanitarian law.  See Alfred M. Boll, The Asian Values Debate and Its Relevance to 
International Humanitarian Law, 83 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2001). 
 64. Apart from the just mentioned piece on “Asian values” in humanitarian law, one 
can also cite the occasional reintegration of “cultural relativism” into technical discussions of 
the laws of war.  See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st 
Century Warfare, 2 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 143, 151 (1999).  
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separate political and diplomatic trajectories as complex sets of rules of 
practice. That downplaying is performed in favor of a higher order of 
commonality that is found in technique, function, purpose, and values. In 
that inverted picture of fragmentation, we witness agreement and 
convergence between “laws of war” and the “rights of humans,” based on 
the same bases as the general process of fragmentation: the two bodies of 
rules are part of a greater formal system, and they have their own 
idiosyncratic constraints, biases, and immediate functions. The diagnosis of 
fragmentation, as it was presented by the International Law Commission’s 
working group in charge of analyzing the issue, was the following: 
The problem—as lawyers have seen it—is that such specialized law–
making and institution–building tends to take place with relative ignorance 
of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the 
general principles and practices of international law. The result is conflicts 
between rules or rule–systems, deviating institutional practices, and 
possibly the loss of an overall perspective on the law.65 
The response that was proposed by the ILC was to approach the process 
as essentially a complex technical problem. If the issue is defined as one of 
the emergence of specialized regimes resulting in contradictions, oversight, 
and general problems caused by poor coordination, those are the issues that 
are to be solved, not fragmentation per se, especially given the fact that 
people are divided on how bad fragmentation itself is.66 And so this is the 
ILC’s method: 
The fragmentation of the international legal system into technical 
“regimes,” when examined from the point of view of the law of treaties, is 
not too different from its traditional fragmentation into more or less 
autonomous territorial regimes called “national legal systems.” This is 
why it is useful to have regard to the wealth of techniques in the traditional 
law for dealing with tensions or conflicts between legal rules and 
principles.67    
In the case of human rights and humanitarian law—both in descriptive 
and normative terms—the issue is one of coping with defragmentation (is it 
happening? and should it happen at all?). Against the general picture of 
fragmentation, what makes defragmentation familiar is that it is also a 
process emptied of political content, in favor of technical management or—
in our case—overriding ethical references, or both. Yet fragmentation 
appears as the objects of regulation differentiate, causing coordination 
problems. By implication, defragmentation—as a reverse of 
  
 65. Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 2, ¶ 8. 
 66. Id. ¶ 9. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
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fragmentation—implies de–specialization and therefore merger not so much 
of norms (since they are always seen as different) as of objects. The 
respective objects of the law of the sea and the law of indigenous rights are 
distinct in a way that the objects of humanitarian law and human rights are 
not. That this appears against a background where the nuances of State 
violence as a political phenomenon disappear in favor of humanity and 
common humanisms is the basis for defragmentation, regardless of the 
practical realities of the meeting between human rights and humanitarian 
law. 
At this point I suggest that we recover the deep political content of 
human rights, and by the same token seek the deep political content of 
humanitarian law. The general backdrop for a recovery of the political in the 
conversation on human rights and humanitarian law is the following. Each 
body of rules has its autonomous structure, regardless of those elements that 
are interpreted to constitute objective overlaps between them. The 
organization of each body of rules, when we imagine them from the outside, 
shows a direction or structural bias.68 Each body of rules frames reality in a 
specific and partial way, as determined by its inner logic and purposes, 
which may not be fully coherent or systematic but are sufficiently so to 
provide an identity to the body of rules. From there the distinction between 
human rights and humanitarian law is related to the bias in each regime. 
What I suggest is that human rights law’s bias is expressed by the 
organization of human rights norms around the fundamental principle of 
“non–discrimination.” Humanitarian law in turn is organized around the 
principle of “distinction.” The meaning of those fundamental principles is 
essentially political, in the specific sense of being rooted in a political 
worldview. That worldview structures each body of norms by defining its 
object and organizes the relationship that they have between them by 
projecting the relationship that those respective objects have with one 
another. That worldview, with all its inner tensions, thereby structures the 
whole normative space within which human rights and humanitarian law 
will meet. That normative space is international law.  
In more specific legal terms, the argument is that the distinction between 
human rights and humanitarian law is intimately linked to the “principle of 
distinction” within humanitarian law. By the same token, the idea of non–
discrimination in human rights is linked to the idea of a separation between 
humanitarian law and human rights, in so far as humanitarian law’s object is 
wartime relations, and human rights’ idea of war is connected to the core 
object of human rights law, i.e. the legitimacy of the State’s exercise of 
coercive power. The relationship between human rights and humanitarian 
law is organized around their respective takes on State violence, and their 
separation reflects a political conception of legitimacy. The un–political 
  
 68. Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at 12. 
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reading of those bodies of law is therefore not un–political. It contributes to 
hiding from political view the deeper reason for the differences and shields 
technocratically what should otherwise be the object of political debate—
that is, the shift from one normative universe to another one.  
A. Humanitarian Law: The Principle of Distinction 
The modern formulation of the principle of distinction—in Articles 4869 
and 5170 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
  
 69. “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” API, supra note 
24, at art. 48. 
 70. Article 51 reads as follows: 
 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations.  To give 
effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to 
other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all 
circumstances. 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, 
shall not be the object of attack.  Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited. 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered 
as indiscriminate: 
(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which 
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and 
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other 
area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian 
objects; and 
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of 
reprisals are prohibited. 
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Conventions—comes to us from a line of codification endeavors expressing 
in different ways the general notion that, in war, combatants and non–
combatants should be distinguished at all times.71 The importance of that 
principle is now fixed in the idea that it constitutes a “cardinal” rule of 
international humanitarian law.72 Distinction is a principle, that is, a 
normative foundation of a general character developed into a variety of 
more specific rules. One formulation of the rule’s high normative status puts 
it as follows: “[c]ompliance with this concept of distinction is the 
fundamental difference between heroic Soldier and murderer.”73 As 
insightfully remarked by two military legal officers in this profound 
statement, the principle of distinction is more than simply fundamental—it 
is a fundamentally distinguishing principle. Distinction is framed as 
compliance with a concept, not a rule. That suggests immediately that the 
distinction (between noncombatant and combatant) branches out into other 
and more specific distinguishing rules, such as the distinction between the 
figure of the “Soldier” and the figure of the criminal. Compliance with the 
“conception” of distinction contributes to marking thereby also the limit 
between war and peace, considered as two fundamentally distinct 
perspectives on death and killing. The uncontroversial claim here is simply 
that the principle of distinction can be understood—not only 
  
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas 
immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede 
military operations.  The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order 
to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield 
military operations. 
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to 
the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian 
population and civilians, including the obligation to take the 
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57. 
 
API, supra note 24, art. 51. 
 71. Whereas the 1907 Hague regulations do not as such refer to the idea of 
“distinction,” an early and quite peculiar formulation of the principle of distinction can be 
found in the Institut de droit international’s 1880 Oxford Manual, Article 7 of which declares 
that “[i]t is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations.” See THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 
(1880), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 44, at 35, 38.  Before 
Additional Protocol I, the General Assembly had proclaimed distinction a principle 
applicable to all situations of armed conflict in the following terms: “distinction must be 
made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian 
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.”  G.A. Res. 2444 
(XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 19, 1968). 
 72. Nuclear Weapons Legality, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 257.   
 73. Lt. Col. Mark D. Maxwell & Maj. Richard V. Meyer, The Principle of 
Distinction: Probing the Limits of its Customariness, 2007 ARMY LAW. 1. 
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philosophically but also legally—as the foundation of the whole system of 
international humanitarian law. To explain what that means, I turn to the 
best exposition of the policy considerations and goals that sustain the 
modern project of humanitarian law: the Preamble to the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration.74  
If one accepts for the sake of argument that the Declaration can serve as 
a succinct exposition of the logic of humanitarian law through its particular 
take on the idea of distinction, two structural features of the principle 
emerge. First, the principle refers at a basic level to an issue of means in 
relation to an end. And, second, the principle of distinction is not mentioned 
by name or even in any apparent fashion in the Declaration. Yet, the twin 
cardinal principle of “prohibition of unnecessary suffering,”75 as well as its 
associated—yet more controversially fundamental—principle of the 
“prohibition of means rendering death inevitable,”76—both of which 
explicitly mentioned in the Declaration (§ 5)—should be understood as 
corollaries of the principle of distinction. The prohibition of unnecessary 
suffering is presented in the logic of the Preamble as a normative 
implication of the Declaration’s statement on the legitimate ends of war, 
which in turn refers implicitly to the idea of distinction (§ 3). In other 
words, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering should be understood as a 
reformulation of the obligation to distinguish between combatants and non–
  
 74. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 21, at 159. 
[¶1] On the proposition of the Imperial Cabinet of Russia, an 
International Military Commission having assembled at St. 
Petersburg in order to examine the expediency of forbidding the use 
of certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations, and 
that Commission having by common agreement fixed the technical 
limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the 
requirements of humanity, the Undersigned are authorized by the 
orders of their Governments to declare as follows: 
Considering:  
[¶2] That the progress of civilization should have the effect of 
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; 
[¶3] That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
[¶4] That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest 
possible number of men; 
[¶5] That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms 
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render 
their death inevitable; 
[¶6] That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary 
to the laws of humanity . . . 
Id. 
 75. Nuclear Weapons Legality, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78. 
 76. See the inspiring discussion in DAVID, supra note 44, at 307. 
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combatants. Instead of discriminating among individuals, the obligation 
here is that of discriminating between the combatant and the non–combatant 
in the same physical person: legitimate violence will be that which is 
necessary to put the physical individual hors de combat (§§ 4–5) or—in 
other words—necessary to kill the (present) combatant without killing the 
(past / future) non–combatant in the physical individual. This imagery is 
where the recovery of the political frame of humanitarian law begins.  
1. Rousseau Distinguishes War 
This edifice of humanitarian law finds its axiomatic base in a vision of 
war that sets discursively the St. Petersburg Declaration in the broad 
political universe of social–contract theories of the State. Rooting the 
principle of distinction in the social contract is how we come to a clearer 
association of humanitarian law with a political discourse on legitimate 
violence. I use one specific episode of the social contract tradition for the 
purpose of expounding the political roots of the principle of distinction, and 
that is the disagreement between Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes on 
the nature of war.77 In it the question of war takes on a fundamental role in 
the understanding of the legitimacy of the State, because of its cardinal 
place in explaining the transition to the political state from the state of 
nature.78 The precise moment to be highlighted here happens when 
Rousseau—agreeing with Hobbes that “war” is a state, rather than an 
event—interjects that for it to be a state it has to be by necessity a public 
phenomenon. The use of violence among individuals qua individuals, as 
opposed to agents of the sovereign, is not war, and that is so for several 
reasons, which will contribute to produce a particular, but very familiar, 
picture of the nature of war.  
  
 77. The purpose here is not a historical reconstruction of the association between 
“war” and international law, but rather a more substantial depiction of what is at stake in the 
peculiar vision of war presented in the St. Petersburg Declaration. An attempt at doing the 
former can be found in the important STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A 
GENERAL HISTORY (2007).  In that context, Neff quite helpfully talks of Rousseau, although 
in passing (yielding a legally justified first role to Grotius), as defending a “nationalization” 
of war.  See id at 101.  
 78. The following can only be a shocking simplification of a complex and much 
commented debate at the origins of modern political liberalism. The importance of a 
reference to Hobbes and Rousseau here lies in the fact that their (ambiguous) disagreement 
on foundational notions within the social–contract tradition have an impact on the 
understanding of “war” and its connection to ideas of sovereignty and citizenship, which are 
important to international law, notably because of international human rights law. Given the 
particular political projects defended by Rousseau, a good starting point is his disagreement 
with Hobbes concerning the deep psychological nature of the human being that comes in 
Rousseau’s extended presentation of his view on the state of nature.  See his Discours sur 
l’origine, et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes [1755] [hereinafter Rousseau, 
Discours], in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ŒUVRES COMPLETES III (Bernard Gangnebin & 
Marcel Raymond eds., 1964) 131–223. 
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Hobbes, at least as Rousseau reads him, describes the state of nature as a 
state of war.79 For Rousseau however, relations among human beings living 
in their “primitive independence,” as he puts it, do not enjoy the kind of 
permanence that a “state” requires.80 Contrary to Hobbes, who sees human 
beings as naturally adventurous and prone towards conquest, Rousseau says 
that one should consider human beings as naturally fearful.81 This leads 
Rousseau to say that human beings are naturally not enemies of one 
another82 (as opposed to Hobbes’ often quoted “homo homini lupus”83 and 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” formulas).84 Besides, as a state or 
condition, war is a relationship to and between things, not between 
individuals85—in the sense that war is about controlling, moving, stealing, 
and destroying things, as opposed to an exchange between individuals qua 
monads or billiard balls. As a result, as far as individual human beings are 
concerned, war is always “accidental.” War is neither universal nor 
permanent, nor general, both because of human beings’ psychological 
make–up and because of the nature of war as an activity involving 
essentially property. In other words, it is only tangential to their existence as 
pre–social "human beings" because of the very idea of “war" understood as 
a social condition or set of social relations.86  
In positive terms, Rousseau’s republican position is expressed therefore 
also in his own conception of war, which is the exact opposite of Hobbes’ 
indistinct war as the natural state of individuals. War needs political society 
to exist on both psychological and conceptual grounds. Psychologically, the 
constitution of political society through the social contract permits the 
growth of feelings that will offset man’s natural fear, such as honor, 
prejudice, or vengeance.87 Those will make war as war possible. 
Conceptually, and more importantly, the constitution of political society 
gives rise to the possibility of a “state” of war, a set of permanent, or at least 
continuous, relations among things, based on the fact that property relations 
  
 79. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651) (in which 
Hobbes famously describes the state of nature as a permanent state of fear and risk, and 
describes such state as a “condition” akin to a type of weather.). 
 80. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, ou Principes du droit politique 
[1762], [hereinafter Contrat social], in OEUVRES COMPLETES III, supra note 78, at 357. 
 81. Rousseau, Discours, supra note 78, at 136. 
 82. Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80, at 357. 
 83. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 3 (Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne 
eds., Cambridge University Press 1998) (1642). 
 84. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 79, at 89. 
 85. Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80, at 357 (“C’est le rapport des choses et 
non des hommes qui constitue la guerre, et l’état de guerre ne pouvant naître des simples 
relations personnelles, mais seulement des relations réelles, la guerre privée ou d’homme à 
homme ne peut exister.”) 
 86. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, in ŒUVRES 
COMPLETES III, supra note 78, at 602. 
 87. Id. at 601  
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are given stability and durability by law.88 In simple terms, if war is to be a 
“state,” it needs States. 
For Rousseau, war is still not possible among individuals after the 
transition to the political state, because—under the sovereign—individuals 
have renounced the power to dispose of their own life and that of their 
partners in the social contract.89 More dramatically—and this is where the 
full import of the discussion with Hobbes shows itself—Rousseau suggests 
that the (hypothetical) first constitution of a civil society triggers the 
formation of others, until the “whole face of the Earth” has changed, in the 
sense of there being no human beings left.90 That is, the natural freedom and 
independence of the primordial human being has disappeared in the 
constitution of societies, which have replaced human beings with citizens. 
Those societies have inherited the total independence of pre–social human 
beings, with the crucial difference that they—unlike humans—are artificial 
beings with no naturally determined limits to their size or strength, and—by 
necessity—a very strong suspicion towards neighboring societies, who are 
equally situated.91 A permanent state is created. Within that state, “war” 
may be the essence of the relations among jealous States, but it will always 
be—by necessity—an accident for human beings within them, in the sense 
that they will just happen to be affected sometimes by war, which is always 
and only a relation among States.92 War is the very result of the formation of 
political societies, as opposed to being their cause or origin. 
From the inter–state perspective, Hobbes and Rousseau may be seen to 
converge.93 That limited convergence is however based on different notions 
of what “war” is, and—very importantly—against the backdrop of a 
fundamental disagreement on whether the state of nature is a state of “war.” 
From that disagreement as to what war is, Rousseau goes on to draw the 
consequences for his own idea of “war” as an intimate political, socially 
  
 88. Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80, at 357. 
 89. Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, supra note 86, at 602. 
 90. Id. at 603.  
 91. Id. at 604–05. 
 92. Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80, at 357. 
 93. According to Hobbes’ famous description: 
 
[T]hough there had never been any time, wherein particular men 
were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, 
Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their 
Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in a state and posture 
of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on 
one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the 
Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their 
neighbours, which is a posture of War.  
 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 79, at 90. 
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constructed, and socially contracted event. As he says, human beings decide 
to attack one another only after they have (been) socialized, and they 
become soldiers only after becoming citizens.94 Being a soldier is possible 
only based on citizenship, that is, membership in a socially contracted 
polity. Therefore in war, human beings meet on the battlefield only 
accidentally. The “accident” is constituted by the meeting of soldiers, who 
on the battlefield are not citizens (“members of the homeland”) but, 
precisely, soldiers (defenders of the homeland).95 As a result of this, the 
killing of human beings is itself an “accident” of war; it is not the objective, 
but it can happen as a result of the activity that is otherwise carried out in 
the pursuit of the actual objective in war. As described by Rousseau, the end 
of war is the destruction of the enemy State, so that it is legitimate to 
destroy its defenders while they are fighting. As soon as they cease to be the 
“instruments” of the State, for instance if they lay down their weapon, they 
become human beings again, and the enemy power loses its right over their 
life.96 As such the State is not supposed to hurt human beings, but rather 
soldiers, with the knowledge that the soldiers were once—and can become 
again—mere human beings. The consequence is that since the State acts 
through its “instruments” against the enemy’s own instruments, human 
beings very rarely meet one another on the battlefield, and as such they have 
no animosity against one another despite the ongoing violence.97 
In other words, the right to legitimate killing is attached to the notion of 
the human being carrying out the function of soldiering, i.e. the idea that the 
human being is enveloped in that function in a way that makes him an 
instrument of the State. In the most striking way, Rousseau suggests on that 
basis that it is possible to “kill the State and not kill a single one of its 
members.”98 That is the ultimate consequence of the notion that war, as 
Rousseau expresses it, does not give any more rights than are necessary to 
its ends. It is possible to kill the instruments of the State while not killing 
the human beings who carry out the function of instruments of the State’s 
will.99 All that is necessary is to put the “instruments” out of function, which 
is done by converting as many fighters into human beings again. In the 
lingo of the laws of war, one would talk of putting soldiers out of combat, 
hors de combat. That again, is based on the notion that in the business of 
war the only enemies are public authorities for whom human beings are 
fighting: citizens of different societies are not one another’s enemies, and 
  
 94. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, supra note 86, 
at 601. 
 95. Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80, at 357. 
 96. Id. 
 97. According to the now famous formula: “les particuliers ne sont ennemis 
qu’accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni même comme citoyens, mais comme 
soldats.”  Id. 
 98. Id. at 357–58. 
 99. Id. at 357.  
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the enemies faced by the State are other States, not the individuals that just 
happen to carry out the will of those enemies (or, as Rousseau puts it, there 
can be no such type of relationship between entities of different kinds, such 
as an individual and a State.)100 The foreigner who just kills and destroys 
without declaring war in those terms—be it a king or a people or an 
individual—is not an “enemy,” but rather a bandit.101  
When one says, therefore, that the objective in war is the destruction of 
the enemy State, that means that the target is the abstraction constituted by 
the social contract; if one could break the social contract in one strike, the 
State would eo ipso disappear and the war would be over, yet no life would 
have been lost.102 The killing of human beings in war is a means and not the 
end,103 so that the killing of human beings is a means to the hurting of the 
State, given that they embody its instruments. But again, it is one means, 
and not a necessary means to that particular end, since human death is 
always to be seen as an accident. As Rousseau sees it, in ways that will be 
technically amplified by the contemporary laws of war, the ill–treatment or 
enslavement of human beings condoned by classic writers of the law of 
nations, including the ill–treatment of prisoners of war, is from that 
perspective rightly looked upon with indignation.104 
One can understand the powerful summary that Rousseau makes of his 
disagreement with the “horrible system” proposed by Hobbes of a war of all 
against all—a system that constituted visibly the chief motivation for 
Rousseau to expand specifically on the issue of war. Rousseau simply says: 
war is born of peace (“la guerre est née de la paix”).105 The elimination of 
the possibility of (hypothetical) “particular wars” in the state of nature (i.e. 
the state of war described by Hobbes) through the creation of social 
contracts is the cause of (actual) “general wars” (wars between societies, 
that is, “general wills”), which are, says Rousseau, much more terrible.106  
Both understandings of “war”—Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s—are 
significantly attached to the liberal tradition, and both are important to the 
idea of the State as the sole source of legitimate violence. A schematic 
notion of the difference as it will play out here, would depict Rousseau’s 
“war” as legal and politically constructed (war exists because of the State), 
whereas Hobbes’ “war” would be seen as the sociological backdrop to the 
  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, supra note 86, 
at 608. 
 103. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Fragments sur la guerre, in ŒUVRES COMPLETES III, 
supra note 78, at 613. 
 104. Id. at 614–15. 
 105. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, supra note 86, 
at 610. 
 106. Jean–Jacques Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de l’Abbé de Saint 
Pierre, in ŒUVRES COMPLETES III, supra note 78, at 564. 
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existence of the State (the State exists because of war). From there, the St. 
Petersburg Declaration can be read against Rousseau’s position, especially 
in association with Rousseau’s extensively discussed understanding of 
human nature, and the relationship of citizen to human being.107 Here it 
takes the form of the known proposition that war does not exist between 
individuals but between societies or—in practice—between armed forces as 
instrumentalities of the State apparatus. The notion that in war there is no 
personal animosity between soldiers who face one another on the 
battlefield108 is therefore not the product of humanitarian afterthoughts, 
although it may certainly find added support in them. It is a direct product 
of the mechanism of State legitimacy, which—under a different outlook—
supports also the monopoly of the “legitimate use of physical force” by the 
sovereign within its territory.109  
2. Privileged and Unprivileged Agents of War 
A legal translation of the foregoing is that war is waged by agents or 
“organs” of the State, resulting thus in “the privilege of the combatant” or 
“combatant immunity.”110 The privilege in question refers to the very idea 
of “war” developed above with the help of Rousseau (if one follows the 
notion that Rousseau’s and humanitarian law’s conceptions of war are 
related). The combatant is not engaged in a private enterprise but is fighting 
on behalf of a society represented by a State.111 As such, the regular actions 
  
 107. For a different take on the linkage between Rousseau’s general outline of the 
social contract and his take on the idea of “war,” see Allan Rosas, J.J. Rousseau and the Law 
of Armed Force, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE.  LIBER 
AMICORUM OVE BRING 219–30 (2008). 
 108. The received intellectual lineage between St–Petersburg and Rousseau would 
come from this passage from Rousseau, Contrat Social, supra note 80, at 156–57.  
 109. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1958) (expressing the notion that 
the state claims monopoly over the use of force). 
 110. A useful contemporary discussion of the privilege of the combatant can be found 
in Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law 
and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148 (2005).  A critical reading of the very idea is proposed in 
Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction 
of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2004–05). 
 111. In line with what Rousseau was cited above as saying about the difference 
between soldiers and bandits, the celebrated decision of the international military tribunal in 
the Einsatzgruppen case explained the difference between members of the Resistance and 
private individuals engaged in violence against Nazi occupation in these terms: 
 
Many of the defendants admitting that they had conducted 
executions, explained that they had not killed any innocent persons 
but had merely shot partisans, to be sure, not in combat, but 
punitively.  This bald statement in itself does not suffice to exonerate 
one from a charge of unlawful killings.  Article I of the Hague 
Regulations provides:  
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of the soldier are privileged, in the sense that it is the combatant’s exclusive 
“privilege” to be entitled to kill and destroy as a matter of principle, simply 
because the combatant is acting precisely not in its quality as a human 
being, but rather in representation of the sovereign. As such, just like as the 
official agents of the State, as organs of the State, are not to be punished 
personally for actions that they have performed under orders of their State 
(even and especially with a portion of its legitimate means of coercion),112 
so are the soldiers covered by an immunity from reproach and prosecution 
for the actions that they have carried out in regular fashion as the pawns of 
the State.113 The killing and the destruction are done by the State, which 
  
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but 
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following 
conditions:  
 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.  
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.  
3. To carry arms openly; and  
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
 
It is unnecessary to point out that, under these provisions, an armed 
civilian found in a treetop sniping at uniformed soldiers is not such a 
lawful combatant and can be punished even with the death penalty if 
he is proved guilty of the offense.  But this is far different from 
saying that resistance fighters in the war against an invading army, if 
they fully comply with the conditions just mentioned, can be put 
outside the law by the adversary.  As the Hague Regulations state 
expressly, if they fulfill the four conditions, “the laws, rights, and 
duties of war” apply to them in the same manner as they apply to 
regular armies.  Many of the defendants seem to assume that by 
merely characterizing a person a partisan, he may be shot out of 
hand.  But it is not so simple as that.  If the partisans are organized 
and are engaged in what international law regards as legitimate 
warfare for the defense of their own country, they are entitled to be 
protected as combatants.   
 
See The Einsatzgruppen case, supra note †, at 491–92. 
 112. This is the root of the whole Rainbow Warrior affair between France and New 
Zealand.  See, e.g., Michael Pugh, Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair, 36 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 655 (1987). 
 113. As none other than Telford Taylor put it, in the best possible fashion:  
 
War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in 
time of peace . . . . Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it 
takes place in the course of war, because the state of war lays a 
blanket of immunity over the warriors.  But the area of immunity is 
not unlimited, and its boundaries are marked by the laws of war.   
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leads to the conclusion that the individual is not liable for those violent 
acts—only the State is.114 This derives simply and again from the notion 
that war—the activity in which the combatant is engaged—occurs between 
“public persons,” as Rousseau put it.115 Private war is in this sense a 
contradiction, expressed legally in the form of minimal tolerance for the 
private use of violence in the midst of war. A clear expression of that 
rejection of private violence in war is found in the “Lieber Code” —the set 
of legal instructions prepared by Francis Lieber for the Union Army in 
1863. The Code uses the term “public enemies” to distinguish members of 
the hostile army from those who—engaging in hostilities illegitimately—
should according to Lieber’s rules be treated as “highway robbers” and 
“pirates.”116 That mirrors the situation of the ones that Rousseau himself 
called “bandits.”117 
The “nationalization” of war, common to Rousseau and the St. 
Petersburg Declaration’s foundations for contemporary humanitarian law, 
allows here to determine that the identity of war as a distinct activity 
revolves around the identity of those who perform it (rather than what the 
activity is). Delimiting the activity requires imagining therefore those who 
are not regular agents of war. The principal irregularity would be 
constituted by an association of war with private individual interest. Such 
privatization of war is what has prompted the notion that the term “unlawful 
combatant” be reserved to mercenaries, which is how Additional Protocol I 
  
 
TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19 (1970). 
 114. In technical terms, this is the link between Articles 43 and 44 API, the first one 
dealing with the definition of the regular armed forces, which constitute the core of the 
category of combatants, and the second one with the relationship between the status of 
combatant and the status of prisoner of war.  The status and treatment of prisoners of war 
follows the idea of combatant privilege, in the sense that despite the fact that POWs may 
have been caught after killing and destroying, they are not detained as a form of punishment, 
but only as a means to keep them away from active hostilities.  A good opportunity for 
clarification of those points arose precisely with the amendments to the definition of 
“combatants” by Additional Protocol I in 1977, which aimed at conferring POW status to 
captured members of national liberation movements, among other things.  See generally W. 
Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Privileged Combatants under 
the Geneva Protocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 4 (1978) [hereinafter Mallison].  
 115. Rousseau, Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social, supra note 86, at 607–08. 
 116. See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Gen. Order No. 100 (1863), art. 82, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 
44, at 3, 14 [hereinafter Lieber Code].  Despite its formally domestic ambitions, it is regarded 
as one of the first contemporary codifications of the laws of war, given especially its 
influence on other codification attempts, such as the already cited Oxford Manual adopted by 
the Institute of International Law in 1880.  See GREEN, supra note 20, at 279 (discussing the 
significance of the Lieber Code in the development of international humanitarian law). 
 117. See Rousseau, Contrat social, supra note 80. 
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seems to consider them.118 If one leaves aside more contemporary debates 
on unlawful participation in combat, particularly in the context of the “War 
on Terror,”119 the delimitation of “war” through a clear identification of its 
regular agents leads to the distinction between “unlawful” participation in 
hostilities and “unprivileged” participation in hostilities. The latter would 
be, in contrast to that of mercenaries, the situation of spies120 under both the 
Hague Regulations and Additional Protocol I.121 The presence of the 
unlawful participant on the battlefield is by definition refused. The presence 
of the unprivileged combatant is acknowledged and tolerated to a certain 
extent, given that it is precisely not branded as unlawful. The distinction is 
crucial for understanding how the idiosyncrasies of humanitarian law relate 
to the fundamental worldview expounded above. 
The clandestine character of the spy’s activity clashes with the openness 
and visibility that characterizes the figure of the combatant—which derives 
itself from the fact that war is “public.” As a result, the activity of spying 
itself is covered by immunity only to the extent that it is carried out openly, 
just like the activity of other combatants. Under contemporary treaty law, 
therefore, a spy who is caught in the middle of spying while not in their 
soldier’s uniform can possibly be executed for the very fact of spying,122 
because of the secrecy of what is otherwise a legitimate activity if not 
carried “under false pretenses”, as the law puts it.123 The complicated 
  
 118. API, supra note 24, art. 47. 
 119. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF. TO THE 
SEC’Y OF THE NAVY REGARDING THE ORDER ESTABLISHING COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNAL (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf (defining the term “enemy combatant” in context). For a summary and 
interesting discussion of the American debate on this point, see Allison M. Danner, Defining 
Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1 (2007). See also the 
position of the ICRC on the topic in Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of 
Unlawful/unprivileged Combatants, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003). 
 120. Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed 
to the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 29, 31, Oct. 18, 
1907 [hereinafter HCIV], reprinted in RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
OTHER RULES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 21; API, supra note 24, 
art. 46.  See also Lieber Code, supra note 116, arts. 88, 104. 
 121. On the question of illegitimate participation, see Mallison, supra note 114 
(providing a very helpful analysis of API).  On spies, see also THE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 321 (Dieter Fleck & Michael Bothe eds., 1999). 
 122. Mallison, supra note 114, at 26–27.  
 123. Again, the Lieber Code expresses it best.  In Section V, covering “Safe-conduct, 
Spies, War–traitors, Captured Messengers, Abuse of the Flag of Truce” one can find the 
recurrent threat of capital punishment for a series of activities such as those mentioned in the 
Section heading.  As for the spy, the Code says that:  “[t]he spy is punishable with death by 
hanging by the neck, whether or not he succeeds in obtaining the information or in conveying 
it to the enemy.”  Lieber Code, supra note 116, art. 88.  The reason for both the hostility 
against spies and the grouping of spies with traitors is made explicit towards the end of the 
Section, where we find an otherwise curiously inoperative provision: “ [w]hile deception in 
war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable 
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situation of the spy reveals that the public / political nature of war carries 
with it an element of openness and publicity that allows for the (easy) 
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate hostility. Spying requires 
secrecy, and therefore, as made clearer in Additional Protocol I, not wearing 
one’s uniform. However, that precisely makes it illegitimate, in that it 
implies a serious difficulty for the spied–on power in recognizing what kind 
of activity it is. Spies are therefore engaged in a treacherous activity, as the 
Lieber Code puts it, “because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to 
guard against them.”124 In all other cases, being a combatant is a privilege 
and carries immunity from moral and legal reproach insofar as it remains 
within the rules by which international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law make war a regulated social activity of a public character. To 
confirm this, the universal rule is—not so curiously—that although spies 
can be executed for spying if caught in the act, they cannot be punished for 
past spying if they were not caught then.125 Although past spying activity 
constituted at the time a treacherous act (the gravity of which would depend 
on the kind of “false pretenses” used),126 it went unnoticed, and will be 
deemed ex post facto an act of the enemy State for which the individual is 
not responsible. From the perspective of the law, however, if caught in the 
act, the spy is individually in a very serious breach of the principle of 
distinction.  
The specific example of the successful spy serves to bring forward the 
more general situation of the prisoner of war, and lead us thereby to the key 
figure in the legal operationalization of the principle of distinction. As such, 
a prisoner of war who tries to escape from a POW camp can be forcefully 
prevented from doing so, and can be legitimately killed in the process. 
However, if the escape is successful, but then the escapee happens to be 
captured at a later point in time, the initial escape cannot be legitimately 
punished.127 That is so because it is understood that it is the soldier’s duty as 
a soldier to try and escape from the enemy’s hands.128 This reminds us that 
being a prisoner of war is not a punishment, given that soldiers cannot be 
punished for participating in combat. That is very concretely the meaning of 
  
warfare, the common law of war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or 
treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to 
guard against them.” Id. at art. 101.  In line with contemporary codifications, the most 
significant element in the act of spying is secrecy: “[a] spy is a person who secretly, in 
disguise or under false pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to 
the enemy.” Id. at art. 88. 
 124. Id. at art. 101. 
   125.     Id. at art. 102.  
 126. Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 8(2)(e)(ix). 
 127. GCIII, supra note 24, art. 91. 
 128. For the U.S. case, see for example, George S. Prugh, Jr., The Code of Conduct 
for the Armed Forces, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 678 (1956). 
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their privilege. Prisoners of war are therefore “detained,”129 that is, they 
literally are “held back” from returning to combat, rather than imprisoned as 
a result of their position of hostility.130 Prisoners of war are all “detainees” 
in so far as they are under the responsibility of a “Detaining Power,”131 pace 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s once compulsive use of the term “detainee” to avoid 
granting implicitly “War on Terror” captives any legal status.132 As such, the 
law insists that “[p]risoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but 
not of the individuals or military units who have captured them.”133 The 
public character of war culminates in the famously alien sounding 
provisions concerning the release of prisoners of war on parole,134 that is, on 
the promise of not going back to combat after release.135 The Hague 
Regulations, in this case, unlike the Geneva Conventions, add that the 
soldier caught in violation of the terms of the parole falls out of the status of 
prisoner of war and can be tried for the use of violence itself.136 
  
 129. The description of the situation of the POWs says that “they have fallen into the 
power of the enemy.” GCIII, supra note 24, art. 4.  
 130. As a result, and except when dictated by necessity, prisoners of war cannot be 
detained in penitentiary establishments.  See GCIII, supra note 24, art. 22. 
 131. That is the term used throughout the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, starting with the framing provision of Article 13: 
 
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention 
relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment 
which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age 
or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated 
alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based 
on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any 
other distinction founded on similar criteria. 
 
GCIII, supra note 24, art. 13. 
 132. In that context, “detainees” are the individuals who are detained on the basis of 
the Military Order of November 13, 2001, that is, individuals later referred as “unlawful 
combatants” or, more confusingly “enemy combatants”.  See Detention, Treatment, and Trial 
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 133. GCIII, supra note 24, art. 12. 
 134. GCIII, supra note 24, art. 21. See also 3 JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF 
WAR 178 (1958). 
 135. See Maj. Gary D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern 
Utility, 156 MIL. L. REV. 200 (1998). 
 136. HCIV, supra note 120, art. 12.  Given that the possibility of parole is entirely 
based on the law of the prisoners’ own State, if upon their return they are told to go back to 
the front coercion will be a mitigating circumstance.  See also 3 JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY 
ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR 178 (1958). 
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3. From Privileged Agents to Legitimate Means of Warfare 
From general ideas of legitimate violence based on public–ness and 
publicity attached to the agents and targets of war (the “armed forces”), the 
St. Petersburg Declaration derives the notion that the aim of war not only 
results in a delimitation of the nature of participants, but also imposes a 
delimitation of the nature of the activity itself. That is the immediate object 
of the Declaration, which constitutes a quintessential “Hague Law” 
instrument, for which the Preamble gives us the most philosophical of 
rationales. 
Against the social contract background, private violence is most likely a 
crime. But public violence is not as such necessarily legitimate war, insofar 
as to be legitimate an act of war must be specifically aimed at weakening 
the military forces of the enemy.137 Rousseau had anticipated the 
Declaration’s formulation, according to which the objective could be 
attained by disabling the greatest possible number of men.138 Any means 
used in the course of war that exceed that objective are not legitimate, that 
is, not legitimated by the aims of war.139 By the terms of the introductory 
paragraph to the Preamble, which states that the mission of the military 
commission that drafted the declaration was to fix “the technical limits at 
which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of 
humanity,” the use of means that exceed the goal of disabling men, would 
then break the limits of military necessity and infringe on the requirements 
of humanity. Such means—or their use—are therefore considered to be in 
breach of the “laws of humanity.”140  
The foregoing happens—by definition—in the case of means of combat 
that produce “superfluous injuries,” “unnecessary suffering,” or “inevitable 
death.”141 Analytically, an “excessive” act violates the agreed upon common 
framework of understanding on the nature of the activity in which different 
States are involved. That activity here is “war.” As a breach it is ipso facto 
not an act pertaining to that activity as defined by the law. The act is 
something else than war: just like private acts of war were once termed acts 
of banditry, here excessive public acts of war will also lose their warlike 
quality and potentially become crimes, that is, unlawful acts of (private) 
individuals.  
In the case of the St. Petersburg Declaration, that much is manifested in 
the staging of the text as the expression of the “technical limits” between 
  
 137. The Declaration, at its second preambular paragraph, declares quite famously 
“the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy.”  St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 21, at 159.  
 138. Id. ¶ 3. 
 139. Id. ¶ 4.  
 140. Id. ¶ 5. 
 141. Id. ¶ 4. 
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military necessity and humanity that have been fixed “by common 
agreement.”142 The breach of the common agreement in the case of “war” 
will always boil down to a breach of the foundational principle of 
distinction, a failure to differentiate between civilians and combatants, or 
between the combatant and the human being that hides behind the uniform 
of the combatant.143 Means of combat that fail to do either one of those 
violate by definition the idea of distinction, and are therefore in 
contradiction with the “laws of humanity,” which otherwise, according to 
the Declaration, contribute to making war a distinct activity. From that 
liberal perspective, deliberate attacks against civilians,144 attacks of an 
indiscriminate nature145 or with indiscriminate means,146 and attacks against 
legitimate military objectives with means that will prolong suffering beyond 
war147 all constitute in the end the same violation. International criminal law 
will implement that idea by categorizing particularly egregiously excesses 
of that type as crimes. As in the case of the spy or the paroled prisoner of 
war, breach of the law makes the private individual reappear; that individual 
is considered then the immediate author of the act, as opposed to the State 
itself. 
4. Distinction and the Construction of War by International Law 
This construction of war as depending on the functional splitting of 
human beings is important on several fundamental counts. First, it supports 
the idea that “war” is a legitimate activity and as such finds grounds for 
legitimacy beyond the rules of the game constituted by the “laws of war.” In 
  
 142. Id. ¶ 1. 
 143. The idea of “excess” as the characteristic of a violation of the laws of war is 
common to violations of the principle of distinction stricto sensu and violations of the 
prohibition of unnecessary suffering.  The first case is exemplified by military operations 
causing “excessive” civilian casualties and damage with relation to what is "necessary" to 
accomplish the objectives of any war operation.  See generally API, supra note 24, art. 
51(5)(b), art. 57, ¶ 2(a)(iii), and a specific instance of it in relation to the protection of 
cultural property in Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, art. 6, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212.  
The second is best exemplified by the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
 144. Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 8(2)(b). 
 145. API, supra note 24, art. 51(4)(a). 
 146. Id. at art. 51(4)(b), 51(4)(c). 
 147. The idea that the effects of war must disappear when war ends is intimately 
connected to the notion of “war” that is contemplated by humanitarian law.  This is evident 
in the way in which the protection of the environment is framed, see for example, API, supra 
note 24, art. 35(3), or in the justifications presented for the banning of certain means of 
combat that continue causing harm after the end of hostilities.  See Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, supra note 29, pmbl. 
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that sense, the “laws of war” never discuss the legitimacy of “war” as an 
existing context, but rather police its boundaries, which results in the very 
possibility of a “correct” way of performing warlike activities.148 Second, it 
is the basis for the idea that wartime killing and destruction are legitimate if 
directed at the “forces of the enemy,” which includes the possibility of 
legitimately ending the life of human beings, as an unfortunate accident 
(and sometimes a necessary byproduct) in the activity of war, rather than its 
objective (the objective in war being to render the enemy incapable of 
participating in war by taking its soldiers out of combat.) As a result, not 
only is war as such a legitimate activity, but also deliberate ending of life 
itself is acceptable. Third, both the unquestioned existence of war and the 
possibility of agreeing on its definition imply that there is a larger frame 
within which the agreement can be reached. Concretely, it means, on the 
one hand, that there is at least a theoretical possibility of agreeing that a 
given situation of war indeed exists, starting with the notion that the two or 
more enemies recognize one another as legitimate enemies (as opposed to 
“bandits.”) On the other hand, it means also that the two enemies will find it 
significant to come up with common rules of a legal nature, which will be 
assumed to be enforceable and enforced by all the parties to the activity of 
war.  
That common frame of agreement today is the international legal system. 
The consequences of framing the laws of war in international law are in turn 
the following. (1) First comes the sovereign State, and the framework in 
which States interact as mutually recognized States, or in contemporary 
terms “equal sovereigns,” in which they are equal precisely by their 
exclusive sovereign function of using war, if need be, against one another 
on behalf of their respective communities. Outside international law, the 
idea of an encounter between two sovereigns is meaningless, since without 
a common law to coordinate sovereigns, starting with their mutual 
recognition as identical entities, sovereignty as a set of privileges against 
others is indistinguishable from greater brute force. (2) The principle of 
distinction is from there fundamentally implemented through the legal 
delimitation of the identity of the “State agent,” from where other identities 
are derived in one way or another, starting with the identity of the non–
combatant by excellence, the civilian.149 Soldiers, combatants, prisoners of 
  
 148. The idea is not new.  See Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation 
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 49 (1994); DAVID 
KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 125 (2006). 
 149. Everything in the system of the Geneva Convention starts with Article 4 of the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which defines the persons 
entitled to the status (and persons entitled to the treatment) of prisoners of war.  GCIII, supra 
note 24, art. 4.  The definition of civilians protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
which is given in its Article 4, defines civilians as those not covered by the three other 
Conventions.  GCIV, supra note 24, at art. 4.  The personal scope of application of the first 
two Conventions is identical to Article 4(A) of GCIII (with the exception of the persons 
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war, civilians and other inhabitants of the land of war are not natural 
occurrences, but rather constructions of the mind situated within common 
systems of meaning. In our case, such a system is designated implicitly by 
the St. Petersburg Declaration to be international law and the political 
theory that animates it. (3) Functional splitting and recombination is a 
permanent feature of war, given the presumption that behind the legal 
identity always lies a human being—just like behind the hospital identity 
marked by the Emblem lies a building, which can be very functionally 
hijacked. The existence of war is in all cases premised on the possibility of 
that splitting being accepted. (4) From that perspective, deliberate killing of 
human beings is in all (theoretical) cases illegitimate, given that it is a 
transgression of the deeper notion of “distinction,” that is, the distinction 
between human beings and their given functional identity. (5) Similarly, at 
the periphery of “war” activity, the soldier can be functionally split into 
human being and State agent for the purpose of criminal sanction 
(independently of the State’s own responsibility on other grounds). Rules 
are (theoretically) agreed upon for the purpose of circumscribing the 
possible circumstances of that splitting, which implies the development of 
rules external to humanitarian law, into which humanitarian law expels 
individuals who are split from their function. Any act that is codified as a 
crime is rooted in a breach of distinction, a breach the seriousness of which 
makes the incriminated act slide out of the world of war, and therefore puts 
the individual behind the uniform in the spotlight. The act is punished as a 
crime in the very same sense that domestic crimes are punished, that is, as 
grave acts that pose a danger to society as a whole, beyond their immediate 
victim.  
The marginal case of war criminality entrenches the fact that the fabric 
of international humanitarian law is marked with the principle of distinction 
in the form of identity assignments, and in so doing constructs “war” as an 
implementation of the basic statements of the St. Petersburg Declaration. In 
concrete terms, “war” is something defined by humanitarian law itself and 
is not received from the sociological facts of the outside world. As a result, 
humanitarian law may not have the same understanding of “war” as other 
possible perspectives on the phenomenon of “war,” including other 
academic and professional disciplines. More specifically here, humanitarian 
law’s war can be different from the “war” imagined in other bodies of law, 
such as the jus ad bellum and international human rights law.  
  
described in Part B of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, who are not entitled to the status but only to the treatment of POWs).  See 
GCI, supra note 24, art. 13; GCII, supra note 24, art. 14; GCIII, supra note 24, art. 4(A). 
When API describes the category of civilians in the context of the conduct of hostilities (and 
the protection of civilians against the effects of those hostilities), it essentially repeats (not to 
get into too much detail here) the maneuver of Article 4 GIV, by referring in the negative to 
Article 43 API (definition of the "armed forces" as those "who have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities") and Article 4(A) GCIII.  See API, supra note 24, art. 50. 
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5. Combatant Immunity as a Basis for all Rights and Obligations      
The foundational move of the jus in bello—considered as the law that 
applies when war is a given—is the designation of the agent of the State 
through which the State operates and carries out the activity of war. The 
cornerstone of the whole legal edifice is therefore the set of rules regulating 
the assignment of the status of prisoner of war. Those rules articulate 
practically the recognition that violence performed by a given individual 
was in fact public violence. 150 The definition of those who are entitled to the 
status of prisoner of war is then the foundation for the residual definition of 
the category of civilians.151 This implementation of distinction is 
generalized as the central structural connection among the four Geneva 
Conventions through the articulation of the personal scope of application of 
each one of them, which in all cases depends on the definition of the 
prisoner of war.152 That is also true of the Additional Protocols, once the 
new definition of those entitled to the status of prisoner of war is integrated 
with the operation of all the Conventions.153 
The implementation of distinction through combatant immunity, implicit 
in the definition of the prisoner of war, gives retrospective coherence to the 
development of the Geneva Conventions themselves. The original and 
immediate purpose of what would become the system of the Geneva 
Conventions was to ensure protection for the medical personnel of the 
armed forces operating on the battlefield.154 The protection of the permanent 
medical personnel of the armed forces,155 and from there the medical 
  
 150. The Inter-American Commission puts it best: 
 
The combatant’s privilege in turn is in essence a license to kill or 
wound enemy combatants and destroy other enemy military 
objectives.  A privileged combatant may also cause incidental 
civilian casualties.  A lawful combatant possessing this privilege 
must be given prisoner of war status, as described below, upon 
capture and immunity from criminal prosecution under the domestic 
law of his captor for his hostile acts that do not violate the laws and 
customs of war. 
 
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter–Am. Comm’n H. R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116/, 
doc. 5 rev, ¶ ¶ 68–70 (2002).  In other words, “lawful combatant and prisoner of war status 
directly flow from the combatant’s privilege.” Id.  
 151. PICTET, supra note 134, at 178. 
 152. Compare, as suggested supra note 149, GCIII, supra note 24, art. 4(A) and GCI, 
supra note 24, arts. 13–14. 
 153. API, supra note 24, at art. 44. 
 154. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, supra note 44, at 279, 280–81. 
 155. GCI, supra note 24, art. 24; GCII, supra note 24, art. 36. 
336 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
function156 is a by–product of the created category of the hors de combat, 
since the latter need to be protected so that the aims of war are not 
overreached by their death through carelessness or negligence. This 
explains the fact that military medical personnel, the core of the medical 
function in war, are part of the armed forces and yet not entitled to the status 
of prisoner of war: they are “retained” if needed for the care of the hors de 
combat, prisoners or civilians, and not “detained” based on status, since the 
status would otherwise make them a legitimate target.157 Protected medical 
personnel are as such the direct outgrowth of the principle of distinction: 
they signal that on the battlefield there is indeed a difference between 
human beings and their functional identity. Deliberate targeting of medical 
personnel is understandably considered a crime, that is, an act that is 
threatening to the legal system and not only harmful to its victim.158 
Similarly, perfidy, a mocking manipulation of the rules establishing that 
minimum of trust that allows for the system of legal protection based on 
distinction to function, is almost naturally singled out as a war crime when 
resulting in death or injury.159 
This exercise in connecting the normative dots against the large picture 
of distinction could be easily pursued with all categories of individuals—
from journalists to spies to mercenaries to civil defense—with more or less 
illuminating conclusions. Here the importance of the case of medical 
personnel lies in the strong association of distinction with the didactically 
named “Geneva law,” that is, the body of rules dealing with “protected 
persons.” The very idea of “protection” comes from distinction, again 
understood as the functional splitting of human beings between human life 
and variously adopted social roles, starting presumably, as Rousseau saw it, 
with citizenship. The principle of distinction is however strongly associated 
also with “Hague Law,” or the law regulating the conduct of hostilities, the 
means and methods of weakening the enemy forces.  
The principle of distinction signals simply that the enemy must 
differentiate between the human body and the public identity that it carries 
around. In the absence of such public identity, there is no enemy. In cases 
where the public identity is spotted, means should be used to kill it (the 
identity) without (necessarily) killing the human body that carries it, since 
that is not necessary to the overall war aim of weakening the State’s 
  
 156. API, supra note 24, arts. 12, 13, 16 (protection of medical units, civilian medical 
units, and medical duties). 
 157. GCI, supra note 24, art. 28; GCII, supra note 24, art. 37; GCIII, supra note 24, 
arts. 33, 35. 
 158. Rome Statute, supra note 30, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxiv), 8(2)(e)(ii). The ICRC 
compilation of customary international humanitarian law suggests that the criminalization of 
such deliberate acts is actually part of the body of unwritten law.  See 1 JEAN MARIE & 
LOUISE DOSWALD–BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 575 (1995). 
 159. API, supra note 24, art. 85(3)(f).  
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capacity resist submission to its enemy’s will, as Clausewitz saw it.160 The 
greater unity between Hague Law and Geneva Law does not come from the 
fact that Additional Protocol I or the Hague Regulations actually contain 
both types of rules. It comes from the fact that the torture of POWs, 
strategic aerial bombings, and the use of explosives generating non–
detectable fragments all constitute the same infraction: transgressing the 
difference between agents of the public cause and human beings. When the 
affected target is a combatant, and not a civilian, we call that more 
specifically “unnecessary suffering,” suffering beyond the threshold that 
puts the soldier hors de combat. As suggested above, this cardinal principle 
is therefore more than a twin to the principle of distinction; it is its legal 
offspring. 
The merger of distinction and unnecessary suffering under the same 
logic of means / ends relationship confirms the image of war as a legally 
constructed tool. The law defines war by starting from its assigned goal, 
which then serves to constrain the activity, the means to pursue the 
objective of the game of war by precisely setting rules to the game of war. 
Humanitarian law, as organized around distinction, is a system that 
contributes to the definition of war as a meaningful activity. More precisely, 
it designates the objective in war, as opposed to the objective of war. Once 
one knows what war is and what it is to wage war, one can imagine how we 
will use it. War as an activity is itself a means towards an end, and from a 
legal perspective that end is a question for the jus ad bellum to settle. For 
instance, it can be a collective understanding of States that war is not an 
appropriate tool of foreign policy,161 or that war is to be eliminated by 
regulating the use of force by States against one another.162 Thus Clausewitz 
and international humanitarian law converge in the general proposition that 
war is a tool, with its logic and necessities, and it can be put to a variety of 
uses, which are determined by political considerations. These political 
considerations today have to be publicly expressed to the society of 
sovereign communities in the language of the jus ad bellum. This comes 
from the collective agreement contained in the Charter of the United 
Nations and again based on the premise of formal sovereign equality as 
  
 160. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Anatol Rapoport ed., 1982) (1832). 
 161. See Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 
57 (stating that the Kellogg Briand Pact signatories “condemn recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in 
their relations with one another.”). 
 162. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations is given a particular place in the 
political architecture of the Charter because the preamble of the Charter opens the statement 
of purpose with the words: “We the People of the United Nations, determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . .” which is followed in the second part of 
the preamble by two mentions of “peace” and one of “armed force” in the four lines 
describing the general means to the ends just described.  See U.N. Charter, pmbl. 
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precisely unpacked in the seven articulations it finds in Article 2 of the 
Charter.  
6. Civil Wars and the Limits of Distinction 
However unwieldy the above generalizations may be, their abstraction 
can seem magnified by the recurrent notion that most “wars” nowadays are 
internal to States as opposed to among States.163 There is a thesis out there 
concerning even the fact that wars are now of a new type, a type essentially 
defined as not being the one depicted in theoretical terms above.164 Without 
entering that debate here,165 a few words need to be said about civil wars as 
wars, in a way that would maintain the integrity of the political and legal 
articulation of war suggested above. Clarifying the idea of civil wars as 
“wars” will be a basis for a discussion of wars outside of the framework 
presented above, which is naturally the main humanitarian law concern 
about the “War on Terror.”166 Here, however, the issue is that of 
understanding how distinction operates in civil wars. What I suggest is that 
civil wars are “wars” only because they are made to fit into the above 
worldview.  
In cases of international wars the operation of the principle of distinction 
and the prohibition of unnecessary suffering depend on the legal 
construction (at both domestic and international levels of law–making) of 
the category of combatant,167 which is attached to the figure of the sovereign 
State from which a combatant receives the privilege of legitimate 
destruction. As a result, in civil wars, the issue for law will be that the 
principle of distinction cannot operate, because as far as the State is 
concerned, the other warring party is constituted by the State’s own citizens. 
As a general consequence of this, the functional classification of human 
  
 163. E.g. HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2004: WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004). 
 164. As an example of this new thesis, see MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: 
ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2nd ed. 2007); HERFRIED MÜNKLER, THE NEW 
WARS (Patrick Camiller, trans., 2005); PAUL GILBERT, NEW TERROR, NEW WARS (2003); 
Michael N. Schmitt, 21st Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 443 
(2007). 
 165. See Mats Berdal, How ‘New’ Are the ‘New Wars’? Global Economic Change 
and the Study of Civil War, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 477 (2003) (providing a starting point 
for analysis of the new type of war). 
 166. PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2002); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2005). 
 167. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 
1949 art. 4, opened for signature  Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered 
into force Oct. 7, 1950) (starting point for analysis of combatants as a category); API, supra 
note 24, arts. 43-44 (starting point for analysis of combatants as a category). See also the still 
very important HCIV, supra note 120, arts. 1–3.  
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beings is not operational in the same way as it is in international conflicts.168 
Rousseau’s logic of public war clearly does not hold, or at least does not 
hold immediately as well as in a war among sovereign communities.  
The principle of distinction in civil wars is therefore thwarted essentially 
by sovereignty, which very pragmatically constitutes an obstacle to the 
international regulation of civil wars.169 In political terms, rejecting 
distinction in principle is tied to the notion that the State is the source of the 
law’s political legitimacy at both domestic and international levels. From a 
jurisprudential perspective—and from the perspective of international 
law—a party rebelling against the State is illegitimate at least until it is 
victorious.170 Out of the difficulty of having “combatants” in the functional 
sense outlined above, comes by implication the strange position of the 
notion of “civilian.”171 In black letter law, the “category” of civilians, 
although used (as in Additional Protocol II), is left undefined in a way that 
should not be surprising given that in international armed conflicts civilians 
are those who (to simplify just slightly) are not eligible for prisoner of war 
status if fallen in the hands of the enemy.172 We do have a mention of 
civilian populations, but the contours of that category are left undefined. 
The legal incongruity is a mere reflection of the notion that the principle of 
distinction cannot formally apply, because there are agents only on one side 
of the conflict; yet the principle of distinction has to apply somehow 
functionally, because distinction is the only reference that tells war apart 
from any other kind of violence, including law enforcement. The 
  
 168. Marco Sassòli, Uses and Abuses of the Laws of War in the War Against 
Terrorism, 22 LAW AND INEQ. 195, 196–97 (2004). 
 169. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 52 (“In accordance with the principle of absolute 
sovereignty over domestic affairs, such non-international conflicts were considered to be 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned”).  Marco Sassòli, Transnational 
Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law 8 (Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research, Harvard Univ., Occasional Paper Series, No. 6, Winter 2006) (mentioning 
that concerns over sovereignty have resulted in the law of non–international armed conflicts 
being “more rudimentary”).  For a detailed historical account of international law’s 
tightening grasp on “non international armed conflicts” as against notions of “absolute 
sovereignty,” see generally ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2010). See in particular id. at 25–
61 (regarding the adoption of common Article 3 as a fundamental innovation, perceived by 
most States as affecting their sovereignty); see also id. at 93–101 (indicating that similar 
reactions occurred when the ICRC presented its draft of what would become Additional 
Protocol II in 1977). 
 170. More specifically, secession is thus not condoned by international law, although 
it is not really prohibited either, because in very simple terms secession is a disruption to the 
factual units that create international law.  The real issue is that of the international effects of 
the outcome of such a rebellion, whether it results in changes of territory or only changes of 
government.  See, e.g., the discussion of secession in international law in the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 171. APII, supra note 24, pt. IV. 
 172. Again, see GCIV, supra note 24, art. 4; GCIII, supra note 24, art. 4; API, supra 
note 24, arts. 43, 44, and 50. 
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association of war with sovereignty poses demands that civil wars be 
similarly defined in terms of sovereignty for the sake of humanitarian law’s 
theoretical applicability and concrete application. 
The Geneva Conventions do not define what an “armed conflict” is, 
apart from a reference to the notion that “war” is implicitly considered as 
the legally formalized state of armed conflict.173 Given this lack of 
definition and the fact that the term armed conflict is used in the 
Conventions and Protocols to refer to inter–State and intra–State situations, 
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia famously stated, on the basis of a transversal examination of the 
four Geneva Conventions, including their common Article 3, and the two 
additional Protocols, that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.”174 Simply stated, the ICTY confirms that the 
phenomenon of war can be apprehended by the law regardless of whether it 
is internal to the State or across its borders. Civil and international wars—
declared or not—are species of the genus “armed conflict.”175 If civil wars 
are added to the description of “war,” the configuration of the participants 
and the nature of the activity must be susceptible to a legal approach 
similarly based on distinction.176 
In both common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of 
the Additional Protocol II, what one can say is that non–international armed 
conflicts are seen as armed conflicts because the nature of violence 
affects—directly or indirectly—the sovereign itself. The paradigmatic case 
may occur when the representative of the sovereign is being overthrown, 
but another case can be that characterized by the government’s loss of 
control over the sovereign’s territory to the point that a “war” is being 
  
 173. See 1 JEAN PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: 
COMMENTARY 28 (1952). 
 174. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). 
 175. According to the ICRC Commentary, common Article 3 can be understood as 
following the above–mentioned idea that “armed conflicts” are factually existing, rather than 
legally established, situations.  See PICTET, supra note 173, at 48.  (“Its observance does not 
depend upon preliminary discussions as to the nature of the conflict or the particular clauses 
to be respected”). 
 176. It is important to mention that, contrary to what appears at first sight, such an 
analysis supports more complex sociological descriptions of war, i.e. descriptions of war that 
are precisely not based directly on the motives or objectives of the participants.  See Stathis 
N. Kalyvas, The Ontology of “Political Violence”:  Action and Identity in Civil Wars, 1 
PERSP. ON POL. 475 (2003), but see Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2355, 2005), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/17/ 
000094946_00060205420011/additional/115515322_20041117154030.pdf. 
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waged on it, with or without its own participation. The rather loose 
definition provided by the ICTY hinges upon the existence of a particular 
type of violence, defined by its extension in time, and a reference to the 
participants being essentially armed organizations. By armed organizations 
one can understand groups that either represent the State or are capable of 
challenging State control by the use of violence. As such, and as further 
limited by the lower threshold of “civil strife,” the notion of “armed 
conflict” would reach out to cover any long–term violence implying a threat 
to, or breakdown of, the legal order itself, such as in the case of the State 
facing paramilitary criminal organizations.177 In all these cases, the term 
“armed groups” imply a permanence of violence resting on the existence of 
discreet entities essentially dedicated to the exercise of violence.178 
From that perspective, and despite the formal absence of civilians and 
combatants in civil wars, one can search the law for functional equivalents 
that would allow distinction to operate. The equivalence will be based on 
the notion that the struggle is between agents of the sovereign and agents of 
a would–be sovereign—signaled for instance by the fact that for all intents 
and purposes sovereignty, in the form of effective control, has ceased on a 
segment of the State’s territory. In international law, that view aligns 
humanitarian law with the rules of the law of State responsibility for 
international wrongful acts, which make States responsible for the pre–
governmental actions of their government if it gained control of the State as 
an insurrectional movement.179 The idea of a functional equivalence 
  
 177. Hence the critique of the militarization of law enforcement, which effectively 
transforms policing into war.  See, e.g., Stephen Hill & Randall Beger, A Paramilitary 
Policing Juggernaut, 36 SOC. JUST. 25 (2009).  On the militarization of law enforcement due 
to the militarization of non–State entities including criminal organizations, see HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, BREAKING THE GRIP? OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE FOR PARAMILITARY MAFIAS IN 
COLOMBIA (2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIFORM IMPUNITY: MEXICO’S MISUSE OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE TO PROSECUTE ABUSES IN COUNTERNARCOTICS AND PUBLIC SECURITY 
OPERATIONS (2009). 
 178. There is some discussion as to what constitutes an “armed group” and whether, 
in particular, criminal armed groups should, or even can, be distinguished from political 
armed groups.  This last question as an impact on the sociology of war, but it does not 
immediately affect the question at hand, insofar as the issue is for now limited to the 
possibility of having a war between anything else than two or more States.  On the issue of 
who is an “armed group.”  See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ENDS & 
MEANS: HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ARMED GROUPS 5 (1999), available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/EndsandMeans.pdf (“In this report, by 
‘armed groups’ we mean groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and 
are not under state control.”) For an attempt at defining "armed groups" for the purpose of 
international humanitarian law (within which they are not defined), see NILS MELTZER, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 27 (2009). 
 179. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. 
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess, Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 45, U.N. Doc 
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).  See also International Law Commission 
Y.B., supra note 46, at 50–52. 
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between the State as a public power and “armed groups,” understood to be 
would–be sovereigns or stand–ins for the sovereign, allows then for the 
hypothetical construction of “civilians” a contrario. Even though there 
cannot be an equivalent to prisoner of war status as a matter of international 
status in civil wars, the description of the civil war equivalent of the civilian 
can be based on the idea of the civil war type of combatant, which is 
implied in the ICTY definition of armed conflicts.  
That is what the ICRC has proposed by defining the essence of the civil–
war combatant with the notion of “continuous combat function.”180 The 
immediate purpose of the ICRC was, in the context of discussions about the 
nonexistent “illegal–combatant” status,181 to define what “direct 
participation” in hostilities means for the purpose of cancelling civilian 
status. In the course of doing so, a contrario reasoning defines direct 
participation as necessarily something other than the participation by 
fighters in hostilities, which in turn suggests that, even in civil wars, there is 
such a thing as a fighter, which can be distinguished from a civilian. So 
much is clear from the provisions relating to the loss of civilian status 
themselves, since they are identical for international and non–international 
armed conflicts.182 The idea of a factually permanent fighter status responds 
in legal terms to the idea that there is a civilian status defined by the fact of 
never participating in hostilities, and the notion that—as common Article 3 
seems to suggest—in civil wars also there are persons hors de combat (i.e. 
who are not simply not fighting, but are rather out of combat capacity). The 
existing law seems to acknowledge implicitly all these categories.183 In other 
words, a civil war is a war, because of its connection to the State, both in 
terms of it being a challenge to sovereign rule, and in terms of being legally 
characterized by the overall application of the public / private distinction 
formalized in the St. Petersburg Declaration. Regardless of what one thinks 
of the functionalization of status for the purpose of maintaining the 
possibility of the laws of war being applicable in non–international 
settings,184 which certainly shifts the background idea of legitimate force 
towards a de facto force–makes–legitimacy generalization, the reasoning 
  
 180. MELTZER, supra note 178. See generally the NYU Journal of International Law 
and Politics' forum on the topic of the ICRC document: Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 637–916 
(2010). 
 181. That discussion was triggered by the Supreme Court of Israel’s decision relating 
to targeting rules that govern military operations against individuals belonging to armed 
groups in the Occupied Territories (referred to generally as “targeted assassinations”).  HCJ 
768/02 The Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The Gov’t of Israel PD [2006] (Isr.). 
The ICRC study on “direct participation” is a response to the Court’s conclusions and 
method. 
 182. API, supra note 24, arts. 51(2), 13(2). 
 183. MELTZER, supra note 178, at 28. 
 184. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010).  
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highlights that civil “wars” are considered and imagined as wars in relation 
to distinction. Even if only by the analogy of civil wars to the general social 
phenomenon of war, the connection of war to the sovereign is always there. 
Beyond the merely practical difficulties in implementing distinction in civil 
wars, that suggests that the idea of a war outside of the laws of war would 
mean a political disconnection of war from sovereignty.185   
Violence below the threshold marked by common Article 3 is criminal. It 
involves the operation of the legal order, rather than its continued existence, 
which is an overall objective common to international and non–international 
armed conflicts. In that sense, the case of civil “wars” justifies—just like 
the case of international wars—the designation of fighting individuals as 
the “enemy” (of the State). That is again well illustrated by the Lieber code, 
which is founded on a similarly public notion of war while in the context of 
a clearly designated “civil war,” a war over secession.186 “Wars”, of 
whichever kind, are always associated with the exercise of public power, 
and more precisely a direct challenge to the holders of public power through 
military means (including cases where the sovereign has lost its public 
power in part of the territory). In this sense all “wars” are indeed associated 
with the sovereign border as the border of the space of operation of a 
government, the border of that space with the international plane, and its 
border with neighboring sovereigns.  
That brings us to the end of the excursion through international 
humanitarian law. The contrived exhibition of the principle of distinction 
here serves the purpose of proposing a vision of international humanitarian 
law as a coherent system based on deceivingly simple ideas about the world 
and human beings in it. Distinction is a principle, a general guiding standard 
that needs further implementation and interpretation to be more immediately 
understandable in the midst of everyday life. As such it is the object of 
debate and contestation. The overwhelming majority of people and States—
if not everyone on the planet—agrees on the idea of distinction as a 
normative guide. But there is no consensus on what it means in practice: 
who is a legitimate target, who is a combatant, who is a civilian, when is 
someone a civilian, does only behavior or also circumstances affect civilian 
status, all those are legitimate questions. Depending on the answers, 
targeting and its corollaries, and especially proportionality, can be 
  
 185. The exporting of the “continuous combat function” back into the realm of 
international armed conflicts results in applying the adapted logic of civil wars to a situation 
that should be entirely governed by formal distinctions.  In that sense, it entrenches the 
factual realities of contemporary warfare, such as massive privatization of war-making, 
without paying attention to the political message that underlies the collapse of formal 
distinctions.  As such it is significant that “permanent combat function” is used in the inter-
State context (or rather, regardless of the type of conflict in which one is) in the case of 
private military contractors.  See MELTZER, supra note 178, at 38. 
 186. See Lieber Code, supra note 116, art. 82. 
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dramatically altered.187   Even at the operational basis of distinction, there is 
a fundamental lack of consensus. States disagree over Articles 43 and 44 of 
the Additional Protocol I, which amend the basis for distinction in the 
system of the Geneva Conventions, in conjunction with the amendment of 
the definition of “armed conflict” in Article 1(4) of the Protocol.188 There is 
disagreement over the legal definition of proportionality, a corollary of 
distinction, in terms of whether acceptable civilian loss should be measured 
against military advantage for the operation or advantage for the overall 
campaign.189 And there is also the notion that more fundamental 
disagreement possibly exists—however marginal in actual military and 
diplomatic practice—on whether the system of the Geneva Conventions 
contains the sole possible approach to the idea of distinction. In other 
  
 187. Schmitt, supra note 64, at 169.  The issue of calculating “proportionality” in 
cases of contemporary asymmetric violent conflicts is highlighted in a particularly dramatic 
fashion in exchanges concerning turn-of-the-millennium instances of use of force by the 
State of Israel against non-State actors based in Lebanon and Palestine.  Proportionality was, 
for instance, central to the United Nations experts’ report concerning the 2006 war in 
Lebanon, and particularly as a frame for evaluating and then condemning Israel’s use of 
force as in many cases illegal.  See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Mission to Lebanon and Israel, Human Rights Council, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/72/2 (Oct. 2, 2006); Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment 
of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Mission to Lebanon and 
Israel, Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/72/2 (Oct. 2, 2006); Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mission to Lebanon 
and Israel, Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/72/2 (Oct. 2, 2006); and the Special 
Rapporteur on Aadequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of 
Living, Miloon Kothari, Mission to Lebanon and Israel, (Sept. 7-14, September 2006), 
Human Rights Council, 2d session, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/2 (Oct. 2, 2006).  Proportionality is 
also the terrain on which Israel’s use of force is defended and its military opponents’ use of 
force is criticized.  See Alan Dershowitz, Israel’s Policy Is Perfectly ‘Proportionate’: Hamas 
Are the Real War Criminals in this Conflict, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123085925621747981.html.  Some have, as a result of these 
experiences, proposed to reevaluate the notion and calculation of proportionality itself.  See, 
e.g., Michael L. Gross, The Second Lebanon War: The Question of Proportionality and the 
Prospect of Non-Lethal Warfare, 7 J. MIL. ETHICS 1 (2008). 
 188. As regards the definition of combatants, an important example is the rejection by 
a number of States of the amendments to Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention by 
Articles 43 to 45 of Additional Protocol I in 1977.  The position of the United States has 
been outlined carefully, most often by components of the Armed Forces.  See, e.g., Arthur 
John Armstrong, Mercenaries and Freedom Fighters: The Legal Regime of the Combatant 
Under Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 30 JAG J. 125, (1978); 
API, supra note 24.  Donald E. Hacker, The Application of Prisoner-of-War Status to 
Guerrillas Under the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 2 B.C. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 131, 131-62 (1978); George S. Prugh, American Issues and Friendly 
Reservations Regarding Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 31 MIL. L. & L. 
WAR REV. 223 (1992). 
 189. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, The Role of the Law of War, in REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 31 I.LM. 615 (1992) (providing a 
clear statement on proportionality as it is defended by the United States). 
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words, there is an ultimate interrogation, given these mounting practical 
difficulties, as to whether distinction between civilian and combatant can 
hold at all as a theoretical proposition for today’s wars, as epitomized by the 
“War on Terror.” 190 The changing realities of war in the field have 
prompted some to suggest that the expansion of the theater of war to include 
most often cities and other zones of civilian habitation, as well as the 
transformation of war into a partially privatized activity, would force the 
distinction between civilian and combatant to eventually yield to a 
distinction between innocent and guilty.191 
Those are important questions. The fact is, however, that no one will 
defend a position of principle that says that distinction as such is not a valid 
idea, even though many will say that in practice it is implemented only with 
careful approximation and extreme difficulty. Getting rid of distinction, 
whichever distinction it is, will render war as we know it impossible—
distinction introduces logic, order and regulation, which are indispensable 
for war, as opposed to chaotic destruction, to take place.192 In the terms used 
for framing this discussion, a vision of war that is disconnected from 
distinction yields a war disconnected from the sovereign and from the 
political legitimacy of force. It is a vision of war as a natural phenomenon 
or, in other words, Hobbes’s weather–like vision of war. As such, that 
image of war is defendable—like any other position on the subject—and 
can be debated on political grounds, but that discussion is not the immediate 
question here. Here, the proposition is that humanitarian law, as we know it, 
is precisely not attached to that vision but is set up against that vision. The 
most important idea backing the whole system of international humanitarian 
law is that war as such is legitimate—war, to be war, must be accompanied 
by some notion of right. Whether war exists or does not exist or should not 
exist is unimportant to humanitarian law; but when war is, it is grasped as a 
public phenomenon that can be essentially legitimate, if conducted 
according to the rules. In the alternative vision, what truly governs is 
nature’s laws. The system of humanitarian law is therefore set up with the 
image of a polity using force against the return to the state of nature, either 
by civil war or foreign invasion, all acts that can dissolve the social contract 
and thereby dissolve the polity. In the other vision, war is natural; it comes 
  
 190. In the course of the “War on Terror” the claim has been made that the non-state 
armed groups operate on the basis of a fundamentally different principle of distinction.  See, 
e.g., MOHAMMAD–MAHMOUD OULD MOHAMEDOU, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND 
CONFLICT RESEARCH, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, NON-LINEARITY OF ENGAGEMENT 
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AL 
QAEDA AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (JULY 2005).  See also the examples from Iraq provided in 
Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern 
Warfare, 39 INT’L LAW. 733, 744-45 (2005).  It should be noted that the author’s thesis is 
that the principle of distinction “rests on an outdated view of the world.”  Id. at 733. 
 191. VAN CREVELD, supra note 37, at 225. 
 192. Id. at 90. 
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from the state of nature and continues into the polity under a different 
guise.193  
That general picture of peace within and war outside, created by the 
metaphor of the social contract, could also be tracked into different parts of 
international law, down to the constitutionalist Preamble of the Charter of 
the United Nations. The relationship of international law to war is a rather 
pessimistic one but one that is founded on the fundamental idea that social 
bonds will both end war inside and propel it outside, as shown by the UN 
Charter itself.194 International human rights law shares this general picture, 
including the image of the social phenomenon of war itself. The idea of 
human rights has many complicated connections with constitutionalism and 
social contract theory already as such. But, beyond human rights law's own 
history and internal life, humanitarian law and human rights coexist within 
the larger political universe that gives humanitarian law, but also the jus ad 
bellum, the direction and orientation depicted above. What I want to discuss 
now in much briefer fashion is how human rights law can be read to express 
that same vision of political society, and highlight how the common 
ideological frame maintains human rights completely separate from the laws 
of war. That will constitute the political background to the technical magic 
of lex specialis in the era of fragmentation. 
B. Human Rights Law: The Principle of Non–Discrimination 
In the next section of this discussion, I will approach the encounter of 
humanitarian law with human rights in the context of human rights 
adjudication. The perspective is that of human rights’ reception and 
treatment of war in parallel to the existence of humanitarian law. The 
premise of that reception of war into human rights law is that humanitarian 
law and human rights may share something in their respective relations to 
the phenomenon of war. In the present section, the purpose is to go into an 
exposition of the inner logic of human rights law, although not to the same 
extent or detail as what was done above with humanitarian law. What is 
needed is a suggestion of the depth of human rights law’s identity in 
corresponding terms. The purpose is, similarly, not to defend a coherent 
image of the body of rules for its own sake, but rather, just like in the case 
of humanitarian law, to revive the notion that a very specific worldview is 
necessary for the idea of having an international law of human rights, which 
would be different from “trade law” or “the law of the sea.” As announced 
  
 193. Michel Foucault, 4 February 1976 Lecture, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST 
BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–76, at 87, at 92 (David Macey 
trans., 2003) (analyzing Hobbes’s view of the primordial war). 
 194. U.N. Charter art. 107 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or 
preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an 
enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by 
the Governments having responsibility for such action.”). 
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at the beginning of the discussion, if distinction constitutes the substantive 
Grundnorm of international humanitarian law, then I would suggest that 
non–discrimination plays the same role for human rights law. 
1.  Not Humanitarian Law’s Politics 
The body of human rights law is political in the very deep sense of 
engaging the operation of the State and sovereignty. It speaks of right and 
wrong ways for the State to use its sovereign means of regulation and 
coercion in relation to those subjected to them. In fundamental 
jurisprudential terms, what human rights and humanitarian law have in 
common is the regulation, and thereby legal construction, of relationships.195 
Like all law, they do not address things (weapons or hospitals) or 
relationships between persons and things (property or speech), but 
relationships between persons, natural or fictional. In the case of both 
bodies of law, legal norms define relations between the sovereign, other 
sovereigns, groups, individuals, and possibly corporate legal persons. What 
the contents of these relationships should be is subject to negotiation, 
reevaluation, and contestation in terms of creating rights, duties, privileges, 
and so on and so forth.  
In the realm of humanitarian law, Canada thought for instance that 
protective power should be extended to non–recognized but habitually used 
emblems of humanitarian organizations, a proposition that was for all 
intents and purposes rejected in the final drafting of relevant international 
black–letter law.196 In the realm of human rights, Spain, for its part, still 
thinks that discrimination against women in the line of dynastic succession 
to the throne of the kingdom should be acceptable, in the sense of being in 
conformity with the object and purpose of a treaty that seeks the elimination 
of all forms of discrimination against women.197 And Australia, to take a last 
example at random, thinks that indigenous peoples do not have a right to 
self–determination.198 The rights of individuals and groups—the 
construction of spheres of autonomy, frames of emancipation, and spaces of 
  
 195. See generally, for instance, Alf Ross, Tû-tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957); 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913–14). 
 196. See Julie Gaudreau, The Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 151 (2003). 
 197. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations 
Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2, at 27 (Apr. 10, 2006). 
 198. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says 
President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sep. 13, 2007).  See generally Stefania Errico, The 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is Adopted: An Overview, 7 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 756 (2007). 
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interaction in which they express their social existence or in which they are 
made to disappear—are obviously subject to dissensus and ensuing political 
persuasion, influence, and coercion. This happens at various points and 
levels of networks of social life, but in terms of international regulation it 
occurs within available spaces of diplomatic dialogue. Human rights law is 
one of those areas where lack of consensus has been made more visible, if 
only through the notorious issue of the number and content of reservations 
to human rights treaties.199 
The process of legalization of human rights is a political process. That 
process is, in its basic features, the same as that of international 
humanitarian law. From within the space of public dialogue and regulatory 
diplomacy, human rights law and humanitarian law can therefore also 
influence each other indirectly through the political process that gives birth 
to them and in which a variety of actors are involved.200 If the Geneva 
Conventions were not directly influenced by the parallel negotiation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR” or “Declaration”),201 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 displays, even beyond the centrality of the 
absorption of a right of peoples to self–determination in its Article 1, some 
terminological parallels with human rights law.202 That proximity highlights 
again that these bodies of law have different histories, but a shared political 
process from within which they talk to one another. That shared political 
process points to a fundamental commonality rooted in the international 
legal process itself: self–regulation by the sovereign. Each legal sub-system 
concerns itself with regulating a set of relationships involving the 
Sovereign. The two sets of relationships are distinct from one another, but 
  
 199. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, Issues Relating to 
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, 52d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Apr. 10, 1994), reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, 161 (May 12, 2003).  Useful general commentaries on the issue of 
reservations and their relation to the object and purpose of human rights treaties can be found 
in Catherine Redgwell, Reservation to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General 
Comment No. 24(52), 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 390 (1997) and Roberto Baratta, Should 
Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 413 
(2000). The issue of reservations has generated in recent years a debate peculiar to US legal 
academia. See particularly, among the endless literature, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 
(2000); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 
(2005).  See also Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State 
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2002). 
 200. See generally Meron, supra note 1. 
 201. Droege, Affinities, supra note 9, at 504. 
 202. Article 75 API on minimum guarantees is usually singled out for its echoes of 
human rights law.  See INT’L RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 863 (Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).  One could also, however, 
mention the terminology used by common Article 3. 
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they overlap in the figure of the sovereign State and the exercise of its 
broadly defined sovereign means of coercion.       
Human rights law is about the regulation of legitimate State power over 
individuals, groups, and the society at large. Once the meaning of that deep 
idea is forcibly made to pervade the whole body of otherwise random rules 
in the human rights corpus, it then becomes clearer how humanitarian law is 
formally and substantively different.203 The Preamble of the St. Petersburg 
Declaration was used above to extract a political narrative that would make 
the project of humanitarian law somehow coherent. Its counterpart in human 
rights law, from a parallel didactic viewpoint, is the Preamble to the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a public explanation of, and 
policy justification for, the operative parts of the Declaration, the Preamble 
can be seen as supporting ideologically the whole human rights corpus, 
whether universal or regional.204 The sense that the Declaration is, as any 
other international instrument, the outcome of complicated political 
  
 203. From the foregoing, it should be clear that the argument does not affect the 
possibility of adopting similar or even identical phrasing across the divide, or the sense of 
family resemblance which would prompt Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch to 
feel at home in the laws of war. The argument seeks here to clarify what type of family this 
is, and what type of family relationship we are assuming. 
 204. At the universal level, the Declaration left its mark in many subsequent treaties. 
See, e.g., example International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993, U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICESCR]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 63/117 (2008); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,  pmbl., opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); G.A. Res. 44/128, at 207, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/44/128 (Dec. 15, 1989); Siracusa Conference, Siracusa, It., Apr. 30-May 4, 
1984, ¶ 65,  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (Aug. 24, 1984); Declaration on Race and 
Racial Prejudice, U.N.E.S.C.O. Res 3/1.1/2, pmbl., arts. 5–7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1, annex V, ¶1, arts. 5-7 (Nov. 27, 1978); U.N. Educ., Sci., & 
Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, Gen. Conf. Res. 5.61, 
pmbl., UNESCO Doc. 28 C/Res. 5.61 (Nov. 16, 1995); International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, pmbl., opened for signature Nov. 
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976).  Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, pmbl., opened for signature 
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, pmbl., Dec. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 97 G.A. 
Res. 54/4, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000),  (entered 
into force Dec. 22, 2000); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, pmbl., opened for 
signature Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Declaration on the Protection of Women and 
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), ¶ 10, U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 146,  U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3318 (Dec. 14, 1974); Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, pmbl., G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
U.N. Doc. A/4354, at 19 (Nov. 20, 1959); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
41, at  pmbl.   
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processes and compromises on various fronts would certainly be obvious 
from the examination of its own drafting saga.205 But from the perspective 
of humanitarian law’s relationship to human rights, what matters in the 
Declaration's Preamble, considered a political platform, is the vision of 
coherence that is proposed, independently of its authors or its authors’ 
intentions. Unlike the image depicted in the St. Petersburg Declaration, the 
Universal Declaration’s Preamble is a statement on the universal socio–
political condition of human beings. As such, it derives the project of an 
international law of human rights from a principle that seems, as a starting 
point, to be diametrically opposed to the foundational and animating 
principle of distinction in humanitarian law, i.e. the principle of non–
discrimination.  
Following revolutionary constitutionalist statements that justified 
rebellion against something suddenly described as an illegitimate exercise 
of power,206 the Declaration asserts that the foundation of human rights law 
lies in human dignity, the pre–legally given worth of individuals grounded 
in their humanity.207 The social–contract vibe emanating from the structure 
of the Preamble comes here not from the specter of Hobbes’ or Rousseau’s 
state of nature, but instead from allusions to the legitimacy of State power 
being bounded by respect for human dignity and the potential for rebellion 
that stems from its possible disrespect (a motif that is more Lockean than 
anything else).208 According to the Preamble, human dignity is to be 
protected by the rule of law;209 from the rest of the Declaration and 
especially the contents of the actual rights, one is to understand that legal 
protection to mean the regulation of the sovereign’s coercive power over the 
individual in a variety of dimensions of social life. In all cases the ground 
  
 205. An indispensable reference, discussing the political substance of legal and 
diplomatic maneuvering around the drafting of the UDHR, is Olivier Barsalou, La guerre 
froide, Les États-Unis et la genèse de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, 
1945–1948 (2008) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal), available 
at http://www.juris.uqam.ca/memoires/Barsalou_Memoire.pdf. 
 206. Stephen P. Marks, From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six 
Billion Persons”: The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French 
Revolution, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 459 (1998). 
 207. UDHR, supra note 15, pmbl, ¶ 1 (stating that “recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”). 
 208. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 77, 94–95 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil, Blackwell, & Mott 1948) (1690).  A 
discussion of the right to rebel in the era of international human rights law can be found in 
the classic Jordan J. Paust, Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related 
Forms of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545 (1983).  
One should note already, based on the fundamental and foundational nature of that "right" to 
rebel, that it is not, and cannot be, part of the legal constitution of the Hobbesian Leviathan.  
See CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING 
AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL 46–47 (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., 2008). 
 209. UDHR, supra note 15, pmbl., ¶ 3. 
2011] Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 351 
 
for constraining or channeling sovereign power is a version of “human 
nature” endowed with dignity independently of social life,210 which results 
in all human beings being endowed with the same rights by the mere fact of 
their being human. Existential equality generates the necessity for the State 
not to make distinctions among human beings.  
The choice of regulatory tool is, in concrete terms, that of expressing the 
bounded legitimacy of sovereign violence, in whatever shape or form it 
comes, in a set of rights held permanently by all individuals on the one 
hand, and a set of corollary duties that frame that exercise of power by the 
State on the other hand. How this is, formally speaking, unlike humanitarian 
law is arguably self–evident, if one focuses on the type of legal relationship 
that is envisaged between the relevant legal subjects.211 The formal frame of 
human rights law is based on the notion of presupposed perfect equality 
among human beings; that leads to a delegation of coercive power that will 
be constrained by a duty for the holder of that power to relate to all in a way 
that acknowledges that equal worth and value. What is meant is not that the 
State should not discriminate, but rather that the State cannot, as a State, 
discriminate. Non–discrimination is in the essence of legitimate State 
power—discrimination makes State power illegitimate and the operator of 
that power a usurper. Hence the presupposition of a pre–political or pre–
contractual “right” to rebel, a mere flipside of the pre–political “right” to 
contract the polity into existence. 
2.  Not Humanitarian Law’s Sovereignty 
The fundamental or foundational character of non–discrimination is 
reiterated and reinforced throughout the law of human rights. At its most 
structurally obvious, it shows its mysterious Grundnorm dimension in the 
  
 210. For a famously critical stance on this approach, see Exec. Bd. of the Am. 
Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGISTCAL ASS'N 
539, 539–43 (1947).  In political thought, the social approach to human rights as that of rights 
of “man in civil society” was provided by Edmund Burke.  See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 218 (J.C.D. Clark ed., 2001) (1790). 
 211. I should insist that it is naturally always possible to look at human rights and 
humanitarian law from a perspective that purports to see beyond legal relations and into the 
substance of life.  Such are perspectives that treat human rights and humanitarian law as 
instruments for a seemingly consensual objective, moral, ethical, or otherwise independent of 
all political debate.  In that case it is quite understandable that legal categories may be mixed 
and matched, since law and legal language are not considered to contribute meaningfully to 
the political construction of the world.  See, e.g., MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: 
ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA 12 (2nd ed. 2007).  The author describes 
contemporary wars as “a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations, so the agents of 
cosmopolitan law-enforcement have to be a mixture of soldiers and police.”  Id.  In that case, 
it is indicative that one will encounter the all-encompassing referent of “violence,” which 
produces a sense of indistinction that must obviously be as politically meaningful as 
distinction is. E.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, VIOLENCE AND THE USE OF FORCE 
(2008).   
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fact that the duty not to discriminate has, strictly speaking, no fully 
independent normative status and is indeed approached as part of the 
operation of (legitimate) sovereign power itself.212 Non–discrimination 
refers not to a discrete right–duty relationship between State and individual, 
but to the manner in which the State discharges any and all of the duties 
corresponding to any and all of the rights held by (or conferred to) the 
relevant individuals. The structural necessity of non–discrimination goes 
thus to the heart of the operation of the State apparatus. More than simply a 
formal requirement, it speaks to the impossibility for legitimate power to 
consider irrelevant differences that are otherwise made to count in the life of 
human beings only through an arbitrary organization of society. It means 
therefore also an obligation for the State to treat differently individuals who 
are situated differently.213 But, even further along, it is understood to require 
a showing by the State that it is not contaminated by (civil) society’s own 
discriminatory biases,214 both in its actual operation (i.e. in fulfilling duties 
to respect and protect) and in its setting of examples and other educational 
activities (i.e. in abiding by the duties to promote and fulfill).215 The 
prohibition of discrimination is tied in black–letter law to all rights, based 
on the very definition of the State duties corresponding to those rights in 
international instruments.216 Moreover, the prohibition of discrimination 
  
 212. E.g., X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1985) (“Article 
14 has no independent existence; it constitutes one particular element (non-discrimination) of 
each of the rights safeguarded by the Convention. The Articles enshrining those rights may 
be violated alone or in conjunction with Article 14.”). 
 213. E.g., Price v. United Kingdom, App. No. 33394/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), 34 
EHRR 53, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
 214. Nachova v. Bulgaria revisits the former, blindly rigid, approach to the State’s 
relationship to patent social discrimination. App. Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. The previous argumentative line concerning the 
implementation of Article 14 of the European Convention, and which led the Court to 
systematically ignore a social background of patent discrimination, was followed in a series 
of cases otherwise displaying the tragic fate of Roma individuals in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It is well represented by Velikova v. Bulgaria, App. No 41488/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2000), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
 215. See generally, in line with the Velikova–Nachova line of development in the 
ECHR, the case of Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre (Roma Rights Centre) UKHL 55 (appeal taken from Eng.) [2004], where the 
United Kingdom’s House of Lords finds a violation by the United Kingdom of the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in the absence of actual exercise of jurisdiction, based on 
the independent obligation to promote the abolition of racial discrimination.  The distinction 
between the four types of State duties corresponding to each human right is now standard in 
human rights practice.  See, e.g., Social and Economic Rights Action Campaign v. Nigeria, 
African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 15th Activity Report, Commc’n No. 155/96, 
37 ¶ 46, AU Doc. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (2002). 
 216. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] and 
ICESCR, supra note 204, art. 2. (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
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remains, with its meta–status, in situations of emergency, which in human 
rights law codify the customary institution of the “state of necessity” by 
allowing non–respect of human rights norms to be excused and explained in 
the form of a suspension of the law.217 Logically, when the State is 
defending its own life, it is still defending it as a State, and what makes it 
act like a State is its non–discriminatory use of power even while 
substantive rights are curtailed. 
Non–discrimination is a political program based on the more general 
idea of perfect equality. In its implementation it is contested, as shown by 
divergent conceptions on the proper scope of a norm of equality based on a 
common human nature. At the international level, that the idea of non–
discrimination is politically expounded, as opposed to being ethically 
transparent, is plainly demonstrated by the fact that it took about sixty years 
for States to legally acknowledge that the human dignity of persons with 
disabilities needed particular protection.218 The centrality of “non 
discrimination,” as it relates to the idea of human dignity, can be seen as 
contingent on the Declaration’s historical context, in the sense that the 
historical process of implementation of non–discrimination starts with its 
assertion and the reasons for making it the primordial legal expression of 
human dignity. As the basis of the universalism of international human 
rights law, understood as a positivist legal tool for the protection of human 
dignity, the contingence of the human rights project is shown in additional, 
contextualized formulations of human dignity, particularly in regionalist 
human rights enterprises.219 In that sense, human dignity itself is subject to 
debate, regardless of a possible consensus on the formal notion of common 
human dignity. The endeavor of legal protection for human dignity can be 
associated, depending on the larger social and political surroundings, with 
the establishment of continental public order220 or even with anti–
colonialism, the protection of peoples’ rights, and social duties towards the 
community.221  
  
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”). 
 217. ICCPR, supra note 216, at art. 4. 
 218. Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 
30, 2007, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008). 
 219. For the framing role given to democratic institutions, even before the expression 
of human dignity, see for example, American Convention on Human Rights pmbl., Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  
 220. E.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75 (1995), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=loizidou&sessionid=66079020&sk
in=hudoc-en (stating that where the Court considers “the Convention as a constitutional 
instrument of European public order.”). 
 221. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights pmbl. § § 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, opened for 
signature June 27, 1981, OAU DOC. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986)  [hereinafter African Charter].  
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Non–discrimination, as intimately tied to the idea of universal human 
rights, is not necessarily accepted as the center of human rights by visions 
that do not associate human rights with legal protection.222 But as a matter 
of legal architecture for international human rights, non–discrimination is 
unavoidably at the heart of the political matter. Given the prescriptive (and 
not descriptive) nature of human rights instruments, the legal principle of 
non–discrimination reinforces the notion that human rights standards and 
norms are enshrined in international law as a reminder of the State’s 
constitutional structure, in which its agents operate legitimately over 
territorial subjects. Various notions of the relationship between State, 
individual, and society will fuel political debate within the frame of human 
rights law on the different ways for the State to relate to human beings on a 
basis that acknowledges in society their pre–social equality.223 This has 
notoriously been the focus of critical analysis in relationship to other modes 
of struggles for emancipation that are not obsessed with the State, the 
individual, or rights.224 The background to those conversations is the overall 
question of the relationship between the State and individuals under their 
power, even when that exclusive formalization of the political realm in the 
  
 222. See e.g., Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 315, 319 (2004).  
 223. A famous instantiation of this idea would be the statement of political theory 
pronounced by the United States of America on the occasion of States’ comments on a draft 
document produced by the Chairperson of the UN Working Group on the Right to 
Development: 
 
There is no international consensus on the precise meaning of the 
right to development. Given the lack of conceptual clarity that has 
surrounded the right to development since its inception, we believe 
that it will be very difficult for the international community to arrive 
at a consensus on its implementation.  The most fundamental flaw 
reflected in the approach of the Independent Expert concerning the 
development compact is the idea that economic, social and cultural 
rights are entitlements that require correlated legal duties and 
obligations.  At best, economic, social and cultural rights are goals 
that can only be achieved progressively, not guarantees.  Therefore, 
while access to food, health services and quality education are at the 
top of any list of development goals, to speak of them as rights turns 
the citizens of developing countries into objects of development 
rather than subjects in control of their own destiny. 
   
U.N. Human Rights Comm’n., Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to Development, 
The Right to Development,  U.N. E, 57th Sess., 26 mtg. at 46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/26, at 
46 (Mar. 20, 2001). 
 224. For indispensable pieces of reading material, see David Kennedy, The 
International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 
(2002); Martti Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights in Political Culture, in THE EU AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); and the particularly lovable Martti 
Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, 4 MENNESKER & RETTIGHETER / NORDIC J. 
HUM. RTS., at 33, 33–45 (2001). 
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figure of the State and its legal system is rejected. What comes as an 
unsurprising conclusion is that the image of the realm where human rights 
operate as a framing guide for the legitimate power of the State over its 
liberal subjects is not that of “war.” If war, in the social–contract image 
displayed above, is the relationship resulting from the constitution of the 
polity, then human rights law refers to a description of the ideal polity in its 
daily operation, within the boundaries that fence off the real state of war 
among communities. 
The best illustration of human rights as a regulatory framework for the 
normal operation of sovereignty on the basis of non–discrimination is given 
by so–called economic, social, and cultural rights. This is so especially 
when they are adjudicated, as they are in the most prevalent but not 
exclusive way, in the form of a judicial examination of the rationality, 
reasonableness and transparency of State–designed policy within the 
framework of the separation of powers.225 The importance of economic and 
social rights in this context lies in the fact that they highlight the association 
of human rights with the legitimacy of State action qua State action, 
including when it takes the form of so–called “policy” and not simply that 
of a discreet action or omission. One of the criteria for the legitimacy of the 
State’s operation in devising and implementing policy is precisely its regard 
for discriminatory biases and effects,226 which brings into focus the relation 
between legitimacy, discrimination, and human dignity.227 When trying to 
recapture from a legal perspective the meaning of “human dignity” some 
jurisdictions have unsurprisingly expounded it in terms of a respect for 
equality, devising thus as the test for a violation of human dignity the 
evidence of discrimination among or against human beings on irrational 
bases.228 Human dignity in society cannot but be a relational notion, and the 
  
 225. This is the approach to economic and social rights notoriously followed by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa.  See for instance the landmark case, Soobramoney v. 
Minister of Health (Kwazulu–Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.).  See also Minister of 
Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
 226. See, e.g., Khosa v. Minister of Social Development/ Mahlaule and Another v. 
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.) (dealing with the element of 
discrimination in the application of the constitutional standard of reasonableness as regards 
implementation of economic and social rights in general, and access to social security in 
particular.). 
 227. As the Constitutional Court of South Africa said of South Africa’s basic law, 
“The socio-economic rights in our Constitution are closely related to the founding values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.”  Id. at ¶ 40. 
 228. In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 S.C.R. 
497, 501 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada explained the purpose of Section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, relating to “equality rights,” as follows:  
 
to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom 
through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or 
social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy 
 
356 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
respect for human dignity in society manifests itself as the recognition that 
from the perspective of sovereign power all individuals are of equal worth.  
The centrality of non–discrimination sets human rights apart from 
humanitarian law in that non–discrimination is a rule that becomes relevant 
for the laws of war only once distinction has occurred (i.e. discrimination 
based on belonging to a legally relevant and defined group or class).229 The 
operational logic of humanitarian law is manifestly unlike that of human 
rights, since it yields an understandable prescriptive discrimination based on 
rank, within the already normatively segregated class of those entitled to 
prisoner–of–war status.230 The difference in logic is intimately connected 
with the fact that there is a “war,” or more precisely that there is a “war” as 
understood in terms of humanitarian law. Against the social contract 
metaphor, the notion of a war as a threat to the polity and therefore the 
social contract itself is illuminating here for legal purposes. From the 
perspective of non–discrimination, the proposed normative framework for 
cases of “civil strife” or “internal disturbances”231 expresses the point of 
  
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian 
society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect 
and consideration. 
 
 229. For instance, see GCIII, supra note 24, at art. 12, regarding non–discrimination 
after POW designation, or see GCIV, supra note 24, at art. 27, regarding non–discrimination 
after designation of individuals as "protected person." 
 230. E.g., GCIII, supra note 24, at arts. 44, 49, 60.  As the European Court of Human 
Rights observed, significantly not in the terms of a lex generalis / lex specialis  relationship: 
 
The hierarchical structure inherent in armies entails differentiation 
according to rank. Corresponding to the various ranks are differing 
responsibilities which in their turn justify certain inequalities of 
treatment in the disciplinary sphere. Such inequalities are 
traditionally encountered in the Contracting States and are tolerated 
by international humanitarian law (paragraph 140 of the 
Commission’s report: Article 88 of the Geneva Convention of 12 
August 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War). In this 
respect, the European Convention allows the competent national 
authorities a considerable margin of appreciation. 
 
Engel and Others v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976) at ¶ 72, available at http://cmiskp.ech.coe.int. 
 231. The notion of that space of violence as an autonomous space in need for specific 
regulation comes from Article 1(2) APII: " This Protocol shall not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."  APII, supra note 24.  The 
formulation of a limit, seemingly defined as a threshold intensity, to what the law of non-
international armed conflict applies is repeated in the amended Protocol on landmines and 
booby–traps to the Conventional Weapons Convention when, among other objectives of the 
process, the amendments extended the original Protocol to conflicts not of an international 
character.  See Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, supra note 143.  See Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby–Traps and Other Devices, As 
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contact between international humanitarian law and human rights law. 
Legally speaking, those situations constitute the point at which the 
sovereign declares the state of necessity for the purpose of saving its own 
life,232 that is, saving the sovereign legal order as the depository of a power 
otherwise regulated and channeled by human rights norms.  
For that particular purpose the temporary suspension of rights is 
warranted in that the disappearance of the State would mean the definitive 
annihilation of human rights law by automatic implication. Yet the 
suspension of human rights law is not followed by the application of 
humanitarian law, given that the level of violence required for a “state of 
emergency to exist” is not necessarily that of a “war.”233 In the proposed 
regulatory frameworks for that in–between space, 234 one finds the principle 
of non–discrimination (contained in Article 4 of ICCPR, for instance) 
effectively coexisting with the principle of distinction (as indicated in the 
proposed “minimum standards” for the regulation of the grey zone of 
violence between peace and armed conflict).235 The sovereign is, in other 
words, foreseen as caught between the exercise of law enforcement and the 
  
Amended on 3 May 3, 1996 Annexed to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, at art. 1(2), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter 
Mines Protocol II].  See also Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-traps and Other Devices art. 1, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133 [hereinafter Use of 
Mines, Booby–traps and Other Devices]. 
 232. The European Convention puts it very well, by framing the codification of the 
“state of necessity” as a “time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR] (emphasis added).  This formulation connects 
with the definition of the “state of necessity” as a specific circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness in the law of State responsibility (a circumstance that, in the peculiar case of 
human rights, transforms a violation into a legitimate “suspension").  See Rainbow Warrior 
Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.) 20 R.I.A.A. 254 (1990). 
 233. This is the classic way of presenting the state of emergency as situated somehow 
“between” the respective scopes of application of human rights law and humanitarian law.  
See, e.g., FRANÇOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 
113 (Laura Brav ed., Laura Brav trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2nd ed. 2007) 
(2001). 
 234. See, e.g., Institute for Human Rights Experts Conference, Turku/Åbo, Fin., Nov. 
30-Dec. 2, 1990, Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards, reprinted in Comm’n 
on Human Rights, Sub–Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub–Commission Has 
Been Concerned, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991 (Aug., 12, 1991) (prepared by Theo van 
Boven & Asbjørn Eide) [hereinafter Turku Declaration].  See also Theodor Meron, Towards 
a Humanitarian Declaration of Internal Strife, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 859 (1984); THEODOR 
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987); 
Theodor Meron, Draft Model Declaration on Internal Strife, 262 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 59, 
59–76 (1988); Theodore Meron & Allan Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 375–81 (1991). 
 235. Non–discrimination and distinction appear in Articles 2 and 5 of the 1990 Turku 
Declaration, respectively. Turku Declaration, supra note 234, arts. 2, 5. 
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defense of the legal order itself against individuals on the verge of being 
“enemies.”  
The relationship between human rights and humanitarian law on the 
terrain where formal sovereignty is under threat confirms the loosely 
common social contract image that allows one to picture, or narrate, the 
relationship of individuals to States in international law, following what was 
done above in examining humanitarian law. First, the State is formed to 
provide for the (variously understood) security of individuals. But then, the 
escalation of violence and disorder (re)opens the possibility of a return to a 
situation of generalized risk (the “state of nature”). At bottom, the situation 
is not (anymore) regulated and sanctioned by a centralized power mandated 
to speak “the law” and guarantee social normalcy. In that general 
background picture, human rights law is concerned with the legitimacy and 
modes of imposition of State power, and defines its abuse and prevents or 
channels its arbitrariness. Humanitarian law, in turn, is concerned with the 
defense of the sovereign legal order, within which arbitrariness is an issue 
for the legitimacy of the Sovereign's power over its legal subjects.  
3. Human Dignity Against War: Legitimacies of Ending Life 
Humanitarian law’s logic, as translated into the principle of distinction, 
is not based on formal and universal equality but rather, in fundamentally 
contrary fashion, on status.236 It absorbs the prohibition of discrimination 
within a system of pervasive and necessary discrimination among classes of 
individuals in relationship to a variety of sovereigns.237 Saying that the laws 
of war are preoccupied with the protection of “human” dignity is therefore 
ambiguous at best. An immediate problem for “human dignity” as 
hypothetical focus of humanitarian law is the apparent lack of deliberate 
regulation by the laws of war of the sovereign’s relation to its own agents (if 
we leave aside loopholes, gaps, contradictions, and other gifts to legal 
interpretation). The idea that humanitarian law has human dignity as its first 
concern would amount therefore to saying that the dignity of soldiers is 
nonexistent or unimportant.238 That would actually constitute an exactly 
opposite result to that of the traditional account of humanitarian law based 
on distinction. The latter would explain how the State’s own citizens may 
  
 236. See generally the very enlightening discussion of the complicated relationships 
between humanitarian law and human rights law that result from the logic of “status” in the 
laws of war, in David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra–Judicial 
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence? 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2005) (discussing 
among other things the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights’ confusing 
importation of status into human rights law in its report on human rights and terrorism.). 
 237. For a different account, see Jelena Pejic, Non–Discrimination and Armed 
Conflict, 83 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 183 (2001). 
 238. For an intriguing essay on this general notion, see Eyal Benvenisti, Human 
Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81 (2006). 
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come back under the scope of the State’s own humanitarian obligations 
through the application of traditional status categories. From there, one can 
see that putting human dignity at the center of humanitarian law conveys, in 
more abstract fashion, that the situation of war does not fundamentally alter 
the very issue of human dignity in society. At bottom, human rights law is 
in many different ways developed for the purpose of not only recognizing 
and guarding human dignity, but also excavating it, highlighting it, 
concretizing it, and implementing it for the purpose of generating true 
equality.239 From there, the continuity of law’s concern for “human dignity” 
into the situation of armed conflict would imply that human dignity can still 
be realized despite war, where, apart from everything else that may 
intuitively seem inimical to human rights, discrimination among individuals 
is even factually a given. 
Unlike human rights law, the laws of war confer very limited individual 
rights to persons. Individual rights are a very secondary regulatory tool, and 
these rights, which are not necessarily attached to “human dignity,”240 are 
based in all cases on the labeling of individuals.241 This includes the general 
safety net of Article 75 in Additional Protocol I, which itself implies that the 
lack of categorization constitutes some sort of anomaly, and grants 
fundamental protections (which look like human rights standards) based 
explicitly on the lack of categorization (i.e. individuals do not get better 
treatment precisely because they do not fall neatly in the category of 
  
 239. An early example is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], supra note 204.  The object and purpose of the 
Convention has been defined in the following terms, in the context of a discussion of the 
special measures mandated by the Convention to compensate for historical discrimination 
(i.e. positive discrimination, or affirmative action): 
 
The scope and meaning of article 4, paragraph 1, must be determined 
in the context of the overall object and purpose of the Convention, 
which is to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women with 
a view to achieving women’s de jure and de facto equality with men 
in the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
States parties to the Convention are under a legal obligation to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfill this right to non-discrimination 
for women and to ensure the development and advancement of 
women in order to improve their position to one of de jure as well as 
de facto equality with men. 
 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of CEDAW, on Temporary Special Measures, in Report of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 30th Sess. (Jan. 12–30, 
2004), 31st Sess. (Jul. 6–23, 2004), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/59/38, G.A.O.R. 59th Sess. Supp. No. 
38 (2004). 
 240. For instance, the right of petition given both to prisoners (see GCIII, supra note 
24, at art. 42) and civilian internees (see GCIV, supra note 24, at art. 24). 
 241. E.g., GCIII, supra note 24, at art. 78 (regarding the right of prisoners of war to 
file complaints). 
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interned civilians or detained prisoners). Regarding what was suggested 
above about the jurisprudential relationship between human dignity and 
equality, the principle of distinction should therefore be deemed itself 
fundamentally incompatible with human dignity.242 That incompatibility 
would in turn give some sort of legitimacy to the emergence of human 
rights lingo when distinctions are deemed not to be possible.243  
From there, one should think that the discrimination between combatants 
and civilians with regard to the fundamental “right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of one’s life” is incomprehensible to the logic of human rights, 
precisely because of human dignity itself. It becomes acceptable only with 
the irruption of international humanitarian law, through the operation of the 
lex specialis principle of interpretation, according to which the more 
specific law prevails over the more general law.244 Considering that 
humanitarian law is “more specific” than human rights in the case of war 
because it is designed precisely for situations of war, the message of the lex 
specialis interpretive maxim is that one should use humanitarian law for the 
purpose of defining what “arbitrary” deprivation would mean in times of 
war.245  
If one seeks responses to the question of human rights law's attitude 
towards discrimination in war in the language of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, for instance, a significant element will be the recurrent 
shadow of the “state of emergency” in the background relationship between 
humanitarian law and human rights. Schematically, Article 2 of the 
European Convention allows intentional deprivation of life essentially if it 
is the result of necessary and proportionate use of force (a) in defense 
against unlawful use of force, (b) in support of a lawful arrest, or (c) in the 
quelling of an insurrection.246 Article 15 of the Convention, which codifies 
the “state of emergency” for the purpose of that instrument, declares that 
Article 2 is non–derogable, except for “deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war.” The combination of the two provisions means that for the human 
rights corpus, intentional killing in war (in contrast to intentional killing in a 
situation of insurrection) is presumably a violation of the right to life, but is 
considered a “derogation” to the extent that it is a “lawful” act of war. By 
“lawful” act of war, one should understand an act that is legalized by the lex 
specialis and not human rights law itself, since human rights law itself does 
not list “lawful” war–deaths alongside “lawful” deaths resulting from law 
enforcement and counter–insurgency in its description of the limits to the 
  
 242. In Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada said that the “imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping or political or social prejudice” would constitute “a violation of 
essential human dignity.” See Law, supra note 228, at 501. 
 243. That would apply also then to the context of non-international armed conflicts, 
where formal distinctions are not made.  See GCI, supra note 24, at art. 3.  
 244. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, at art. 30.   
 245. Nuclear Weapons Legality, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25. 
 246. ECHR, supra note 232, art. 2. 
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right to life.247 This legal construction of the right to life, which requires 
humanitarian law to make lawful something that presumably would be 
structurally abhorrent under human rights248 (like discrimination based on 
status, national origin, language, religion or whatever other social label, for 
the exclusive purpose of killing), is the fundamental meaning of the lex 
specialis story and points to the deep difference between the two bodies of 
law. 
The point of contact between human rights and humanitarian law is not 
the dignity of the human being, but the sovereign border, the space of 
sovereign power. Associating human rights and humanitarian law on the 
basis of some substantive standard, moral or otherwise, may sound 
reasonable or even desirable. It has, however, deep consequences in the 
sense of normalizing the operation of the logic of one of those bodies of law 
in the “normal” domain of operation of the other. At a very fundamental 
level, as intuited above in the European Convention’s dealings with war–
deaths, human rights are associated with peace,249 not in the sense of their 
material scope of application, but in the sense of their raison d’être. The 
universal human rights regime, as derived from the Charter of the United 
Nations, shares in the general project of preventing war,250 a goal reasserted 
in one way or another in a variety of human rights instruments251 and an 
idea that should be taken very seriously when considering human rights as 
part of the process of contemporary international law. Human rights law 
should be approached as fundamentally hostile to war, given that war 
carries the risk of disappearance of the State as the provider of human rights 
protection, not to mention the physical disappearance of human beings and 
their social environment, as constituted by the social contract. As the Inter–
American Commission said very simply with reference to human rights 
instruments in general, “one of their purposes is to prevent warfare.”252  
Conversely, humanitarian law is for its part foundationally agnostic 
about war, within the limits of its relationship to the jus ad bellum.253 This 
  
 247. ECHR, supra note 232, art. 15.2. 
 248. As indicated by human rights bodies, the notion that limitations to the exercise of 
human rights must be provisions previously laid down in the law is to be understood as 
referring not only to domestic law but also international law.  See, e.g., Jawara v. The 
Gambia, African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 13th Activity Report, Comm’c Nos. 
147/95 and 149/96 (2000), 102, 104, 106 ¶ ¶ 43, 58, 68, reprinted in, COMPENDIUM OF KEY 
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN UNION, supra note 221, at 211–14. 
 249. UDHR, supra note 15, at pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 250. U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1(1). 
 251. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 216, at pmbl.; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 204, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra 
note 204.   
 252. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev ¶ 158 (1997).  
 253. If one leaves aside more contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention, 
the "responsibility to protect", and other marks of a resurgence of just war theory, a nice 
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indifference about whether war should or should not exist is how 
humanitarian law legitimates war; it essentially receives it as a fact and then 
proceeds to regulate it as a social activity within international law. Human 
rights law in turn legitimates State violence by the standard legal process of 
inclusive/exclusive regulation; for instance, under the definition of torture 
and inhumane treatment, the State is allowed to abandon inmates to the 
formally unsolicited and unsponsored yet known, tolerated, and potentially 
extreme violence of prisons.254 But human rights cannot be used as easily 
for facilitating or favoring war in ideological terms.255 The importance of 
human rights law’s stance towards war, understood against the background 
of a loose contractualist vision of political society, makes sense of the 
otherwise strange fact that two prohibitions targeting duties potentially 
extending to individuals are inserted, within one common provision, among 
  
example of the attitude of humanitarian law to the jus ad bellum appears in the way in which 
the first sentences of the Preamble to the Institute of International Law’s 1880 Oxford 
Manual frame the whole codification exercise: 
 
War holds a great place in history, and it is not to be supposed that 
men will soon give it up – in spite of the protests which it arouses 
and the horror which it inspires – because it appears to be the only 
possible issue of disputes which threaten the existence of States, their 
liberty, their vital interests. But the gradual improvement in customs 
should be reflected in the method of conducting war. It is worthy of 
civilized nations to seek, as has been well said, “to restrain the 
destructive force of war, while recognizing its inexorable 
necessities.” 
   
THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 71, at 36.  See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 
supra note 44, at 37. 
 254. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE–RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 
(2001) (charging State authorities with the legal responsibility for preventable and 
widespread sexual violence perpetrated in penitentiary establishments in the United States). 
 255. This opens up the whole issue of humanitarian intervention and its contemporary 
avatar, the “responsibility to protect” or “R2P.” This is not the place to engage fully with 
those issues.  But one can say at least that R2P, and similar discussions concerning human 
rights and the demise of traditional sovereignty, are based on an alternative reading of human 
rights, in which they are not considered formal and subsumed structurally under international 
law, but are rather approached as substantive and of a moral character.  Human rights are 
thereby used for the purpose of redefining sovereignty in reverse: sovereignty exists so long 
as human rights are protected, as opposed to the vision discussed above, which says that 
human rights exist as long as sovereignty exists.  From the latter perspective, the 
International Court of Justice’s frowning upon the idea that the use of military force could be 
justified by an appeal to human rights is still comprehensible as a political take.  From the 
former perspective it is an unwanted excess of formalist legalism.  See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Judgment 14, 268 (June 27).  For a recent example of the systematically substantivist reading 
of human rights, which results in a substantivist reading of sovereignty, see the 
programmatic Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513 
(2009). Compare then with the project developed by Ruti Teitel, mentioned supra note 7. 
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the list of civil and political rights: the prohibition of war propaganda and 
the prohibition of incitement to discrimination.256 Those two are intimately 
tied by their common association with the legitimation of extra–contractual 
State authority and exercise of authority by virtue of force. 
 
4. Human Indignity in the Convergence of Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights 
From the perspective of the relationship between the two bodies of 
norms, one should then slowly attune to the sense of perversion that comes 
with the infiltration of human rights lingo into the domain of war. That 
infiltration happens here, and quite beside the direct legitimation of physical 
force by the assumed program or grand ideal of human rights,257 through the 
idea that humanitarian law is ultimately concerned with human dignity or, 
more loosely speaking, the idea that human rights and humanitarian are part 
of the same substantive ideal or project. Both implementing the distinction 
between human rights and humanitarian law, on the one hand, and 
neglecting it, on the other hand, have operational ramifications. Given their 
separate original purposes, there is nothing extraordinary in their operating 
side by side. Yet from that statement what follows is that the protection of 
human dignity mandated by human rights can always also inform the 
operation of the laws of war. Of particularly transcending, if not disturbing, 
interest is the fact that the protection of human dignity within the 
jurisdiction of the State may factor into the calculation of proportionality 
when dealing with foreign civilians in international armed conflicts.258 
Human rights would in this case normalize, under the heading of "human 
dignity", the process by which the cost of “force protection” is externalized 
onto the enemy civilian population. In other words, we would see human 
rights provide a legal–ideological justification for tipping the balance of 
  
 256. ICCPR, supra note 216, at art. 20: 
 
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.  
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law. 
 
 257. There exists enthusiasm for translating the substantivist vision of sovereignty 
(see supra note 255)  into a legitimating ground for military action.  E.g., Fernando R. Tesón, 
Ending Tyranny in Iraq, 19.2 ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Summer 2005, at 1, 1-20 (2005); William 
Burke-White & Anne–Marie Slaughter, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1 (2002); or Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Duty to Prevent, 83 
FOREIGN AFF. 136 (2004), among many others. 
 258. Again, one can profitably refer to the arguments developed in Benvenisti, Human 
Dignity, supra note 238. 
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proportionality “in favor” of minimizing military casualties, and therefore, 
if necessary, “against” minimizing civilian casualties and destruction.259 
And the logic should also be extended to the case of civil wars, for the 
relationship between the State, its own agents, and the insurgent side, and 
including the “civilian” population caught in the middle. 
The foregoing does not imply denying across the board that these two 
bodies of law have things in common and have influenced each other in the 
past sixty years. What matters is however that their respective logic remains 
separate as long as one considers that they are indeed distinct bodies of rules 
and have not merged as of yet. Sometimes the implications of the 
operationalization of these two bodies of rules puts them at odds with one 
another, simply because of the distinctive facet of sovereign power that they 
address. As a matter of fact, one could also suggest that human rights and 
humanitarian law share “something” with international refugee law, yet the 
latter will also remain a distinct body of rules for very fundamental reasons 
having to do with the system in which these rules can occur in the first 
place.260 Discursive adventures in the confusion of genres and discourses, 
for whichever purpose one may favor, are perfectly acceptable. Yet 
positions favoring one fashion or another of merger between human rights 
and humanitarian law should be then accompanied by the awareness of the 
political and otherwise normative underpinnings and possible consequences 
of one’s position. 
The foregoing serves in the end to reinforce a view on humanitarian 
law’s relationship to human rights that is otherwise a very classic position, 
at least from the perspective of humanitarian law. The suggestion is that 
they are animated by different principles and that their overlap is more than 
a technical question. Now, to switch perspectives, I turn to the practical 
encounter of human rights with war, in which human rights has to deal with 
the existence of humanitarian law. The encounter in judicial terms confirms 
the centrality of sovereignty in the construction of war, through the meeting 
point of human rights’ own reliance on sovereignty with war as a public 
  
 259. See Thomas W. Smith, Protecting Civilians…or Soldiers? Humanitarian Law 
and the Economy of Risk in Iraq, 9 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 144 (2008) (providing an illustrative 
and interesting discussion on the possibly disruptive place of “force protection” in the logic 
of humanitarian law). 
 260. A good discussion of practical issues raised by the distinct character of refugee 
law from the perspective of human rights can be found in Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, 
Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133 (2002).  A particular 
re-reading of refugee law as informed by human rights is defended by James Hathaway.  See 
James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection, 4 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 113 (1991), and Daniel Warner & James Hathaway, Refugee Law and Human Rights: 
Warner and Hathaway in Debate, 5 J. REFUGEE STUD. 162 (1992).  Although, as noted by 
B.S. Chimni, the same trends of merger and acquisition seem to have been happening to that 
relationship, at least rhetorically, as have been supposedly affecting human rights’ 
relationship to humanitarian law.  See B. S. Chimni, Globalization, Humanitarianism and the 
Erosion of Refugee Protection, 13 J. REFUGEE STUD. 243 (2000). 
2011] Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 365 
 
phenomenon. That encounter brings into technical focus the central 
expression of the difference between them, understood as rooted in their 
separate approach to the regulation of sovereign coercion. The new element 
in sight is the issue of jurisdiction, both in terms of the limits to the State’s 
exercise of legitimate power and in terms of the possible authority that can 
discriminate between application of human rights and application of 
humanitarian law in practical terms. 
II. A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
The courtship of war by human rights has been occurring for some time 
already, despite the young age of human rights law. The dealings of human 
rights institutions, and particularly courts and associated bodies, with 
questions of war and humanitarian law is instructive in exploring what the 
relationship of humanitarian law and human rights means when one 
discusses practically rights, duties, and breaches of obligations. In the 
foregoing discussion I have insisted on the fact that the difference between 
the two bodies of law should be maintained for structural reasons, even if 
one decides that the distinction then in practical terms should be overcome 
in one way or another. In particular, what comes out of the discussion is that 
human rights law does not and should not relate to war in the same way as 
humanitarian law, even though it appears that human rights will relate to 
humanitarian law for the purpose of delimiting the border of war. In the 
pages below I want to examine some of the most important case–law 
dealing with that issue, for two specific reasons.  
The first reason is that the “lex specialis” slogan has been used and 
abused as the ultimate expression of the relationship between them in 
practice. What it means at a deeper structural level, against the picture given 
above, is however unclear, especially if one takes seriously the relationship 
between humanitarian law and human rights as a relationship of opposition 
between distinction and non–discrimination as they relate to the exercise of 
legitimate State violence. The second reason for this exercise is that the 
wielding of legal arguments relating to war, especially in the contrast 
between courts of general jurisdiction like the International Court of Justice 
on the one hand, and specialized courts like the regional human rights 
institutions on the other hand, offers the opportunity of witnessing the 
constraints of legal argument over a quintessentially political discourse such 
as war. In that examination, I seek also to capture the importance of 
intertwining legal systems for the purpose of defining what war is, and 
showing how war is essentially constructed by law, in ways that make 
Rousseau’s vision of war technically visible. Human rights case law 
confirms quite naturally the unconscious attachment to a social contract–
based vision of war, even when it seems to ignore the actual occurrence of 
war or even appears to condone it. 
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A. Lex Specialis in the World: The ICJ’s Position 
At the universal level, the now notorious position adopted by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) is that humanitarian law 
relates to human rights law as the lex specialis to the lex generalis.261 That 
general articulation of the relationship, derived from the general law of 
treaties, has been examined by the United Nations International Law 
Commission as the overall method for a discussion of relations among legal 
regimes under the heading of the “fragmentation of international law.”262 As 
noted in the report prepared by Martti Koskenniemi for the International 
Law Commission, the meaning of lex specialis is not transparent.263 The use 
of the formula suggests two possible views on what it actually means or 
commands:264 either human rights law yields to humanitarian law in toto 
when humanitarian law is applicable ratione materiae; or else the 
specifically relevant norms of human rights law yield to somehow 
corresponding norms of international humanitarian law when the latter is 
materially applicable and to the extent that human rights law and the laws of 
war appear to be in conflict.265 In line with what one would do in applying 
rules concerning the interpretation of conflicting treaties or treaty rules,266 
the ICJ chose the second reading. The Court’s conviction, otherwise shared 
by specialized human rights institutions, is that human rights do not as such 
cease their operation in times of armed conflict. As a result, the “lex” that 
we are considering in juggling with the general and special “leges” is not a 
given body of rules with its own worldview, but rather a specific rule in 
conflict with another rule, detached from its normative context. This 
detachment of rules from their systemic home is what allows for a 
dispassionate technical and apolitical management of legal argument when 
facing war. That is how concealing the ideological implications of each 
regime’s “structural bias” becomes part of technocratic legal argument. 
From a technical perspective, the most important consequences of 
resorting to the lex specialis trope from the perspective of the ICJ, not only 
as a judicial body but more precisely a judicial body of general international 
jurisdiction, are the following. First, the theoretical applicability of human 
rights rules to occupied territories in international armed conflicts is made 
  
 261. Nuclear Weapons Legality, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25. 
 262. See Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 2. 
 263. Id. ¶¶ 56–67. 
 264. The report suggests distinguishing two general uses of the lex specialis, one in 
cases where two rules conflict, and another in which one rule is more specialized than the 
general one but does not contradict it.  See id. ¶ ¶ 56–57, 88–107.  Here I follow a narrower 
notion, against the systemic backdrop presented above, which seeks to highlight the question 
of whether regimes or else rules within regimes are deemed to be in conflict. 
 265. Palestinian Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106. 
 266. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, at art. 53. See also Fragmentation of 
International Law, supra note 2, ¶ ¶ 251–266. 
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unremarkable.267 And, second, human rights rules (as generalized from the 
specific example of the right to life) are only applicable to the extent that 
they conform to the rights and duties provided by the lex specialis, i.e. 
humanitarian law (in this case combatant immunity from prosecution for 
lawful killing, and the corollary of acceptable intentional killing by the 
State).268 The application of human rights law to situations of occupation 
has been found also by others to be based on the notion that occupation is a 
functional equivalent of sovereignty, amounting to de facto jurisdiction.269 
That idea, accepted by the ICJ, triggers thus the operation of human rights 
standards in times and concrete situations of war, i.e. in times where 
humanitarian law is applicable materially.270 The application of human 
rights standards in situations of occupation should however logically, from 
that standpoint at least, not conflict with rules of humanitarian law.271   
Based on the more systemic account given above of the political 
dynamic at work in both human rights law and humanitarian law, the notion 
that the point of contact between the two regimes is the space of occupation 
is not surprising. The operation of human rights targets the government of 
people, while humanitarian law governs in this case occupation (as a result 
of armed conflict), which is a temporary, yet total, replacement of the 
sovereign’s authority over people and territory.272 The International Court of 
Justice adopted this view and confirmed that human rights law is applicable 
  
 267. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
116/10455.pdf (providing a relevant example of the unremarkable manner in which the I.C.J 
treats the applicability of human rights rules in occupied territories). 
 268. Nuclear Weapons Legality, 1996 I.C.J. at 240. 
 269. An interesting discussion, and ultimately skeptical account, of the application of 
human rights standards to situations of occupation from the domestic perspective is offered 
by the House of Lords in Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26.  A 
critique of the decision, relating to the fear of the consequences of exporting human rights 
into non de jure jurisdictional zones, is provided by Ralph Wilde, Complementing 
Occupation Law? Selective Judicial Treatment of the Suitability of Human Rights Norms, 42 
ISR. L. REV. 80 (2009). 
 270. Palestinian Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 109.  See also Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 
15318/89, Merits, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (1996), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/. 
 271. It should be repeated, even though it is not really crucial in this particular 
context, that the scope of application of humanitarian law is not limited to situations of 
armed conflict, but extends also to peacetime issues (such as the dissemination the 
Conventions, or the regulation of the uses of the Emblem), which are however directly 
related to the fact that humanitarian law needs to be actually applicable in times of armed 
conflict. This means that humanitarian law is formally applicable in times of “peace,” i.e. 
beyond the duration of the hostilities stricto sensu.  See, e.g., Tadić, Decision on Defence 
Motion, Case No. IT–94–1, ¶ 67.  As far as the Geneva Conventions are concerned, critical 
examples are of course provisions relating to prisoners of war after the end of hostilities (e.g., 
GCIII, supra note 24, at art. 5, 119) and implementation or enforcement of treaties (e.g., 
GCIV, supra note 24, art. 146). 
 272. HCIV, supra note 120, arts. 42, 43. 
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to “acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its 
territory,” as exemplified by situations of occupation.273 More specifically, 
Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 define who the 
Occupying Power and what occupation essentially is in terms of a 
temporary but complete substitution of controlling authorities over a 
territory, which carries the obligation of enforcing law and order on the 
occupied territory in the absence of the sovereign. For the Court, this 
“obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to 
protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and 
not to tolerate such violence by any third party.”274   
The expression “exercise of its jurisdiction,” used by the Court as a 
general description of the State’s exercise of power, is ambiguous when 
taken outside of context, given that it thus flattens the difference between 
jurisdiction based on sovereignty, on the one hand, and temporary exercise 
of power based on other reasons, be it a legally expressed international 
agreement or extra–legal unilateral deployment of State power. On a formal 
level, humanitarian law and human rights law have in common, from the 
ICJ’s perspective, the fact of being bodies of international legal rules 
necessarily based in one way or another on sovereignty. But in a more 
substantive way, one should remember that the mode or facet of sovereignty 
regulated by each body of norms is distinct, which explains the generally 
different shape of their respective norms, but also the resulting different 
shape of the monitoring or enforcement mechanisms, and the fact that these 
mechanisms do not generally coincide.275 The ICJ, however, has 
hypothetically general jurisdiction over international law and all of its 
discreet parts, on the basis of them being all primary rules of international 
law subjected to the same secondary rules (such as the sources of law, that 
determine whether the rules are hand are really "law", or the rules of 
international responsibility, which determine what happens if rules of 
international law are breached.) In the case of the two advisory opinions in 
which the lex specialis policy is suggested, the ICJ exercises interpretive 
jurisdiction over all of international law, by virtue of its material jurisdiction 
not being bound at all by the consent of States.276 But the perspective of 
  
 273. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 204, ¶ 70 (Dec. 19). 
 274. Id. ¶ 178. 
 275. The lack of complete overlap, despite contextual coincidence, is the reason why 
“human rights” as a special regime, or "self-contained regime", is a recurring example in the 
report of the International Law Commission’s Working Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law.  See generally Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 2.  See 
also, Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.  553 (2002). 
 276. Palestinian Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 46 (rejecting in particular the notion that the 
Court should not exercise jurisdiction in the case at hand for the reason that the underlying 
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institutions designed for the implementation of one of those bodies of law is 
not the same, given that in the case of those institutions there is a 
jurisdictional limit to the possibility of such an encounter between different 
types of rules, while that limit does not exist a priori for a court of general 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the perspective on the encounter will be shaped by 
the substantive mission of the institution. The era of fragmentation has been 
exemplified most notoriously by the visibility of a bitter dialogue between 
the ICTY and the ICJ around the proper interpretation of international law 
across sub–disciplinary borders, in relation to issues of responsibility in 
cases of violations of humanitarian law.277 Of importance is that the ICJ here 
asserts its unique access to general international law, while insisting on the 
specialized perspective of international criminal law, i.e. the limited 
functional perception of international law by a specialized organ like the 
ICTY.278 What comes out of the exchange for the purpose of the relationship 
  
contentious case is beyond the consent-based jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice). 
 277. As is generally known by now, the inter-institutional dialogue had to do with the 
proper “control” test to be used in assessing whether an individual can be legally considered 
to be a de facto agent of a State.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua,  (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at Judgment 14, 115 (June 27).  The exchange starts 
with the classic formulation of the “effective control” test in the context of the relationship 
between the United States and counter-revolutionary guerrillas in Central America.  Id.  Then 
comes the rejection of the “effective control” test by the ICTY in deciding who was an agent 
of the State in context of the wars in former–Yugoslavia, in Prosecutor v.  Tadić, Case No. 
IT–94–1–A, Judgment, ¶ 112 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).  
And the last step comes in the shape of the ICJ’s reassertion of its Nicaragua test, and 
rebuking of the ICTY for its inept incursions into the world of general international law, in 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Merits, Judgment 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 402 (Feb. 26). 
 278. Id. ¶ 403:  
 
The Court has given careful consideration to the Appeals Chamber’s 
reasoning in support of the foregoing conclusion, but finds itself 
unable to subscribe to the Chamber’s view. First, the Court observes 
that the ICTY was not called upon in the Tadić case, nor is it in 
general called upon, to rule on questions of State responsibility, since 
its jurisdiction is criminal and extends over persons only. Thus, in 
that Judgment the Tribunal addressed an issue which was not 
indispensable for the exercise of its jurisdiction. As stated above, the 
Court attaches the utmost importance to the factual and legal findings 
made by the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused 
before it and, in the present case, the Court takes fullest account of 
the ICTY’s trial and appellate judgments dealing with the events 
underlying the dispute. The situation is not the same for positions 
adopted by the ICTY on issues of general international law which do 
not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover, 
the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the 
criminal cases before it. 
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between human rights law and humanitarian law, considered in our present 
context to be respectively the lex generalis and the lex specialis, are the 
following. The institutional organs of the lex generalis, in our case human 
rights law, have a perspective that is based on the lex generalis itself, which 
does not solve its own relationship to the lex specialis. Those organs, from 
the perspective of international law, are specialized organs in the sense of 
being jurisdictionally limited to one area of substantive international law. 
Their relationship to even general international law (like the law of treaties 
and the law of State responsibility) will be mediated by that limitation—as 
the ICTY–ICJ dialogue demonstrates in practice.  
More generally, war–situations have given rise, because of the available 
institutional fragmentation in international law, to multi–jurisdictional 
litigation processes.279 In each fragment of the litigation process the “war” 
in question is by necessity re–described according to the particular dynamic 
of the law being applied, and according to the institutional setting in which 
it was applied. Unsurprisingly, even from the intra–disciplinary perspective 
of law, there is potentially a variety of legal perspectives on war. Those 
need not be compatible, since after all, from the perspective of the lex 
specialis of humanitarian law question itself, human rights is necessarily 
another lex specialis. Against the background presented above, which gives 
meaning to the notion that human rights and humanitarian law are separate 
fragments of the same whole, now we can envisage the encounter of human 
rights with humanitarian law on the basis of what human rights and 
humanitarian law have in common, but also what they do not have in 
common. 
The three regional human rights systems have had different encounters 
with war, and as part of those encounters have had the opportunity of saying 
a few things about the relationship between human rights and humanitarian 
law in institutional and substantive terms. A close examination of those 
encounters will say three things. First, there is a jurisdictional difference 
between the two bodies of law, which expresses in formal terms the fact that 
they are interested in different aspects of sovereignty, where sovereignty is 
  
 279. The NATO operation in Belgrade in March of 1999 gave rise to a few 
international legal proceedings. Before the International Court of Justice it took the shape of 
the FRY suing member States of NATO, yielding the ICJ decision on Legality of Use of 
Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Fr.), (Serb. & 
Mont. v. F.R.G.), (Serb. & Mont. v. Italy), (Serb. & Mont. v. Neth.), (Serb. & Mont. v. 
Port.), and (Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 2004/3 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 15).  
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the Kosovo campaign took the shape of the 
case of Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. And before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former-Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing gave rise to a review process 
on the possibility for the ICTY Prosecution to start proceedings against State members of 
NATO.  See FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW 
THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2000), 
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1257–83 (2000).  
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legally speaking exclusive (territorial) jurisdiction.280 From the jurisdictional 
perspective of human rights, humanitarian law as such is never met, because 
human rights law never meets “war,” be it civil or international, as a 
relevantly distinct state of affairs. Second, human rights’ ignorance of war is 
an assertion of material (subject matter) jurisdiction and, following what 
was said above about human rights law in general, is a political gesture. As 
a political gesture, the reaching out of human rights jurisdiction into a 
domain that is otherwise considered sufficiently special to have its lex 
specialis, needs to be debated but should not be seen as a set of simply 
“technical” questions. In other words, the political meaning of fragmenting 
sovereignty into different areas of regulation must be recovered, behind the 
seemingly formal notion of jurisdiction. Third, case law across the three 
regional human rights systems is not homogeneous. Yet the only system 
that has taken heed of the political foundations of human rights is the 
African Human Rights system. As will be shown below, the African 
Commission’s facing up to the intimate abhorrence of human rights for war 
is an antidote in particular to the European Court’s own take so far, which 
displays a lack of explicit awareness in relation to the political nature of 
jurisdiction, and a resulting incoherent attitude towards jurisdiction itself. 
We begin, however, with the Inter–American system’s very clear exposition 
of the question of jurisdiction as a background. 
B. Lex Generalis and War in the Americas: Ambivalence  
1.  The Court: Jurisdictional Orthodoxy 
The Inter–American Court stated its position in fairly clear terms in the 
case of Las Palmeras, while lecturing the Inter–American Commission on 
how to deal with the legal analysis of war–time claims:  
  
 280. Sovereignty is legally speaking exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. According to 
the celebrated formulas used by Judge Max Huber, “Sovereignty in the relations between 
States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” Island of 
Palmas Arbitration (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).The 
translation of the political notion of sovereignty into the legal image of absolute and 
exclusive competence is especially well expressed from a non-legal, sociological perspective 
concerned with the effects of conflict on the State entity if one considers it seriously as a 
jurisdictional space.  See Jieli Li, State Fragmentation: Toward a Theoretical Understanding 
of the Territorial Power of the State, 20 SOC. THEORY 139, 141 (2002).  If sovereignty 
concerns the way in which exclusive jurisdiction is exercised over respective territories of an 
empire or a nation-state, then the power of a sovereign state is more than the authority of 
bureaucratic administration; it hinges on territorial integrity.  By viewing the state in terms of 
territorial integrity, attention is drawn to the extreme uncertainties of territorial boundaries in 
constant interstate conflict.  One considers then not only how the incumbent government 
could survive politically, but more importantly, how statehood being viewed as the quality of  
both a physical and a legal entity could be preserved. 
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   The Court is . . . competent to determine whether any norm of domestic 
or international law applied by a State, in times of peace or armed conflict, 
is compatible or not with the American Convention. In this activity, the 
Court has no normative limitation: any legal norm may be submitted to 
this examination of compatibility. In order to carry out this examination, 
the Court interprets the norm in question and analyzes it in the light of the 
provisions of the Convention. The result of this operation will always be 
an opinion in which the Court will say whether or not that norm or that 
fact is compatible with the American Convention. The latter has only 
given the Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of 
the States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.281 
The Inter–American Court, while making clear that it does not have 
jurisdiction over humanitarian law claims in the sense of not having formal 
jurisdiction over humanitarian law treaties such as the Geneva Conventions 
(and implying that neither does the Commission possess such jurisdiction), 
concurs with the Commission in considering that humanitarian law is 
however relevant to the interpretation of human rights standards. Whether 
that is done along the lines of the interpretive rule of lex specialis is unclear. 
The position is simply that the Court considers international humanitarian 
law as factual data, which as any other relevant fact may be useful in 
interpreting the applicable law.282  
What the Court means as the final position on the matter within the 
Inter–American system becomes clearer in its broader jurisprudential 
context. The Court’s moderately stern jurisprudential position is, first of all, 
set against the more adventurous stance of the Commission. In a more 
teleological perspective, the Commission suggested that the Geneva 
Conventions and the American Convention “share a common nucleus of 
non–derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting human life and 
  
 281. Las Palmeras Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 
33 (Feb. 4, 2000). 
 282. Along the same lines, in considering in a different context how to apply the right 
to freedom of movement to the situation of displaced communities, the Court noted: 
 
Of particular relevance to the present case, the UN Secretary 
General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons 
issued Guiding Principles in 1998, which are based upon existing 
international humanitarian law and human rights standards. The 
Court considers that many of these guidelines illuminate the reach 
and content of Article 22 of the Convention in the context of forced 
displacement. 
 
Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 
2006) 
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dignity.”283 The Commission reiterated its understanding of a normative 
convergence between the two regimes in the context of the Guantánamo 
detention facilities, and more particularly the legal situation of their 
inmates, concerning whom the Inter–American Commission issued 
precautionary measures initially in 2002.284 The United States government, 
following a strict separationist position which had been deployed also 
against other human rights bodies who had attempted to deal with the 
Guantánamo issue,285 suggested that the question was one of humanitarian 
law, and therefore beyond the jurisdictional reach of the Commission.286 In 
the course of multiple reiterations of its mandated interim measures, the 
Commission decided to propose its own understanding of the general 
relation that the two bodies entertain with one another, as an alternative to 
both the United States’ position and also what we have seen to be the final 
position of the Court. Given the specificity of the position, it is worth 
quoting at length: 
[T]he Commission has drawn upon certain basic principles that inform the 
interrelationship between international human rights and humanitarian 
law. It is well–recognized that international human rights law applies at all 
times, in peacetime and in situations of armed conflict. In contrast, 
international humanitarian law generally does not apply in peacetime and 
its principal purpose is to place restraints on the conduct of warfare in 
order to limit or contain the damaging effects of hostilities and to protect 
the victims of armed conflict, including civilians and combatants who have 
laid down their arms or have been placed hors de combat. Further, in 
situations of armed conflict, the protections under international human 
rights and humanitarian law may complement and reinforce one another, 
sharing as they do a common nucleus of non–derogable rights and a 
common purpose of promoting human life and dignity. In certain 
circumstances, however, the test for evaluating the observance of a 
particular right, such as the right to liberty, in a situation of armed conflict 
may be distinct from that applicable in time of peace. In such situations, 
international law, including the jurisprudence of this Commission, dictates 
  
 283. Juan Carlos Abella, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 158 (emphasis added).  See 
also Coard,  supra note 61, at ¶ 39.   
 284. Inter-American Comm’n H.R., Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request for 
Precautionary Measures, (March 12, 2002) [hereinafter Request for Precautionary Measures], 
excerpted in 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002). 
 285. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 36th Sess., 703d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/SR.703, (May, 12 2006) (stating that in the presentation of its second periodic report 
on the implementation of the convention against torture, the government of the United States, 
before engaging in a detailed discussion of the question of individuals captured in the course 
of the “War on Terror,” mentioned that the issue was governed by the “laws of war” and 
therefore beyond the scope of the Convention and beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee).  
 286. Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures – 
Detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1015 (2002). 
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that it may be necessary to deduce the applicable standard by reference to 
international humanitarian law as the applicable lex specialis.287  
This argumentative line, which the Commission incidentally justifies as 
supported by “the jurisprudence of the Commission,” is more expansive 
than that of the Court. The latter motivated its own conclusion on the 
jurisdictional notion that, as an organ established by the American 
Convention, it does not have the power to interpret norms of humanitarian 
law qua norms (and neither does the Commission, as far as the Court can 
tell). The discrepancy between the two—which is understandable given that 
the Inter–American Commission is not a judicial body and seemingly 
enjoys a greater leeway for the purpose of its promotional and advocacy 
functions288—is highlighted by the pre–Palmeras cases that the Commission 
refers to under the heading of “the jurisprudence of the Commission.”  
2.  The Commission: Creative Heterodoxy 
Of particular interest in this context is the Abella case. In it, the 
Commission follows a decidedly purposive and teleological interpretation 
of the legal bases for its power to use humanitarian law alongside human 
rights law, and unpacks in detail what appears only superficially in the 
Guantánamo orders on provisional measures. Of importance here are the 
clarifications that it brings on the issue of sovereignty and State jurisdiction, 
given the jurisdictional stance taken by the Court in Las Palmeras. The 
central passage in which the Commission discusses the issue of applying 
humanitarian law says the following: 
    Though it is true that every legal instrument specifies its own field of 
application, it cannot be denied that the general rules contained in 
international instruments relating to human rights apply to non–
international armed conflicts as well as the more specific rules of 
humanitarian law. For example, both Common Article 3 and Article 4 of 
the American Convention protect the right to life and, thus, prohibit, inter 
alia, summary executions in all circumstances. Claims alleging arbitrary 
deprivations of the right to life attributable to State agents are clearly 
within the Commission’s jurisdiction. But the Commission’s ability to 
resolve claimed violations of this non–derogable right arising out of an 
  
 287. Request for Precautionary Measures, Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, supra note 284, at 532–33.  See also Inter-American Comm’n H.R., Pertinent Parts of 
July 23, 2002 Reiteration of Precautionary Measures Regarding Detainees in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba, reprinted in 45 I.L.M. 667 (2006). 
 288. See generally Control de legalidad en el ejercicio de las atribuciones de la 
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (arts. 41 y 44 a 51 de la Convención 
Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), Opinión consultiva, OC-19/05, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 19 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones.cfm?idOpinion=25.  
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armed conflict may not be possible in many cases by reference to Article 4 
of the American Convention alone. This is because the American 
Convention contains no rules that either define or distinguish civilians 
from combatants and other military targets, much less, specify when a 
civilian can be lawfully attacked or when civilian casualties are a lawful 
consequence of military operations. Therefore, the Commission must 
necessarily look to and apply definitional standards and relevant rules of 
humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance in its resolution of 
this and other kinds of claims alleging violations of the American 
Convention in combat situations. To do otherwise would mean that the 
Commission would have to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in many 
cases involving indiscriminate attacks by State agents resulting in a 
considerable number of civilian casualties. Such a result would be 
manifestly absurd in light of the underlying object and purposes of both 
the American Convention and humanitarian law treaties.289 
To supplement this, the Commission displays, as always, great legal 
ingenuity. By virtue, it says, of obligations under the Geneva Conventions, 
and particularly common Articles 1 and 3, States have a duty to respect (and 
ensure respect of) those instruments and otherwise implement them as part 
of their domestic law. Once this is done, Article 25 of the American 
Convention, which provides that an individual under the State’s jurisdiction 
has a right “to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that 
violate his [sic] fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of 
the state concerned or by this Convention,” provides a basis for the 
Commission to assess how humanitarian law is violated via the violation of 
domestic law.290 And the Commission does not stop at one creative step, but 
proceeds further. 
The Commission turns first to Article 29 (b) of the American 
Convention,291 which prohibits, as other human rights treaties do,292 
(mis)using the legal instrument for the purpose of “restricting the enjoyment 
or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any 
State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said 
  
 289. Juan Carlos Abella, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ ¶ 160–161. 
 290. Id. ¶ ¶ 161–162 (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. ¶ 164. 
 292. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 216, at art. 22(3) (relating the issue of abuse of rights to 
the exercise of freedom of association, and specifying that nothing in the Convention should 
be used to diminish responsibilities of State Parties under ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, opened for signature  
July 9, 1948,  68 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force July 4, 1950))).  More generally, Article 
23(b) of CEDAW declares that nothing in the text of the treaty should be interpreted as 
affecting other international legal obligations that are more conducive to the advancement of 
the elimination of gender discrimination.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, supra note 204, at art. 23(b).  
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states is a party.”293 The result of that provision, as far as humanitarian law 
is concerned, would then be that:  
where there are differences between legal standards governing the same or 
comparable rights in the American Convention and a humanitarian law 
instrument, the Commission is duty bound to give legal effort to the 
provision(s) of that treaty with the higher standard(s) applicable to the 
right(s) or freedom(s) in question. If that higher standard is a rule of 
humanitarian law, the Commission should apply it.294 
Then the Commission turns to Article 27 of the Convention, relating to 
derogations, and particularly the limitation clause, which states that 
suspension of rights by a State should not be “inconsistent with that State’s 
other obligations under international law.” The Commission interprets that 
provision quite candidly in the following terms: 
[W]hile it cannot be interpreted as incorporating by reference into the 
American Convention all of a State’s other international legal obligations, 
Article 27(1) does prevent a State from adopting derogation measures that 
would violate its other obligations under conventional or customary 
international law.295 
The key moment in this argument highlights also the core of the 
argument in the Guantánamo context. It consists here in drawing the 
ambiguous connection between the two parts of that last sentence: the 
Convention under the Commission’s jurisdiction does not include 
humanitarian law, even if it is relevant, yet at the same time it should not be 
interpreted, per its express provisions, as affecting it if it is relevant. To 
operationalize that proposition, the Commission refers to Judge and 
Professor Thomas Buergenthal’s commentary on the state of emergency in 
ICCPR, a text that is all the more contextually relevant since Buergenthal 
was once President of the Inter–American Court, later a member a the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (in charge of monitoring the 
ICCPR), and still later a judge on the ICJ. Under Article 4 of ICCPR (the 
equivalent of the cited Article 27(1) of the American text), says the 
Commentary, a suspension of rights that violates other obligations of the 
State would constitute a violation both of those obligations and of the 
Covenant.296 The Commission endorses this statement, based on the parallel 
wording adopted by ICCPR and the American Convention:  
  
 293. American Convention on Human Rights art. 29b, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (emphasis added). 
 294. Juan Carlos Abella, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 165. 
 295. Id. ¶ 168. 
 296. Id. ¶ 169 (referring to Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State 
Obligations and Permissible Derogation, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 82 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)). 
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[W]hen reviewing the legality of derogation measures taken by a State 
Party to the American Convention by virtue of the existence of an armed 
conflict to which both the American Convention and humanitarian law 
treaties apply, the Commission should not resolve this question solely by 
reference to the text of Article 27 of the American Convention. Rather, it 
must also determine whether the rights affected by these measures are 
similarly guaranteed under applicable humanitarian law treaties. If it finds 
that the rights in question are not subject to suspension under these 
humanitarian law instruments, the Commission should conclude that these 
derogation measures are in violation of the State Parties obligations under 
both the American Convention and the humanitarian law treaties 
concerned.297 
From that vantage point, if we look back at the (later) exchange between 
the United States government and the Inter–American Commission 
regarding the Guantánamo situation, the debate boils down to two 
preliminary legal issues. The first is that in times of war, the lex specialis 
comes into play, and the institution in charge of implementing the lex 
generalis needs to make that practically relevant. That is a substantive issue, 
a question of what norms apply to what situation, which is what the ICJ 
presented as solved precisely by the lex specialis principle. The second 
point is, however, that the Commission is a human rights body: it is both 
created by a human rights treaty and has a delimited jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, constituted by the text of its founding treaty, and the precise 
competence and functions that States have attributed to the Commission 
directly. That is not faced at all by the ICJ, because its position is dictated 
first by its position as a court of theoretically general jurisdiction, and 
second by the immediate context of an advisory opinion, where it has for all 
intents and purposes general jurisdiction (i.e. it is not limited by the consent 
of States expressed in jurisdictional limitations, and can “apply,” or at least 
interpret, any international legal norm that might seem relevant). 
In Abella, the ingenious argumentative line developed by the 
Commission is really two–dimensional, as the Commission implicitly tries 
to deal with those two preliminary issues at the same time. The first line is 
based on teleological interpretations of humanitarian law treaties and the 
American Convention.298 The second line is the one that connects 
humanitarian law to the American Convention, through references by the 
Convention to the rest of international law. The problem is that these 
arguments do not, quite paradoxically, answer the jurisdictional question, 
which generated a fundamental problem for the practical implementation of 
the lex specialis idea, given that lex specialis is a principle of interest for 
treaty interpretation by a judge or equivalent institution. The first line 
  
 297. Id. ¶ 170. 
 298. The Commission follows the same type of interpretive line in Coard, supra note 
61, at ¶ 39. 
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establishes a substantive relationship between human rights and 
humanitarian law, with which one can agree or disagree. On the basis of 
what was said above, and with the considerable amount of respect due to the 
Commission, I would personally disagree with it, most of all on the basis of 
its political implications. In any event, the second argumentative line 
adopted by the Commission boils down to saying that humanitarian law 
may bind the State as part of the body of international rules outside of the 
Convention, and to which the Convention refers in Articles 27 and 29. That 
a violation of international law in the terms posited by Thomas Buergenthal 
would actually also constitute a violation of the Convention is plausibly as 
undeniable as the Commission makes it sound. Yet this does not mean that 
the Commission has jurisdiction to decide that such violation has occurred. 
Prima facie, in very positivistic terms, a striking issue of discrepancy 
between procedure and substance appears, as had appeared significantly 
several times before the ICJ. That there is a violation of international law 
does not mean that we can say that there is a violation of international law; 
that is the result of consensual jurisdiction as the basis for all institutional 
activity in the inter–State system.299 Here the notion is that it may well be a 
violation of humanitarian law, or for that matter it may well be a violation 
of anything else in international or domestic law. But the Commission may 
not be entitled to say that it is. The first argumentative line is there 
seemingly to by-pass the substance/procedure divide, by proposing that in 
the end human rights (which are within the Commission’s jurisdiction) and 
humanitarian law (which is not) have the same objective, so that 
presumably we can treat them in the same way from the perspective of the 
Commission’s institutional mission. The Court did not buy that confusion of 
genres. 
The Palmeras case quoted at the beginning of this discussion would 
seem therefore to align the Inter–American approach on the general 
jurisprudential view of the ICJ, within which we could assume that the lex 
specialis statement would not lead to a derogation of the 
substance/procedure or merits/jurisdiction distinction. In other words, as the 
Court mentioned it, the Inter–American human rights organs are not legally 
justified in interpreting humanitarian law qua law in the same way as they 
do interpret the American Convention. That does not contradict the notion 
that humanitarian law is a lex specialis to the lex generalis of human rights. 
The technical issue of jurisdiction, however, which was obscured by the 
ICJ’s ethereal position, draws attention to sovereignty and sovereign 
consent. Disregarding the issue of material jurisdiction means disregarding 
the importance of the sovereign border for a differentiation between war and 
any kind of violence, including crime or State brutality. Blurring the 
process/substance in the implementation of international law is 
  
 299. For a classic example, see East Timor Case, 1995 I.C.J. 90.  See also Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), Jurisdiction, 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4). 
2011] Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 379 
 
unsurprisingly connected to a weakening of the position of formal 
sovereignty as a spatial and political reference. Supporting justification for 
the leap is here found in normative proximity (created for instance by the 
fact that implementation of a convention can be imagined to result in a 
weakening of other relevant provisions), which seems to be a formal 
relationship, but rests rather on the fundamental assumptions that bodies of 
rules can conflict because they talk about the same thing, but should 
however not conflict, because they have the same objective.  
3. Clarifying Lex Specialis: The Guantánamo Exchange 
If one tries to recapitulate, two important points are raised in the 
exchange between the United States government and the Inter–American 
Commission in the context of the Guantánamo situation. The first point is 
that everyone and their neighbor now relies on the ICJ’s “lex specialis” 
dictum, from the Commission to the Court to the (defendant) State(s). Yet 
each one of them seems to have their own understanding of what the 
meaning of “lex specialis” is and what the principle really mandates in 
terms of the enforcement of special, or would–be self–contained, 
international legal regimes. The divergence of views was rehearsed at each 
juncture where a human rights body would meet “war” in the form of the 
Guantánamo Bay detention facilities. It occurred most visibly first in the 
United States’ exchange with the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture,300 and then in even sharper contrast in its dialogue with the Human 
  
 300. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention Against Torture: United States of America ¶ 14, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006), where the Committee refers to the United States’ lex 
specialis argument in these terms: 
 
The Committee regrets the State party’s opinion that the Convention 
is not applicable in times and in the context of armed conflict, on the 
basis of the argument that the “law of armed conflict” is the 
exclusive lex specialis applicable, and that the Convention’s 
application “would result in an overlap of the different treaties which 
would undermine the objective of eradicating torture. 
The summary record manifests then the plasticity of the lex specialis method in the best 
possible fashion when it concludes that:  
 
[t]he discussions with the United States delegation on the question of 
lex specialis had been noteworthy. While he recognized that that 
principle might be used in determining the primacy of one 
convention over another, public opinion expected the application of 
rules which provided greater protection to defenceless individuals, 
who should enjoy the presumption of innocence. 
   
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. CAT, 36th Sess., 703 mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/SR.703 (May 12, 2006). 
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Rights Committee.301 In those exchanges, as in the dialogue with the Inter–
American Commission, nobody contradicts the ICJ, including the United 
States Government. To the above mentioned statement by the Inter–
American Commission on the fact that human rights keep applying to the 
Guantánamo captives (whether there is a war or there is none), the 
government of the United States responds (and this is quite significant given 
the United States Government’s supposedly tense relationship with the ICJ 
in general since the Nicaragua days) that the Commission has failed to 
follow the “methodology” developed by the ICJ for dealing with the 
relationship between the two bodies of law.302 That failure is, incidentally, 
only an addition to the primary fact that the Commission had manifestly 
acted beyond its jurisdiction.303 In other words, the United States’ second 
line of legal defenses consists in telling the Commission exactly what the 
Human Rights Committee later told the United States Government: it is 
indeed a question of lex specialis, but you don’t understand what applying 
the lex specialis method means. 
A second point that is highlighted in the exchange between the United 
States and the Commission is that, beyond the fact that there is 
disagreement on the actual contents of the lex specialis interpretive maxim, 
there is visibly a split between substance and procedure within the question 
of the lex specialis. As a matter of fact, the first line of lawyerly defense 
  
 301. The position of the United States on the lex specialis issue was expressed in the 
following simple terms: 
 
The United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaida, the 
Taliban, and their supporters. As part of this conflict, the United 
States captures and detains enemy combatants, and is entitled under 
the law of war to hold them until the end of hostilities. The law of 
war, and not the Covenant, is the applicable legal framework 
governing these detentions. 
  
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ONE-YEAR FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO THE [HUMAN 
RIGHTS] COMMITTEE’S CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2007), available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100845.pdf.  The position of the Human 
Rights Committee was that the United States did not understand the ICJ’s decision and 
should therefore revise its position on the relationship between the Covenant and the laws of 
war.  Based on its concern about “the restrictive interpretation made by the State party of its 
obligations under the Covenant, as a result in particular of . . . its position that the Covenant 
does not apply . . . in time of war, despite the contrary opinions and established jurisprudence 
of the Committee and the International Court of Justice[,]” it recommended therefore that the 
United States “should in particular . . . acknowledge the applicability of the Covenant … in 
time of war.”  Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: United States of America, 87th sess., July 10–28, 2006, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (emphasis added). 
 302. Response of the U.S. to Request for Precautionary Measures, supra note 286, at 
1019. 
 303. Id. at 1020. 
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was to say that, even if there is a way in which human rights is a lex 
generalis to the lex specialis of the laws of war (and regardless why it 
would be so), the issue of jurisdiction is not solved by that interpretive 
maxim. Simply stated, no human rights body has jurisdiction over the lex 
specialis just because they have jurisdiction over the supposed lex generalis. 
After all, one could say that international refugee law is also a lex specialis 
to human rights law, but in this case too there is a host of issues, both 
institutional and substantive, that are raised by the peculiar relationship 
between the two bodies of law, and that are not clarified in any way by the 
mere mention of  the lex generalis/lex specialis principle.304 The ICJ, who 
started the whole lex specialis mania out of an otherwise innocuous maxim 
on the interpretation and application of contrary treaty norms, is a court of 
(theoretically) general jurisdiction, which is exactly what human rights 
bodies are not.305 And so, when the United States Government says that the 
  
 304. Although it would be going too much into the details of the question by pursuing 
the example here, it is worth noting that technically speaking, the relationship between 
human rights on the one hand, and refugee law and humanitarian law on the other hand, has 
been rendered more legally visible by the Convention on Rights of the Child, supra note 41, 
art. 38, ¶ 2 (referring to humanitarian law and “child refugees” in ¶ 38 and to “other 
international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties” 
in ¶ 22), but not the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); see Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
41.  See also Warner & Hathaway, supra note 260 (discussing the technical relations 
between human rights law and refugee law). 
 305. Against this broad statement, one would have to mention a particularly 
interesting case, which would certainly deserve a more detailed treatment.  The example is 
that of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, as well as its now unclearly defunct 
predecessor, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.  Before the creation of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the extent of the jurisdiction of its now unclearly 
defunct predecessor, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, was delineated as 
follows: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other 
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.”  This made the African 
Court the only human rights judicial institution to be able to enforce ICCPR or the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, or the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.  See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 3, opened for 
signature June 10, 1998, OAU DOC. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III), reprinted in  
COMPENDIUM OF KEY HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN UNION 33 (Christoph 
Heyns & Magnus Killander eds., 2007).  The statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights was the result of the merger of the just mentioned African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the African (Union’s) Court of Justice, the latter having been 
created by the Art. 5 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (see Id. at 6) and an AU 
Assembly’s subsequent implementing Decision (Decision on the Draft Protocol of the Court 
of Justice of the African Union, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 25 (II), (July 11 2003.)).  See 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, July 1, 2008, 
http://www.africanunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Me
rged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf.  The new Court’s jurisdiction is set by Article 29 of the 
Statute in narrower, yet still incomparably broader terms, at least with regard to the Court’s 
sister regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas.  These specific jurisdictional 
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relationship between humanitarian law and human rights within the Inter–
American system is settled by the Palmeras case (a precedent that is then 
precisely not followed by the Inter–American Commission),306 what it 
points to is the fact that, whatever way one may choose to look at the lex 
specialis issue, a human rights body cannot enforce the Geneva 
Conventions or even customary humanitarian law qua law, for lack of 
material jurisdiction. Whether facts of war comes up on the radar screen of 
human rights is another question, which has been for now implicitly 
answered in the affirmative, but which will need more examination below. 
As a result, the notion that humanitarian law may have merged with human 
rights in any more substantive fashion remains relegated, as far as the Inter–
American lex lata is concerned, to the domain of individual opinions.307 But 
otherwise, the discussion has shown that the general notion of humanitarian 
law as a lex specialis to the lex generalis of human rights is not immediately 
obvious from the perspective of bodies in charge of enforcing or monitoring 
  
limits ratione materiae, resulting partly from the complicatedly dual nature of that judicial 
institution (half general and half specialized), are obviously offset by the restricted 
limitations ratione personae and ratione loci known also to the other two regional systems. 
The wording of Article 29 is the following: 
 
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all cases and all legal disputes 
submitted to it in accordance with the present Statute which relate to: 
a) the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act; 
b) the interpretation, application or validity of other Union Treaties 
and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the framework of 
the Union or the Organization of African Unity; 
c) the interpretation and the application of the African Charter, the 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, or any other legal instrument relating to human 
rights, ratified by the States Parties concerned; 
d) any question of international law; 
e) all acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the 
Union; 
f) all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that 
States Parties may conclude among themselves, or with the Union 
and which confer jurisdiction on the Court; 
g) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a 
breach of an obligation owed to a State Party or to the Union; 
h) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of 
an international obligation. 
 
Id. at art. 29.   
 306. Response of the U.S. to Request for Precautionary Measures, supra note 286, at 
1019.  
 307. Moiwana Village, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at  ¶ 21 (Cançado, J., 
separate opinion).   
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human rights norms, i.e., the lex generalis to the lex specialis of 
humanitarian law, but still a lex specialis to the lex generalis of international 
law. Managing the concurrent material scope of application of humanitarian 
and human rights law does not solve the problem. Sovereign jurisdiction 
does. The politics of the jurisdictional issue comes forward in clearer form 
in the European jurisdictional context. 
C. Lex Generalis and War in Europe: Repression 
In the handful of cases within the corpus of European human rights 
jurisprudence in which humanitarian law or war were either mentioned or 
implied, the European Court has had the opportunity of facing very plainly 
the difference between concurrent applicability and jurisdiction. The 
specificity of the European Court’s position, in relationship to its American 
counterpart, is its management of the jurisdictional issue posed by war–
contexts in the form of a repression of both war and humanitarian law. They 
both appear as a non–issue, in massive contrast with the juggling exercise 
and academic engagement performed by the American institutions. The 
Court managed notoriously to deal with claims arising from the situation in 
Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s without referring in its reasoning to 
humanitarian law or war, aside from reporting that the claimants had done 
so in their claims, 308 or that other institutions had reported on the situation 
in terms of humanitarian law violations,309 and without seemingly paying 
any attention to the otherwise meaningful question of whether there actually 
was an “armed conflict” or not. The background instance here, the 
equivalent of the Las Palmeras opinion, comes in the following statement 
by the European Court: 
    Article 2 [i.e., the right to life] must be interpreted in so far as possible 
in light of the general principles of international law, including the rules of 
international humanitarian law which play an indispensable and 
universally–accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of 
armed conflict . . . . The Court therefore concurs with the reasoning of the 
Chamber in holding that in a zone of international conflict Contracting 
States are under obligation to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, 
engaged in hostilities. This would also extend to the provision of medical 
assistance to the wounded; where combatants have died, or succumbed to 
  
 308. Isayeva v. Russia, Yusupova v. Russia, Bazayeva v. Russia, App Nos. 57497/00, 
57948/00, 57949/00 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 102. 157,  (February 24, 2005) , 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight= 
Isayeva&sessionid=66101579&skin=hudoc-en (2005). 
 309. Musayev v. Russia, Labazadova v. Russia, Magodanov v. Russia, App Nos. 
57941/00, 58699/00, & 60403/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118 (July 26, 2007), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action 
=html&documentId=821526&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.  
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wounds, the need for accountability would necessitate proper disposal of 
remains and require the authorities to collect and provide information 
about the identity and fate of those concerned, or permit bodies such as the 
ICRC to do so.310 
The European Court seemingly takes notice of the "international 
conflict," humanitarian law, the ICRC, “protected persons,” combatants, 
and so on. In other words, the Court encounters in its own way the principle 
of distinction, which would open up the possibility, if not the necessity of 
imposing humanitarian law on the interpretation of “arbitrary” deprivations 
of life. Dealing then with the notion of people being in the power of the 
Enemy in times of hostilities, the Chechen situation would come out of the 
"state of emergency" framework of human rights law, and fall into the 
situation of an armed conflict. However, the paragraph cited above 
constitutes the only reference in the decision at hand to humanitarian law or 
the notion of distinction. More importantly, when it comes to discussing the 
claims relating to, precisely, the deprivation of the right to life, the Court 
falls back onto its traditional rhetoric, including that used in all cases 
relating to the situation in Chechnya, and consisting in finding a violation of 
the due diligence obligation of investigating deaths occurring under the 
control of the State.311 
The overall approach of the European Court does not therefore mirror the 
formalist traditionalism displayed by the Inter–American Court, or the 
militant creativity of the Inter–American Commission, when it comes to 
translating lex specialis into a workable relation between substance and 
jurisdiction. What comes out of the European Court in terms of the 
interpretation of the lex specialis idea is the notion that, as the ICJ said, 
human rights continue in times of war. When jurisdiction is added to the 
mix, the result is that human rights is blind to humanitarian law, and is 
therefore blind to war as a specific social phenomenon. The only question is 
whether there is an “emergency” in formal terms. If there is no such 
derogation from the normal situation, the underlying conditions will be 
normal as far as human rights are concerned. 
1. Normalizing Chechnya: The Invisibility of War to Human 
Rights  
The line of reasoning in approaching the Chechnya situation does not 
engage the lex specialis question. From the human rights’ jurisdictional 
point of view, humanitarian law is possibly irrelevant for the examination of 
  
 310. Varnava v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 
16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 & 16073/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), ¶ 185, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=854079&portal=hbkm
&source=externalbydocnumber&tabl. 
 311. Id. ¶ 194. 
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a situation otherwise approachable as one of internal armed conflict; and 
that is so, if the situation in question can otherwise be portrayed as a law 
enforcement operation, i.e. a “regular” exercise of State police power. Here 
we can see a follow–up from the Inter–American position; the human rights 
jurisdiction bumps into something that could be a “war” and covered by the 
“laws of war,” but unlike the Inter–American institutions, the specificity of 
the encounter is not acknowledged and the material jurisdiction of human 
rights erases the material jurisdiction of the laws of war.  
That some may want to dispute the possibility of discussing the Chechen 
situation without treating it as something different from a mere police 
operation, as seen in the fact that NGOs cited by the Court do regard the 
situation as covered by humanitarian law,312 highlights the regularizing 
effect of human rights law over war–like violence in the life of the State. In 
terms of the construction by human rights law of authorized State–based 
lethal violence, one should remember that counter–insurrectional violence is 
a law enforcement measure for the purpose of the right to life (Article 2), 
whereas the evaluation of war operations is declared to be outside the scope 
of human rights by their exclusion from the list of lawful instances of 
intentional deprivation of life (Article 15).313 Asserting the applicability of 
human rights would suggest in that very precise sense that there is no “war” 
where war is associated with the restoration of the nation’s health rather 
than the daily (if brutal) operation of the sovereign. 
In very basic terms, leaving the legal relevance of the existence of an 
armed conflict un–discussed means before anything else that material 
jurisdiction is not in question for a court like the European Court. The 
question is very concretely: should the lex generalis ignore the special 
circumstances that make the lex specialis applicable if the application of the 
lex specialis is not possible for jurisdictional reasons? We can see how the 
looming legal invisibility of war in this context shares something, though 
not yet fully distinct, with the blending of functional and actual sovereignty 
in cases of occupation—i.e. when human rights meet humanitarian law in 
international conflicts as opposed to civil war situations. Making war 
invisible as a special set of circumstances for human rights legitimates a 
priori decision–making by the court just like it legitimates decision–making 
  
 312. Musayev, ¶ 118. 
 313. Although, in order not to lose sight of the general issue at stake here, one has to 
remember that the perceived contemporary landscape of war, within and beyond the “War on 
Terror,” has changed the terms of the difference regardless of the traditional framework. 
Even though a term like “counter-insurgency” was already a challenge to the traditional 
frame by being a war–like police–operation (or vice versa), especially as it depicted the 
strategy deployed against national liberation movements, the type of “insurgency” that it is 
designed to “counter” in contemporary environments is presented as the source of all 
confusion.  See the opinion of the chief strategic advisor on counter-insurgency to the United 
States Armed forces in Afghanistan, in David Kilcullen, Counter-insurgency Redux, 48 
SURVIVAL 111 (2006). 
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by the State in occupied territory. Human rights law, as the yardstick of 
political normalcy, simply normalizes that to which it extends its gaze. As a 
result, the issue of irrelevance of humanitarian law points, formally 
speaking, to the fact that the only question that will be asked is whether a 
state of emergency has been declared, to then proceed to an evaluation of 
the proportionality of force used to restore order based on the existence or 
inexistence of a declared emergency.314 Given that the only consideration in 
a human rights case is whether the State acted legitimately within its 
jurisdiction, it appears therefore that the human rights perspective is 
logically blind to the notion of civil war, and can consider with an 
epistemologically straight face that the use of the air force and artillery is a 
regular form of anti–terrorist law enforcement.315  
In terms of legal argument, however, that line is not even minimally 
outlandish, given that human rights law governs the behavior of States 
towards non–State actors within a defined jurisdictional scope (like 
territory), and bombing people constitutes such a type of State behavior. 
Moreover, because of the premises on which human rights law rests, that 
specific kind of State behavior does not differ in kind from any other State 
action, from taxation to providing health care, as far as human rights law is 
concerned. Contrary to (traditional) human rights law, humanitarian law in 
civil wars also addresses the behavior of non–State actors, as a result of 
forcing the principle of distinction into the insides of State sovereignty. It 
addresses therefore also individuals, most notably through criminalization 
of certain violations, but not exclusively.316 Disregarding “war” as a legally 
relevant set of specific facts—which could require referring to humanitarian 
law as a set of meaningful facts for the sake of interpretation—amounts to 
making non–State actors visible only as a circumstantial element in 
evaluating State action. Here evaluation of State action means approaching 
it as State action presumed to be legitimate (otherwise human rights would 
make no sense as a constitutional yardstick), something that is obviously not 
true from the perspective of the opposing side in a civil war. Human rights 
  
 314. Isayeva, ¶ 125. 
 315. Id. ¶ 174. 
 316. Compare Mines Protocol II, supra note 231, art. 3, ¶ 2 (“Each High Contracting 
Party or party to a conflict is, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, responsible 
for all mines, booby-traps, and other devices employed by it….”) with Mines Protocol II, 
supra note 231, art. 1, ¶ 2:  
This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in 
Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This 
Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 
   
See Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices, supra note 231, art. 1, 3. 
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makes the context of a civil war into a just war situation, by implicitly 
rejecting the idea of equality of parties, despite what the passing reference 
to “combatants” seems to anticipate. Human rights law has to disregard the 
essential circumstance of shaky State legitimacy and the use of military 
violence for political purposes, because those circumstances are foreign to 
the core of human rights in the precise sense of putting the traditional 
concept of human rights law at risk. When the situation is a de facto state of 
emergency, but is not so in legal terms because the State has not declared it, 
we can see how the domain of normalcy has expanded to encompass the 
daily shelling of entire regions as normal State behavior. In simple words 
again, civil war means the repression of extra–constitutional contestation of 
State action as legitimate State action, and normal human rights cannot see 
it outside of the state of emergency. By very natural implication and 
definition, the operation of human rights law in all cases legitimates state 
action by discussing its modalities, never its principle.  
Human rights law as a whole simply cannot address a situation of civil 
war qua civil war in any legally meaningful way, beyond punctual instances 
such as the dwindling and indirect presence of war as a justification for the 
death penalty,317 or for the already mentioned prohibition of war 
propaganda.318 It treats the deployment of war machinery, in the enigmatic 
terms of the European Court, as any other “situation in which it is permitted 
to ‘use force’ which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the 
deprivation of life.”319 More generally, it is considered as any act of 
sovereign power that interferes with individual rights for the benefit of the 
community, or, in the European case, in light of what is necessary in a 
“democratic society.”320 Human rights law evaluates therefore the 
deployment of force in terms of the standard of “arbitrary” deprivation of 
life, where arbitrariness is interpreted as the negative yardstick of a 
reasoned, rational, reasonable calculation: “the force used must be strictly 
proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims.”321  
Here, one could note in passing the important fact that proportionality as 
a tool of evaluation is a point of contact that is otherwise implicitly assumed 
between humanitarian law and human rights. This is what one will find also 
behind the extension of human rights into the domain of military 
occupation, which is otherwise governed by humanitarian law. The 
  
 317. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty art. 2, Apr. 28, 1983, 
ETS 114; and the subsequent European Courts of Human Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.] Protocol No. 
13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circumstances, pmbl., May 3, 2002, 
E.T.S. No. 187.  
 318. ICCPR, supra note 216, art. 20(1). 
 319. Isayeva, supra note 308, ¶ 169. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
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European Court adopts into its language, beside the brief mention of 
“combatants,” words like “civilian,” and frames the assessment of proper 
governmental response (in a context of what from the Court’s own 
description looks like an armed conflict) in the general language of 
balancing and proportionality. That suggests “proportionality” in the very 
sense of humanitarian law. It is undeniable that the reference to 
proportionality is inherent to the implementation of human rights,322 but that 
idea of proportionality refers to a means/ends relationship that is, as should 
be clear from the European Court’s own idea of proportionality, 
significantly different from that of humanitarian law. However, 
proportionality here serves clearly as a substantive bridge for any situation 
where the State is engaged in systematic violence, regardless of its 
magnitude, under the province of human rights; the implicitly exclusive 
limitation is that the State must have jurisdiction. The European Court does 
not therefore ignore humanitarian law because it does not have jurisdiction 
over that body of law; that issue is left un–discussed given that the Court 
precisely does not even engage with the need for humanitarian law to enter 
the frame. What appears, rather, is that the Court does not look at 
humanitarian law because (civil) war is nothing special for human rights, as 
long as jurisdiction of the State is not a/in question. In general terms, the 
possibility that civil war may remain invisible in a human rights perspective 
such as that of the European Court is therefore an illustration of the legal 
construction of “war” and the connection of that legal construction with 
distinction and sovereignty. War here is a set of facts, which from the 
perspective of human rights are seen as any other set of facts. When war is 
reabsorbed by human rights, as opposed to being kept outside of the bounds 
of the social contract, it logically disappears. 
2. Legalizing Occupation by Facts 
The European Court has also had the opportunity of considering the 
operation of humanitarian law itself within the jurisdiction of the State. It 
has done so only in terms of approaching it as a relevant fact in deciding 
whether a Convention right had been violated: in that specific instance the 
proper application of humanitarian law was itself the subject of a complaint 
concerning fairness in a war crimes trial.323 Significantly, dissenting judges 
considered that the majority of the Court had effectively engaged in a 
mistaken interpretation of humanitarian law as a fact, even in the absence of 
  
 322. A systematic discussion of the use of proportionality in human rights law can be 
found in Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality:  An Assault on Human Rights?, (Jean Monnet, 
Working Paper No. 9, 2008), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/ 
08/080901.pdf. 
 323. Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Third Section (2008), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=838477&portal=hbkm
&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649. 
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a power to interpret humanitarian law as law.324 Considering the difference 
between interpreting the law as a fact and actually correcting the 
interpretation of the law by the national courts, the Court’s majority was 
chastised by dissenting judges for doing the former while pretending to be 
doing the latter, i.e. treating humanitarian law as law over which it can 
impose an interpretive supremacy that it has only over the Convention.325  
In other words, in the Chechnya cases, the issue was that of human rights 
being blind to war as a legally meaningful situation, which would have 
otherwise triggered questions relating to the application of humanitarian 
law. Here the issue is that of a human rights body being limited to 
considering humanitarian law as a fact, and of being structurally enjoined 
from interpreting it as relevant law. What these positions have in common is 
that they do not deal with the relationship between humanitarian law and 
human rights as two bodies of law, but rather with the application of human 
rights standards to humanitarian law as a fact, as in the case of talking about 
“civilians” while not applying the law that defines entities as being 
“civilian,” that is, individuals who under the laws of war are not legitimate 
  
 324. Id. ¶¶ 8-14 (Costa, Kalaydjieve, Poalelungi, J.J., dissenting). It should be noted 
that when the case was then transferred to the Grand Chamber of the Court, the decision got 
into the development and contents of international humanitarian law in even greater detail 
(including a lengthy discussion of the evolution of the "principle of distinction"), without 
either the Court, the applicant, the respondent, or the dissenting judges mentioning anything 
concerning the Third Section dissenters' view on the jurisdictional difficulty of treating 
humanitarian law as indeed a fact and not law (except for mentioning in passing that the 
European Court is not an appellate criminal court.) See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 
36376/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber (2010), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=867803&portal=hbkm
&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649. 
 325. Korbely v. Hungary, App. No. 9174/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber, ¶ 2 
(Aug. 19, 2008), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=k
orbely&sessionid=68147263&skin=hudoc-en: 
 
In its recapitulation of general principles, the judgment reiterates that 
it is not normally the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic 
courts and that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the 
courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. 
It rightly points out that this also applies where domestic law refers 
to rules of general international law or international agreements, the 
Court’s role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of 
such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention … 
Nevertheless, the majority, without any explanation, head off in a 
different direction and, on a flimsy, uncertain basis, quite simply 
substitute their own findings of fact for those of the Hungarian 
judicial authorities. 
  
(Lorenzen, Tulkens, Zagrebelsky, Fura–Sandstrom and Popovic, J.J., dissenting). 
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combatants, not legitimate targets, and therefore not entitled to prisoner–of–
war status in the context of an international armed conflict.   
The foregoing provides in any event a basis for the application of human 
rights to situations of occupation. Whereas for international law occupation 
is a separate legal regime and part of the lex specialis (just like "civilians" 
or "unnecessary suffering"), human rights standards are here applied by 
human rights bodies in the discussion of “war” situations because 
occupation is considered de facto jurisdiction. The transition from legal 
regime to facts makes the issue as to whether there is or was a “war” 
disappear, as far as human rights are concerned. The context of occupation 
is approached in deliberately general abstraction from the essential 
difference between jurisdiction and occupation as two fundamentally 
opposed legal regimes.326 This is done in turn on the basis of the notion that, 
to the axiomatic jurisdictional attitude of considering any extra–
jurisdictional law as a fact,327 corresponds the possibility of considering 
“occupation” as a factual deployment of the power of the State as a State, 
and not a particular legal regime which otherwise gives meaning to that 
deployment in the first place. In the words of the European Court:  
    In this respect the Court recalls that, although Article 1 [i.e., States 
respect and protect rights of individuals under their jurisdiction] sets limits 
on the reach of the Convention, the concept of “jurisdiction” under this 
provision is not restricted to the national territory of the High Contracting 
Parties. According to its established case–law, for example, the Court has 
held that the extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting State 
may give rise to an issue under Article 3 [i.e., the prohibition of torturem 
inhumane and degrading treatment], and hence engage the responsibility 
of that State under the Convention . . . . In addition, the responsibility of 
Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, 
  
 326. There is a historical reading of the development of the law of occupation, which 
places emphasis on the notion that “occupation” was devised against the backdrop of the 
development of “sovereignty” and in systematic contrast with it.  See generally Eyal 
Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 621, 
621–48 (2008). 
 327. For reference to the canonical statements, see Payment of Various Serbian Loans 
Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21, at 18–20 (July 12); and 
Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), Merits, Judgment, 1925 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25).  A particular famous discussion of this version of 
legal dualism can be found in the Nottebohm case, where the ICJ explained the relationship 
between invalidity and inopposability of a domestic legal act, stating in the course of the 
presentation that domestic law is just a fact and the invalidity of the domestic legal act is a 
question of domestic law, not international law.  Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 
Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).  On that topic, an early reminder of this traditional position 
in international law was provided by the already mentioned dissent by Judge Anzilotti 
regarding the assessment of the constitutionality of domestic legal decrees under the 
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig.  See Consistency of Certain Legislative Decrees 
with the Constitution of the Free City, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, at 60–66 (Anzilotti, J., 
dissenting). 
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whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which produce 
effects outside their own territory . . . . Bearing in mind the object and 
purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a Contracting Party may 
also arise when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or 
unlawful—it exercises effective control of an area outside its national 
territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms 
set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it is 
exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration. 328 
The jurisdictional gaze of human rights makes war disappear by ironing 
out the legal construction of war, and such corollaries as “occupation”; that 
constitutes the basis for generalizing the notion that the use of artillery and 
air power can be significantly translated into human rights lingo as 
something akin to law enforcement. Significantly in the case of occupation, 
we have moved from civil wars to international wars, thus functionally 
analogizing deployments of force not only across the police/military divide, 
but also across the internal/international divide. The perspective of the 
Court is very naturally that of generalizing the condition of normalcy as 
simply that of there not being a situation of emergency, understood to 
constitute the breaking point of the State’s margin of appreciation in 
defending its own existence. Adding “factual” jurisdiction seems in that 
sense not only innocuous but also quite unsurprising, in that the possible 
background “illegality” constituted by a violation of the jus ad bellum is 
irrelevant simply by virtue of being legally invisible (although mentioned in 
passing) – occupation is "like" sovereignty as far as human rights are 
concerned. In that sense the legal endpoint for the European Court’s 
trajectory of engagement with armed conflict will be the Bankovic 
decision,329 decided again without resorting to humanitarian law (and again 
despite the applicants’ formal suggestions). Bankovic tries to make sense 
jurisprudentially of the implications of extending human rights to 
factualized State power, and bumps into the notion that human rights and 
war do not fare well together. 
3. The Bankovic Containment Strategy 
Following the Lotus dictum on the nature of State jurisdiction,330 the 
Court here asserts that extraterritorial application of the Convention is 
  
 328. Loizidou, ¶ 62.  See also Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ ¶ 
68–71 (2004), available at 
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exceptional,331 and the Convention does not accept a general “cause–and–
effect” theory of jurisdiction,332 which would otherwise impose human 
rights standards onto any action of the State, just because it emanates from 
the State. That is an interpretive statement on the seemingly unstoppable 
reach of the Loizidou pronouncement concerning the possibility of 
factualizing jurisdiction and sovereignty. As applied to the case at hand, the 
Court's decision is that an act of killing someone by dropping a bomb on 
them is not governed or measurable by human rights standards if it happens 
on foreign territory in the course of a punctual military operation. The 
otherwise obvious link of control that exists between the victim and the 
agent of the State (the military aircraft) does not constitute a link that can be 
assimilated to “jurisdiction.” For the assimilation to be possible, one needs a 
theory of jurisdiction that fragments the Convention into a variety of 
standards governing a variety of situations of “control” by the State, each 
duty/right relationship arising when a particular type or degree of control 
exists. For instance, for the purpose of imposing on a State the duty not to 
deprive an individual of their life arbitrarily, one needs a situation where the 
State has at least control over the relevant aspect of that person protected by 
the right to life, i.e. it has the capacity of ending that person's life. That is 
not, says the Court, what States understand "jurisdiction" to mean for the 
purposes of the Convention.   
  
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it 
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of 
a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a 
convention. It does not, however, follow that international law 
prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in 
respect  of any case which relates to acts which have taken place 
abroad,  and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of intern 
national law.  Such a view would only be tenable if international law 
contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of 
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to  persons, property 
and acts 'outside their territory, and if, as an  exception to this general 
prohibition, it allowed States to do so  in certain specific cases. But 
this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at 
present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that 
States may not extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property' and acts outside their 
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion 
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards 
other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it 
regards as best and most suitable.  
 
 331. Bankovic, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73.  The statement comes from Issa, ¶ 
68. 
 332. Id. ¶ ¶ 57, 69. 
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Stated from another perspective, the general principle is that the 
Convention is a European constitutional bill of rights, which explains why 
the jurisdiction of the Court (whose job it is to interpret the Convention in 
applying it to State action) is tied to the jurisdiction of States (who are by 
the terms of the Convention a discreet number of States each deploying 
their own jurisdiction according to received principles of international law.) 
As a result, for the Court at least, instances involving anything below 
effective control over a foreign territory (such as in cases of occupation), or 
equivalent control of a person abroad (such as in consular facilities), 
whether in a lawful or unlawful situation (which is obviously irrelevant as 
such given that all extra–jurisdictional law is a fact),333 will be deemed to be 
beyond the scope of the Convention. Those situations are beyond the scope 
of the stated human rights duties of the State, simply because such duties 
are tied to jurisdiction; one asks whether there is jurisdiction to see whether 
there are duties, as opposed to the opposite.334 In plainer terms, the State 
cannot in principle act as a State beyond its jurisdiction, because that would 
mean that it is acting outside of itself; for human rights purposes, 
jurisdiction is territorial, and any actions beyond that domain are, as far as 
human rights are concerned, not State actions at all. The borders of the 
domain of jurisdiction may be blurry, because of such phenomena as 
military occupation and exercise of State power within the facilities of 
diplomatic missions in foreign territory. But there is a border, and that is in 
principle the border of the State’s territory. 
The position of the Court in Bankovic is however untenable and, after 
Loizidou, any argument on the limits of “jurisdiction” based on a textual or 
contextual interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention will be largely 
unconvincing. That was already obvious when the Court deemed it proper 
to justify the extension of human rights to factual–control situations on the 
grounds of good human rights policy. Citing approvingly the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, the Court had explained that: 
“Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could 
  
 333. Issa, ¶ 71 (extending responsibility of States for acts committed on foreign 
territory with regards to individuals under their control). 
 334. Bankovic, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 75: 
 
Furthermore, the applicants’ notion of jurisdiction equates the 
determination of whether an individual falls within the jurisdiction of 
a contracting state with the question of whether that person can be 
considered to be a victim of a violation of rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. These are separate and distinct admissibility conditions, 
each of which has to be satisfied in the afore-mentioned order, before 
an individual can invoke the Convention provisions against a 
contracting state. 
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not perpetrate on its own territory.”335 In Bankovic the European Court sets 
formal jurisdictional limits to the obligations of State parties based on the 
notion that obligations follow jurisdiction, and so jurisdiction must be based 
on something other than obligations (which was the position of the 
claimants). But the policy reasons behind the move to extend obligations to 
occupation situations is that obligations should follow the State when it 
steps out of its formal jurisdictional space; as a State bound by the 
Convention, it would appear strange that it could behave contrary to the 
Convention at all. 
In other words, the Court expounds its understanding of the jurisdictional 
limits of human rights obligations in a way that converges its factual 
understanding of war and its factual relationship to humanitarian law, and 
moves towards entrenching its formal and strict image of human rights as 
associated with the exercise of sovereignty. Not formal sovereignty, 
however, but rather the substance or effect of sovereignty is what is required 
for the purpose of extending the Convention to situations of occupation. The 
weakness of the effort to contain the extension of human rights’ evaluative 
reach, once the idea of jurisdiction has been factualized,336 becomes little 
less than blatant when the Bankovic Court deems it necessary, in line with 
what it does with situations of de facto jurisdiction, to support its textual 
and contextual interpretation of Article 1 with teleological policy 
considerations. While the parties insist quite legitimately that a gradualist 
vision of jurisdiction is precisely implied in the application of human rights 
to situations of occupation,337 the Court turns eventually to an even broader 
justification, which is borrowed from the foundational reasoning in Loizidou 
and lies at the root of the above quoted Issa dictum borrowed from the 
Human Rights Committee. According to the Court, the Convention aims at 
establishing a “European public order,”338 geographically defined by the 
outer jurisdictional limits of the State parties. Speaking of the turn to 
functional equivalents of sovereignty, the Court explains that “the 
desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so 
far been relied on by the Court in favour [sic] of establishing jurisdiction 
only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific 
circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention”; by a 
territory “normally covered,” the Court explains that one should mean a 
territory within the regional space of public order.339 The Court thus justifies 
that, in cases of occupation, de facto jurisdiction is the equivalent of de jure 
jurisdiction for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention, on the grounds 
  
 335. Issa, ¶ 71. 
 336. See Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 81 (noting the ambiguous 
arguments of the Court when trying to distinguish Bankovic from the Issa and Ocalan cases, 
both dealing with armed activities of the State abroad). 
 337. Id. ¶ ¶ 47–48. 
 338. Loizidou, ¶ 75.  
 339. Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73.  
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that, had the occupation not happened, human rights norms would have 
been in force for the responsible (and now ousted) sovereign. It is the 
reverse of the Human Rights Committee’s statement according to which a 
State should not do something abroad that would be internationally 
wrongful if done at home. The ousting of the sovereign through occupation 
of the territory is necessarily, as far as the Court is concerned, equivalent to 
the acceptance by the occupying power of the human rights responsibilities 
of the ousted sovereign.  
Why that is, and why one should accept that acquiescence and 
occupation are functionally equivalent, is far from clear, even though the 
whole argumentative line is supposed to support that position. The series of 
steps can be seen to match in reverse the positions of the Inter–American 
system, in which the Court finally settled for formal limitations mandated 
by sovereign consent. Here the Court, in order to first extend jurisdiction to 
occupation and then contain it there, follows the Commission in sliding 
from formal to substantive arguments, but in reverse. The Court bases its 
argument on Article 1, which is said to naturally limit obligations to de jure 
and de facto jurisdiction, but then decides to contain it by saying that 
although the European public order may seem to mandate that all member 
States should behave everywhere in the same way, they should not because 
otherwise human rights would follow them and that is not what jurisdiction 
means. The Loizidou argument is impossible to contain, yet in the course of 
doing so, the Court has made the distinctions between normalcy and 
exception, between norm and fact, between domestic and international, and 
between peace and war considerably less persuasive. Yet it has done so for 
the benefit of human rights and public order. 
Witnessing the steps taken by the Court, in reference to issues relating to 
war, is instructive for the purpose of understanding how factualizing 
sovereignty is the key to a complete merger of human rights and 
humanitarian law, into some sort of non–legal human rights talk that would 
effectively render the political meaning of the system invisible. In Bankovic, 
to limit the expansion of the “jurisdiction” of States for the purpose of 
human rights, the Court cannot plausibly rely on factual criteria, such as 
“overall control,”340 “effective overall control,”341 or “authority and 
control”342 on their own. How having the ability to destroy one person’s 
right to life is not effective control is unclear, especially if one has also to 
establish the essential difference between being under the control of an 
aircraft and being under the control of embassy officials (which counts as 
effective control),343 and especially if we abandon, as we should, the notion 
  
 340. Issa, ¶ 73. 
 341. Loizidou, ¶ ¶ 49–50.   
 342. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 91 (2005), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/.  
 343. Bankovic, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 71.  
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that diplomatic missions are territorial enclaves of the sending State.344 One 
would have to find parameters that would provide a solid basis for the 
distinction with a case where punctual physical control by agents of law 
enforcement is sufficient, in foreign or international territory, to establish a 
jurisdictional link for purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.345  
The policy considerations, referring to gaps in the regional public order, 
produce complications. In situations of occupation, the State is said by the 
Court to be responsible for human rights, on the one hand, if under the 
previous (normal) circumstances human rights were applicable on that 
territory. But it is responsible, on the other hand, also because it is 
exercising “all or some” of the competences of the sovereign. The two 
grounds are jurisdictionally different, since the first refers to the occupier’s 
jurisdiction and the second to the occupied country’s (lost) jurisdiction. 
Saying that occupation is equivalent to sovereignty for the purpose of 
human rights because of control is one theory, which has certainly been 
accepted by most if not all human rights bodies,346 even though it is never 
fully explained. Sovereigns are responsible for human rights even when 
they are not in full control, and the direct analogy between sovereign 
jurisdiction and effective control for the purpose of responsibility, if 
intuitively plausible, is therefore not undeniable.347 Yet even if one admits 
the connection between jurisdiction and effective control, the “gap–in–the–
European–public–order” argument cannot support it, since it could just as 
well support the arguments for the gradual-jurisdiction approach to human 
rights duties of the State. That becomes more apparent when one asks what 
the difference is between a situation where the territory of a non–party is 
occupied and the situation where the territory of a state party is occupied, if 
in both cases we are talking about a State party performing the occupation 
and exercising effective control. In the first case, there is a stated risk of a 
“gap” in the regional public order, while in the second there is no such risk, 
and that is the only thing that the Court can tell us. The gap argument has 
  
 344. An early judicial rejection of the idea that diplomatic missions are territorial 
enclaves, deriving from the move towards a functional idea of what diplomatic immunities 
are, can be found in Fatemi v. United States, 192 A.2d 525 (D.C. 1963). 
 345. Ocalan, ¶ 92. 
 346. See, e.g., Victor Saldano v. Argentina,  Inter-Am. C. H. R. Report No. 38/99, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. ¶ 19 (1998).   
 347. One aspect of that notion comes in the form of a debate about responsibility of 
States for acts occurring outside of their territory and committed by non-State agents. See, 
e.g., Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State 
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights 
Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 598, 598–625 (2007).  Another aspect of that comes in the notion that 
the “duty to promote,” and possibly also the “duty to fulfill,” which constitute two of the four 
duties attached to each right, do not need exercise of jurisdiction or even control over 
anybody and can apply to abstract acts of legislation or regulation themselves.  See the 
already mentioned Roma Rights Centre, Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport 
[2004] UKHL 55. 
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nothing to do with effective control, as a justification for the 
implementation of the Convention extraterritorially, even though it also 
sounds like a plausible, yet independent, policy consideration presumably 
relating to vested rights, expectations, and the relatively more stable nature 
of human rights regimes in the law of treaties.348 If one accepts effective 
control only within the sphere of public order, that seems to imply collective 
responsibility for the implementation of the Convention, an argument that is 
also hypothetically defendable, but that thankfully the Court does not try to 
develop.  
The result is that the reference to the goals of the treaty effectively tries 
to limit the otherwise impossibly contained idea of de facto jurisdiction in 
an era where extraterritoriality abounds. There is a pressing need at work to 
abide by the formal borders of the human rights regime, which hinges on 
the sovereign border, and here that need is manifested by the fact that the 
Court resorts to almost every single one of the available tools for treaty 
interpretation,349 including consideration of the travaux préparatoires and a 
discussion of sister treaties (which interestingly it rejects as a valuable tool, 
while mentioning in the same breath the travaux leading to the ICCPR).350 
At the end of the day, the Court’s creative dealing with the ultimate 
consequences of factualizing sovereignty sustains the message that there 
always is an inside and an outside of the sphere of application of human 
rights, and the ideal marker of the border is sovereignty. The turn to 
effectiveness is however slippery in that it recognizes the extra–
jurisdictional (and therefore out–of–body) exercise of power by the State as 
plausibly legitimate under human rights law and therefore analogous to 
normal behavior by the State. That the bombing of "civilians" outside of the 
State's territory is invisible to human rights law is only an extension of the 
invisibility of war operations within the State, or the invisibility of 
occupation as a situation resulting from war. From its inherent hostility to 
war, human rights law is made into a normalizing machine for the worst of 
political violence. 
As far as legitimation of State coercion is concerned, it should be noted 
that the inside/outside distinction marked by the sovereign border has 
certainly been noticed by States who have attempted to do abroad what is 
not allowed at home, on the basis that in most situations they precisely do 
not have “jurisdiction” abroad, even though they are actually exercising 
State power.351 As far as the Bankovic idea is concerned, and with regard to 
to the European Court’s dealing with the relationship between human rights 
  
 348. See supra note 46, at 112 (referring to the International Law Commission’s 
discussion of “humanitarian” provisions, including human rights treaties, which are not 
subject to the mechanism of suspension for material breach). 
 349. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, arts. 30–33.   
 350. Id. at art. 32.   
 351. See Roma Rights Centre [2004]. 
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and war, the most important aspect is the rhetorical insistence on the 
distinctiveness of the normal space of operation of human rights within an 
“inside” (the “espace juridique”) that can possibly be stretched at times, but 
that is contrasted with an “outside” (the “world”) to which the European 
instrument was not meant to be applicable.352 The idea that, even after the 
factualization of jurisdiction, there is still an ideal border between the inside 
and the outside finally explains the otherwise not–so–straightforward 
rejection by the Court of what it depicts as the alternative position on 
jurisdiction presented by the claimants. That interpretation, the Court says: 
"equates the determination of whether an individual falls within the 
jurisdiction of a contracting state with the question of whether that person 
can be considered to be a victim of a violation of rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.” That, the Court says, constitutes a confusion of “separate and 
distinct admissibility conditions, each of which has to be satisfied in the 
afore–mentioned order, before an individual can invoke the Convention 
provisions against a contracting state."353  
What we learn from the European Court here is that the issue of dealing 
with war–like situations through human rights is substantively dictated by 
the fact that human rights law is concerned with the effects of the State’s 
(abuse of) coercive power on individuals. The above suggests that the 
operation of human rights in zones of occupation is therefore the 
continuation of the invisibility of civil war for human rights standards. The 
factual treatment of civil war situation by human rights normalizes civil war 
by making it functionally equivalent to “counter–terrorist” law enforcement, 
which makes that mode of reasoning resonant with larger issues in the 
contemporary political setting. Similarly, the operation of human rights in 
occupation entrenches a technocratic notion according to which occupation 
is functionally equivalent to sovereignty, which is in turn based on the 
premise that sovereignty is plausibly seen as a (bunch of) function(s).354 
Finally, the issue of jurisdiction, which is the bridge for the extension of 
human rights normalcy, allows the Court to reject the relevance of the ICJ’s 
lex specialis idea by normalizing everything legal that would be outside of 
the State’s jurisdiction as being invisible to the Court itself. That is rendered 
equally shaky by the fact that the Court has been able to observe human 
rights and their violation far away from the borders of the European public 
order.355 
  
 352. Bankovic, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 78. 
 353. Id. ¶ 75 (emphasis added). 
 354. See Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone – “A Zone of Reasonableness?”, 41 
ISR. L. REV. 13 (2008). 
 355. See, e.g., Al–Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, ¶ 58 
(accepting that an individual has been the victim of torture, within the meaning of Article 3, 
while the acts of torture themselves, as well as their relevant effects, are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Court or any State party to the Convention.). 
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The more or less convincing break presented by Bankovic constitutes an 
attempt at establishing the centrality of the distinction between de jure and 
de facto sovereignty, meaning here the importance of the form of 
sovereignty for the logic of human rights, as it emanates from the Preamble 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The problem is that, as noted 
by the European Court itself, one cannot second–guess the State in its 
appreciation of the means to be deployed to defend itself. By introducing 
the logic of the “margin of appreciation” into the domain of war, suddenly 
we have lost sight of the fact that human rights law does not regulate war—
it is supposed to oppose it.   
D. Lex Generalis and War in Africa: Redemption 
A creative alternative to that type of ambiguous courtship of war by 
human rights starts with the idea that war itself is a problem for human 
rights, if not a violation of human rights. That leads then to a more 
complicated and less compromising relationship between human rights and 
humanitarian law. That starting point is provided in the jurisprudence of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1. From War as Law 
Considering the European Court’s engagement with war, an alternative 
starting point is that, logically, war should be understood as an exceptional 
situation, and lex specialis would therefore mean that we have first of all 
(from the perspective of human rights, and not that of the ICJ) crossed the 
border of normalcy into the domain of anomaly, where the exceptions 
apply. Such an exception would be for instance constituted by an 
amendment to the otherwise general right to life, in the spirit of what is 
noted by Article 15 of the European Convention, according to which lawful 
acts of war resulting in death are a “derogation” from Article 2. This is so 
because “war,” understood from the model of inter–State war, is the breach 
of sovereignty by another sovereign—that is, the breach of (legal) 
normalcy. And in contemporary terms, this notion forces the meeting of 
human rights with the jus ad bellum, the issue of the legality of war itself. If 
in contexts otherwise approachable by humanitarian law as “non–
international armed conflicts,” “war” disappears for human rights, the fact 
that we can extend human rights to situations of occupation without paying 
attention to the fact that it is a “war” makes human rights suddenly agnostic 
about “war” in general. That can be seen as a problem, and therefore one 
can choose another approach, which starts with an expression of human 
rights’ existential opposition to war as war. Human rights law rejects war 
not because it is violence, but because it is an instantiation of violence 
precisely conceived of as a war or, more technically, an “armed conflict.” 
“War” can be accepted, as far as international law is concerned, as the 
result of the operation of particular norms, as opposed to a fact of life that is 
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received passively by law. This is confirmed by the European Court's 
mistreatment of war following its factualization of both war and 
sovereignty. The upsetting (and now generally rejected) conclusion above 
was that as long as human rights operate there is legally no “war,” in that 
Chechnya is not a (civil) war in any distinctive way visible to human rights 
law, in the same way that the context of the Basque country can be talked 
about without taking seriously any claim about the legitimacy of a violent 
struggle for self–determination.356 Again, from the perspective of “human 
rights,” the only question is whether there is a state of emergency, because 
the state of emergency encompasses (the state of) war. This means 
concretely that, in the terms of Article 15 of the European Convention, the 
issue will be whether the state has acknowledged a state of “war,” since 
otherwise there is no deference to humanitarian law at all.357 That civil wars 
are theoretically invisible to human rights qua wars is therefore the flipside 
of the fact that war is indeed a legal construct, i.e. the result of the operation 
of other norms. But additionally, this sequence of steps from human rights 
to war shows also the strangeness of the application of human rights to 
occupied territory; on top of normalizing through rights a temporary and 
necessarily abnormal situation (under the jus ad bellum), the operation of 
human rights here disregards the fact that there is an international war going 
on. The connection of occupation to (international) war should at a 
minimum trigger the question of whether the occupied territory is not 
precisely and by definition under a state of emergency, expressed in the 
special regime of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The problem lies in the 
fact that the operation of humanitarian law does not depend on a formal 
deferral by human rights, but depends on the factual situation of “armed 
conflict,” or possibly on the jus ad bellum having been implemented or 
breached. The blindness of human rights, which is otherwise plausibly 
connected to the fact that human rights is hostile to war, has to meet the fact 
that the existence of war does not depend only on the sovereign, but also on 
other sovereigns. 
  
 356. Ass’n Ekin v. France, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 323, ¶ 48.  
 357. I leave aside the obvious, yet here largely irrelevant, issue of whether a given 
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2. Towards War as a Violation of Human Rights 
The alternative take on human rights’ reading of war must therefore start 
with human rights’ hostility to war, and the notion that, contrary to the 
human rights regime, the structure of humanitarian law implies the 
existence or hypothetical existence of several sovereigns. Some clues as to 
what that alternative view is come from the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in its landmark case on the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (landmark if only because it was its first decision on 
a State–to–State complaint). The Commission faces in this case the exact 
same situation that had been presented also to the ICJ,358 but from the 
perspective of a human rights body, i.e. a body not benefiting from the 
god’s eye point of view that arbitrates between lex specialis and lex 
generalis.  
To summarize a case that has received too little attention of the type 
advocated here, the Commission produced a series of legal maneuvers that 
express in a less normalizing way that war can be approached by human 
rights as a bad thing before anything else. That approach would contrast 
with the alternative, observed in the case of the European Court, which is 
for human rights to approach war as some set of brute facts to be governed 
or managed, without any “structural bias” against the very phenomenon, 
despite the Universal Declaration’s and so many other treaties’ preambles. 
In other words, the perspective here would be that human rights can 
plausibly approach war in the way it approaches genocide, as something 
that is meaningful to its normative system, as opposed to approaching war 
only as human rights law also approaches crime, which is only indirectly 
meaningful to it (for instance in talking about war propaganda). That shift of 
perspective constitutes also a return to the political message of human 
rights, which connects humans, the Sovereign, and the repulsion of the state 
of nature to the borders of the polity and into the domain of the “state of 
war.” 
The way the African Commission implements the alternative sensibility 
of human rights follows a few simple steps. The preliminary is that, for an 
institutional body created by international law, the forceful invasion and 
occupation of one country by another country is a violation of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and the general obligation to settle international disputes 
peacefully, that is, a violation of the purposes (Article 1) and principles 
(Article 2) of the Charter of the United Nations.359 Those violations, 
  
 358. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 273; Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2006 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3 2006).   
 359. Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, African Comm’n 
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including the violation of the jus ad bellum as enshrined in the UN Charter, 
constitute a violation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
also, in that they constitute violations of the right of peoples to peace and 
security (Article 23), as well as the all–important right of peoples to self–
determination (Article 20).360 From there, “the Commission having found the 
alleged occupation of parts of the provinces of the Complainant State by the 
Respondents to be in violation of the Charter cannot turn a blind eye to the 
series of human rights violations attendants [sic] upon such occupation.”361  
In other words, occupation is by definition an illegal situation in which 
the human rights of individuals and peoples are being denied as such, 
without the need for the occupier to do anything else beyond occupying. 
Any other wrongdoing in the course of the situation of occupation will 
simply be added to the list, but all actions, whether they are legal or not for 
international humanitarian law, will be seriously tainted, as far as human 
rights are concerned, because they all stem from an original violation of 
human rights law. That initial violation, a situation that lives in legal 
anomaly, is precisely what justifies the application of humanitarian law, 
which as we saw is agnostic about how we got there and who is to be 
blamed. But human rights law on its part is not agnostic; it is a firm believer 
in the evil nature of war, to the point that it even prohibits advocating it. 
When we get to humanitarian law, which we undeniably reach because 
there has been a war, the problem will be again that of dealing with it from 
the perspective of human rights, the lex generalis. The Commission does 
that unsurprisingly in terms of interpreting the standards of the African 
Charter, over which it has interpretive jurisdiction, as opposed to dealing 
with humanitarian law itself. Technically, that sounds like the Inter–
American Commission, whom the African Commission incidentally holds 
in great esteem.362 The African Commission, however, deals with the issue 
of the lex specialis in a way that parallels exactly the key issue at stake in 
the legal relationship between the two bodies of law, that is, the connection 
between the supervising bodies’ jurisdiction and each body of law’s 
relationship to sovereignty. On the basis of the Banjul Charter,363 and “[b]y 
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 362. Article 60 reads as follows: 
 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on 
human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of 
various African instruments on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of 
African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries 
in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as from the 
provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised 
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virtue of Articles 60 and 61 the Commission holds that the Four Geneva 
Conventions and the two Additional Protocols covering armed conflicts 
constitute part of the general principles of law recognized by African States, 
and take same into consideration in the determination of this case.”364 After 
considering the violation of the jus ad bellum as a violation of human rights, 
that interpretive ground allows the Commission to translate violations of the 
jus in bello into violations of human rights standards. In an important 
interpretive move, the idea that human rights do not cease to operate in 
war365 is reinterpreted to mean that the process of war does not put an end to 
human rights, but rather constitutes a violation of it. All the violations that 
follow are simply ramifications of the fact that the invasion is a violation of 
the foundational human right, the right to self–determination, and its 
corollary right to peace and security. And both rights happen to be within 
the material jurisdiction of the African Commission.366 
This sequence of arguments allows the Commission to dare the 
incredible statement that, from the perspective of human rights law, killing 
as part of war is indeed a problem. Human rights cannot, pace what the 
Bankovic Court suggests however sweepingly, close its eyes on wartime 
killing, simply because it is war, or because it occurs abroad. War is a 
human rights issue qua war, not simply as violence; the structure or form of 
war, which distinguishes it from crime or law enforcement, and is then 
legally translated into such operative ideas as the principle of distinction, 
make it an issue of relevance to human rights. In particular, and 
astonishingly so, if one considers an alternative worldview that considers 
  
Agencies of the United Nations of which the Parties to the present 
Charter are members. 
 
African Charter, supra note 221, at art. 60.  Article 61 in turn reads as follows: 
 
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary 
measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special 
international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognised by 
Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, African 
practices consistent with international norms on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law 
recognised by African States as well as legal precedents and 
doctrine. 
 
Id.  The text is also reproduced in HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS  1457 (2d. ed., 2000). 
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artillery a legitimate means of law enforcement, wartime killing is still a 
violation of the right to life, because as far as human rights are concerned, it 
is quite simply done discriminately, on the basis of national origin.367 This 
otherwise mind–blowing statement simply echoes in substance the fact that 
the African Charter counts among its specificities the absence of any 
provision on the state of emergency and associated derogations.368 If one 
takes seriously the fact that, first, human rights do not cease in times of war, 
and second, occupation is equivalent to sovereignty in functional terms, 
then occupation as a forcible extension of jurisdiction is a forcible extension 
of the operation of human rights law itself. This results in this forcible 
exercise of sovereignty being both a violation of human rights in itself, and 
additionally subject in its modalities to the operation of human rights as 
interpreted through the lex specialis (humanitarian law), which is in turn 
triggered by the act of extending jurisdiction across borders in such a way. 
This is in essence a rejection of the possibility of States having out–of–body 
experiences, exercising State power outside of their jurisdiction. In all cases 
there will be the crossing of a border and that crossing is neither a detail in 
international law nor meaningless to human rights themselves. The spotlight 
on the exceptional character of war, through a reminder that the State is a 
legal creature and cannot therefore exist outside of its own legal operation, 
makes suddenly the line of thought behind (and including) Bankovic very 
apparent as a legitimization of extra–territorial exercises of violence as State 
acts. 
In that light, human rights do not either flatten the specificity of wartime 
violence into a normal operation of State coercive power or, as the case 
displays it well, leave unnoticed the temporary and forceful change of 
sovereignty over a territory. As a human rights body, the Commission 
actually “disapproves” of the instance of foreign occupation and finds it 
contrary to Article 23 of the African Charter. It seems reasonable to add that 
the (jus ad bellum) interests of the invading States would be better served 
within the limits of their own territory—in this case the interest in defending 
oneself against alleged incursions from neighboring sanctuaries.369 
Everything starts therefore from the fact that the ousting of sovereignty is a 
violation of human rights, as opposed to the notion that human rights claims 
simply arise because of de facto sovereignty, without notice being taken of 
the de jure/de facto transformation being by definition a breach of some 
social contract somewhere, i.e. war. Another important example of the 
ramifications of the fact that the breach of jus ad bellum is considered (a set 
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of) violation(s) of human rights is in this context the further conclusion that 
the plunder of natural resources, while also a violation of the jus in bello 
through the prohibition of pillage,370 is also a violation of the right of people 
to self–determination and in particular their permanent right to ownership 
over the natural resources of their legitimately sovereign territory.371 In that 
last case, insisting on the continuity of human rights, and in particular the 
foundational right to self–determination, leads to the further important point 
that there are limits to the power of the lex specialis maxim. What is implied 
here by necessity is that the use of resources on occupied territory, when 
seen from the right to self–determination, will not be examined by the jus in 
bello if it contradicts human rights.372 
From a human rights perspective, there is something importantly similar 
between Bankovic and the DRC case: jurisdiction matters. The difference is 
that in the former, the Court tries to reinforce some notion of formal 
sovereignty against its unstoppable functional alternative, whereas in the 
latter case the Commission signals that violation of formal sovereignty is a 
human rights violation that taints all further acts of the violating State as a 
problem. Occupation for the African Commission is illegal in itself, and we 
should be wary of the perversion of treating the result of a violation of 
international law simply in terms of “proportionality.” Extending the logic 
of the Chechnya cases to the DRC situation would mean discussing war–
violence of that sort in terms of the proportionality of means in relation to 
the (implicitly) legitimate (public order) ends of the State, something that in 
the Chechen context was already obscene, but here would certainly rise one 
or two pegs along the scale of legal cynicism.  
As a conclusion, one can note here that the DRC case as treated by the 
African Commission serves the function of reawakening human rights from 
the managerial slumber so well displayed by the European Court’s Chechen 
file. The relationship between human rights and war is one of antagonism, 
since human rights is ultimately a tool for the preservation and development 
of peace. What the DRC case points to is that the relationship between 
humanitarian law and human rights is mediated by sovereignty’s framing of 
how human rights conceive of normalcy and emergency. The application of 
distinction implies a situation of exceptional risk for human beings where 
the protection of their life is diminished by law by allowing for plausibility 
of being killed because of a uniform. The triggering of that situation implies 
the (possible, feared or actual) weakening of State structures and therefore 
the weakening of the frame that supports the system of human rights. The 
  
 369. Lieber Code, supra note 116, art. 44.  
 370. Id. at art. 93.  
 371. This is also implicit in the ICJ’s dealings with the right to self–determination of 
the Palestinian people in relationship to the “separation barrier.”  But it is not in that context 
recognized as a reversal of the lex genralis/lex specialis relationship as it is posited in general 
terms by the Court.  See Palestinian Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122. 
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importance of those State structures is recognized both by human rights law 
(from below) and by international law in general (from above). As such, the 
next obvious step would be to extend the conversation to the particular 
meeting point of the jus in bello, human rights, and the jus ad bellum, given 
that they share a central but differentiated interest in both war and 
sovereignty. If armed attacks are plausibly a violation of human rights, then 
what is the relationship between humanitarian law and armed attacks, or 
self–defense, for that matter, given the particular relationship of human 
rights to humanitarian law? The encounter between humanitarian law and 
human rights supports the notion that war is a legal construction attached to 
humanitarian law, which then explains the host of legal complications 
arising from too much proximity between human rights and war. Now, the 
question would be simply whether there is a similar relation between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, where the jus in bello would build its specificity 
both through its distant relationship with the neighboring legal field of 
human rights, and through its monopoly over the construction of war as 
war. What will remain as a background for a conversation to be had on 
issues of humanitarian intervention, "responsibility to protect," human 
security, and similar notions is that war is a legal construct attached to the 
forms of sovereignty, which is politically important to the distinct projects 
of human rights and humanitarian law.  
A QUESTION OF REFRAGMENTATION 
The foregoing discussion has tried to force some meaning into the 
formalistic distinctions that are being blurred in descriptions of 
humanitarian law and human rights as kin projects or related legal regimes. 
The relationship of human rights to humanitarian law, and a series of other 
formal distinctions that accompany both of them in their respective 
operation, are based on their different relationships to formal sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. The formalism of the distinction is warranted by the fact 
that the end of factual distinctions in contemporary conflicts 
(civilians/military, internal/international, private/public, and so on) can be 
perceived only on the basis of a backdrop constituted by a legal 
understanding of war, constructed on the otherwise arbitrary idea of 
“distinction” as a legal and a political artifact. The move to substantive, or 
functional, criteria yields difficulties that are therefore not only doctrinal, 
but also rather political, in the sense of the respective foundational 
principles of human rights and humanitarian law being precisely 
foundational. And because ultimately we are talking about war, the African 
Commission wakes us up from our technocratic slumber by reminding 
everyone that war is still a political issue and essentially a political problem, 
and the whole of contemporary international law beyond its technical 
artifices is still supposed to be dedicated to solving it. In other words, 
human rights and humanitarian law are deeply rooted in a political 
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worldview, which says something about what legitimate violence is. The 
delicate balance between the two bodies of law is organized around the idea 
of formal sovereignty and what it represents as the international legal 
formalization of the existence of many socially–contracted polities, who are 
trying to diminish the risk of violence associated with existence in a deeply 
assumed, and poorly assimilated, state of nature. Moving causally towards a 
functional or factual equivalent of the legal forms, which justify their 
arbitrary existence not from functional success but political theory, signifies 
a move towards another political universe. There is nothing inherently bad 
about moving from inter–governmental cooperation to global governance. It 
is however not “simply” a technical or even legal issue. It is a political 
program. It is an alternative political program to that of international law. 
What matters is that, as in the casual treatment of war by human rights 
law, “war” can disappear from sight as a result of the dismissal of 
formalisms that are otherwise generated by abstract political projects, such 
as political liberalism and social contract theory. The disappearance of war 
from legal sight constitutes a normalization of the state of war in the same 
way as human rights helps normalize police repression of crime, and more 
generally, State violence as presumably legitimate within its jurisdiction. To 
close the ideological circle, one would therefore logically need to turn to the 
jus ad bellum’s relationship to humanitarian law, that is, the relationship 
between the seemingly prohibitive regulation of war’s emergence and the 
exceptionalist regulation of the conduct of that prohibited, yet regulated,  
war. Based on the foregoing, the discussion of that relationship will occur 
against the backdrop of human rights’ propaganda for a type of peace that is 
essentially the absence of war. Undoubtedly the rise of contemporary 
enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention will appear here as the product of 
an equally casual dismissal of formal distinctions for seemingly higher 
purposes,373 as witnessed in the expansion of the lingo of global governance 
with such notions as “human security” or the unavoidable “R2P.” The 
passing legal framework will then hopefully help us keep together, before it 
fades completely, the notion that war is not a natural occurrence. War is and 
should be in all cases a politically assumed project, in the way it is asserted 
in unison by Clausewitz and the St. Petersburg Declaration, and as opposed 
to an exercise in the management of populations, containment of risk, or 
moral redemption. 
  
 372. See, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON EUROPE’S SEC. CAPABILITIES, A HUMAN SECURITY 
DOCTRINE FOR EUROPE (2004) (presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Javier Solana in Barcelona on Sept. 15, 2004). 
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“Every disadvantage has its advantages”   -Johan Cruyff  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every four years, the World Cup provides a visible reminder that 
football1 is the world’s game. European football clubs have capitalized on 
this popularity to generate billions of dollars from fans, media companies, 
and commercial advertisers.2 The emergence of football as a revenue 
generating enterprise has naturally led to an examination into who reaps the 
riches of football success.  
Successful clubs demonstrate a few main characteristics. Before 
considering these characteristics, it is important to note that football clubs 
have a unique position in European society. Clubs exist because a 
community of fans has associated themselves based on a love of football. 
Any successful club must try to incorporate fans because fans are the reason 
why the club exists and continues to exist. One of the most important 
aspects of a successful club is on the field success. For the top clubs, this 
usually means winning every competition the club competes in. For less 
successful clubs, this may mean finishing in a particular league position. 
Another characteristic is less visible than winning on the field of play. A 
successful club is one that lives within its financial means—a club that 
makes neither a profit nor a loss. A club with sizable yearly losses runs the 
risk of bankruptcy or seriously interfering with the integrity of the 
competition. A club that is too profitable risks complaints from fans 
regarding a lack of investment in the team. The challenge of successful 
managers is navigating these constraints. Club finances are not merely 
determined by on the field results, but are impacted by the ownership 
  
 . Johan Cruyff Football Quotes, EXPERTFOOTBALL.COM,  
http://expertfootball.com/gossip/quotes.php?search=Johan_Cruyff. Johan Cruyff is a Dutch 
football legend. He is considered one of the best five players to play the game. After his 
playing days ended, he turned to management and reestablished FC Barcelona as a force in 
football. 
 1. This paper will use the term football to describe the game that Americans know 
as soccer.    
 2. The 665 first division generated a record €11.7 billion in revenue in 2008/09. 
Jonathan Clegg, Soccer Clubs Warned Over Finances, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791904576075982800093382.html. 
However, a great deal of this revenue was spent on player salaries. 64% of the club revenues 
were spent on salaries and 73 clubs spent more than 100% of their revenues on salaries. Id.  
The twenty richest clubs collectively generated revenues in excess of €4.3 billion during the 
2008/09 season. SPORTS BUSINESS GROUP, DELOITTE, FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/UK_
SBG_DFML2011.pdf.  
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structure of the club. Clubs controlled by fans may wish to spend money on 
tangible things like players, whereas clubs controlled by investors may wish 
to earn a return on their investment. The recent economic crisis has 
disrupted the delicate equilibrium that many clubs had previously 
maintained.  
In an effort to establish some guidelines for the proper governance of a 
club, UEFA3 has formulated a new set of regulations. Part I will examine 
these new regulations. Part II will look to the nature of the corporate 
structure of football clubs in Spain, in particular FC Barcelona and Real 
Madrid. Part III will analyze the various club structures allowed in Germany 
through the examples of Bayern Munich and BVB Borussia Dortmund. Part 
IV will address the nature of club ownership in England. This examination 
will include a look at clubs owned by a benefactor and clubs run as a normal 
business. Finally, Part V will attempt to decide which corporate form best 
promotes a sustainable and successful football club.4  
II. UEFA FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES5 
The Financial Fair Play Rules owe their existence to Michel Platini, 
President of UEFA.6 Shortly after Platini took office in 2007, reform efforts 
took on greater significance due to the global recession. The recession has 
prompted a thorough reexamination of the financial conditions of clubs. 
Many clubs, including some of the leading clubs in Europe, faced and 
continue to face serious financial difficulties as a result of changes in the 
European business world.7 Platini decided that something must be done to 
encourage financial reform. Because of European Union regulations, UEFA 
is limited in the measures that it can take.8 Any measure must comply with 
the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. For instance, the Bosman decision 
prevents UEFA from controlling costs by imposing caps upon the number 
  
 3. FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) is the governing body of 
world football. UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) is the governing body of 
football in Europe. Each country has a federation or football association that governs the 
sport in the particular country. The United Kingdom is an anomaly in that it contains 
individual football associations for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Despite 
unequal market size, each national association has equal voting power in UEFA. 
 4. As mentioned earlier, success can be defined both on the field and financially. 
This paper deals entirely with the financial definition of success with only brief mentions of 
on the field successes. 
 5. UEFA, UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS EDITION 
2010 (2010) [hereinafter UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS]. 
 6. Paolo Bandini, Platini Elected Uefa President, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2007/jan/26/newsstory.sport13.  
 7. See Leander Schaerlaeckens, Rolling Out of Control, SOCCERNET.COM (Sept. 22, 
2010), http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/5580467/european-football-eating-itself. 
The European clubs collectively lost €1.2 billion for the 2008/09 season. Clegg, supra note 2. 
 8. See Robert Siekmann, Is Sport ‘Special’ in EU Law and Policy?, in THE FUTURE 
OF SPORTS LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37, 44–47 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2008). 
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of foreign, but European Union nationals in a team or preventing them from 
changing clubs after the player’s contract has expired.9  
Due to UEFA’s limitations, Platini formed an advisory group, the 
Professional Football Strategy Council, to examine what could be done to 
improve the financial regulation of the game.10 An American–style salary 
cap was considered, but ultimately discarded because of the difficulties in 
designing a system that complies with European Union law.11 Platini 
recognized that any regulation would have no chance of success if the most 
marketable clubs were opposed; therefore he also consulted with their 
representatives.12 Any reforms that UEFA may propose must abide by 
European Union labor and competition law.13 Although the European Union 
recognizes sports are a special case when considering competition law, it 
has not completely exempted sports leagues from European regulations.14 
As part of his efforts, Platini unsuccessfully petitioned the European Union 
Parliament to grant this sporting exemption from its competition law.15 
Ultimately, the Executive Committee of UEFA approved a plan called the 
  
 9. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. 
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I–4921.  
 10. Dominic Fifield, Platini Vows to Fight ‘Cheating’ English Clubs Over Debts, 
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 7, 2008,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jun/07/premierleague.chelsea. 
 11. Kevin McCarra, Platini Sends Financing Warning to Europe’s Top Clubs, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 26, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jun/26/premierleague.europeanfootball; David 
Conn, Michel Platini’s Victory for Stability Spells End to Freewheeling Culture, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 26, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/may/26/michel-platini-uefa-club-finances. See 
also Thomas M. Schiera, Note, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow 
European Football to Reestablish the Completive Balance That It Helped Destroy?, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 709 (2007) (examining the legality of various methods to restrict player 
salaries); Christine Snyder, Note, Perfect Pitch: How U.S. Sports Financing and Recruiting 
Models Can Restore Harmony Between FIFA and the EU, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 499 
(2009) (examining why FIFA plans relating to player employment conflict with European 
Union Law). The most applicable provisions are contained in the competition provisions of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, specifically Article 101 (Article 81 TEC). See Schiera, supra note 11, 
at 731-32; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities art. 101, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 O. J. (C 115) 1.  
 12. Matt Scott, Platini Renews His Fight for European Salary Cap, THE GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), July 8, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jul/08/2. 
 13. See Schiera, supra note 11.  
 14. Snyder, supra note 11, at 516–18. However, the EU Sports Commissioner has 
recently stated that the EU will investigate options such as caps on transfer fees. 
Commissioner Vassilieu: ‘I’m Shocked by Size of Football Transfer Fees, Euractive.com 
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/en/sports/commissioner-vassiliou-im-shocked-
size-football-transfer-fees-interview-502414 [hereinafter Commissioner Vassilieu]. 
 15. Matt Scott & David Gow, Platini Calls on European Parliament to Make Sport a 
Special Case, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/feb/18/michel-platini-uefa-european-parliament. 
See also Snyder, supra note 13, at 516–18. 
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Financial Fair Play Rules with the support of wealthy owners.16 The 
European Union has recently stated that it approves of the rules laid out by 
UEFA.17 The Financial Fair Play rules have not yet taken effect, but Platini 
remains firm in his assertion that clubs will be excluded from the 
Champions League18 if they do not meet the requirements.19  
The Financial Fair Play Rules provide a basis for how a club should 
operate in order to obtain a license to compete in a UEFA competition20 like 
the Champions League. Although UEFA sets the standards for licensing, the 
actual licensing itself is every year done by the national association or the 
national league.21 The regulations require that the applicant be either a 
registered member of the association or have a contractual relationship with 
the registered member.22 However, any alterations within the past three 
years to the legal form of the club to evade the regulations and gain a 
license are forbidden.23 This would seem to be targeted toward preventing 
the creation of subsidiaries or other related companies solely to hold debt or 
to cover the club’s losses. The regulations take great care to inform 
applicants that the clubs have a continuing duty to provide any information 
required to make a decision concerning licensing.24 The Fair Play Rules are 
not just financial regulations, but include structural requirements for proper 
  
 16. Patrick Barclay, Michel Platini Finds Ally in Roman Abramovich as War on Debt 
Culture Intensifies, TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/european_football/article6813001.ece; UEFA 
Approves Financial Fair Play Rules for European Clubs, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/27/uefa-michel-platini-club-financial-
regulations. 
 17. Developing the European Dimension in Sport, at 12, COM (2011) 12 final (Jan. 
18, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Commission Communication], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/doc/communication/communication_en.pdf. 
 18. The UEFA Champions League is an UEFA–wide competition run by UEFA. The 
Champions League includes the best clubs in Europe, including those that have not won their 
league the previous year. The competition takes place from September until May. Clubs play 
on Tuesdays and Wednesdays throughout the year. A number of clubs are given automatic 
places in the group stage, while other clubs must proceed through qualifying rounds. 
England, Spain, and Italy each have 3 guaranteed places in the group stage and 1 place in the 
final qualifying round. Germany has 2 automatic places and 1 qualifying place. The 32 team 
group stage contains eight groups of 4 teams. Each team in the group plays the other teams 
home and away. The top two teams in each group advance to the knockout rounds. The 
teams are drawn in a playoff system with the winner after the home and away legs advancing 
to the next round. The final is a single game played in May on a neutral field.  
 19. David Conn, Michel Platini Will Expel Debt-Laden Clubs from the Champions 
League, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/aug/26/michel-platini-champions-league. 
 20. UEFA competitions include the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA 
Europa League. 
 21. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 5. The license can be 
withdrawn if the club becomes bankrupt or is liquidated. Id. art. 14. 
 22. Id. art. 12. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. art. 13. 
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operations. Among the requirements are a youth development program, 
player registration, training facilities, a general manager, a financial officer, 
a media officer, a supporter liaison officer, a head coach, and assistants.25 
The organizational requirements are not very onerous for clubs that 
compete in European competitions because most clubs have required 
infrastructure in place. The challenge for clubs is to fulfill the break–even 
requirement.26 UEFA determines that a club has broken even for the year 
when the relevant expenses exceed the relevant income by less than €5 
million for the prior year.27 UEFA permits small losses because on the field 
upsets and disappointments are expected in an unpredictable business like 
sports. UEFA recognized that many large clubs could not currently pass the 
break even requirement, thus the amount of any acceptable deviation will 
gradually decrease to the €5 million goal. A loss of €45 million for the 
2013/14 and 2014/15 monitoring periods is acceptable, but this threshold is 
then lowered to €30 million for the following two periods.28 Although the 
losses are permitted, UEFA requires that these losses be covered by 
contributions from an equity holder.29 This ensures that creditors, especially 
other football clubs, will be paid. Although short term financial results may 
be acceptable, the applicant must demonstrate the future ability of the club 
to continue as a going concern.30 Required documentation includes 
information about the club, the club’s subsidiaries,31 and controlling 
parties.32 UEFA has stated that a club that has a wage to revenue ratio 
greater than 70% or a net debt greater than 100% of revenue will be closely 
scrutinized.33 Because the owners of many of the clubs have sufficient 
resources to evade these simple requirements, UEFA has set out a list of 
relevant income and expenses and required that they be valued at their fair 
market value in an arm’s length transaction.34 
Although many of Fair Play provisions are already in place, this is the 
first time that UEFA has managed to impose some strict standards of 
corporate governance on its member clubs. With the state of the economy, 
  
 25. Id. arts. 17–18, 20, 25, 28–30, 35, 36–39. 
 26. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 57.  
 27. Id. art. 61. Platini noted at a press conference in January 2011 that 11 clubs 
would potentially have been excluded from the 2010/11 Champions League and the 2010/11 
Europa League. Clegg, supra note 2. Platini also noted that despite the €11.7 billion in 
revenue, the top division clubs collectively lost €1.2 billion. Id. 
 28. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 61. The 2013/14 monitoring 
period begins with the 2011/12 season. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. art. 52. 
 31. Many clubs own their own stadium or have other commercial interests related to 
the professional team. Separating these from the professional team has benefits in regard to 
limiting liability.  
 32. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 46. 
 33. Id. art. 62. 
 34. Id. art. 58. 
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football clubs can only benefit from moving towards a sustainable financial 
model. Although firm rules are in place, it remains to be seen if UEFA will 
actually exclude high profile clubs that fail to meet the break even 
requirement or bow to sponsorship and political pressure. 
III. SPANISH SOCIO MODEL 
The Spanish governance model adopted by FC Barcelona (“Barcelona”) 
and Real Madrid CF (“Real Madrid”) is a model that has remained 
relatively unchanged in the century since the foundation of both clubs. Fans 
who pay a modest fee are given the opportunity to exercise some measure of 
control over club governance. Even among Spanish clubs, this fan-
controlled structure is anomaly. This model has been named the “socio” 
model after the Spanish word for fan. 
A. FC Barcelona 
Futbol Club Barcelona is one of the most famous clubs in the world. 
Barcelona has transformed itself into a global brand through television 
exposure and summer tours of North America and Asia. The result of these 
efforts is shown in the five million Barcelona jerseys that have been sold in 
the last five years. 35 Barcelona was founded by Swiss, British, and Spanish 
players in 1899.36 From humble beginnings, Joan Gamper provided the 
driving force that led to a club with 12,000 members after only 25 years.37 
From the 1920s until Franco’s death in 1975, the Spanish government 
attempted to extinguish Catalan culture.38 Only at Barcelona games were 
Catalans allowed to publicly speak in Catalan.39 As a result, Barcelona 
became inextricably identified as a symbol of the region of Catalunya.40 
The organization of the club gives the fans considerable influence. In 
keeping with the club’s original theme, the governing power resides in its 
  
 35. Alex Miller, Exclusive: Manchester United Lead in Global Shirt Sales; Liverpool 
in Chasing Pack, SPORTINGINTELLIGENCE.COM (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2010/08/31/revealed-the-worlds-best-selling-club-
football-shirts-310802/. 
 36. JIMMY BURNS, BARÇA: A PEOPLE’S PASSION 76–77 (rev. ed. 2009). 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. FRANKLIN FOER, HOW SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD 200–04 (rev. ed 2006). 
 39. Id. at 195, 204–05. 
 40. Despite Franco’s disfavor, the club did manage to build Camp Nou, its 99,000 
seat stadium, and win numerous trophies during the Franco era. BURNS, supra note 36, at 41, 
172. Barcelona fans adamantly believe that Franco influenced the transfer of Alfredo 
DiStefano to Real Madrid instead of Barcelona. DiStefano was an Argentinean that sought to 
play in Spain during the 1950s. Barcelona had extensive negotiations with DiStefano before 
the Spanish Federation imposed a ban on the signing of foreign players. As a result of the 
ban, the Federation told Barcelona and Madrid that they would be forced to share the player. 
Eventually, Barcelona agreed to give up its claim on the player. Id. at 158–59. 
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members. 41 Barcelona currently has over 170,000 socios42 as a result of a 
worldwide campaign to generate revenue and loyalty to the club. Despite 
the global reach of Barcelona, non-Spanish members constitute less than 
20% of the socios.43 The requirements to become a member and maintain 
membership are simply the payment of a relatively modest annual fee as 
well as good behavior by the member.44 Every socio is subject to regulation 
of the five person disciplinary commission, which can remove a member for 
failure to pay dues or a violation of club behavioral regulations.45 Because 
the typical socio is distant from the governing of the club, a member’s 
trustee serves as an independent advisor and defender of the socio’s rights.46 
Club membership entitles the fan to privileges like a bimonthly magazine 
and a monthly email as well as the right to vote.47 The socio may vote to 
elect the President and the Board of Directors that manage the day to day 
operations of the club.48 The socio may also occasionally be called upon to 
vote on extraordinary issues affecting the club.49  
  
 41. Sean Hamil, Geoff Walters, Lee Watson, The Model of Governance at FC 
Barcelona: Balancing Member Democracy, Commercial Strategy, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Sporting Performance, 11 SOCCER & SOC. 475, 496 (2010).   
 42. Alex Duff, Barcelona Soccer Club Members Vote to Sue Laporta After Loss, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-16/barcelona-
soccer-club-members-vote-to-sue-laporta-after-loss.html. 
 43. FC BARCELONA, MEMORIA 2008–2009, at 91 (2009). 
 44. FC BARCELONA, FC BARCELONA STATUTES 12–13 (2009) [hereinafter 
BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES], 
http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/downloads/sala_premsa/estatuts/ESTATUS_ANGLES_20
09_COMPLETS_baixa.pdf. Barcelona has recently controversially closed membership to the 
general public, limiting membership to former members and members who have a family 
member who is a member. Members Zone, Advantages, Information and Special Offers, FC 
BARCELONA, http://www.fcbarcelona.cat/web/english/socis/fes-te_soci/nova/info_senior.html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010).The cost to join the club is currently €161.50. Id. 
 45. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 12–13, 58, 66–69. 
 46. Id. at 55–57. The member’s trustee must be a member of the club and serves a 5 
year term. The selection by the Board of Directors is ratified by the Assembly of Delegates. 
Id. at 56. 
 47. Members Zone, Advantages, Information and Special Offers, FC BARCELONA, 
http://www.fcbarcelona.cat/web/english/socis/avantatges/viu.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2010). 
 48. Hamil, supra note 41, at 496. As with US citizens, the right to vote does not 
necessarily mean that a member will exercise it. The record turnout for a Barcelona election 
is only 54.7%. Id. at 482. 
 49. Id. at 486. An example of an extraordinary issue is the vote on shirt sponsorship. 
Barcelona traditionally has never had a shirt sponsor. In 2005, the members approved a 
proposal to allow shirt sponsorship. Although the board favored passage in order to increase 
revenue for playing operations, Barcelona later decided to place UNICEF on its shirt at no 
cost to UNICEF. A number of the members were not pleased about this loss of potential 
revenue. Id. at 493. Barcelona has recently announced that it will be sponsored by the Qatar 
foundation for 5 seasons, commencing at the start of the 2011/12 season. The Qatar 
foundation will pay the club €30 million per year. Paolo Bandini, Barcelona Are More Than 
Just a Club. They Are a Business, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 10, 2010), 
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A club with significant business interests like Barcelona cannot feasibly 
be directly governed by votes of its thousands of members.50 In order to 
create a structure that is better suited to govern, Barcelona has an Assembly 
of Delegates. The Assembly of Delegates consists of three thousand 
members serving two year terms.51 The vast majority of Delegates are club 
members chosen at random, but board members, former presidents, 
members of the disciplinary and economic commissions, and up to twenty 
five members chosen by the board are also included.52 The Assembly is 
tasked with general supervisory functions like approving the club’s budget 
and annual report.53 The Assembly is also given the power to censure the 
Board and the President as well as to appoint the members of the economic 
commission, which advises the Board of financial matters involving the 
club.54   
An effectively run business must have a small core of individuals 
running the day to day business. At Barcelona, this role is fulfilled by the 
Board of Directors and the President. The President and Board of Directors 
are elected on a single electoral slate for six year terms.55 The Board is 
given the function of managing club operations while the President oversees 
the club.56 The Board does not have a fixed membership and can vary 
between fourteen to twenty one members depending upon how the President 
and Board wish to divide responsibilities.57 The club has wisely chosen to 
set up a series of checks on the power of the President and the Board. The 
President is not permitted to serve more than two terms as president.58 
Because the President and Directors are jointly liable for any financial 
damage to the club resulting from malfeasance, the President and every 
Director must provide a €1.5 million guarantee to the club as part of the 
election process.59 The President and Board are not only subject to regular 
  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/dec/10/barcelona-record-sponsor-qatar-
foundation. 
 50. There is a club that is directly governed by its supporters. Ebbsfleet United is 
owned by myfootballclub, an online venture. myfootballclub allows its members to vote 
directly on club policies, but not to pick who plays on the field. David Conn, AFC 
Wimbledon and Ebbsfleet Have Different Reasons for FA Cup Hope, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), 
Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/nov/05/afc-wimbledon-
ebbsfleet-united-fa-cup. 
 51. Hamil, supra note 41, at 480; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 18. 
 52. Hamil, supra note 41, at 480. 
 53. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 15–17. 
 54. See Hamil, supra note 41, at 480; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 
57. 
 55. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 27, 43–44. 
 56. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483. 
 57. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 24. 
 58. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483. A board member is allowed to serve an unlimited 
number of terms. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 27. 
 59. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 32–
33. Spanish sports law provides that a board of directors must provide a guarantee of 15% of 
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elections, but also to no confidence votes if 5% of the voting members are 
not satisfied with the club’s governance.60  
As with transitions in national governments, presidential succession at 
Barcelona can be a difficult time for the club. In the summer of 2010, 
Sandro Rosell was elected president to replace the outgoing Joan Laporta.61 
Rosell and Laporta were once allies, but a dispute arose in 2005 that 
prompted Rosell’s resignation from his vice presidency.62 Predictably, this 
tension continued after Rosell came to power. Laporta had previously 
reported that Barcelona had made a €11 million profit for 2009–2010.63 
Rosell instituted a Deloitte & Touche audit that uncovered a loss of €79.60 
million.64 Rosell also stated that Barcelona had €392 million in debt at the 
end of the 2009–10 season.65 This debt promoted Barcelona to take out a 
£130 million loan to meet short term commitments.66 Rosell proposed 
personally suing Laporta for €48.7 million on the basis of financial 
mismanagement of the club.67 The member assembly voted narrowly in 
favor of the suit.68 
  
the club’s budget for the year. Spanish Sports Act 7th Additional Protocol (B.O.E. 1990, 10), 
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1990/10/17/pdfs/A30397-30411.pdf. The guarantee 
is enforceable by La Liga, the Spanish professional league. Id. Any action for damages may 
be initiated by the Assembly by a majority vote of those present within four months of the 
end of the fiscal year. Id. Spanish law also provides for the 15% guarantee to be reduced by 
any profits accumulated by the club. Royal Decree on Sports Corporations 2d Additional 
Protocol (B.O.E. 1999, 1251), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1999/07/17/pdfs/A27070-27080.pdf.. 
 60. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 51–52. However, removal 
requires a two third majority of the votes cast. Id. at 54. 
 61. Barcelona’s New President Says Club Will Not End Cesc Fabregas Pursuit, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jun/14/barcelona-cesc-fabregas-arsenal. 
 62. Sid Lowe, Execs, Lies, and Videotape, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 25, 2005), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2005/oct/24/europeanfootball.sport2. 
 63. Sid Lowe, End of an Expensive Era, But Barcelona’s Players Prove Priceless, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/oct/18/barcelona-end-of-expensive-era. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Matt Scott, With Their Worrying Balance Sheet, Can Barcelona Afford Cesc 
Fabregas?, THE GUARDIAN (U.K), July 14, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/14/barcelona-debt-finance-fabregas. Rosell’s 
rhetoric was a bit alarmist and probably overstated for political purposes. The presence of a 
large amount of short term debt does not necessarily mean that the club is in poor financial 
shape. How Can Barcelona Afford Cesc Fabregas?, SWISS RAMBLE, 
http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2010/05/how-can-barcelona-afford-cesc-fabregas.html (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 66. Barcelona Take Out £130m Santander and La Caixa Loan to Pay Wages, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 14, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/14/barcelona-
loan-santander-la-caixa. 
 67. Lowe, End of an Expensive Era, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. Interesting enough, Rosell himself abstained from voting. Id. As the legal 
process is not yet complete, Laporta has not yet been forced to relinquish his guarantee. 
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Barcelona is probably the most famous example of the fan–owned club 
in the world. Barcelona has exploited this unique situation in positioning 
itself as a club of the people. In conjunction with the club’s attractive style 
of play,69 the club’s democratic structure is very appealing to potential fans 
outside of Spain. The club’s structure also has economic advantages. The 
members provide a substantial amount of financial support to the club 
through their member dues.70 Additionally, the widespread membership 
forces the Barcelona leadership to look beyond their parochial interests. 
Despite the club’s significant fan involvement, there are substantial 
drawbacks to the Barcelona model. Because Barcelona is committed to 
ownership by its fans, its legal structure does not permit equity to be sold in 
the club. If the club confronts a future cash crisis, the club is limited in the 
ways that it can raise cash. This problem is tempered by the fact that 
Spanish banks have been extremely willing to lend money to other football 
clubs, as well as Barcelona itself.71 A bank that is a creditor of Barcelona 
would be extremely unwilling to be seen as the bank that forced the 
dissolution of the club. Along with the weaknesses in the share structure, 
the populist leadership of the club can be seen as a negative. As with any 
democratic election, there is the danger of politics and nasty campaigning. 
Furthermore, the Catalan character of the club makes the club a tool for 
political gain in Catalunya, as demonstrated by Laporta’s campaign for the 
Parliament of Catalunya.72 These aspects can distract from the underlying 
purpose of the club as a sporting entity. Additionally, the elective structure 
allows for the leadership of the club to change rather suddenly. Barcelona 
appears to have had rather good luck with its leaders, but it is certainly 
possible that an ill–advised choice of president could create significant 
financial difficulties. Barcelona’s club structure allows for fan input but 
lacks the continuity in leadership that a corporation can offer. 
B. Real Madrid 
Real Madrid is a probably the most famous club in the world. Through 
adept marketing of its superstars, Real Madrid has sold over 6 million 
jerseys over the past six years and has topped the Deloitte Money List as the 
  
 69. Barcelona utilizes a ball possession style of play that emphasizes the use of many 
short passes. This results in a many scoring opportunities, but also has the advantage of 
denying scoring chances to the opponent. The December 2010 5–0 victory over Real Madrid 
is a great example of Barcelona’s style. See, e.g., Brian Phillips, All Hail Barcelona, 
SLATE.COM (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2278915/. 
 70. Duff, supra note 42. 
 71. BURNS, supra note 36, at 349. 
 72. Giles Tremlett, Barcelona’s Former Chairman Joan Laporta Adds Sex to 
Catalan Separatism, GUARDIAN.CO.UK. (Nov. 14, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/14/barcelona-joan-laporta-catalan-separatism. 
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richest club in the world.73 However, Real Madrid did not become world–
famous overnight. Real Madrid was founded as Madrid Futbol Club on 
March 6, 1902.74 At the outset of the club, the governing structure was very 
important as evidenced by the fact that the club’s board of directors was 
elected even before the formal paperwork was filed. 75 By 1912, the club 
had 450 members and the members were able to build a stadium.76 In 1920, 
the club had received sufficient prominence to receive the “real” 
designation from King Alfonso XIII.77 During Franco’s dictatorship, Real 
Madrid became a public relations device both internationally and 
domestically because of its location in the capital of Spain.78 Real Madrid’s 
fame results not only from its marketing success but also its nine European 
Cups, including the first five cups staged.79   
The club is organized in a similar manner to Barcelona. Members of Real 
Madrid vote for the President and Board of Directors of the club.80 As of the 
2009 annual report, Real Madrid has 93,587 members that paid €143 per 
year for member privileges.81 These members not only had to pay the 
required yearly fee, but also gain the recommendation of two current socios 
in order to join the club.82 These privileges include not only the right to 
vote, but also priority in the purchasing of tickets.83 Like Barcelona, Real 
Madrid socios are also subject to discipline if the socios fail to pay dues or 
conduct themselves in an appropriate manner.84  
As decisions can be better considered by a relatively small body, the 
members are represented at the Member Assembly. Unlike Barcelona’s 
decision to randomly select delegates to its member assembly, Real Madrid 
has chosen to elect its 1,992 ordinary members for 4 year terms.85  Because 
of the interest in the election by socios, the club has required that the voting 
  
 73. Miller, supra note 35; DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 74. PHIL BALL, WHITE STORM: 101 YEARS OF REAL MADRID 50 (rev. ed. 2003). 
Ironically, the meeting took place in a store owned by Catalans. Id. at 45–46. 
 75. Id. at 50–51. On March 9, the club’s first game was played after the members’ 
dues were collected. The monthly dues were 2 pesetas. Id. 
 76. Id. at 52. 
 77. Id. at 53. The real designation is a mark of royal patronage and permits the club 
to include a crown in its seal. 
 78. Id. at 109. 
 79. Football’s Premier Club Competition, UEFA.COM (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/index.html. The Champions League 
replaced the European Cup in 1992. Id. 
 80. REAL MADRID C.F., ESTATUTOS SOCIALES 11-12 (2009) [hereinafter REAL 
MADRID CLUB STATUTES], 
http://www.realmadrid.com/StaticFiles/RealMadrid/img/pdf/LibroEstatutosSociales.pdf. 
 81. REAL MADRID C.F. GENERAL REPORT 2008–2009, at 33 (2009) [hereinafter REAL 
MADRID 2009 REPORT]. 
 82. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 7. 
 83. REAL MADRID 2009 REPORT, supra note 81, at 33. 
 84. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 9–10. 
 85. REAL MADRID 2009 REPORT, supra note 81, at 32. 
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for delegates take place in person.86 Like Barcelona, the Member Assembly 
also includes a number of extraordinary members, including the 13 
members of the Board of Directors, the President, and former club 
presidents.87 The Member Assembly is tasked with regular annual matters 
like approving the budget as well as extraordinary measures like 
disciplining the President and authorizing the club to borrow money.88 
The socios elect the President as the head of an electoral slate that 
includes the President and the Board of Directors.89 At the time of the 
election, the President must be Spanish and a member of the club for ten or 
more consecutive years.90 When standing for the 4 year term, the candidates 
for President must provide a substantial bank guarantee.91 In 2009, the 
socios of Real Madrid elected Florentino Perez to serve as president.92 This 
is currently Perez’s second stint as president. His first stint lasted from 2000 
until his resignation in 2006.93 The latter half of his term was characterized 
by on the field disappointment. Perez had lured a number of stars from other 
clubs at great cost in order to create a team of superstars.94 Since the 
Champions League victory in 2003, Real Madrid has failed to advance from 
the first knockout round of the Champions League every year.95  Despite the 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 16–17. 
 89. REAL MADRID C.F. ELECCIONES A PRESIDENTE Y JUNTA DIRECTIVA–12/06/2009, 
at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
&blobheadername1=Content-
disposition&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DNORMASELECTORALES.pd
f&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1202886663591&ssbinary=true. The 
number of members of the Board may vary from five to twenty. REAL MADRID CLUB 
STATUTES, supra note 80, at 18. 
 90. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 81, at 19. 
 91. Id. For the 2009 race, the guarantee amounted to €57 million. Election Rules, 
REAL MADRID C.F., 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite/en/1202772523299/noticia/Noticia/Election_rules.ht
m (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). At Barcelona, the guarantee does not have to be formalized 
until just before the Board assumes office. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 51. 
 92. Organogram, REAL MADRID C.F., 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite/en/Club/1193041516782/EstructuraOrganizativa/Org
anogram.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 93. Sid Lowe, Lock Up Your Glacticos-Florentino Perez Is Poised to Return to Real 
Madrid, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 13, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/may/13/real-madrid-florentino-perez-election. 
 94. Perez paid €440 million in three years for stars like  Luis Figo, Zinedine Zidane, 
Ronaldo, and David Beckham. Id. The Portuguese midfielder Luis Figo was acquired from 
Barcelona in 2000. The French midfield Zidane arrived from the Italian club Juventus in 
2001. The Brazilian striker Ronaldo came from Inter Milan in 2002. The English midfielder 
David Beckham arrived from Manchester United in 2003. 
 95. Sid Lowe, Lyon Send Cristiano Ronaldo’s Real Madrid Packing, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/mar/10/real-
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disappointing on the field results, the Galacticos project96 was a tremendous 
commercial success, propelling Real Madrid into the title of the world’s 
richest club.97 When Perez was elected again in 2009, he instituted a similar 
project. The club took out a €152 million loan to finance purchases in the 
summer of 2009.98 The club surpassed the world record transfer fee99 twice 
in the span of a few weeks. The Brazilian forward Kaka was signed for 
€68.5 million from AC Milan before the Portuguese forward Cristiano 
Ronaldo was signed for €93.5 million from Manchester United.100 Despite 
the substantial outlay, the club still failed to advance to the second knockout 
round of the Champions League or win the Spanish League title. During the 
summer of 2010, Perez wisely decided to refrain from wild spending on 
players and hired the accomplished manager Jose Mourinho.101 
The club structure of Real Madrid has a number of similar characteristics 
to the Barcelona structure, especially in regard to fan engagement. 
Additionally, because of the wealth requirements to gain elective office, the 
club is usually run by competent businessmen. These businessmen have 
managed the Real Madrid brand quite well. The commercial success has led 
to Real Madrid’s placement at the top of the Deloitte Football Money 
League. However, the same businessmen who have shown such great 
judgment in building their fortunes often have abandoned good sense for on 
the field matters. Money is often spent on star offensive players that the 
manager does not necessarily want and that unbalance the team. The 
pressure that the fans and the President place on the team can be 
suffocating, thus resulting in a high turnover rate of its managers. The club 
has changed managers about every year since the last Champions League 
trophy. This impatience has a severely negative impact upon developing the 
  
madrid-lyon-champions-league1. As of the completion of this paper, Real Madrid was tied 1-
1 going into the second leg of the first knockout round of the 2010/11 Champions League. 
 96. In English, galacticos means star. Real Madrid gained this derisory designation 
because it had acquired a number of world stars based on marketing potential and apparently 
without regard as to how so many offensive players could play together. 
 97. DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 9. 
 98. See Sid Lowe, Revealed: The Loans Real Madrid Took Out After Kaka and 
Ronaldo Deals, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/16/real-madrid-loans-debt. 
 99. Unlike in American sports, neither free agency nor trading players is very 
common. Players usually change clubs when a second club pays a transfer fee to the first 
club for the registration rights of the player. Cristiano Ronaldo’s transfer was the most paid 
by any club for a single transfer. 
 100. Manchester United’s Cristiano Ronaldo Seals Six-Year Deal with Real Madrid, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 26, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/26/cristiano-
ronaldo-manchester-united-real-madrid.  As of January 1, 2010, Ronaldo has been a huge on 
the field success while Kaka has struggled with poor form and injury. 
 101. Sid Lowe, Jose Mourinho Represents Real Madrid’s Last Throw of the Dice, 
THE OBSERVER (U.K), Aug. 29, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/aug/29/jose-mourinho-real-madrid. Mourinho 
managed the most recent Champions League winner, Inter Milan. Id.  
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product on the field for the medium term. Perez has apparently resolved this 
problem by appointing Mourinho as manager, but it remains to be seen 
whether the socios will turn on Mourinho if Real Madrid do not win this 
year. The short term thinking brought on by officials with relatively short 
terms can damage the club in the long term. 
C.  S.A.D.s 
At their founding, Real Madrid and Barcelona were not alone in having a 
socio club structure. Virtually every club in Spain was formed in a similar 
way. However, the limited success of the other clubs limited the financial 
performance of the clubs and the clubs lived beyond their financial means. 
In 1990, the Spanish government required all clubs to form themselves into 
a Sociedades Anonimas Deportiva (S.A.D.).102 The clubs’ debts were 
canceled and shares were given to the individual members.103 Gradually, the 
shares were collected by wealthy supporters and the poor financial 
performance continued.104 As of March 2010, the overall debt in the Spanish 
league is estimated at €3.5 billion.105 The third most successful club over the 
past five years, Valencia C.F. owes €600 million.106 Despite the best 
intentions of the Spanish government, the required reorganization has done 
nothing except transfer control from the club’s fans to a few wealthy 
individuals. The lesson of Spain shows that one type of club structure is not 
preferable to the other if the same bad management remains in charge. 
IV. GERMAN MODEL 
The Bundesliga, Germany’s top professional division, has the unique 
distinction of being the only major European football league where its teams 
collectively make a profit.107 The Bundesliga also has the highest average 
attendance of the five major European leagues in part because of its fan-
  
 102. Spanish Sports Act 9th Additional Protocol (B.O.E. 1990, 10), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1990/10/17/pdfs/A30397-30411.pdf.. See also Hamil, supra note 
39, at 479.  Only FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, Athletic Bilbao, and Osasuna were excepted 
from this requirement because they had recorded a positive account balance during the 
1985/86 season. Id. at 480. The Societas Anonimas is the equivalent of the UK limited 
company and the US corporation. Javier Aroyo, Spain, in EUROPEAN COMPANY STRUCTURES 
215, 216 (Michael J. Oltmanns ed., 1998). 
 103. Hamil, supra note 41, at 479. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Sid Lowe, Domination of Barcelona and Real Madrid Making Spain the New 
Scotland, THE OBSERVER (U.K), Mar. 20, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/mar/28/barcelona-real-madrid-spain. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Jamie Jackson, How the Bundesliga Puts the Premier League to Shame, THE 
OBSERVER (U.K.), Apr. 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/apr/11/bundesliga-premier-league. 
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friendly measures of low ticket prices and direct fan involvement in club 
affairs. 108 This financial strength may have come at the cost of success in 
the Champions League, as no Bundesliga team has won the Champions 
League since 2001.109 The governing body of German Football, the 
Deutsher Fußball–Bund, has made certain provisions for governance that 
has helped lead to such great financial strength. In 1998, the Bundesliga 
permitted its member clubs to adopt a few different club structures as long 
as the club controls the new structure (known as the 50+1 Rule).110 These 
provisions allow for a number of unique options in structuring a club. 
A. The Traditional Structure (e.V.) 
Until the late 1990s, the typical Bundesliga club was organized as an 
eingetrager verein (e.V.).111 The e.V. has legal personhood and provides for 
restricted legal liability for its members.112 The e.V. has a limited set of 
requirements that includes at least seven members, a board, and a charter.113 
The e.V. is attractive to a more informal grouping of individuals because it 
has no capital requirements, no accounts publication requirements, and no 
fixed organizational structure other than the requirement of a board.114 
Another advantageous feature of German corporate law allows for an e.V. 
to own profit–seeking enterprises.115 As a football club structure, the e.V. 
provides a strong voice for the member–fans who ultimately control the 
club. However, many larger German clubs have moved away from this 
structure for a variety of reasons. Although the fan input is important, the 
club management can be distracted by petty issues like parent complaints 
about their children’s playing time. These minor disputes can paralyze or 
fracture the management of the club. The minimal central control makes it 
difficult to make long–term decisions necessary for the large professional 
club and poses an obstacle when attempting to exploit important 
commercial revenue streams. 
  
 108. Id. La Liga attracted an average of 28,478 fans, Ligue 1 (France) 21,034, Serie A 
(Italy) 25,304 and the Premier League 35,592. These figures are dwarfed by the Bundesliga’s 
average of 41,904. Id. 
 109. Id. In this period of time, only Spanish (3), Italian (3), English (2), and 
Portuguese teams have won Champions League titles. However, German teams have made 
two losing appearances in the final.  
 110. Uwe Wilkesmann & Doris Blutner, Going Public: The Organizational 
Restructuring of German Football Clubs, 3 SOCCER & SOC. 19, 27 (2002).  
 111. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, 
§§ 21, 65 (Ger.), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bgb/index.html, translated at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. 
 112. Id. §§ 31, 31a.  
 113. Id. §§ 25, 26, 56, 57. 
 114. Annette Zimmer, et al., The Legacy of Subsidiarity: The Nonprofit Sector in 
Germany, in FUTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: MAKING CENTRAL EUROPEAN NONPROFIT-
ORGANISATIONS WORK 681, 691 (Eckhard Priller & Annettee Zimmer eds., 2004). 
 115. BGB § 22.  
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B. AGs 
A number of clubs have moved to the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) structure, 
including Bayern Munich, Germany’s most successful club.116 The AG is 
the German equivalent of the public limited company or American 
corporation.117 An AG is characterized by a dual board structure.118 The 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is elected at the shareholders’ general 
meeting.119 The Aufsichtsrat is charged with appointing, consulting and 
supervising the managing board (Vorstand).120 A member of the 
Aufsichtsrat is forbidden from membership on the Vorstand in order to 
eliminate conflicts of interest.121 German law also limits the terms of 
members of the Aufsichtsrat to five years to ensure that the stockholders 
have the opportunity to choose whether to continue with the management 
composition.122 The Vorstand is charged with running the operations of the 
AG.  German law does not provide a limit to the number of members of the 
Vorstand, but does provide that the term of a member may not exceed five 
years without reappointment.123 In AGs with a wide range of business 
interests, each member of the multi–person Vorstand may be given different 
responsibilities.124 The members on the Vorstand act jointly for liability 
purposes and thus all members of the Vorstand must agree on an action 
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.125 Because of its 
popularity in German business, German law provides a very defined 
corporate structure for organizations that adopt the AG model.      
Bayern Munich serves as a good model for demonstrating the AG 
structure in football. As Bundesliga rules prevent the club from constituting 
itself as an AG owned entirely by individual shareholders, Bayern Munich’s 
  
 116. ULRICH HESSE-LICHTENBERGER, TOR!: THE STORY OF GERMAN FOOTBALL 161 
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Butler, supra note 118, at 562–63. 
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130,000 members pay an annual fee of €50 to belong to Bayern Munich 
e.V. 126  The members elect their president–currently Uli Hoeneß–and two 
vice presidents. 127 By virtue of its 87.4% stake in Bayern Munich AG, 
which owns the professional part of the club, the e.V. complies with the 
Bundesliga’s 50+1 control requirement. 128 The remaining stake in the AG is 
owned by Adidas and Audi. 129 As required by law, Bayern Munich AG is 
governed by an Aufsichtsrat and a Vorstand. Bayern Munich AG’s articles 
of incorporation provide for a nine member Aufsichtsrat.130 Significant 
members of the Aufsichtsrat include Hoeneß, the chairman of Audi, and the 
CEO of Adidas.131 This ensures that the most powerful shareholders can 
exercise some measure of control over the company. Bayern Munich AG is 
ultimately run by the four member Vorstand, chaired by Karl–Heinz 
Rummenigge, a former Bayern Munich player. 132    
Bayern Munich is an exceptionally well–run club from a financial 
perspective. The club has made a profit for seventeen straight years.133 In 
the latest Deloitte Football Money League, Bayern had the fourth highest 
turnover at €323.0 million.134 Bayern Munich has managed to achieve this 
financial prosperity in a balanced manner. Bayern Munich owns its own 
stadium, the Allianz Arena, which generates 21% of the club’s revenue 
while keeping ticket prices affordable for fans.135 Bayern Munich’s 
commercial sponsorships bring in a football record €172.9 million, which 
constitutes 553 of the club’s revenue.136 Most remarkable is that Bayern has 
managed to pay only 48% of its turnover on wages while still remaining 
incredibly effective on the field.137 
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 134. DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 12. 
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revenue). See also How Can Bayern Munich Pay Franck Ribery So Much?, supra note 133. 
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Bayern Munich serves as a good model for the AG/e.V. structure, but 
may be a model that is difficult to emulate for less successful clubs. The 
club model allows for the fans to feel invested in the club through their 
membership and express their wishes in electing management. However, the 
overall AG is somewhat insulated from any disruptions in the e.V. This 
allows for the professional football operations to be managed more 
smoothly. The club can raise capital easily through the AG structure, 
provided that the e.V. retains a controlling stake. Bayern Munich has 
provided an example of how the AG can accommodate local business 
leaders, like leaders at Audi and Adidas, who provide corporate advice as 
well as valuable connections to commercial income. The emphasis on 
increasing access to commercial revenue has the benefits of increasing 
money available for the on the field product while keeping ticket prices for 
the members relatively low. The AG structure does bring the negatives that 
any public corporation has. The management of the AG can become too 
isolated from the members of the e.V.138 Because the same people, namely 
former players, tend to be elected to positions of leadership in the club and 
the AG, there does not tend to be much exposure to different management 
viewpoints.139 Additionally, the presence of the corporate leaders on the AG 
supervisory board can lead to the club being more business driven than fan–
driven. Although Bayern Munich provides a model for a successful football 
AG, this may be case because of its leading position in German football. 
C. GmbHs 
The Bundesliga’s reforms also allowed for the club to be constituted in a 
Gesellschaft mit beschrnäkter Haftung (GmbH) provided that the club itself 
owned a majority of the GmbH.140 The GmbH is the German equivalent of 
the American limited liability company.141 As a limited liability corporation, 
the flexibility of the GmbH makes it a favored corporate form for small 
entities.142 The GmbH structure can share many of the same characteristics 
with the AG form, including the shareholder meeting, Aufsichtsrat, and 
Vorstand.143 However, the GmbH is not required to have an Aufsichtsrat if 
  
Milan, had a wage to turnover ratio of 104%. The Price of Inter’s Success, SWISS RAMBLE 
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 140. Wilkesmann & Blutner, supra note 110, at 27–28. 
 141. Drude & Oltmanns, supra note 91, at 94. 
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the articles of incorporation specify a different structure.144 The ability of 
small investors to influence the GmbH is demonstrated by the right of 
shareholders holding at least 10% of the shares to call a general meeting of 
the shareholders. 145 The GmbH is attractive to smaller entities because it 
provides a great deal of flexibility in the company’s structure but also limits 
the liability of the shareholders only to the amount of their contribution to 
the GmbH.146 Additionally, the shareholders are permitted to transfer their 
shares through sale or inheritance.147 One aspect of the GmbH that would be 
very unfavorable as a club structure in football is the provision for capital 
calls to be made on the shareholders.148 Sporting clubs are often unprofitable 
because of unrealistic dreams or unexpected failures, thus the cash call 
might be exercised on a regular basis. Although fans may voluntarily meet 
the financial requirements, they would probably not want to be required to 
do so.   
Very few clubs exist in the GmbH form. The most prominent examples 
are Bayer Leverkusen and VfL Wolfsburg.149 Bayer Leverkusen is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the chemical giant Bayer AG while VfL Wolfsburg is 
owned by Volkswagen.150 The GmbH is primarily designed for small, 
entrepreneurial companies, thus clubs are unlikely to pick this form. If a 
club is of sufficient size with enough financial resources to consider the 
GmbH form, additional complexities of the AG are probably not too great 
of a difficulty to confront. If the club is too small to be an AG, remaining as 
an e.V. is probably the wisest choice.  This dynamic probably explains the 
rarity of this form among Bundesliga clubs.  
D. KGaAs 
The third corporate form that is permitted in the Bundesliga is the 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA).151 The KGaA is a form of 
partnership that combines a general partner with limited partners. 152  
Investors can become limited partners by purchasing shares that can be 
  
 144. Id. § 52. 
 145. Id. § 50. 
 146. Id. § 13. 
 147. Id. § 15. 
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traded on a stock exchange.153 Like the AG, the KGaA has an Aufsichtsrat 
and shareholders.154 However, the KGaA lacks a Vorstand.155 The 
management is instead entrusted to the general partner who assumes an 
unlimited personal liability for actions of the KGaA.156As a result, the 
Aufsichtsrat has no influence over appointment of the management of the 
KGaA, but does retain the supervisory function. The shareholding limited 
partners retain the rights of AG shareholders to elect the Aufsichtsrat and to 
vote on extraordinary matters, but many of the shareholders’ resolutions can 
be vetoed by the general partner.157 The KGaA form is ideal for a 
corporation wishing to retain a great deal of control while still being able to 
raise capital.158 Although the KGaA general partner retains control, the 
general partner is subject to unlimited personal liability. German law 
permits this to be mitigated through the use of an AG or a GmbH as a 
general partner.159  
The best example of the KGaA structure in the Bundesliga is BVB 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA.160 The club, BVB Borussia 
Dortmund e.V., follows the spirit of the 50+1 rule by maintaining control of 
the general partner, Borussia Dortmund Geschafsfuhrungs–GmbH, while 
selling shares in the KGaA. The GmbH is solely owned by the e.V.161 The 
members of BVB Borussia Dortmund e.V. elect an economic council, 
which also becomes the advisory council of the KGaA.162 The advisory 
council then appoints the managing board of the GmbH.163 As required in a 
KGaA, BVB Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA does have a 
supervisory board, but the articles of incorporation do not grant it the power 
to hire or remove the managing directors of Borussia Dortmund 
Geschaftsfuhrungs–GmbH or to restrict the directors’ decisions.164 As a 
result of this structure, the members of the e.V. ultimately direct the 
operations of the KGaA, but are several layers removed from any personal 
liability. The shareholders of the KGaA have essentially no power.  
Despite its complicated structure, the GmbH & KGaA has certain 
interesting aspects. The structure of the club is such that it grants 
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considerable autonomy to the managers of the various aspects of the 
organization. In addition, the members directly have a voice as members of 
the e.V. and as shareholders, albeit largely symbolic. The share structure 
allows for the club to raise cash through offerings of equity, provided that 
the 50+1 control is maintained. However, the KGaA stock has limited 
appeal for an investor because it grants very little power. The nature of a 
football club KGaA means that essentially only fans will be interested in 
any new share offerings by the club.165  
The same autonomy that is granted to the managers of the operations can 
prove fatal to the club if the proper managers are not chosen. BVB 
Dortmund is a prime example of this danger. BVB Dortmund initially 
issued shares in 2000 at €10 per share.166 As a result of poor financial 
planning, the club faced bankruptcy in 2005.167 New management managed 
to save the club through an outside loan and the generosity of the Dortmund 
community.168 As part of these efforts, BVB Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
issued approximate €50 million in new shares.169 The issuance of new 
capital and the poor history of management have driven the share price 
down to €2.60.170 However, this financial rebalancing has come at the 
expense of on the field success.171 
By any financial measure, German football clubs are the model for the 
rest of Europe. They collectively make a profit and have the highest 
attendance in the major European leagues.172 German clubs provide fans a 
voice in the governing of their clubs in a variety of unique corporate forms 
while also allowing for outside investment. The 50+1 rule plus the 
flexibility in the allowed corporate forms allows clubs to balance 
commercial interests with the interests of its members. German football 
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governance seems to be the envy of Europe, yet this appears to have come 
at the cost of European success. 
VI. ENGLISH MODELS 
Despite being the most popular league worldwide, the English Premier 
League (EPL) has faced a number of problems.  The top players that once 
joined the top EPL teams are now joining the best teams in Spain and Italy. 
Furthermore, 70% of English clubs lost money in the 2008/09 season.173 
Last year saw one of its clubs, Portsmouth, enter bankruptcy during the 
season.174   
The typical English club is constituted as a public limited company 
(PLC), which is the equivalent of the American corporation. The benefit of 
a PLC is that it is permitted to sell shares to the general public and trade 
shares on a stock exchange.175 The PLC is required to have a board of 
directors, but is only required to have two directors and a secretary.176 The 
interesting characteristics of the English football clubs is not how they are 
constituted, but how they are controlled. There are two basic categories of 
clubs. One type of club is controlled by a rich individual who acts as a 
benefactor for the club. The other type is controlled by an individual or 
group of individuals that treats the club like a normal business. 
A. The Benefactor Model 
1. Chelsea 
Chelsea F.C. is a club that has been historically unsuccessful until a 
renaissance in the last decade and a half. Since the club’s establishment in 
1905, Chelsea has played its home matches at Stamford Bridge in West 
London.177 Despite its wealthy location, Chelsea had won only one league 
title, in 1955, until its recent run of three titles in the past six years.178 
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Although Chelsea fans are among England’s richest, Chelsea has 
continually had financial difficulties. The blame for this financial hardship 
can be blamed both on the mediocre on the field results and on the costs 
incurred in renovating Stamford Bridge. During one financial crisis, the 
club devised a scheme to thwart the efforts of a developer eager to exploit 
the valuable property. A nonprofit group, Chelsea Pitch Owners, P.L.C., 
was created to own the property on which Stamford Bridge sits.179 The 
group is constituted in a manner that caps the voting rights of individual 
shareholders in order to prevent a takeover.180 The club also transferred 
ownership of the name Chelsea F.C. to Chelsea Pitch Owners, P.L.C. to 
exercise a check upon later owners wishing to move the club elsewhere.181  
During the 1990s, Chelsea followed the trend of modernizing English stadia 
with its Chelsea Village project.182 The Chelsea Village project included a 
hotel and shopping complex that were not as successful as originally 
planned.183 Ultimately, the debts incurred during redevelopment financially 
crippled the club and later led to its sale.184  
Chelsea’s history of financial woes came to an abrupt end in June 2003. 
As the club prepared to enter bankruptcy, the Russian oil magnate Roman 
Abramovich purchased the assets of the club for £60 million and assumed 
the club’s £80 million in debt.185 Abramovich has embarked on a 
remarkable spending spree since assuming control. He is estimated to have 
spent well over £500 million on the acquisition of players.186 As a result of 
his lavish spending, Chelsea has recorded financial losses every year during 
his ownership.187 Despite a pledge to balance the books by 2010, Chelsea 
still incurred a £71 million loss on revenue of £209.5 million in 2010.188 
This actually been an improvement on a record loss of £140 million in 
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2005.189 Further prudence is shown in the cost cutting that has led to a wage 
to revenue ratio of 73%.190 Abramovich has funded these lavish 
expenditures through £726 million in interest free loans to the club.191 The 
looming Fair Play Rules have made this debt extremely unfavorable to 
maintain on the balance sheet, thus Abramovich has recently converted the 
loans into equity.192 As a result of Abramovich’s vast injections of capital 
into Chelsea, the club has enjoyed by far its most successful period in its 
history. 
2. Manchester City 
Manchester City FC has a reputation as an unlucky club that continually 
languished in the shadow of its more successful neighbor, Manchester 
United. Manchester City was founded in 1880 and had its most successful 
period during the 1960s and 1970s.193 However, since its heyday in the 
1970s, Manchester City has failed to win a single trophy and has been 
relegated.194 The club lived on a relatively modest income until it was 
acquired for £81.6 million in June 2007 by the former Prime Minister of 
Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra.195 Shinawatra had been exiled from Thailand 
in 2006 as the result of a coup.196 Because he wished to return from exile, he 
wanted a way to generate positive publicity in Thailand. Despite having an 
estimated £800 million in assets frozen by the coup leaders because of 
allegations of fraud and corruption,  Shinawatra managed to purchase 
Manchester City as well as fund player purchases in the short term. 197 
Eventually his problems in Thailand caught up with him. Shinawatra did not 
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have sufficient free cash to continue to fund the club. At the same time, the 
Thai authorities issued warrants for his arrests.198 The legal actions 
prompted the Premier League to consider declaring him an unfit and 
improper owner.199 With problems mounting, Shinawatra sold the club to 
the Abu Dhabi United Group.200 
The Abu Dhabi United Group has generated a great deal of controversy 
in its short term of ownership, but this controversy has generally centered 
around the vast sums of money spent by the owners. The Abu Dhabi United 
Group is headed by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan.201 The backing 
of a prominent member of the Abu Dhabi royal family meant that 
considerable money was and is available for the club. Sheikh Mansour 
originally appointed Dr. Sulaiman Al–Fahim to be his agent for the 
takeover.202 After Al–Fahim made outlandish and controversial statements 
about the resources now available to the club, Al Fahim was removed and a 
more reserved chairman was appointed.203 In the two years since Sheikh 
Mansour’s takeover, Manchester City has spent an astounding £300 million 
on player acquisitions.204 This lavish spending has had predictable effects 
upon the financial statements. Manchester City followed a loss of £92.6 
million in 2009 with a £121 million loss in 2010.205 The wage to revenue 
ratio has alarmingly increased from 95% in 2009 to 107% in 2010.206 These 
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are certainly not acceptable under the Fair Play Rules. Sheikh Mansour has 
directly financed £400 million of these expenditures through equity 
offerings as well as shareholder loans that are later converted to equity.207  
Despite the lavish spending, Manchester City has still failed to finish in the 
fourth place spot in the EPL necessary to qualify for the Champions League.  
3. Blackburn Rovers 
Although Roman Abramovich was the first foreign benefactor in the 
EPL, the model did not originate with him. Rich men have always funded 
their local clubs as a type of community service, but the scale seen in the 
last twenty years is completely new. Despite the benefits of a benefactor, 
there are dangers associated with it. One of the best examples of the 
negatives of the benefactor model is Blackburn Rovers F.C. The Blackburn 
Rovers were acquired in the early 1990s by the steel magnate Jack 
Walker.208 Under Walker, Blackburn spent £25 million in the transfer 
market during the early 1990s, including two British record signings.209 The 
spending culminated in the 1994–95 Premier League title.210 Walker died in 
2000, but provided for the club in his will.211 For a decade, the club was 
managed by the Jack Walker Trust.212 The trustees ended up writing off 
£100 million in loans made by Walker and the trust as well as loaning a 
further £5 million to the club. 213The trustees put the club up for sale in 
2007, but it took until November 2010 to find a buyer.214 Due to a lack of 
certainty as to the future of the club as well as the limited ability of the trust 
to fund the club, the club has lacked a clear direction since Walker’s death. 
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4. Benefactor Model Analysis 
As Chelsea, Manchester City, and Blackburn have demonstrated, the 
benefactor model has positives and negatives. The benefactor can directly 
inject cash into the club to acquire new and better players.215 Because the 
benefactor holds all the control in the club, the benefactor can make quick 
decisions for the club without needing to gain the approval of others. 
However, the strengths of the benefactor model are also its great weakness. 
Because all of the power rests in one person, the fans can feel marginalized. 
The benefactor can alleviate most but not all of this feeling through success 
on the field. The benefactor may be forced to make decisions that are best 
for the financial health of the club at the expense of the sense of community 
that the fans have.216 In the benefactor model, fans have very few concrete 
ways of expressing their views on the direction of the club other than at the 
game.217  
The total influence of the benefactor over club affairs can be dangerous. 
Although the benefactors are typically extremely successful businessmen, 
sports are a unique type of business. Success in the business world does not 
necessarily translate into on the field success.218  Failing to take the advice 
of individuals experienced in football team building can lead to on the field 
failure. Additionally, the influence of the owner can taint the image of the 
club. Roman Abramovich gained his immense fortune in 1990s Russia by 
means that could be considered illegal today. Abramovich’s negative 
reputation has led to rival fans calling Chelsea “Chelski.” A similar type of 
venom may be targeted at Manchester City because of its Emirati 
ownership.  
The presence of a single man in charge can lead to chaos when that one 
man becomes incapacitated. This phenomenon can be also observed in 
politics and in other types of business. Sophisticated businessmen like the 
benefactors mentioned above obviously have estate planning mechanisms in 
place of such an eventuality. However, the example of Blackburn shows 
that when the one man in charge is no longer in charge, there is a leadership 
void that ensues. That void may be filled by the relatives of the benefactor, 
but there is no guarantee that these relatives will be as vested in the club’s 
success as the benefactor. That void may linger for quite a long time and 
lead to stagnation if the club is unlucky. The power collected in a single 
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benefactor ultimately has the potential to shape the club in a positive or 
negative manner. 
B. The Normal Business Owner Model 
The other model of English clubs is what I have termed the normal 
business owner model. The normal business owner model is a company that 
is run, or is intended to be run, like a sustainable business. This can take a 
number forms depending upon the ownership. The club may be owned by a 
single individual or group of individuals. In many ways, this can resemble 
the benefactor model, but the business owner model generally features more 
restrained spending.   
1. Manchester United 
Manchester United has dominated English football for the past two 
decades. Since the Premier League was formed in 1992, Manchester United 
has won eleven league titles as well as two Champions League trophies.219 
This remarkable run of success has come under the direction of manager Sir 
Alex Ferguson who has been in charge of Manchester United since 1986.220 
Manchester United had a humble beginning in 1878 as a club founded by 
railway workers in the Newton Heath area of Greater Manchester.221 Only 
when the club joined the professional Football League in 1892 was the club 
incorporated.222 The incorporating members took this step to limit their 
liability rather than to obtain equity for later sale. For many years, shares 
were of negligible monetary value. The club periodically issued shares to its 
fans when it faced financial hardships, but the shares entitled the 
shareholders only to minor perks like a season ticket.223  
In the 1950s, Louis Edwards became involved in Manchester United. At 
first he held only a few shares, but when his company began trading on the 
stock exchange, Louis Edwards began a quest to buy Manchester United 
shares.224 By 1964, Edwards had obtained 2,223 shares, giving him 54% 
control of the club.225 Later purchases in the 1970s took the Edwards 
shareholding up to 74%.226 Up until the early 1980s, the English Football 
Association had maintained regulations that forbade paying club directors 
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and restricted the dividends that could be paid.227 Because of the five pence 
per share restriction on dividends, Louis Edwards created a right for each 
shareholder to buy 208 new shares for each existing £1 share that the 
shareholder owned.228 As a result, there were 209 times as many shares to 
pay out the five pence dividend. By evading the restrictions, Louis Edwards 
was able to dramatically increase the amount of money paid out of the club 
in dividends.229 Sensing that the club could command a large amount of 
money, Louis Edwards attempted to sell the club to a number of 
individuals.230 After those plans fell through, Louis Edwards created a 
holding company for Manchester United and traded shares in the holding 
company on the London Stock Exchange.231 Louis’s son Martin Edwards 
gradually sold the family’s entire holding in the club, making a profit of 
approximately £88 million on the initial £800,000 investment.232  
Manchester United’s time on the London Stock Exchange was an 
interesting period. In 1998, Rupert Murdoch launched a £625 million 
takeover bid that was thwarted by the UK government on competition 
reasons.233 Following the failure of the Murdoch bid, the Irish investors John 
Magnier and J.P. McManus built up a significant stake in the club by the 
end of 2001.234 In March 2003, the American Malcolm Glazer announced 
that he had acquired a small stake in the club.235 By October 2004, Glazer 
had raised his stake to 28.11%.236 After Glazer acquired Magnier and 
McManus’s 28.7% shareholding, Glazer continued to acquire shares until he 
owned the entire club.237  
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The Glazer acquisition was very costly and controversial. The entire cost 
of acquisition was approximately £831 million.238 The most controversial 
part of the takeover was that Glazer transferred loans amounting to £559 
million of the acquisition cost to the club.239 The debt was both in bank 
loans as well as “payment in kind” loans, which carried an initial interest 
rate of 14.25%.240 Unlike a normal loan where interest is repaid regularly, 
the high interest rate on the “payment in kind” loans continue to accumulate 
until the time of repayment.241 As a result, Manchester United went from a 
financially successful club to one that was heavily laden with debt.    
This heavy debt load is very unpopular with fans who believe that the 
Glazers have diverted the club’s revenue to paying the interest on the debt. 
The fans worry that the Glazers have not invested sufficient resources in 
players to win trophies as a result of interest payments on the debt. Because 
fans have lost their voice in the boardroom, they have organized a number 
of protests. Just after the takeover, a group of fans formed a new club called 
FC United of Manchester. In 2010, another round of protests began under 
the title of Green and Gold.242 An offshoot of this movement, calling 
themselves the Red Knights, prepared a £1 billion offer for the club.243 
Ultimately, the Glazer family has stood firm and has steadfastly ignored the 
protests about their ownership.  
  
& Daniel Taylor, Glazer Poised for 100% Ownership, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 28, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2005/jun/28/newsstory.sport1. 
 238. David Conn, Cash-Strapped Glazers Banking on Manchester United, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 7, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/david-conn-inside-sport-
blog/2010/jun/07/glazer-banking-manchester-united. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. The Glazer family issued a £521.7 million bond in January 2010 to alleviate 
the loan pressure. Owen Gibson, David Gill Says Manchester United Are Healthy Despite 
Record Losses, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/oct/08/david-gill-manchester-united-losses.  The 
bond issue cost resulted in a loss of £83.6 million. Id. One controversial portion of the bond 
issue allowed the Glazer family to withdraw up to £127 million from the club. Id.  Recently 
the Glazer family announced that they were in the process of paying off the payment in kind 
loans, which had reached £220 million and were increasing at 16.25% per year. Tariq Panja, 
Manchester Utd. to Pay Off 220 Million Pounds of Team’s Debt, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-15/manchester-united-to-pay-off-353-
million-of-soccer-team-s-corporate-debt.html. 
 241. Manchester United’s Debt: Six Key Questions, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Jan. 12, 
2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-
united/6969460/Manchester-Uniteds-debt-six-key-questions.html.  
 242. Luke Bainbridge & Ed Vulliamy, Manchester United Fans Go Green and Gold 
at Wembley in Colour-Coded Protest Against Owners, THE OBSERVER (U.K.), Feb. 28, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/feb/28/manchester-united-green-gold-wembley. 
Green and Gold were the club’s original colors. 
 243. Daniel Taylor, Red Knights to Press Ahead with Offer for Manchester United, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (May 7, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/07/red-
knights-manchester-united. 
440 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
Despite strong revenue generation, Manchester United faces an uncertain 
future. A substantial portion of the club’s revenue is allocated to servicing 
the acquisition debt. At some point the debt may grow to a point where it 
cannot be financed any further. Alternatively, the club may fail to reach the 
Champions League, thus depriving the club of a substantial amount of 
revenue needed to service the debt. The fate of Manchester United rests, as 
it has for two decades, on manager Sir Alex Ferguson’s ability to generate a 
winning product on the field. Sir Alex is now in his late sixties and expects 
to retire within the next few years. The debt has placed an immense pressure 
on him and his future successor to continue to deliver consistent revenue 
growth on minimal reinvestment. Ultimately, the Glazer acquisition 
resolved some short term uncertainty in ownership but has posed new, 
longer term questions about the financial viability of the club.  
2. Liverpool 
Liverpool is one of the most famous clubs in world football. The club 
has won five European cups, more than any other English team.244 Although 
Liverpool dominated the 1970s and 1980s, it has failed to win a league title 
since 1990. Despite the recent failings, the memory of Liverpool’s greatness 
remains and gives the club considerable worldwide marketing potential.  
Liverpool was founded in 1892 by the owner of its stadium, Anfield, to 
utilize the vacant stadium after the departure of Everton F.C., Liverpool’s 
other major club.245 For most of the past half century, the club was under the 
control of the Moores family.246 In the mid–2000s, the majority shareholder 
David Moores decided that he could not compete in the changing climate in 
football as evidenced by Roman Abramovich’s acquisition of Chelsea. 
Moores entertained a number of bids, including bids from Thaksin 
Shinawatra and Dubai Investment Capital, before deciding to sell to 
Americans Tom Hicks and George Gillett.247 
The Hicks and Gillett group paid £218 million for the club and took out 
£350 million in loans to fund the acquisition as well as the planning phases 
of a new stadium.248 Despite initially claiming that their takeover was not 
like the Glazer takeover of Manchester United, Hicks and Gillett managed 
to transfer about half of the debt to the club.249 As at Manchester United, 
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this action did not endear Hicks and Gillett to the Liverpool fans. Hicks and 
Gillett also were unfortunate in the timing of their takeover of the club. A 
centerpiece of their business plan was to build a new stadium. When the 
acquisition was completed, Hicks and Gillett decided to revise the existing 
plans.250 By the time the plans were revised, the credit crisis made obtaining 
a loan to build a new stadium virtually impossible.251 Due in part to the 
financial pressures from the loan repayment, Hicks and Gillett developed a 
great deal of animosity toward each other and toward manager Rafael 
Benitez.252 Adding to the soap opera between Hicks and Gillett and Benitez 
was an incident where Hicks’s son sent a derogatory email to a fan and was 
forced to resign from his club position.253 The many controversies and 
perceived lack of investment in the club made Hicks and Gillett very 
unpopular with the fans. 
The financing structure of the takeover deal ultimately proved to be the 
undoing of Hicks and Gillett. A large portion of the debt was due in April 
2010.254 The holder of the debt, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), granted 
Hicks and Gillett a six month extension in an effort to find a buyer for the 
club.255 However, RBS instituted a number of conditions for this extension. 
Among these conditions were that Martin Broughton, chairman of British 
Airways, was to be made chairman of the holding company.256 RBS also 
required that Liverpool’s articles of association be amended to grant the 
chairman the exclusive right to appoint or remove directors.257 Broughton 
was given the task of finding a buyer that would serve the best interests of 
the club.258 The sale was complicated not only by conflicts between the 
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owners and the manger, but also by Liverpool’s failure to qualify for the 
2010/11 Champions League. 
As the October deadline approached, a bid from New England Sports 
Ventures (NESV) emerged.259 The bid proposed repaying the RBS loan, but 
left no money for the shares of Hicks and Gillett or the loans to the holding 
company made by Hicks and Gillett.260 Hicks and Gillett were not pleased 
with the bid and attempted to replace two of the five directors of the club’s 
holding company with Hicks appointees.261 Broughton then launched a legal 
action to prevent Hicks and Gillett from blocking the sale to NESV.262 The 
English High Court granted Broughton’s request for an injunction.263 Before 
the sale could proceed, Hicks obtained a temporary restraining order from a 
Texas court to block the sale.264 Broughton responded by obtaining an order 
from the English High Court preventing the enforcement of the Texas 
injunction.265 Eventually, the sale was completed before the RBS 
deadline.266 The new owners at NESV have refrained from any public 
relations disasters in the short time they have owned the club, but so far 
have not given much indication as to future actions. 
3. Arsenal 
Although the club has not won anything in five seasons, Arsenal F.C. 
remains one of the most successful clubs in English football history and one 
of the most famous names in world football. Arsenal originated as a club of 
workers at the Woolwich Arsenal in Southeast London.267 The club later 
incorporated to limit the liability of the members. The club struggled 
financially in Southeast London, but came under the influence of Sir Henry 
Norris in the years leading up to World War I.268 Sir Henry moved the club 
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to the Highbury area of North London, where the club has remained every 
since.269 After Sir Henry left the club, Sir Samuel Hill–Wood gained control 
of the club.270 For much of the past eighty years, the Hill–Wood family, 
including Peter Hill–Wood, the current chairman, has controlled the club.271 
Around the same time that Louis Edwards began extracting money from 
Manchester United, a trader named David Dein purchased 16% of Arsenal 
for £292,000.272 Dein later increased his shareholding dramatically, but sold 
a substantial portion of his shares to diamond trader Danny Fiszman 
throughout the 1990s.273 Although he was only vice–chairman of the club, 
Dein had considerable influence over football matters, including the 
responsibility for hiring manager Arsene Wenger.274 Since hiring Wenger in 
1996, Arsenal has won three English Premier League titles and four FA 
Cups. Because the nature of Arsenal’s stadium constrained further 
development, plans were made to move the club to a modern stadium which 
could generate much more revenue. Dein was initially not a supporter of the 
move, but Fiszman pushed the idea through.275 The costs of the stadium 
project amounted to approximately £390 million.276 The project was 
financed with a combination of £260 million of debt and cash from naming 
rights, equity offerings, and an advance on commercial revenues.277  
Although the stadium has resulted in a tremendous increase in revenue, the 
debt restricted the ability of the club to invest in players until a large amount 
of the property associated with the project was sold.278 
The financial restrictions imposed by the stadium as well as the 
emergence of Abramovich’s Chelsea led to a fracture in the ownership 
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group. Dein believed that the club needed a billionaire benefactor for 
Arsenal to achieve the success it desired. Dein took steps toward that goal 
by introducing American billionaire Stan Kroenke to the club through the 
sale of a 10% stake in the club owned by ITV.279 The Arsenal board was not 
pleased by the suggestion and forced Dein to resign from his vice–chairman 
position.280 Chairman Peter Hill–Wood went so far as to say that he didn’t 
want Kroenke’s sort at the club.281 Dein subsequent sold his 14.58% stake in 
the club to Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov.282  Faced with the threat of 
a takeover by Usmanov, the Arsenal board subsequently decided that 
Kroenke was the sort that they wanted at the club and made him a board 
member. In an effort to counter a takeover, the board entered into a 
lockdown agreement that prevented the board members from selling their 
shares to a nonapproved person until October 2010.283 In the midst of the 
controversy, the Arsenal board also forced out Nina Bracewell–Smith, who 
holds 15.9% of the shares.284 As of November 2010, Arsenal’s ownership 
seems to have reached some measure of stability, with Usmanov owning 
27% and Kroenke owning 29.9%.285 
The controversy regarding the ownership of Arsenal greatly concerned 
many fans. Although Arsenal, through its holding company Arsenal 
Holdings, PLC, is quoted on the PLUS exchange,286 shares trade currently 
  
 279. Conn, supra note 275. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Gary Jacob & Ben Smith, Stan Kroenke Refuses to Declare Arsenal Takeover 
Intent, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 22, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/premier_league/arsenal/article6885477.ece. 
 282. Dominic Fifield, Arsenal Get An Oligarch As Dein Sells His Stake, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 31, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2007/aug/31/newsstory.arsenal2. 
 283. Matt Scott, Arsenal Bring Kroenke on Board and Stymie Usmanov Takeover, 
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/sep/20/arsenal.premierleague. 
 284. Matt Scott, Arsenal Board Treated Me Appallingly, Says Shocked Bracewell-
Smith, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 19, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/dec/18/matt-scott-on-arsenal-board. Despite her 
efforts to sell, her shares still remain unsold. 
 285. David Conn, Arsenal Step Back From Era of Rich Owners and Offer Fans a 
Voice, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/david-
conn-inside-sport-blog/2010/aug/18/arsenal-kroenke-usmanov-owners-fanshare. It is crucial 
to note that both are under the 30% threshold that mandates an offer for all of the shares. 
Kroenke is currently a board member and effectively controls the club with the voting power 
of the board. One of the major reasons why a full takeover bid has not yet been launched is 
that Arsenal’s market cap is approximately £681 million. Arsenal Holdings PLC, PLUS, 
http://www.plusmarketsgroup.com/home.html (search for “Arsenal Holding” link) (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
 286. The PLUS exchange is a London-based stock exchange that trades primarily in 
small and medium size enterprises. See Plus Prepared for Bear, WORLD FINANCE (May 23, 
2008), http://www.worldfinance.com/news/world-market/foreignexchange/article220.html. 
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trade in excess of £10,000.287 The price of the Arsenal share is far outside 
the reach of most fans, but Arsenal has begun an initiative called the 
Arsenal Fanshare.288 The Fanshare is a plan that allows fans to make 
monthly contributions to a pool of money that will buy shares when they 
become available.289 If a fan contributes at least 1% of the cost of a share, 
the fan will be able to vote as a shareholder and attend the shareholder 
meeting.290 Although the impact of this initiative will be small in view of the 
considerable obstacles to blocking a takeover, it is a step toward making 
Arsenal fans more involved in the decision–making at the club. 
Although Arsenal has experienced mixed results on the field, the 
financial situation is excellent. Arsenal recorded a £56 million profit while 
reducing the net debt by £154 million in the 2010 annual report.291  The 
future is not quite as promising as it may appear at first glance. Manager 
Arsene Wenger has been responsible for a large part of the impressive 
performance by finding great value in players, but when Wenger eventually 
leaves Arsenal, there is no guarantee that his successor will be able to keep 
it up. Despite Usmanov’s announcement that he plans to raise his stake to 
just under 30%,292  the cold war between Kroenke and Usmanov could 
become hot at any moment. There is also the potential that a takeover bid 
could be launched by Kroenke or Usmanov or from unknown third party. 
The danger is that such a takeover bid would likely be financed by debt and 
thus lead to a Manchester United or Liverpool situation. Arsenal’s 
ownership appears precariously balanced for the time being.  
4. Normal Business Owner Model Analysis 
As the examples of Manchester United, Liverpool, and Arsenal show, the 
business owner model has advantages and disadvantages. The primary 
advantage of a PLC is the easy ability to raise capital. In a situation like 
Arsenal or Manchester United before the Glazer takeover, the ability to own 
  
 287. Arsenal Holdings PLC, supra note 285. 
 288. Conn, supra note 285. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Cash City Rockers, supra note 278. The financial results were not so promising 
for the first six months of the 2011 annual report. The club reported a £ 6.2 million loss 
before taxes as a result of a decrease in income from property sales, player sales, and less 
home matches, coupled with an increase in player salaries. ARSENAL HOLDINGS, PLC, 
RESULTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.arsenal.com/assets/_files/documents/feb_11/gun__1298899376_Arsenal_Holdin
gs_plc_-_Half_Ye.pdf. 
 292. Matt Scott, Alisher Usmanov’s Attempt to Increase Arsenal Stake Looks Set to 
Fail, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/dec/21/alisher-usmanov-arsenal-stake. Once a 
shareholder reaches 30%, the shareholder is obliged to make an offer for the remaining 
shares of the company. If the bid fails, the shareholder must reduced the stake to just under 
30%. See id. 
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shares in the club allows for fans to play at least a minor role in club 
decisions. The lack of a benefactor guaranteeing losses necessitates that the 
club break even every year. Only with the introduction of the Fair Play 
Rules has this become a benefit. Additionally, the absence of a benefactor 
drives the owners of the club to maximize all available revenue sources. 
This added revenue then can be expended upon players and facilities.   
As Manchester United and Liverpool have demonstrated, the business 
owner model has a number of great flaws. The ability of a club to trade on 
the stock exchange makes it vulnerable to attempts to take over the club 
because of a limited ability for fans to block the action. The more alarming 
aspect of the takeovers is the acquisition debt that owners place upon the 
clubs. This crushing debt diverts money from the on the field expenditures 
to interest repayment. As Arsenal and Liverpool have shown, the presence 
of multiple owners has a potential to create a great deal of problems for the 
club. At Liverpool, the owners were at war with themselves, the manager, 
and the fans. As a result, the club was thrown into chaos and was a 
contributing factor to the club’s failure to qualify for the 2010/11 
Champions League. The Arsenal crisis was confined to the boardroom, but 
this was probably due only to the great influence of Arsene Wenger over the 
club. The lack of one clear decision–maker often creates a void of 
leadership that can cripple a club. Although the business owner model often 
gives the fan some amount of involvement in the club, the fan involvement 
has been almost nonexistent in practice. When the fan feels excluded from 
the club and sees that large sums of money are diverted to interest 
payments, dividends, or club bank accounts, the fan can feel quite unhappy 
with the state of the club. 
VI. WHAT MODEL IS BEST? 
A number of models for ownership of a football club have been 
explained above: the socio model of Spain, the variety of mixed models in 
Germany, and the benefactor and business owner PLC models of England. 
The variety of corporate forms has grown out of the cultural differences in 
the business and sports of each nation. It is important to note that every 
corporate model can meet UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations with 
competent managers and realistic on the field expectations.  
As Europe becomes more integrated, a unified model may be appropriate 
for UEFA to create a level playing field for clubs competing in UEFA 
competitions. This UEFA model needs to balance the desire of the club’s 
fans to influence club decisions about buying and selling players and 
choosing managers with the commercial realities of the modern club. 
Aspects of an ideal form can be derived from examining the structures 
currently in place. The socio model provides for heavy involvement of the 
fans in club decisions, but is not a great model commercially or financially 
because equity cannot be sold and management can get distracted in club 
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politics. The PLC model run by a benefactor provides excellent resources 
and central direction but leaves fans on the outside. The normal business 
owner PLC model can allow for fans to gain some voice in club decisions 
but is very vulnerable to a leveraged buyout. The KGaA model provides 
fans a small voice, but grants its managers too much leeway while 
neglecting shareholders. The AG model combines a measure of fan 
involvement with the ability to raise equity and effectively manage the 
business operations of the club. 
The UEFA model club should adopt the features of the German AG. The 
fans have control of the underlying club while also allowing for equity 
investment. The dual board structure characteristic of German AGs allows 
for much active corporate governance than the single board that exists in 
PLCs and clubs like Barcelona and Real Madrid. As Bayern Munich 
demonstrates, the AG best attempts to balance the desire for fan 
involvement with the commercial and financial realities of the competitive 
club. 
The implementation of the model club structure would be extremely 
difficult. The process of convincing clubs to adopt this type of structure 
while remaining within European Union law would be difficult. Although 
the AG structure might be best for the club, club owners have their own 
interests to protect. For instance, the Glazer family will never give control 
of the Manchester United to the fans when they have such a valuable asset 
and so much debt. For clubs like Barcelona and Real Madrid, the possibility 
of a conversion is not quite so remote. Because these types of clubs have no 
single owner, a change in structure would not be so financially painful, but 
very culturally painful.   
Any UEFA regulation must also comply with European Union law, 
therefore any UEFA rule must be carefully drafted. Any move to enforce a 
model club structure would most likely violate European Union law. The 
implementation efforts would first require the European Union to grant a 
general sporting exemption in European Union law or, at the very least, an 
ad hoc exemption. Despite football’s unique place in European culture, the 
European Union refuses to accept UEFA’s advocacy for an exemption and 
likely will continue to do so in the future.293 Although UEFA may argue that 
this is the best way to balance fan interest and commercial realities, the 
European Union is extremely unlikely to agree to implement a plan that 
effectively deprives many owners of a multi–million Euro asset.  
  
 293. The European Union has considered this issue, but has chosen to reject any 
further steps at this time. See, e.g., Commission Communication, supra note 17, at 12. 
However, there continue to be investigations into these areas. See Commissioner Vassilieu, 
supra note 13.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
As the financial crisis in football worsens, the Financial Fair Play Rules 
have provided a basis to consider what types of football club structures 
might be preferable for a financially sustainable club. Although it may be 
practically impossible to force significant changes without governmental 
involvement, adopting a German style model is the preferable option. The 
German model provides the optimum amount of fan involvement in club 
affairs while providing the benefits of centralized control. Despite different 
club structures, a financially sustainable club is possible with the right 
leadership and realistic expectations. Revenue in football has saturated the 
European market and the tantalizing North American and Asian markets 
may never by fully exploited by clubs. It is important that clubs exercise 
sufficient discipline to ensure that the club exists for the fans of the future.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 International corporate governance changes swiftly amid major global 
economic developments; these changes are made from country to country—
and now these changes must accommodate an international global 
marketplace. Today, as the pressures of an increasingly interdependent 
global economy are thrust upon the corporate world, corporations and 
boards of directors must be cautious of every decision they make—and of 
the risks associated with such decisions. “Corporate governance involves a 
set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.”1 Corporations today are no longer simply domestic entities; 
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 1. PETRI MANTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS 
AS A RULE–MAKER 1, 9 (2005). 
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instead, many corporations are now expanding into international markets 
and adding international representatives to their boards.2 Now more than 
ever companies and their boards of directors must place an increased 
emphasis on their corporate governance procedures.3 Boards of directors 
face numerous challenges in today’s struggling economy.4 Boards of 
directors are faced with the tasks of planning a corporation’s long–term 
strategy, monitoring performance and compliance, determining executive 
compensation, dealing with risk management, handling shareholder proxy 
access, and working effectively as a functioning board of directors.5 As the 
global economy undergoes major changes, governmental agencies in the 
U.S. and abroad are looking into these issues in hopes of stabilizing and 
developing the global economy. Previously, corporate governance issues in 
the U.S. have dealt with actions of the board of directors in the face of 
hostile takeover bids6 and whether the board fulfilled their fiduciary duties 
owed to their shareholders under the “Business Judgment Rule”7—the 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care.8 Since the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis,   these issues now represent only a small part of the puzzle that is 
corporate governance.  
 Part I presents a general background of corporate governance measures 
and principles. This section discusses the importance of the “Business 
Judgment Rule,” the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” and the “Entire Fairness 
Test.” This section also discusses the background of corporate governance 
in the areas of shareholder proxy access, executive compensation, risk 
management, and the goals sought by regulation in such areas on an 
international scale. Part I then discusses the controversy surrounding current 
corporate governance issues. Part II discusses and compares the board of 
directors’ duties regarding the issues of executive remuneration and risk 
management.9 Parts III and IV discuss the trends of international corporate 
governance, the impact it will have globally, and potential resolutions to the 
upcoming problems that face international corporate governance. Part IV 
will also discuss potential solutions to the problems facing corporations in 
the United States and European Union.10 
  
 2. See generally Russ Banham How GLOBAL Is Your Board?, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, 
Nov/Dec 2009, at 58. 
 3. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Risk Management and the 
Board of Directors (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter Board of Directors]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on Some Thoughts for 
Boards of Directors in 2010 (Nov. 30, 2009) at 1–3 [hereinafter Thoughts for Boards]. 
 6. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 7. “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010). 
 8. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 9. See infra Part I, Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III, Part IV. 
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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MEASURES 
A. United States 
United States corporate governance principles are “grounded in the 
common interests of shareholders, boards and management teams in the 
corporate objective of long–term value creation, the accountability of 
management to the board, and ultimately the accountability of the board to 
shareholders for such long–term value creation.”11 Stockholders are 
suppliers of capital for corporations and are expected “to want corporate 
efficiency, honesty, productivity and profitability.”12 The corporate 
governance responsibilities for a board of directors are cumbersome and 
require that directors act as the primary vehicle for oversight and 
accountability.13 In dealing with this daunting task, directors are faced with 
tough decisions: how to organize the board, how the board should function, 
and what priorities the board should set for the corporation.14  
Corporate governance in the United States typically follows the lead of 
the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”)—which because of its well established legal history of dealing 
with the complexities of corporate and business law has been established as 
a leading authority in the field.15 Corporations choose to incorporate in 
Delaware because of the flexibility allowed by the DGCL.16 In order to 
understand the general principles and background of corporate governance 
in Delaware and the United States, the first step is to understand the DGCL 
statute and the goals it attempts to accomplish through established case law.  
The relationship between the board of directors of a corporation and its 
shareholders is akin to an “agency” relationship between an agent and 
principal.17 Courts have commonly recognized that corporations are 
organized and continued primarily for the profit of the stockholders.18 
  
 11. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES TO STRENGTHEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR U.S. PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 5 (2008) [hereinafter KEY 
AGREED PRINCIPLES]. 
 12. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 1. 
 13. KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See About Agency, DEL.  DEP’T ST.: DIV.  CORPS., 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter 
About Agency]. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person 
(an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 18. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the 
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Within this agency relationship, laws are set in place in order to protect 
shareholders from abuse of the agency relationship. Actions of the board of 
directors must align with specific standards of conduct; they must fulfill the 
fiduciary duty of care19 and the duty of loyalty.20 Delaware Courts—along 
with other U.S. courts—follow three different standards of review.21 These 
standards of review are the: (1) Business Judgment Rule, (2) Entire Fairness 
Test, and (3) Enhanced Scrutiny Test. The “Business Judgment Rule” 
protects decisions made by the board of directors.22 There are also pre–
conditions that must be met before the board is accorded protection under 
the “Business Judgment Rule.”23 These pre–conditions are five–fold.24 First, 
the board must exercise “process due–care” in coming to an informed 
decision.25 Second, the board must exercise reasonable business judgment.26 
Third, the board must be composed of disinterested and independent 
directors, which establishes that the board had no conflict of interest.27 
Fourth, there must be an absence of fraud or illegality in the transaction 
made by the board to demonstrate that the board acted lawfully.28 Lastly, the 
board must show that the decision is attributed to any rational business 
purpose.29 However, when fraud, illegality, self–dealing or gross negligence 
are present, the “Business Judgment Rule” does not apply; instead, Courts 
apply the “Entire Fairness Test.”30  
The “Entire Fairness Test” has two parts: fair dealing and fair price.31 
Fair dealing relates to the circumstances surrounding the transaction: the 
timing, or, in other words “how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors and how approval from the directors and 
stockholders were obtained.”32 On the other hand, fair price looks towards 
the economic and financial considerations of a proposed course of action.33  
  
reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.”). 
 19. See generally Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858. 
 20. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
 21. See generally Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 
(Del. 2003). 
 22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010). 
 23. See generally Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858. 
 24. See generally Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on Takeover 
Law and Practice (2009) at 23–27 [hereinafter Takeover Law and Practice]. 
 25. Id at 24–26. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id at 24–25. 
 30. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (en banc). 
 31. Id. at 711. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (stating that “[r]elevant market factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
stock.”).at 711 (“Relevant market factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, 
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In determining the overall fairness of a transaction entered into by a board, 
both parts of the “Entire Fairness Test” must be met.34 Furthermore, the 
“Entire Fairness Test” requires a duty of candor as part of fair dealing.35 
However, when a board makes a decision that looks self–interested, 
Delaware courts review using the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test.”36  
The “Enhanced Scrutiny Test” is a takeover test, which, in order to 
satisfy, the board must “show that they had “reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed . . . .”37 
This burden can be satisfied by a showing of “good faith”” and “reasonable 
investigation.”38 Under the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” the decision of the 
board must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.39 Additionally, 
boards must show that their chosen action falls within the “range of 
reasonableness” in proportion to the threat posed.40 If the court finds that the 
board satisfied this burden in showing that the decision was within the range 
of reasonableness, then the “Business Judgment Rule” applies.41 However, 
if the court finds the decision of the board to be “draconian,” the “Entire 
Fairness Test” applies.42 In addition to the takeover circumstances that 
implicate the Unocal “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” another specific subset of 
facts triggers application of the test. When it becomes apparent that the 
breakup of a company is inevitable due to takeover bids, and the board of 
directors then recognizes that the company is for sale, the board’s duties 
owed to the stockholders changes from the preservation of the company as a 
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholder’s benefit.43 At this point, “[t]he directors’ role changes from 
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”44  
In an effort to protect the stockholders from directors who may abuse 
the corporation, Delaware Courts have applied the DGCL to preserve 
  
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.”) Id. 
at 711. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701. 
 36. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 37. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964). 
 38. Id. at 555. 
 39. Unocal, 493 A.2d 955 (applying the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test” is when board 
decisions pertain to defensive measures implemented during or resulting from a perceived 
hostile takeover threat). See also id. (“Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy 
of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
‘constituencies’ other than shareholders…, the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of 
securities being offered in the exchange.”). 
 40. Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1955). 
 41. Id. at 1388. 
 42. Id. at 1387. 
 43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 44. Id. at 182. 
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stockholder rights.45 Stockholders are entitled to be present at annual or 
special meetings of the corporation—either by means of remote 
communication or by proxy.46 Stockholders have the right to vote at 
meetings47 and make amendments to the corporation’s Articles of 
Incorporation.48  A survey performed by Directorship Magazine shows that 
since the recent financial crisis, investors have lost confidence in corporate 
boards.49 
These protections are often helpful; yet, it is often easier for small 
investors to remain passive in corporations due to the cost of becoming 
active within the corporation.50 Stockholder activism is commonly regarded 
as a positive aspect of corporate governance;51 however, much of the time 
stockholder activism can be regarded as unnecessary due to the lack of 
sufficient knowledge and expertise in knowing how to vote or what they are 
voting on.52  
1. The Corporate Governance Marketplace Today – Resulting 
Regulation from the Wild Rollercoaster Ride of the Last 
Decade 
Since 2000, market activity has been a rollercoaster ride of peaks and 
valleys.  This has resulted in advancements in the area of corporate 
governance.53 With the “dot–com” bubble bursting between 2000 and 2001, 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the Enron and WorldCom 
corporate scandals—the markets were extremely unstable.54 Investors began 
to lose confidence in public companies, public accounting, and in the 
marketplace itself as more and more large companies filed for bankruptcy.55 
The market was able to briefly regain some stability until the financial crisis 
of 2008 ensued and resulted in one of the deepest recessions in United 
States history.56 As market recovery continues to remain a focus for 
  
 45. See generally About Agency, supra note 15. 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(2) (West 2010). 
 47. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2010). 
 48. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2010). 
 49. See generally Directorship Editors, What Society Thinks: Where Main Street 
Meets the C-Suite, DIRECTORSHIP – BOARDROOM INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.directorship.com/main-street-meets-c-suite/ [hereinafter Where Main Street 
Meets the C-Suite]. See generally What Society Thinks: Where Main Street Meets the C-
Suite, DIRECTORSHIP – BOARDROOM INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.directorship.com/main-street-meets-c-suite/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 50. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 1. 
 51. Id. 
         52.     Id. 
 53. N.Y. STOCK EXCH. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT OF N.Y.S.E.]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. 
2011] Boardroom Roulette 455 
regulators and investors in the United States, market volatility presently 
continues and investors remain wary of what the future holds.57 In 
particular, investors are concerned with the pace and sustainability of the 
economic recovery in the United States and Europe.58 
As a result of the events of the last decade, there has been increased 
corporate governance and disclosure regulation. In an effort to restore 
investor confidence in capital markets, Congress adopted the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002.59 Sarbanes–Oxley addressed corporate governance in 
several significant ways.60 The Act established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, thereby regulating public accounting 
companies used by publicly–listed companies; increased independence 
standards for auditors; required certification by officers for quarterly and 
annual reports; and  established up–to–date reporting rules expanding the 
range of current reports.61 Since Sarbanes–Oxley, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has implemented numerous additional 
public disclosure requirements for public companies.62 Since the SEC’s 
adoption of these rules, companies must now provide disclosure for “new 
executive compensation and related person transactions,”63 notice and 
access of proxy materials for shareholder meetings,64 and “enhanced proxy 
statement disclosure regarding risk management, compensation consultants, 
background and qualification of directors, diversity of directors, board 
leadership structure, and real-time disclosure of shareholder meeting 
results.”65 Companies must also provide proxy access policies that allow 
flexibility for longer–term shareholders or shareholder groups that hold at 
least three–percent of the company’s stock for at least three years in order to 
gain access to a company’s proxy statement.66 
In addition to Sarbanes–Oxley’s additional requirements, the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) made enhancements to its corporate governance 
  
 57. Id. at 12. 
 58. REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 12. 
 59. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–24, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 60. See generally id. 
 61. See REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33–8732A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Aug. 29, 2006); see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., 
supra note 53, at 19. 
 64. See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 
34–56135, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,221 (July 26, 2007); see generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 20. 
         65.   See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 33–9089, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 16, 2009); Proxy Disclosure Enhancements; Correction, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33–9089A, 75 Fed. Reg. 9100 (Feb. 23, 2010); see generally REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 20. 
 66. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 
33–9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Aug. 25, 2010); see generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 20. 
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regulations in the NYSE Listing Requirements at the behest of the SEC.67  
The NYSE also requires that the make–up of boards be comprised of a 
majority of independent directors;68 the independent directors meet 
regularly without management directors for executive meetings held on a 
regular basis;69 companies issue charters for nominating governance, 
compensation and audit committees, where each committee holds specific 
responsibilities for various issues within each committee’s respective 
subject area;70 companies gain shareholder approval for all equity 
compensation plans;71 the CEO annually complete certification of 
compliance with corporate governance standards;72 the company include 
disclosure requirements within proxy materials or annual reports of different 
corporate governance requirements;73 and companies provide disclosure of 
several corporate governance matters on the company’s website.74 On a 
similar note, Delaware General Corporation Law made several changes 
affecting the governance structure of corporations.75 One of the most 
notable changes involved permitting proxy access in a corporation’s 
bylaws.76 
As swiftly as Sarbanes–Oxley followed the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals, other congressional legislation quickly followed the financial 
crisis of 2008 and 2009. Specifically, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010” (“Dodd–Frank”) made numerous 
significant changes to corporate governance in the United States.77 The 
changes arising from Dodd–Frank mainly addressed financial reform issues 
arising from the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009; numerous topics of 
corporate governance also were addressed in the legislation, including 
public disclosure of compensation, “say on pay,” proxy access, board 
  
 67. REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
         68.  See N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.01–02 (2009) [hereinafter 
N.Y.S.E.]; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
 69. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.03; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 18. 
 70. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.04–07; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 18–19. 
 71. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.08; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 19. 
 72. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.12; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 19. 
 73. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.00, .02–05, –.07, .09–11; see also REPORT 
OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 19. 
 74. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.04–05, –.07(b), .09–10; see also REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 19. 
 75. See generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 21. 
 76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (West 2010); see generally REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 21. 
 77. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111–203, H.R. 4173 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
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composition, and independence of committee members.78 Specifically in the 
area of corporate governance, Dodd–Frank authorizes the SEC to adopt 
rules regarding proxy access, requires enhanced stock exchange listing 
standards on independence of compensation committee members and hiring 
of advisors, mandates further disclosure of the relationship between 
financial performance and executive compensation, and demands corporate 
policies regarding clawback of executive compensation in particular 
situations.79 The implementation of new corporate governance regulations—
whether followed under the DGCL, NYSE, SEC or Congress—attempt to 
provide greater investor confidences in the capital markets. Resulting 
impacts from such regulations extend beyond the United States’ borders and 
have a profound impact globally on international firms. 
B. European Union History, General Principles, and Goals 
The principal focus of European Union company law is the freedom of 
establishment.80 Corporate governance regulation in the EU focuses on: (1) 
freedom to decide what form the company should take in the EU, (2) 
widespread coordination of regulating securities markets and financial 
reporting in the EU,81 and (3) EU binding rules and non–binding 
Commission recommendations.82 Company law in the EU has a minimal 
number of binding rules that make up the field of corporate governance.83 
Even so, regulations exist in the area of share capital and mergers or 
divisions which are within the breadth of EU law.84 In addition to the 
binding rules, non–binding EU Commission recommendations exist relating 
to the role and compensation of directors, quality assurance baseline 
standards for statutory audits and the independent status of the statutory 
auditors.85 The European Community Treaty (“EC Treaty”) acts in 
furtherance of the principal goal of EU company law by prohibiting any 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of citizens of Member States in 
the territory of another Member State within the EU.86  
Early on, European Community institutions were wrought with 
disorganization; no clear–cut goal or agreed upon rationale for company law 
  
 78. See REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 22. 
 79. See Dodd–Frank Act. 
 80. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 35. 
 81. Id. (“The disclosure of information to investors is largely governed by derivative 
EU law.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 43,  Feb. 26, 2001, 
2006 O.J. (C321) 39 (as in effect 2006) (now TFEU art. 49) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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existed.87 After several Company Law Directives failed, the Commission 
took aim at passing a Statute for the European Union.88 Starting in the 
1990s, the EU company law legislative process has changed allowing more 
political deference to national laws of Member States, including more 
references to national rules of Member States in the legislative proposals.89 
The legal rationale behind this methodology lies in the principle of 
“subsidiarity.”90 This harmonization approach allowed for more flexibility 
which ultimately “resulted in the adoption of the Regulation of the 
European Company Statute (Societas Europaea) in October 2001.”91 
Presently, the traditional continental European approach to corporate 
governance is commonly followed, which assumes that companies will 
finance privately opposed to the more recent trend of corporations publicly 
financing through capital markets.92 However, companies are regulated and 
must still follow mandatory provisions of Company Company Law, which 
were put into effect to protect minority stockholders and creditors.93 In the 
past, EU legislation concentrated on the maintenance and alteration of 
capital, representation of the company and its transactions with third parties, 
financial reporting standards, and issues regarding disclosure of information 
to investors.94  
In 2003 the Commission proposed its Action Plan.95 The goals of the 
plan sought: (1) strengthening stockholders’ rights along with providing 
protection for employees, creditors and other parties interacting with 
companies and (2) promoting efficiency and competitiveness of business, 
specifically targeting issues of cross-border transactions.96 The Commission 
believed that the European regulatory framework required modernization 
and explained that its reasoning occurred because of: (i) the increasing trend 
of European companies operating cross-border within the internal market; 
  
 87. See MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 37. 
 88. Id. at 37. 
 89. Id. at 38. 
 90. EC Treaty art. 5 (as in effect 2006) (now TFEU art. 5) (“In areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action  . . . only if and in so 
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.”). GERT–JAN VOSSESTEIN, MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-A PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD 
19 (2010) [hereinafter MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]. 
 91. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 38. See also Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC, of 
8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1. 
 92. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 47. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 47–48. 
 95. Commission Proposal for Recommendations on Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, at 1, 
COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Modernising Company Law]. 
 96. Id. at 8–9. 
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(ii) the ongoing incorporation of European capital markets; (iii) the high-
speed of growth in new information and communication technologies; (iv) 
the imminent expansion of the European Union to ten new Member States; 
and (v) the disastrous effect of financial scandals.97 
European Company Law protects stockholders through the use of 
directives.98 These directives are implemented within EU member states “to 
the extent necessary”99 with the perspective that such stockholder 
safeguarding directives will become standard and mutually similar 
throughout the European Community.100 In following EU Company Law 
and the objective of freedom of establishment, the EC Treaty also provides 
that any procedure which would stand in the path of the freedom of 
establishment, by means of directives will be abolished.101 The principles 
behind the adoption of Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty rest on the premise 
that allowing freedom of establishment based on a minimum number of 
requirements allows easier start–up for companies to establish themselves in 
different Member States where the regulatory structure is comparable; they 
also rest upon the idea of building trust between firms which enter into 
cross-border economic relationships102 by “ensuring legal certainty in intra-
Community operations” due to the existence of common safeguards. 103  
In addition to freedom of establishment, European Union Company 
Law seeks to accomplish many other goals. European Union company law 
seeks to remove obstacles to trade that interfere with the internal market and 
adjust the structures of production to the European Community 
(“Community”) sphere.104 Companies transact business beyond national 
boundaries, creating choice of law problems; these conflicts between laws 
of conflicting Member States give rise to legal and cultural difficulties.105 In 
order to help foster efficiency and competitiveness of businesses, the 
Commission recommended implementing EU initiatives that tackle only 
specific cross–border issues, where subsidiarity cannot be accomplished and 
Community intervention is the only means to accomplish the goals.106 Also, 
these initiatives allow for reduced uncertainties stemming from the 
harmonization of the defined national issues.107 Companies operating within 
  
 97. Id. at 6–7. 
 98. EC Treaty art. 44(1) (now TFEU art. 50). 
 99. EC Treaty art. 44(g) (now TFEU art. 50(2)(g)). 
 100. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 35. 
 101. EC Treaty art. 44 (2)(c) (now TFEU art. 50(2)(c)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 36. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 9 (“e.g. cross-border merger or 
transfer of seat, cross-border impediments to the exercise of shareholder rights.”). 
 107. Id. 
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the Member States are also given flexibility in circumstances where 
governance structures are considered comparable.108 
In responding to stockholder protection, EU Company Law states that 
“it is necessary to ensure minimum equivalent protection for both 
shareholders and creditors of companies as well as other people doing 
business with companies.”109 EU legislation finds it necessary to guarantee 
that the “principles of equal treatment of shareholders in the same position 
are observed and harmonised.”110 This is necessary to guarantee that 
competition within the internal market is not disrupted by differences in the 
laws of Member States so that Community companies may be able to 
compete equally in global markets.111 Along those same guidelines, legal 
hurdles that hinder company development on the European front must be 
eliminated to allow companies to operate throughout Europe in the same 
fashion they would in their Member State.112 Another important objective of 
EU company law is ensuring protection of investors and the safeguarding of 
investor confidence in the financial markets.113 The Commission provided 
that strengthening shareholder rights and third parties protection was a key 
objective in its Action Plan.114 The Commission indicated this objective to 
be at the core of company law policy and that effectuating a sound 
framework for protection of shareholders and third parties creates a high 
degree of confidence in the business relationship.115 The relevancy of this 
protectionism increases continually due to the increased mobility of 
companies within EU Member States.116 The Commission provided 
guidelines to aide European companies in achieving and maintaining 
efficient protection for stockholders and third parties.117 These guidelines 
provide for the Commission to contemplate new initiatives aimed at 
shareholder rights and providing clarity as to duties of management.118 The 
proposed guidelines also provide for a distinction between the different 
  
 108. Id. 
 109. Council Directive 68/151, recital 5, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8 (EC); Council Directive 
77/91, recitals 2, 3, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC); Council Directive 78/855, recital 3, 6, 8, 1978 
O.J. (L 295) 36 (EC). 
 110. Council Directive 77/91, recital 4, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC). 
 111. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 36. 
 112. Id. See also Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC, recital 6, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1. 
 113. See Commission Regulation 1606/2002, Application of International Accounting 
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1; See also, e.g., Council Directive 2003/6, Insider Dealing and 
Market Manipulation, recitals 1, 2, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. 
 114. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 8. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (“The provisions related to the protection of creditors should be modernised 
with a view of maintaining a high quality framework.”). 
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categories of companies119 and provide that company law should facilitate 
and support the use of current information and communication technologies 
by companies in their various relationships with stockholders and third 
parties.120 Lastly, the Commission sought protection of stockholders and 
third parties by implementation of carefully constructed, yet limited amount 
of measures designed at preventing fraud and abuse of legal forms.121 
Aimed towards boosting investor confidence, the Commission 
recommended that “a common approach should be adopted at EU level with 
respect to a few essential rules and adequate coordination of corporate 
governance codes should be ensured.”122 
 After the “dot–com” bubble burst and the financial crisis of Enron and 
WorldCom, the Commission took aim at enhancing corporate governance 
disclosure at the EU company level.123 Under the Action Plan, the 
Commission recommended specific disclosures that should be required in a 
company “Annual Corporate Governance Statement.”124 Specifically, listed 
companies should be required to include at least the following items: (1) 
“the operation of the shareholder meeting and its key powers, and the 
description of the shareholder rights and how they can be exercised;”125  (2) 
the make–up and functionality of the board of directors and its committees; 
(3) the majority shareholders whom own major holdings and those 
shareholders voting rights, control rights and key agreements; (4) other 
direct and indirect relationships among major shareholders and the 
company; (5) any and all material transactions with other related parties; (6) 
existence and character of a risk management system; and (7) “a reference 
code on corporate governance, designated for use at national level, with 
which the company complies or in relation to which it explains 
deviations.”126  
These suggestions work side–by–side with strengthening stockholders’ 
rights because such disclosures allow for access to information by investors. 
Stockholders of listed companies should be furnished relevant information 
regarding the company by use of electronic means in a timely manner in 
advance of the corporation’s Annual General Meetings.127 The Commission 
  
 119. Id. (“A more stringent framework is desirable for listed companies and 
companies which have publicly raised capital. They should be subject to a certain number of 
appropriate detailed rules, in particular in the area of disclosure.”). 
 120. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 8. 
 121. Id. at 9. 
 122. Id. at 12. 
 123. See generally id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 12–13. 
 127. See Council Directive 2007/36 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders 
in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 (EC). The Annual General Meeting is where 
shareholders come together to exercise their voting rights as shareholders on items placed 
upon the agenda to vote upon. 
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bases its strengthening of shareholders’ rights on the principles of providing 
shareholders with information regarding their numerous existing rights and 
how these rights are utilized, as well as developing the services essential to 
ensure that these rights are effectively employed.128 Stockholders require 
disclosure as a safeguard to ensure the boards of companies they invest in 
are not being mismanaged. One responsibility of a board of directors is 
ensuring the shareholder–director relationship remain strong, since it is 
essential if companies are to continue to raise capital at the lowest cost 
through public financing. In a continued effort to restore confidence in the 
markets, the Commission enhanced directors’ responsibilities by holding the 
entire board collectively responsible for key non–financial and financial 
statements.129 
     The Commission’s Action Plan recommended a modernization of the 
board of directors as part of its plan to modernize EU corporate governance 
policy.130 The Commission recommended three areas for modernization: (1) 
“Board composition,”131 (2) “Directors’ remuneration,”132 and (3) 
“Directors’ responsibilities.”133 The Commission recognized the importance 
of implementing new measures designed primarily for restoration of 
confidence in the markets by its adoption of Commission Directive 
2010/43/EU on July 1, 2010.134 One key area where the Commission 
recommended modernizing deals was with regard to conflicts of interest 
among executive directors, which are directors who are paid for the work 
they perform on the board.135 Decisions which could be considered within 
the spectrum of “conflict of interest” should instead be left to non–executive 
or supervisory directors who are in the majority independent.136 As far as 
nomination of directors for appointment under national law, the 
Commission recommended that this responsibility be assigned to a group 
mainly comprised of executive directors because of their vast knowledge of 
the obstacles that face the company and the experience and skill required to 
  
 128. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 14. 
 129. Commission Directive 2010/43; see also Modernising Company Law, supra note 
95, at 16. 
 130. See generally Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 16. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See generally Commission Directive 2010/43 Implementing Directive 
2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards Organisational 
Requirements, Conflicts of Interest, Conduct of Business, Risk Management and Content of 
the Agreement Between a Depositary and a Management Company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42 
(EU). [hereinafter Commission Directive 2010/43]. 
 135. See, e.g., Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15 (“remuneration of 
directors, and supervision of the audit of a company’s accounts.”). 
 136. Commission Directive 2010/43, arts. 18, 19. Commission Directive 2010/43, 
supra note 134, arts. 18, 19. 
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handle these obstacles.137 In an attempt to ensure that a satisfactory control 
mechanism is in place, the EU adopted requiring a permanent compliance 
function and an internal audit function.138 The goal of the audit function is 
to ensure and evaluate that the different control mechanisms which the 
company implemented are followed.139  
 In addition to the enforcement of the control mechanisms, the 
Commission recommended that the appropriate regulatory scheme 
regarding directors’ remuneration should consist of four key components.140 
The first two key components involve disclosure of the “remuneration 
policy in the annual accounts [and] disclosure of details of remuneration of 
individual directors in the annual accounts.”141  The last two components 
involve “prior approval by the shareholder meeting of share and share 
option schemes in which directors participate [and] proper recognition in 
the annual accounts of the costs of such schemes for the company.”142 
C. Lithuania 
 Member States within the EU have their own national laws and their own 
corporate governance regulations... One of these member states is 
Lithuania.. The Republic of Lithuania amends its “Law on Companies” as 
needed, and has amended such Company Law Company Law as recently as 
July 17, 2009.143  In accordance with EU Company Law, the National Stock 
Exchange of Lithuania Corporate Governance Code provides a 
recommended framework of measures companies in the Republic of 
Lithuania should follow.144  The objectives of the Code are to provide basic 
principles which seek to ensure transparent management and operation for 
both domestic and foreign investors; to encourage listed companies to 
continuously improve their governance framework and continuously 
  
 137. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15. 
 138. Commission Directive 2010/43. 
 139. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15 (“In view of the recent 
accounting scandals, special emphasis will be placed on the audit committee [or equivalent 
body], with a view to fostering the key role it should play in supervising the audit function, 
both in its external aspects [selecting the external auditor for appointment by shareholders, 
monitoring the relationship with the external auditor including non-audit fees if any] and its 
internal aspects [reviewing the accounting policies, and monitoring the internal audit 
procedures and the company’s risk management system]”); see also Commission Directive 
2010/43. 
 140. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 16. 
 141. MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 90, at 16 (alteration in original). 
 142. Id. (alteration in original). 
 143. Law on Companies, 2000 07 13, No. VIII-1835, as amended by 2009 07 17, No. 
XI–354 (Lith.). 
 144. See NAT’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR THE 
COMPANIES LISTED ON THE NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE OF LITHUANIA, 2004 2 (2004) 
[hereinafter NAT’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH.].  
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improve disclosure of information; to promote listed companies to develop 
quality management as a method of increasing performance of the 
company; to promote activities which involve the listed companies at the 
international level while at the same time improve domestic and foreign 
investor confidence, as well as the confidences of stakeholders within the 
companies and their corporate governance structure; and to promote 
internationally the activities of the National Stock Exchange of Lithuania to 
improve domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Lithuanian capital 
markets.145 The goals of Company Law in the Republic of Lithuania are 
aligned with those of EU Company Law.  Similar to EU Company Law, the 
Republic of Lithuania provides property and non–property rights for 
shareholders.146 Non–property shareholder rights include the right to attend 
General Meetings of Shareholders; submit of questions to the Company in 
advance of the General Meeting of Shareholders regarding issues on the 
agenda; vote at General Meetings of Shareholders; receive information 
about the company; and file a derivative claim of damages arising out from 
nonfeasance or malfeasance for conduct by a manager of the company and 
members of the Board of their duties listed under the Law on Companies 
and the company’s Articles of Incorporation.147 
 In an effort to provide adequate transparency, the Republic of Lithuania 
requires that companies provide a response to questions regarding issues on 
the agenda of the General Meeting.148  Questions from shareholders to the 
company must be received no later than three working days before the 
General Meeting.149  Lithuanian Company Law does not require that 
companies reveal trade secrets or other confidential information; yet it does 
require that companies inform the shareholders that answering such a 
question would reveal confidential information and thus cannot be 
answered.150  Lithuanian Company Law provides shareholders with the right 
to vote in accordance with the rights carried by the type of shares owned.151 
With the common goal of regaining confidences in capital markets, the 
Lithuanian Company Law affords shareholders the right to information 
concerning the company.152  In order for shareholders to provide 
shareholders with information, a written request must be sent to the 
  
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally Law on Companies, art. 14. 
 147. Law on Companies, art. 15. 
 148. Law on Companies, art. 16. See also First Council Directive 68/151/EEC, art. 58, 
1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (“on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies . . . with a 
view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.”). 
 149. Law on Companies, art. 16. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Law on Companies, art. 17. 
 152. Law on Companies, art. 18. 
2011] Boardroom Roulette 465 
company and within seven days of receiving such a request, the company is 
required to provide access or copies of the information to the shareholder.153  
 In order to protect the rights of shareholders, Lithuanian Company Law 
provides that “the management organs of the company must act for the 
benefit of the company and its shareholders . . . .” The structure of 
management in Lithuania is governed by a single company manager, a 
collegial supervisory body composed of the Supervisory Board and a 
collegial management organ (the “Board.”)154  The Supervisory Board may 
or may not be formed within the company; if the Supervisory Board is not 
formed from within the company, then the duties allocated to its scope of 
powers shall be executed by the company manager.155  In furtherance of 
providing corporate governance transparency, companies may elect or 
remove the manager of the company either by the Board, or—if there is no 
Board—by the General Meeting of Shareholders.156  In addition to electing 
the manager, this governing body will also set the manager’s salary, 
approve his job description, including the duties he must fulfill while in 
office, offer incentives and impose penalties.157 Possessing both a 
Supervisory Board and a separate Management Board facilitates a clear 
separation of management and functions delegated to the Supervisory Board 
allowing for a transparent and efficient management process.158 In the 
formation of the Management Board, the Stock Exchange of Lithuania 
posits that providing a mechanism that ensures objective and fair 
monitoring operates to safeguard shareholder rights and impart 
accountability upon the Supervisory Board to the shareholders.159 To ensure 
independence, the Stock Exchange of Lithuania proposes that for a member 
  
 153. Id.  Upon a written request from shareholders, companies must give access or 
provide copies of the following documents:  
 
[T]he Articles of Association of the company, set of annual financial 
statements, annual reports of the company, the auditor’s opinion and 
audit reports, minutes of the General Meetings of Shareholders or other 
documents executing decisions of the General Meetings of 
Shareholders, the recommendations and responses of Supervisory Board 
to the General Meetings of Shareholders, the lists of shareholders, the 
lists of members of the Supervisory Board and the Board, also other 
documents of the company that must be publicly accessible under laws 
as well as minutes of the meetings of the Supervisory Board and the 
Board or other documents executing decisions of the above-mentioned 
company organs, unless these documents contain a commercial 
(industrial) secret of the company, confidential information.   
 
Id.   
 154. Law on Companies, art. 19. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Law on Companies, art. 37. 
 157. Id.   
 158. NATI’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH., supra note 144, at 3. 
 159. Id. at 3. 
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to serve on the Management Board, the member is not deemed independent 
when the member: (1) is connected or is the controlling shareholder of the 
company; (2) previously served as chief executive officer or another 
empowered employee of the company within the previous three years; (3) 
served as head of the company that consulted with the company within the 
previous three years; (4) currently is a client or major supplier of the 
company or head, employee, or member of said supplier or client; (5) 
currently is bound by material contractual agreements with the company; 
(6) previously served as a member of a collegial body of the company for a 
period that may be considered long enough to influence the determination of 
that member to act in the best interests of the company; and (7) has relations 
that potentially can cause a conflict of interest and influence the 
determination of that member to act in the best interests of the company.160  
In comparison, Delaware General Corporation Law § 144 takes aim at the 
independence of the directors of Delaware incorporated firms.161 The DGCL 
permits interested directors to attend, participate, or even vote so long as: 
(1) material information regarding the interested director’s relationship to 
the subject transaction are made known to the board and the board acts in 
good faith in voting affirmatively for the transaction, even if disinterested 
directors make up less than quorum, or; (2) the interested director discloses 
such material information to the shareholders and the shareholders in good 
faith vote affirmatively for the subject transaction, or; (3) the subject 
transaction is fair to the corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or 
ratified, by the directors, a committee or by the stockholders.162 For the 
Board to avoid possible conflicts of interest, the Stock Exchange of 
Lithuania recommends the Board establish an Audit Committee, a 
Remuneration Committee, and a Nomination Committee.163 The tasks these 
Committees perform offer greater management transparency and continue 
the restoration of confidence in the Lithuanian capital markets. 
The Board’s powers enumerated in Lithuanian Company Law also serve 
the goal of protecting shareholders and offering transparency.164 The Board 
is entrusted with determining the proper operating strategy of the company 
and the proper management structure and placement of its employees.165 To 
further the confidence in Lithuanian capital markets, Lithuanian Company 
Law provides checks and balances by requiring that the Board oversee 
information offered by the manager of the company regarding the 
implementation of the company’s operating strategy and the organization of 
the company’s financial status and activities.166  The General Meeting of 
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Shareholders offers many exclusive rights involving actions of the 
company, including (1) amending the Articles of Incorporation of the 
company; (2) electing or removing members of the Supervisory Board, 
collegial board or the manager of the company; and (3) selecting and 
removing auditors of the firm that perform the audit of financial 
statements.167   
II. EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 Boards have increased their focus on risk management techniques and 
issues of executive remuneration in an attempt to restore investor 
confidence in the capital markets after the volatility of the previous decade.  
After the financial crisis in 2008, public outcry grew over the excessive 
executive compensation policies and over the intertwining connection 
between these policies and the risk taking and short term mindset.168 In the 
United States, this has led to regulation under Dodd–Frank regarding “say–
on–pay,” “clawbacks,” and “compensation consultant independence.”169 
Due to the changes enacted by Dodd–Frank, proxy disclosure regulations 
require information concerning executive compensation in regards to the 
relationship of compensation policies to risk, to the compensation 
consultant independence and to the reporting of stock options and other 
equity awards.170 As a result of Dodd–Frank, disclosure of compensation 
risk is only mandated in a few limited situations.171 With the new 
regulations in force, corporations must now disclose compensation policies 
used for all employees, “and their risk management philosophy only if the 
risks arising from their compensation programs are ‘reasonably likely to 
have a material adverse effect’ on the company.”172 Shearman & Sterling’s 
Survey of Corporate Governance (“Shearman Survey”) found proxy 
statements to be consistent regarding components listed to support a 
corporation’s finding that policies dealing with compensation do not pose a 
risk to the venture.173 The Shearman Survey provided that of the Top 100 
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Companies in the United States, eighty–six provided disclosure of some 
level of “risk” in their proxy statement.174 Additionally, of the Top 100 
Companies, seventy–one indicated that they maintain a “clawback policy,” 
which triggers after the occurrence of specific events that affect the 
corporation’s financial statements.175  
 The perplexing problem regarding how improvements in boardroom 
corporate governance can be made often draws regulators’ attention to 
investigating what actions may have caused the investors to lose confidence 
in the first place.  Investors list executive remuneration as a key reason for 
their lack of confidence in the capital markets.176 Compensation by means 
of stock options, bonuses, and cash incentives at corporations has been a 
method of rewarding boards and other executives for risky, but profitable, 
business measures undertaken on behalf of the corporation.177 This dilemma 
begins with a review of compensation programs previously in place, which 
rewarded directors for short–term goals as opposed to the corporation’s 
long–term corporate strategy.178 Regulations are being enacted in hopes of 
restoring investor confidence after the financial crisis...  In order for 
investor confidence to return, investors must once again believe that a 
“board’s risk oversight responsibility derives primarily from state law 
fiduciary duties, federal laws and regulations, stock exchange listing 
requirements and certain established (and evolving) best practices.”179 
 Delaware—as the primary authority for corporation law—has developed 
a framework for the fiduciary duties of corporations.180 Generally, the rule 
laid out in Caremark imposes director liability only for a failure of 
oversight where there is “sustained or systemic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure [that] a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists.”181 The Caremark court 
also indicated that this is a “demanding test.”182 Since Caremark, Delaware 
courts have stressed their interpretation of its holding, positing that no 
Caremark liability would ensue unless the “directors intentionally failed 
entirely to implement any reporting or information system or controls or, 
having implemented such a system, intentionally refused to monitor the 
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system or act on warnings it provided.”183 The Delaware perspective views 
risk oversight on the small scale dealing with risk oversight by a board of 
directors on individual decisions. In comparison, the recently enacted 
Dodd–Frank legislation imposes risk oversight fiduciary duties on a larger 
scale dealing with risk oversight and the series of decisions and rationale 
behind those decisions. 
 The Dodd–Frank legislation concerns itself more with risk management 
disclosure issues rather than solely focused on risk oversight functions.184  
While both aspects of risk are important, Dodd–Frank takes aim at directors 
of corporations who follow risk oversight procedures, but make short–term 
decisions out–of–line with the corporation’s long–term corporate 
strategy.185 The conflict arises between the directors’ short–term decisions 
being linked to director compensation and the short–term decisions not 
being in the best interests of the company and their long–term corporate 
strategy.186 Dodd–Frank has thus imposed new rules relating to executive 
remuneration by requiring a non–binding shareholder vote on executive 
pay187 and establishing new guidelines as to independence of members of 
compensation committees.188 Regarding executive remuneration, the Act 
also requires disclosures of executive pay in comparison to the financial 
performance of the company and the ratio of the Chief Executive Officer’s 
pay to the median pay of every all other employees of the said company.189 
Dodd–Frank also requires “clawbacks,” which mandate recovery by the 
company of funds dispersed to executive officers for improprieties or other 
certain financial restatements made by the company and its executive 
officers.190 One of the most controversial provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act 
involves proxy access. This somewhat controversial provision in Dodd–
Frank would provide shareholders the right—contingent on the 
shareholder’s ownership stake in the company—to include a list of 
candidates for board positions in the company.191 
 As the United States adapts to investors’ call for executive compensation 
regulation, the European Union adapts as well. In the EU numerous member 
states currently mandate executive remuneration for listed companies be 
associated with individual and corporate performance.192 This required 
association has brought additional focus on ensuring that compensation is 
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structured to not incentivize and avoid inappropriate risk taking.193 As 
recently as April 2009, the European Commission issued a non–binding 
recommendation in an effort to institute controls on risk taking.194 The 
recommendation provides that “the compensation of executives of all listed 
companies should be principally based on performance and be in the long-
term interests of the company.”195 The Commission recommends that 
certain measures be enacted to further this goal: “(1) limits on the amount of 
variable compensation; (2) the deferral of a significant portion of variable 
compensation; (3) imposing performance conditions on variable 
compensation; and (4) clawbacks of variable compensation awarded on the 
basis of data that proves to be manifestly misstated.”196 Clawback 
provisions are becoming more common in the United States, yet such 
policies are few and far between among EU countries.197 However, a 
number of EU countries have adopted advisory “say–on–pay” shareholder 
voting procedures that have helped voice shareholder concerns for executive 
compensation procedures.198 Nevertheless, if shareholders vote significantly 
against procedures disclosed to them for vote, the results from the non–
binding vote provide great feedback for boards so that they may consider 
alternatives to avoid future backlash.  While both the United States and the 
European Union indicate progress in regulation of executive compensation, 
neither indicates whether such changes have affected investor confidence in 
capital markets.  
III. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE     
 Currently in the United States, federal regulation has increasingly 
targeted actions which previously were regulated solely by state law. State 
laws previously regulated such actions as disclosure and shareholders voting 
rights until federal regulation usurped these actions in order to provide 
greater transparency and confidence in the capital markets. Regulation in 
the United States has and continues to be bountiful and swift since recent 
financial crises. In the United States each crisis has been followed almost 
immediately with some form of regulation.  This trend will likely continue 
perpetually until market equilibrium is found. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 followed after the “dot–com” bubble burst, the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, and the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals. The 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and 
other regulatory actions followed as a result of the financial crisis of 2008 
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and 2009—which stemmed from the “sub–prime meltdown”—causing the 
“housing bubble” to burst. 
 In the European Union, the trend follows a continued improvement 
approach towards modification of corporate governance. This EU approach 
to modification of corporate governance may be largely due to the fact that 
the EU is a relatively new body, whereas the United States is relatively old 
in comparison. As a result, the EU approach seems to be aimed at 
discovering what the law of the land should be and to continue to modify 
the law. Alternatively, the U.S. tweaks its corporate governance laws over 
time, only after crises or other similar situations provoke action necessary to 
remedy existing problems.  Although the EU approach to corporate 
governance regulation is more time consuming, it seems to be broader and 
forward–looking at potential stumbling blocks that could interfere with 
progress. Unlike the EU, the United States’ traditional approach takes aim at 
removing the stumbling blocks after an event occurs, which requires making 
a change to the regulation. This difference can be summarized simply as the 
U.S. living and learning from their mistakes, whereas the EU approach 
seems to use a slow yet forward looking method of preparation to avoid 
future potential obstacles of its regulation. Recently, the pattern of U.S. 
regulation seems to have made a change from the “learn from mistake” 
approach through enacting the Dodd–Frank Act.  In adopting Dodd–Frank, 
the United States has taken a forward looking approach to corporate 
governance by providing proxy access to shareholders, allowing for non–
binding “say–on–pay” voting, and providing “clawback” provisions. It 
seems the U.S. is starting to aim at both providing a remedy for problems 
past and at solving future potential problems in the shareholder–director 
relationship. However, opponents of Dodd–Frank argue that Congress does 
not have the Constitutional power to enact such broad sweeping legislation 
as it did in Dodd–Frank—causing several aspects of Dodd–Frank to remain 
contested and not in force. 
 Not only must the European Union make necessary changes reflecting the 
capital markets in the EU—it must also make regulatory changes in reaction 
to events occurring in the United States. After the enactment of the 
Sarbanes–––Oxley Act of 2002, European Union corporations seeking 
expansion into the United States are required to follow U.S. laws relevant to 
their operation. Specifically, EU corporations operating in the United States 
were required to follow disclosure requirements implicated by Sarbanes–
Oxley. Additionally, with recent adoption of Dodd–Frank, EU incorporated 
companies are required to follow additional requirements. EU–based 
companies must now inquire as to what the laws of the United States require 
of them and adapt. This problem results in a barrier of entry for cross–
border expansion. Finding a resolution to this problem helps improve the 
capital markets of both EU–based companies and U.S.–based companies 
alike by providing growth opportunities into the markets.    
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IV. AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM WITH AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION  
The future of international corporate governance is headed towards the 
general framework currently utilized in the European Union. The EU 
framework sets out a few broad directives—which must be followed by 
all—and then the EU Commission provides recommendations for smooth 
transitions cross–border.  While the United States and European Union both 
operate differently, the focus of corporate governance in the United States 
begins at local or state regulation followed by federal regulation.  As 
corporations today grow into global conglomerates, cross–border issues 
continue to arise resulting in the need for a set of international guidelines on 
corporate governance. Companies seeking global expansion often find 
expansion difficult due to confusion and a lack of clarity in interpreting the 
rules and regulations imposed by other countries. The United States 
operates with state to state jurisdictional differences and there remain 
several federal regulations placed upon each and every company.  Unlike 
the United States, the EU operates by placing several directives upon 
corporations as to how they may or may not operate and additionally 
provides them with recommendations that the EU Commission believe to be 
actions considered “good” governance. As corporations continue the 
outward trend of becoming international conglomerates, problems arise 
when boards are not familiar with the rules and regulations of the countries 
in which they seek expansion.   
To remedy this problem, I propose the establishment of an International 
Corporate Governance Regulatory Agency (“ICGRA”). The purpose of this 
Agency will be to establish a set of cross–border guidelines that are to be 
followed by both the United States and the European Union, and thus will 
synthesize the similarities between both entities in order to provide 
standards when companies seek cross–border expansion.  These cross–
border guidelines would be followed by corporations with operations in 
more than one country or member state, in either the United States or 
European Union. The fusion of the corporate governance similarities will 
provide companies opportunities to expand into new markets and help 
remove obstacles that previously stood in the way of growth.  This would be 
similar to the European Union corporate governance ideology of freedom to 
establishment.199 These synergies will provide a foundation for companies 
seeking expansion and how they should begin their expansion efforts. 
The ICGRA would also act similar to the EU Commission by providing 
recommendations for what it believes to be “good” governance features. 
The ICGRA would provide recommendations for major issues such as: 
executive remuneration, risk management, proxy access and fiduciary duties 
owed by boards of directors. The ICGRA’s recommendations would not 
apply solely to the EU or United States, but such recommendations would 
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be offered for companies operating in both the United States and EU capital 
markets...  These synergies would have a wide–range effect that would 
allow EU companies and U.S. companies alike to expand into new global 
markets that were previously unavailable to them. 
In providing such synergies, the ICGRA would be able to operate in 
tandem with local and national regulatory authorities in dealing with 
corporate governance issues because both are seeking the same goal of 
improved corporate governance regulations. These regulations, whether 
enacted regionally, nationally or by the ICGRA would act to pre-empt 
further problems typically not addressed by both United States and 
European Union based corporations. Implementation of these ICGRA 
recommendations would take regulations that were previously solely United 
States based or solely European Union based and work to implement a 
recommendation that would aim towards both the United States and 
European Union. Such regulations would have the effect of allowing 
efficiencies in the market place where previously one market has fallen 
behind the other. 
The ICGRA would be managed by an international committee composed 
of members from corporate governance regulatory agencies in the United 
States and the EU. Members on the committee would include congressional 
committee members and representatives from the SEC and NYSE for the 
United States delegation. In the EU, committee members will be selected 
from the EU Commission and representatives from different Member States 
in order to provide an international perspective to the ICGRA committee. 
The diversity gained from such widespread representation will aid the 
ICGRA in forming recommendations that address issues at the forefront of 
each regulatory body. With the trend of international representatives on the 
board of directors of global companies, forming the ICGRA committee in a 
similar fashion helps the ICGRA stay abreast to potential communication 
issues that companies encounter and resolve such issues by forming 
recommendations to account for potential communication conflicts.200  This 
format gives the ICGRA an opportunity to learn about problems other 
regulatory agencies face before they become problems on a larger scale. 
Learning about these problems earlier and enacting recommendations to 
resolve potential issues can halt or at least slow down a potentially global 
problem by addressing it during its early stages. Such diverse representation 
on the international committee will enhance the transparency and 
understandability of the ICGRA’s recommendations.  Another benefit of 
committee diversity is the opportunity of each member to voice any issues 
or concerns they may find while forming recommendations. By raising 
issues or concerns prior to issuing a formal recommendation, the ICGRA 
can work together and resolve potential conflicts before they arise while at 
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the same time providing clarity for companies located in both the United 
States and European Union.  
 Everyday corporations are facing new obstacles in the marketplace, some 
local, some regional, some national, and now even global obstacles 
challenge corporations.  With implementation of the ICGRA, the United 
States and European Union will be taking a prospective approach toward 
corporate governance. By working together, the ICGRA will look to remove 
potential obstacles that could stand in the way of corporate development and 
growth across borders. The elimination of confusion and guidance from the 
ICGRA will provide easier entry into foreign markets than ever before. 
Effectively utilizing the ICGRA will have short-term and long–term 
benefits. In the short-term, the ICGRA will provide clarity to regulations 
and standards required for entry into cross-border marketplaces. In the 
long–term, when investors begin seeing the benefits provided from the 
ICGRA, the decrease in crises because of early actions and the growth in 
corporate expansion due to the clarity provided by the ICGRA, investor 
confidences in the markets will be restored. 
CONCLUSION 
 The international corporate governance marketplace changes with each 
transaction, decision, or meeting; from the smallest family–owned shop to 
international conglomerates, addressing issues these companies face is a 
daunting task. Difficulties arise when determining which issues require 
most immediate action.  Addressing these issues properly can prevent future 
crises, provide smooth transitions into markets and help stabilize and restore 
investor confidences in the marketplaces. By establishing an international 
agency whose job is to address potential future issues that could arise in the 
United States and European Union marketplaces, ICGRA could help 
prevent a small issue from developing into a crisis. The ICGRA will provide 
clarity to regulations and standards that corporations are required to abide 
by in order to expand into new marketplaces. By addressing the issues that 
investors are most concerned with, the ICGRA will offer an opportunity for 
restoring investor confidence in the markets. 
 






